Paper 2016/926
LIZARD - A Lightweight Stream Cipher for Power-constrained Devices
Matthias Hamann, Matthias Krause, and Willi Meier
Abstract
Time-memory-data (TMD) tradeoff attacks limit the security level of many classical stream ciphers (like $E_0$, A5/1, Trivium, Grain) to $\frac{1}{2}n$, where $n$ denotes the inner state length of the underlying keystream generator. In this paper, we present LIZARD, a lightweight stream cipher for power-constrained devices like passive RFID tags. Its hardware efficiency results from combining a Grain-like design with the $FP(1)$-mode, a recently suggested construction principle for the state initialization of stream ciphers, which offers provable $\frac{2}{3}n$-security against TMD tradeoff attacks aiming at key recovery. LIZARD uses 120-bit keys, 64-bit IVs and has an inner state length of 121 bit. It is supposed to provide 80-bit security against key recovery attacks. LIZARD allows to generate up to $2^{18}$ keystream bits per key/IV pair, which would be sufficient for many existing communication scenarios like Bluetooth, WLAN or HTTPS.
Note: Camera-ready version for FSE 2017 (ToSC: Volume 2017, Issue 1)
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in FSE 2017
- Keywords
- Stream CiphersLightweight CryptographyTime-Memory-Data Tradeoff AttacksFP(1)-modeGrainRFID
- Contact author(s)
- hamann @ uni-mannheim de
- History
- 2017-02-24: revised
- 2016-09-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/926
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/926, author = {Matthias Hamann and Matthias Krause and Willi Meier}, title = {{LIZARD} - A Lightweight Stream Cipher for Power-constrained Devices}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/926}, year = {2016}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/926} }