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The Demand for Police

Author

Listed:
  • Jeffrey I. Chapman

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the estimation of a demand schedule for a public service–police protection. The paper's object is to determine the wage elasticity of demand for policemen, since if police demand is wage-inelastic, then police unions could have a powerful future. The paper follows a simple public choice framework by postulating a citizen utility function and income constraint in order to determine utility maximization conditions. It is shown that the quantity of policemen demanded–which was used as a proxy for police service–should be positively related to the citizen's income and wealth, and negatively related to the police wage. Further, other variables such as other government expenditures, crime rates, traffic congestion, and class status were also related to the police variable. The demand equation was estimated for a pooled, cross-sectional sample of California cities. Two-stage least squares was the estimation technique. Most of the signs of the significant variables were as anticipated. Especially interesting was the result that the demand for policemen is quite wage-inelastic.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey I. Chapman, 1976. "The Demand for Police," Public Finance Review, , vol. 4(2), pages 187-204, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:4:y:1976:i:2:p:187-204
    DOI: 10.1177/109114217600400205
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Sjoquist, David Lawrence, 1973. "Property Crime and Economic Behavior: Some Empirical Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 439-446, June.
    3. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    4. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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