NATO was taken by surprise by the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. No offi... more NATO was taken by surprise by the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. No official anticipated the speed with which the peaceful turmoil in central and eastern Europe took place. At the same time, while NATO discussed how to respond to those events, a major ethnic conflict exploded in the Balkans. Initial attempts were undertaken by the international community to contain the violence, first by the United Nations and later by NATO. In 1992, the UN security council authorized the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, the so-called protection force (UNPROFOR). This was a 38,5 9 9 -strong multinational force under chapter VI of the UN charter. The force was mandated to ensure the demilitarization of the three protected areas in Croatia as well as to provide safety for all persons in those zones. While NATO as an international organization was not part of UNPROFOR directly, most of its constituent states were and made troops and equipment available. The top three were France, 4493; the United Kingdom, 3405; and Canada, 2091. When UNPROFOR was unsuccessful in containing the violence in 1994, NATO took over that responsibility and assembled a considerable force to enforce peace in the Balkans.1 This mandate was in NATO's interest as the Balkan peninsula was in close proximity to NATO territory and thus posed a spillover threat. It also spoke to the new role of the alliance as a crisis manager in international security affairs post-1989. This is a role that NATO gave itself at the Rome summit in 1991.While NATO's peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo are well documented in the literature, the question of how the internal burden of NATO activities was shared post-1990 has not attracted much scholarship.2 This is a significant oversight for at least three reasons: first, the issue of NATO burden-sharing in the post-Cold War era remains controversial as larger member-states such as the US and the UK downsized their armed forces by up to 40 percent (see table 1 below) and put pressure on smaller states to increase their commitments to collective defence. Second, after 1989, geopolitical changes in the international security environment called into question the raison d'etre of NATO as a defence alliance. These forces of transformation also affected the perception of international threats, the meaning of security and power, and the role and functions of armed services.3 Historically, the amount of military equipment, the size of the armed forces, and the level of defence spending in relation to a country's GDP have been used as the primary indicators for measuring allied contributions to collective defence in the Cold War. However, these determinants, one might contend, have become outdated in the post-Cold War era. In addition, using these old indicators and applying them in a postCold War security environment may not adequately reflect the level of burden- sharing of the alliance's smaller member- states. Canada is one of those countries and has been criticized for not doing enough for the alliance. And finally, an analysis of the share of burdens and commitments to the alliance in the 1990s by each member-state can be seen as vital to full comprehension of the extent of NATO's current role in and pledges to Afghanistan. In other words, an examination of the 1990s gives one a better understanding of member- states' commitments to the current mission in Afghanistan.Against this backdrop, this article asks the following questions: what was the distribution of the Atlantic burden between 1989 and 2001?4 More specifically, what was the level of burden that Canada - as a medium-sized NATO country - shouldered in NATO in the 1990s?In the Canadian foreign policy literature, it has been suggested that in the 1990s Canada became the "slacker of transatlantica," especially after the government decided to close its two forward-operating bases in Germany in 1994. …
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Jul 1, 2011
One of the main priorities of Stephen Harper’s government since it came to power in 2006 has been... more One of the main priorities of Stephen Harper’s government since it came to power in 2006 has been to preserve what it defines as «A Safe and Secure Canada.» Thus, it has remained in line with the radical security measures adopted by his predecessor following the September 11 attacks, turning them into a central and sustained feature of the country’s policy but also breaking up with the traditional representations of Canada as being less belligerent than its southern neighbour. This volume, which has emerged from discussions held during the September 25, 2009 conference on Canada’s «Security, Identity(ies) and Territory(ies)» (Universite Stendhal – Grenoble 3), presents the thoughts of eight researchers from a wide variety of backgrounds and disciplines, who have reflected upon the consequences of Canada’s security policy. Ten years after September 11, it attests to the issues that are still directly or indirectly linked to the attacks, but also to Canada’s new areas of concern in terms of security. Depuis son arrivee au pouvoir en 2006, l’une des priorites du gouvernement de Stephen Harper a ete de preserver ce qu’il definit comme «A Safe and Secure Canada», poursuivant un virage securitaire amorce par son predecesseur suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et instaurant ainsi dans la duree une politique qui semble rompre avec les representations traditionnelles d’un Canada moins belliqueux que son voisin americain. A partir d’une discussion amorcee lors de la journee d’etudes « Securite, Identite(s) et Territoire(s) » du 25 septembre 2009 (Universite Stendhal – Grenoble 3), cet ouvrage presente les reflexions de huit chercheurs de disciplines et d’horizons tres differents qui se sont interroges sur les consequences de cette politique. Dix ans apres le 11 septembre, il fait etat des enjeux qui sont encore directement ou indirectement lies a cet evenement, mais aussi des nouvelles preoccupations du Canada en matiere de securite.
At present, our knowledge about the mechanisms of party-voter linkage in Africa is very limited. ... more At present, our knowledge about the mechanisms of party-voter linkage in Africa is very limited. There are very few systematic studies in this field and we know next to nothing about what parties in Africa really do and how they function internally. This poses a number of challenges to the project at hand.
Over the past two decades, we have seen a significant rise in the popularity of the concept of re... more Over the past two decades, we have seen a significant rise in the popularity of the concept of resilience, especially in the academy where the concept of resilience is known for its interdisciplinarity (Man yena, 2006; Welsh, 2014; Chandy, 2015) and informing policies dealing with developmental, social, economic, security and environmental problems in fragile states. As Seville (2008: 1) notes, resilience has become “the new black” as it continues to crop up in a wide-range of discussions across the literature. In other words resilience is a central concept in the field of international development that studies the factors that lead states to become fragile or even failed, as well as how to make states more resilient towards external shocks like natural disasters, economic crises or general (geo-)political instability (Gaillard, 2010). In many ways, one might argue, the literature considers state fragility as the opposite to resilience (Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014).
1. European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in Operation? Peter Schmidt and Benjamin Zyla EURO... more 1. European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in Operation? Peter Schmidt and Benjamin Zyla EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 2. 'Let's Call the Whole Thing Off'? Security Culture as Strategic Culture David G. Haglund 3. EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End Per M. Norheim-Martinsen 4. Strategic Culture and the Common Security and Defense Policy: A Classical Realist Assessment and Critique Sten Rynning TESTING STRATEGIC CULTURE: MILITARY OPERATIONS 5. From Words to Deeds: Strategic Culure and the European Union's Balkan Military Missions Charles C. Pentland 6. EU's Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Culture, Interests and Games Peter Schmidt 7. The Failure of a European Strategic Culture: EUFOR CHAD: The Last of its kind? Jean Yves Haine TESTING STRATEGIC CULTURE: CIVILIAN OPERATIONS 8. In Search of aTtrademark: EU Civilian Operations in Africa Reinhardt Rummel 9. Putting Ideas into Action: EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Western Balkans Arnold H. Kammel CONNECTING: THE EU, UN AND NATO 10. Strategic Culture and Multilateralism: The interplay of the EU and the UN in conflict and crisis management Ingo Peters 11. Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-)Culture Benjamin Zyla
In choosing not to free ride while the United States was in Afghani-stan, second-tier powers like... more In choosing not to free ride while the United States was in Afghani-stan, second-tier powers like Canada challenge conventional accounts of military burden sharing. To elucidate the puzzle posed by excessive military contributions, the article considers two explanatory factors: alliance value and status seeking. We pair them with insights on elite consensus to explain Canadas desire to have a large role in the war in Afghanistan. We argue that it is expected to support U.S.-led military operations and contributes more than its relative power if it seeks recognition of an elevated status by valued alliance members. Absent elite consensus, however, state executives may have difficulty implementing their status enhancement objectives. We further demonstrate the value of our reasoning by confronting it with the ever-increasing factor of threat perceptions. We conclude by stressing that ideational motivations for intra-alliance burden sharing pose a serious challenge to conventional accounts of state contributions to U.S.-led military interventions.
During the Cold War, the American-European relationship was referred to as the “West. ” It was, f... more During the Cold War, the American-European relationship was referred to as the “West. ” It was, for example, institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the first formal transatlantic military alliance ever.2 While the Cold War was proceeding and the threat of Russian forces marching into Western Europe was still imminent, the West used NATO’s military structures and capabilities to contain the Russians. Some people argued “there was no more durable symbol of the West than the transatlantic relationship ” (Asmus, 2003: 20-31). In this sense, the NATO alliance marked the institutionalization of the transatlantic relationship and helped managing the balance of power in Europe. In fact, there has never been such a sturdy relationship in world power over the past half century as the transatlantic alliance constructed by the United States. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, however, changed the meaning of the symbol “West ” as well as the nature of inter...
NATO was taken by surprise by the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. No offi... more NATO was taken by surprise by the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. No official anticipated the speed with which the peaceful turmoil in central and eastern Europe took place. At the same time, while NATO discussed how to respond to those events, a major ethnic conflict exploded in the Balkans. Initial attempts were undertaken by the international community to contain the violence, first by the United Nations and later by NATO. In 1992, the UN security council authorized the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, the so-called protection force (UNPROFOR). This was a 38,5 9 9 -strong multinational force under chapter VI of the UN charter. The force was mandated to ensure the demilitarization of the three protected areas in Croatia as well as to provide safety for all persons in those zones. While NATO as an international organization was not part of UNPROFOR directly, most of its constituent states were and made troops and equipment available. The top three were France, 4493; the United Kingdom, 3405; and Canada, 2091. When UNPROFOR was unsuccessful in containing the violence in 1994, NATO took over that responsibility and assembled a considerable force to enforce peace in the Balkans.1 This mandate was in NATO's interest as the Balkan peninsula was in close proximity to NATO territory and thus posed a spillover threat. It also spoke to the new role of the alliance as a crisis manager in international security affairs post-1989. This is a role that NATO gave itself at the Rome summit in 1991.While NATO's peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo are well documented in the literature, the question of how the internal burden of NATO activities was shared post-1990 has not attracted much scholarship.2 This is a significant oversight for at least three reasons: first, the issue of NATO burden-sharing in the post-Cold War era remains controversial as larger member-states such as the US and the UK downsized their armed forces by up to 40 percent (see table 1 below) and put pressure on smaller states to increase their commitments to collective defence. Second, after 1989, geopolitical changes in the international security environment called into question the raison d'etre of NATO as a defence alliance. These forces of transformation also affected the perception of international threats, the meaning of security and power, and the role and functions of armed services.3 Historically, the amount of military equipment, the size of the armed forces, and the level of defence spending in relation to a country's GDP have been used as the primary indicators for measuring allied contributions to collective defence in the Cold War. However, these determinants, one might contend, have become outdated in the post-Cold War era. In addition, using these old indicators and applying them in a postCold War security environment may not adequately reflect the level of burden- sharing of the alliance's smaller member- states. Canada is one of those countries and has been criticized for not doing enough for the alliance. And finally, an analysis of the share of burdens and commitments to the alliance in the 1990s by each member-state can be seen as vital to full comprehension of the extent of NATO's current role in and pledges to Afghanistan. In other words, an examination of the 1990s gives one a better understanding of member- states' commitments to the current mission in Afghanistan.Against this backdrop, this article asks the following questions: what was the distribution of the Atlantic burden between 1989 and 2001?4 More specifically, what was the level of burden that Canada - as a medium-sized NATO country - shouldered in NATO in the 1990s?In the Canadian foreign policy literature, it has been suggested that in the 1990s Canada became the "slacker of transatlantica," especially after the government decided to close its two forward-operating bases in Germany in 1994. …
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Jul 1, 2011
One of the main priorities of Stephen Harper’s government since it came to power in 2006 has been... more One of the main priorities of Stephen Harper’s government since it came to power in 2006 has been to preserve what it defines as «A Safe and Secure Canada.» Thus, it has remained in line with the radical security measures adopted by his predecessor following the September 11 attacks, turning them into a central and sustained feature of the country’s policy but also breaking up with the traditional representations of Canada as being less belligerent than its southern neighbour. This volume, which has emerged from discussions held during the September 25, 2009 conference on Canada’s «Security, Identity(ies) and Territory(ies)» (Universite Stendhal – Grenoble 3), presents the thoughts of eight researchers from a wide variety of backgrounds and disciplines, who have reflected upon the consequences of Canada’s security policy. Ten years after September 11, it attests to the issues that are still directly or indirectly linked to the attacks, but also to Canada’s new areas of concern in terms of security. Depuis son arrivee au pouvoir en 2006, l’une des priorites du gouvernement de Stephen Harper a ete de preserver ce qu’il definit comme «A Safe and Secure Canada», poursuivant un virage securitaire amorce par son predecesseur suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et instaurant ainsi dans la duree une politique qui semble rompre avec les representations traditionnelles d’un Canada moins belliqueux que son voisin americain. A partir d’une discussion amorcee lors de la journee d’etudes « Securite, Identite(s) et Territoire(s) » du 25 septembre 2009 (Universite Stendhal – Grenoble 3), cet ouvrage presente les reflexions de huit chercheurs de disciplines et d’horizons tres differents qui se sont interroges sur les consequences de cette politique. Dix ans apres le 11 septembre, il fait etat des enjeux qui sont encore directement ou indirectement lies a cet evenement, mais aussi des nouvelles preoccupations du Canada en matiere de securite.
At present, our knowledge about the mechanisms of party-voter linkage in Africa is very limited. ... more At present, our knowledge about the mechanisms of party-voter linkage in Africa is very limited. There are very few systematic studies in this field and we know next to nothing about what parties in Africa really do and how they function internally. This poses a number of challenges to the project at hand.
Over the past two decades, we have seen a significant rise in the popularity of the concept of re... more Over the past two decades, we have seen a significant rise in the popularity of the concept of resilience, especially in the academy where the concept of resilience is known for its interdisciplinarity (Man yena, 2006; Welsh, 2014; Chandy, 2015) and informing policies dealing with developmental, social, economic, security and environmental problems in fragile states. As Seville (2008: 1) notes, resilience has become “the new black” as it continues to crop up in a wide-range of discussions across the literature. In other words resilience is a central concept in the field of international development that studies the factors that lead states to become fragile or even failed, as well as how to make states more resilient towards external shocks like natural disasters, economic crises or general (geo-)political instability (Gaillard, 2010). In many ways, one might argue, the literature considers state fragility as the opposite to resilience (Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014).
1. European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in Operation? Peter Schmidt and Benjamin Zyla EURO... more 1. European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in Operation? Peter Schmidt and Benjamin Zyla EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 2. 'Let's Call the Whole Thing Off'? Security Culture as Strategic Culture David G. Haglund 3. EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End Per M. Norheim-Martinsen 4. Strategic Culture and the Common Security and Defense Policy: A Classical Realist Assessment and Critique Sten Rynning TESTING STRATEGIC CULTURE: MILITARY OPERATIONS 5. From Words to Deeds: Strategic Culure and the European Union's Balkan Military Missions Charles C. Pentland 6. EU's Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Culture, Interests and Games Peter Schmidt 7. The Failure of a European Strategic Culture: EUFOR CHAD: The Last of its kind? Jean Yves Haine TESTING STRATEGIC CULTURE: CIVILIAN OPERATIONS 8. In Search of aTtrademark: EU Civilian Operations in Africa Reinhardt Rummel 9. Putting Ideas into Action: EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Western Balkans Arnold H. Kammel CONNECTING: THE EU, UN AND NATO 10. Strategic Culture and Multilateralism: The interplay of the EU and the UN in conflict and crisis management Ingo Peters 11. Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-)Culture Benjamin Zyla
In choosing not to free ride while the United States was in Afghani-stan, second-tier powers like... more In choosing not to free ride while the United States was in Afghani-stan, second-tier powers like Canada challenge conventional accounts of military burden sharing. To elucidate the puzzle posed by excessive military contributions, the article considers two explanatory factors: alliance value and status seeking. We pair them with insights on elite consensus to explain Canadas desire to have a large role in the war in Afghanistan. We argue that it is expected to support U.S.-led military operations and contributes more than its relative power if it seeks recognition of an elevated status by valued alliance members. Absent elite consensus, however, state executives may have difficulty implementing their status enhancement objectives. We further demonstrate the value of our reasoning by confronting it with the ever-increasing factor of threat perceptions. We conclude by stressing that ideational motivations for intra-alliance burden sharing pose a serious challenge to conventional accounts of state contributions to U.S.-led military interventions.
During the Cold War, the American-European relationship was referred to as the “West. ” It was, f... more During the Cold War, the American-European relationship was referred to as the “West. ” It was, for example, institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the first formal transatlantic military alliance ever.2 While the Cold War was proceeding and the threat of Russian forces marching into Western Europe was still imminent, the West used NATO’s military structures and capabilities to contain the Russians. Some people argued “there was no more durable symbol of the West than the transatlantic relationship ” (Asmus, 2003: 20-31). In this sense, the NATO alliance marked the institutionalization of the transatlantic relationship and helped managing the balance of power in Europe. In fact, there has never been such a sturdy relationship in world power over the past half century as the transatlantic alliance constructed by the United States. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, however, changed the meaning of the symbol “West ” as well as the nature of inter...
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