This archive contains replication data and the supplemental appendix for the article: Stinnett, D... more This archive contains replication data and the supplemental appendix for the article: Stinnett, Douglas, Bryan Early, Cale Horne, and Johannes Karreth. 2011. "Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls." International Studies Perspectives 12 (3), 308-326. We provide original data for the nonproliferation export control systems of 30 randomly selected countries, measured in multiple dimensions.
How do international institutions affect trade with sanctioned states? Despite the central role p... more How do international institutions affect trade with sanctioned states? Despite the central role played by international institutions in theories of sanctions success, little is actually known about the direct effects they have on state behavior. This paper explores the effects that institutional membership and institutional sanctions have on states’ proclivity to sanctions-bust. We test the literature’s assumption that international institutions’ sanctions are capable of preventing their members from undercutting sanctioning efforts by trading heavily with the sanctions’ target. We test this hypothesis and others via an analysis of the trade conducted with the targets of 164 sanctions episodes from 1950-2004 and the role played by five different international institutions. Surprisingly, we find only weak evidence that institutional sanctions actually reduce their members’ likelihoods of sanctions-busting and no evidence that U.N. sanctions do. We also find that members of the Europe...
In September 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives ... more In September 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which were unilateral measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals to date. Despite their eventual success, the United States took on significant risks in launching the PNIs. To uncover the best theoretical explanation for their onset, this article uses realism, neorealism, the bureaucratic politics model, expected utility theory, and prospect theory to generate ex ante predictions regarding nuclear arms control at the end of the Cold War. It then tests the theories’ predictions against the empirical record. The results suggest that a focus on an individual decision maker—President Bush—is necessary to fully understand the PNIs and that an explanation rooted in prospect theory offers the most explanatory power. This study speaks to an important debate in discipline regarding the significance of individuals, while underscoring the...
ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflic... more ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflicts but not in others? While previous studies have examined aspects of the causes and consequences of child soldier usage, to date there has never been a comprehensive empirical analysis that has examined their worldwide usage. In this study, we develop a theory that explains the use of child soldiers as a tactical military innovation that rebel groups have greater incentives and abilities to adopt as compared to governments. As we argue, however, governments’ incentives and ability to adopt child soldiers increase dramatically if rebels adopt the tactic. According to our theory, the decision to adopt child soldiers by governments and rebel groups will be primarily driven by tactical considerations rather than the socio-demographic factors typically highlighted in the literature. To test our theory, we collected global data on the usage of child soldiers by governments and rebel groups in 109 internal armed conflicts from 1987-2007. This new data shows that governments and rebels employed child soldiers in 45% of the internal armed conflicts that took place during this period, whereas governments were the only party to employ them in 10% of the cases and rebels were the only part to do so in 26% of the cases. Our analysis of these cases using binomial and multinomial estimation techniques reveal strong support for our tactically-driven explanation of child soldier usage, especially compared to the rival socio-demographic account. Our findings have salient implications for how this problem should be understood and the policy measures that may be effective in diminishing its occurrence.
ABSTRACT Ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are complementary technologies that dramatically ... more ABSTRACT Ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are complementary technologies that dramatically enhance each other’s strategic utility. To date, explanations of how these military technologies proliferate have largely considered their developmental paths as separate from one another. In this study, we argue that mastering missile technology provides states with significant advantages in acquiring nuclear weapons. Both missile programs and nuclear weapons programs are costly, scientifically challenging endeavors that require the mastery of a significant body of tacit knowledge. However, missile programs are less expensive, less risky, and pose lower scientific entry barriers compared to nuclear programs. By investing in the mastery of rocket technology, states cultivate scientific-military industrial complexes (SMICs) that increase the research infrastructure and scientific and technical human capital within their countries that can also aid in nuclear weapons acquisition efforts. Furthermore, such programs provide governments with cross-applicable experience in managing expansive, interdisciplinary weapons acquisition projects. Lastly, military rocketry SMICs have significant incentives to lobby on behalf of acquiring nuclear weapons, which could spur significant additional investments in their own programs. We test our theory with a large-n analysis of the factors affecting the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 154 countries from 1945-2000. Our results provide strong support for our theory, demonstrating that mature military rocketry programs substantially contribute to countries’ ability to acquire nuclear weapons.
ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflic... more ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflicts but not in others? While previous studies have examined aspects of the causes and consequences of child soldier usage, to date there has never been a comprehensive empirical analysis that has examined their worldwide usage. In this study, we develop a theory that explains the use of child soldiers as a tactical military innovation that rebel groups have greater incentives and abilities to adopt as compared to governments. As we argue, however, governments’ incentives and ability to adopt child soldiers increase dramatically if rebels adopt the tactic. According to our theory, the decision to adopt child soldiers by governments and rebel groups will be primarily driven by tactical considerations rather than the socio-demographic factors typically highlighted in the literature. To test our theory, we collected global data on the usage of child soldiers by governments and rebel groups in 109 internal armed conflicts from 1987-2007. This new data shows that governments and rebels employed child soldiers in 45% of the internal armed conflicts that took place during this period, whereas governments were the only party to employ them in 10% of the cases and rebels were the only part to do so in 26% of the cases. Our analysis of these cases using binomial and multinomial estimation techniques reveal strong support for our tactically-driven explanation of child soldier usage, especially compared to the rival socio-demographic account. Our findings have salient implications for how this problem should be understood and the policy measures that may be effective in diminishing its occurrence.
ABSTRACT This article draws upon recent findings from the field of neuroscience to explore how lo... more ABSTRACT This article draws upon recent findings from the field of neuroscience to explore how loss aversion affects foreign policy resolve. We theorize that U.S. policy makers are more resolute in pursuing preventive policies that seek to avoid losses than they are in pursuing promotive policies that seek to acquire new gains. To test our theory, we conduct the first large‐n analysis of foreign policy hypotheses derived from the neuroscience of loss aversion using data from 100 cases of U.S.‐initiated Section 301 trade disputes. The results provide strong support for the loss‐aversion‐based theory, revealing that American policy makers are willing to fight harder and hold out longer in trade disputes with preventive objectives than they are in cases with promotive ones. Our study demonstrates that hypotheses derived from neuroscientific findings can be tested using large‐n techniques in study of foreign policy, revealing a new avenue of inquiry within the field.
ABSTRACT The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 2004 reflects an emerging... more ABSTRACT The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 2004 reflects an emerging consensus that more should be done by the international community to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. UNSCR 1540 articulates a universal, legally binding obligation for all states to confront proliferation by adopting effective export control systems. To date, however, there have been no attempts to systematically analyze compliance with this new obligation, making it impossible to assess the success of this measure and the underlying causes of any shortcomings. This study addresses this by conducting a systematic empirical analysis of state compliance with UNSCR 1540. Drawing upon theories of compliance with international law, we investigate two distinct explanations for variation in the degree to which states adopt nonproliferation export controls: one based on state interests and enforcement and the other based on state capacity. Our statistical tests of these theories use a new, cross-national data set detailing the nonproliferation policies of 30 states. The empirical results indicate that compliance with international nonproliferation obligations is influenced most by a state’s economic and governmental capacities and has little to do with interest-based factors. These findings suggest that capacity-building programs are the best option for improving the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and of nonproliferation efforts in general.
This archive contains replication data and the supplemental appendix for the article: Stinnett, D... more This archive contains replication data and the supplemental appendix for the article: Stinnett, Douglas, Bryan Early, Cale Horne, and Johannes Karreth. 2011. "Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls." International Studies Perspectives 12 (3), 308-326. We provide original data for the nonproliferation export control systems of 30 randomly selected countries, measured in multiple dimensions.
How do international institutions affect trade with sanctioned states? Despite the central role p... more How do international institutions affect trade with sanctioned states? Despite the central role played by international institutions in theories of sanctions success, little is actually known about the direct effects they have on state behavior. This paper explores the effects that institutional membership and institutional sanctions have on states’ proclivity to sanctions-bust. We test the literature’s assumption that international institutions’ sanctions are capable of preventing their members from undercutting sanctioning efforts by trading heavily with the sanctions’ target. We test this hypothesis and others via an analysis of the trade conducted with the targets of 164 sanctions episodes from 1950-2004 and the role played by five different international institutions. Surprisingly, we find only weak evidence that institutional sanctions actually reduce their members’ likelihoods of sanctions-busting and no evidence that U.N. sanctions do. We also find that members of the Europe...
In September 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives ... more In September 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which were unilateral measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals to date. Despite their eventual success, the United States took on significant risks in launching the PNIs. To uncover the best theoretical explanation for their onset, this article uses realism, neorealism, the bureaucratic politics model, expected utility theory, and prospect theory to generate ex ante predictions regarding nuclear arms control at the end of the Cold War. It then tests the theories’ predictions against the empirical record. The results suggest that a focus on an individual decision maker—President Bush—is necessary to fully understand the PNIs and that an explanation rooted in prospect theory offers the most explanatory power. This study speaks to an important debate in discipline regarding the significance of individuals, while underscoring the...
ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflic... more ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflicts but not in others? While previous studies have examined aspects of the causes and consequences of child soldier usage, to date there has never been a comprehensive empirical analysis that has examined their worldwide usage. In this study, we develop a theory that explains the use of child soldiers as a tactical military innovation that rebel groups have greater incentives and abilities to adopt as compared to governments. As we argue, however, governments’ incentives and ability to adopt child soldiers increase dramatically if rebels adopt the tactic. According to our theory, the decision to adopt child soldiers by governments and rebel groups will be primarily driven by tactical considerations rather than the socio-demographic factors typically highlighted in the literature. To test our theory, we collected global data on the usage of child soldiers by governments and rebel groups in 109 internal armed conflicts from 1987-2007. This new data shows that governments and rebels employed child soldiers in 45% of the internal armed conflicts that took place during this period, whereas governments were the only party to employ them in 10% of the cases and rebels were the only part to do so in 26% of the cases. Our analysis of these cases using binomial and multinomial estimation techniques reveal strong support for our tactically-driven explanation of child soldier usage, especially compared to the rival socio-demographic account. Our findings have salient implications for how this problem should be understood and the policy measures that may be effective in diminishing its occurrence.
ABSTRACT Ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are complementary technologies that dramatically ... more ABSTRACT Ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are complementary technologies that dramatically enhance each other’s strategic utility. To date, explanations of how these military technologies proliferate have largely considered their developmental paths as separate from one another. In this study, we argue that mastering missile technology provides states with significant advantages in acquiring nuclear weapons. Both missile programs and nuclear weapons programs are costly, scientifically challenging endeavors that require the mastery of a significant body of tacit knowledge. However, missile programs are less expensive, less risky, and pose lower scientific entry barriers compared to nuclear programs. By investing in the mastery of rocket technology, states cultivate scientific-military industrial complexes (SMICs) that increase the research infrastructure and scientific and technical human capital within their countries that can also aid in nuclear weapons acquisition efforts. Furthermore, such programs provide governments with cross-applicable experience in managing expansive, interdisciplinary weapons acquisition projects. Lastly, military rocketry SMICs have significant incentives to lobby on behalf of acquiring nuclear weapons, which could spur significant additional investments in their own programs. We test our theory with a large-n analysis of the factors affecting the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 154 countries from 1945-2000. Our results provide strong support for our theory, demonstrating that mature military rocketry programs substantially contribute to countries’ ability to acquire nuclear weapons.
ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflic... more ABSTRACT Why do governments and rebel groups employ child soldiers in some internal armed conflicts but not in others? While previous studies have examined aspects of the causes and consequences of child soldier usage, to date there has never been a comprehensive empirical analysis that has examined their worldwide usage. In this study, we develop a theory that explains the use of child soldiers as a tactical military innovation that rebel groups have greater incentives and abilities to adopt as compared to governments. As we argue, however, governments’ incentives and ability to adopt child soldiers increase dramatically if rebels adopt the tactic. According to our theory, the decision to adopt child soldiers by governments and rebel groups will be primarily driven by tactical considerations rather than the socio-demographic factors typically highlighted in the literature. To test our theory, we collected global data on the usage of child soldiers by governments and rebel groups in 109 internal armed conflicts from 1987-2007. This new data shows that governments and rebels employed child soldiers in 45% of the internal armed conflicts that took place during this period, whereas governments were the only party to employ them in 10% of the cases and rebels were the only part to do so in 26% of the cases. Our analysis of these cases using binomial and multinomial estimation techniques reveal strong support for our tactically-driven explanation of child soldier usage, especially compared to the rival socio-demographic account. Our findings have salient implications for how this problem should be understood and the policy measures that may be effective in diminishing its occurrence.
ABSTRACT This article draws upon recent findings from the field of neuroscience to explore how lo... more ABSTRACT This article draws upon recent findings from the field of neuroscience to explore how loss aversion affects foreign policy resolve. We theorize that U.S. policy makers are more resolute in pursuing preventive policies that seek to avoid losses than they are in pursuing promotive policies that seek to acquire new gains. To test our theory, we conduct the first large‐n analysis of foreign policy hypotheses derived from the neuroscience of loss aversion using data from 100 cases of U.S.‐initiated Section 301 trade disputes. The results provide strong support for the loss‐aversion‐based theory, revealing that American policy makers are willing to fight harder and hold out longer in trade disputes with preventive objectives than they are in cases with promotive ones. Our study demonstrates that hypotheses derived from neuroscientific findings can be tested using large‐n techniques in study of foreign policy, revealing a new avenue of inquiry within the field.
ABSTRACT The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 2004 reflects an emerging... more ABSTRACT The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 2004 reflects an emerging consensus that more should be done by the international community to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. UNSCR 1540 articulates a universal, legally binding obligation for all states to confront proliferation by adopting effective export control systems. To date, however, there have been no attempts to systematically analyze compliance with this new obligation, making it impossible to assess the success of this measure and the underlying causes of any shortcomings. This study addresses this by conducting a systematic empirical analysis of state compliance with UNSCR 1540. Drawing upon theories of compliance with international law, we investigate two distinct explanations for variation in the degree to which states adopt nonproliferation export controls: one based on state interests and enforcement and the other based on state capacity. Our statistical tests of these theories use a new, cross-national data set detailing the nonproliferation policies of 30 states. The empirical results indicate that compliance with international nonproliferation obligations is influenced most by a state’s economic and governmental capacities and has little to do with interest-based factors. These findings suggest that capacity-building programs are the best option for improving the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and of nonproliferation efforts in general.
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