This paper presents the results of an experimental study that tests whether both arousal and comp... more This paper presents the results of an experimental study that tests whether both arousal and competence affect psychic payoffs, and if so, are the effects independent or interactive. We determine that both do affect psychic payoffs and that the effects are independent of each other. We conclude that emotional arousal is an important omitted variable in many competence models that powerfully affects psychic payoffs.
ABSTRACT This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing theory and evidence on ... more ABSTRACT This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing theory and evidence on how the performance measurement process influences subordinate’s intrinsic incentives. The study investigates competing theories concerned with the research question of how subordinate’s performance measure preference and superior’s performance measure choice influence subordinate’s intrinsic bonus and penalty incentives associated with favorable performance outcomes. This study uses a field experiment and a behavioral economic method to control extrinsic incentives and to monetize the intrinsic incentive. Performance measure preference and choice are found to interactively influence intrinsic bonus and penalty incentives in a way that is consistent with self-determination theory and the enabling and coercive roles of accounting but not with attribution theory. Subsequent analysis reveals performance measure preference and choice influence intrinsic incentives by influencing subject’s sense of personal agency and skill but not by providing information or reducing uncertainty.
... Jacob G. Birnberg Robert W. Murphy Jr. Professor of Management Control Systems University of ... more ... Jacob G. Birnberg Robert W. Murphy Jr. Professor of Management Control Systems University of Pittsburgh birnberg@katz.pitt.edu Michael D. Shields Eli Broad Professor of Accounting Michigan State University shields@msu.edu November 2005 ...
Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align... more Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align incentives. As a result the free-rider problem can emerge. This paper presents two experiments in which dominant incentives to free ride were held constant. The first experiment examined the question of whether aligning accounting report structure and team structure in such a way as to create a “group frame” helps to mitigate the free-rider problem. Accounting report structure was found to complement team structure. When properly aligned, accounting and team structures helped to resolve the free-rider problem interactively by operating as a powerful group framing device. The second experiment provides theory-consistent evidence that people outside the teams (subjects who acted as management control system designers) fail to appreciate how powerfully the design of accounting and team structures influence performance within teams. Finally, the study provides additional insight into the ro...
Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align... more Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align incentives. As a result the free-rider problem can emerge. This paper presents two experiments in which dominant incentives to free ride were held constant. The first experiment examined the question of whether aligning accounting report structure and team structure in such a way as to create a “group frame” helps to mitigate the free-rider problem. Accounting report structure was found to complement team structure. When properly aligned, accounting and team structures helped to resolve the free-rider problem interactively by operating as a powerful group framing device. The second experiment provides theory-consistent evidence that people outside the teams (subjects who acted as management control system designers) fail to appreciate how powerfully the design of accounting and team structures influence performance within teams. Finally, the study provides additional insight into the ro...
This paper presents the results of an experimental study that tests whether both arousal and comp... more This paper presents the results of an experimental study that tests whether both arousal and competence affect psychic payoffs, and if so, are the effects independent or interactive. We determine that both do affect psychic payoffs and that the effects are independent of each other. We conclude that emotional arousal is an important omitted variable in many competence models that powerfully affects psychic payoffs.
ABSTRACT This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing theory and evidence on ... more ABSTRACT This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing theory and evidence on how the performance measurement process influences subordinate’s intrinsic incentives. The study investigates competing theories concerned with the research question of how subordinate’s performance measure preference and superior’s performance measure choice influence subordinate’s intrinsic bonus and penalty incentives associated with favorable performance outcomes. This study uses a field experiment and a behavioral economic method to control extrinsic incentives and to monetize the intrinsic incentive. Performance measure preference and choice are found to interactively influence intrinsic bonus and penalty incentives in a way that is consistent with self-determination theory and the enabling and coercive roles of accounting but not with attribution theory. Subsequent analysis reveals performance measure preference and choice influence intrinsic incentives by influencing subject’s sense of personal agency and skill but not by providing information or reducing uncertainty.
... Jacob G. Birnberg Robert W. Murphy Jr. Professor of Management Control Systems University of ... more ... Jacob G. Birnberg Robert W. Murphy Jr. Professor of Management Control Systems University of Pittsburgh birnberg@katz.pitt.edu Michael D. Shields Eli Broad Professor of Accounting Michigan State University shields@msu.edu November 2005 ...
Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align... more Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align incentives. As a result the free-rider problem can emerge. This paper presents two experiments in which dominant incentives to free ride were held constant. The first experiment examined the question of whether aligning accounting report structure and team structure in such a way as to create a “group frame” helps to mitigate the free-rider problem. Accounting report structure was found to complement team structure. When properly aligned, accounting and team structures helped to resolve the free-rider problem interactively by operating as a powerful group framing device. The second experiment provides theory-consistent evidence that people outside the teams (subjects who acted as management control system designers) fail to appreciate how powerfully the design of accounting and team structures influence performance within teams. Finally, the study provides additional insight into the ro...
Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align... more Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align incentives. As a result the free-rider problem can emerge. This paper presents two experiments in which dominant incentives to free ride were held constant. The first experiment examined the question of whether aligning accounting report structure and team structure in such a way as to create a “group frame” helps to mitigate the free-rider problem. Accounting report structure was found to complement team structure. When properly aligned, accounting and team structures helped to resolve the free-rider problem interactively by operating as a powerful group framing device. The second experiment provides theory-consistent evidence that people outside the teams (subjects who acted as management control system designers) fail to appreciate how powerfully the design of accounting and team structures influence performance within teams. Finally, the study provides additional insight into the ro...
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