Dennis Hirota

Although the notion of attaining shinjin 信心 in Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1263) constitutes the central, most distinctive element of his Pure Land path and offers significant resources for exploring a Japanese Buddhist view of human existence, it is often construed, both in the traditional Shin Buddhist (Jōdo shinshū 浄土真宗) scholasticism in Japan and in the modern West, in terms of a commonsense notion of faith as belief or creedal assent. This article is intended to suggest that a new, more apposite and fruitful paradigm for a contemporary understanding of what Shinran terms “the attaining of shinjin” may be brought to light by examining various aspects of his teaching in comparison with elements of the thought of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Such a revised understanding of shinjin would suggest not merely a different view of one among a number of Shinran’s key concepts, but a viable way of recasting the basic concerns of his thought and writings as a whole. Despite the vast differences in t...

This article explores Shinran's conception of practice by taking up the question of why nembutsu as the saying of the Name of Amida should be the  single act designated by the Buddha as constituting the requisite practice in accord with the Primal Vow. Passing reference is made to the thinking of Martin Heidegger on language to suggest ways of understanding Shinran's discussions of the Name and also avenues for possible comparative reflections.

Shinran is widely recognized as one of the most original and seminal figures in the Japanese intellectual tradition. His importance in the Buddhist tradition turns on his insight into the recalcitrance of self-attachment even in religious discipline and on his self-reflective exploration of unenlightened, conditioned existence in vigorous engagement with the Buddhist path. These enable him to trace, from an existential perspective, the nonduality of the karmically created and the uncreated that is taught to characterize wisdom or reality in Mahayana tradition. The pivotal themes of his thought—self-will or “self-power” (jiriki), “calculative thinking” (hakarai), the linguisticality of human existence, “provisional” and “true” hermeneutical modes of Buddhist engagement, temporality, “naturalness” or the self-giving of reality (jinen), and “the attainment of awakening by the person who is evil” (akunin jōbutsu)—resonate with several concerns of recent Western thought.

Gutoku Shinran 愚禿親鸞 (1173–1263) maintains his status today as one of the most consequential religious thinkers in Japanese history. The tradition stemming from his thought and teaching activity, Shin Buddhism (J. Jōdo Shinshū 浄土真宗), has been a significant force in Japanese society since the fifteenth century and remains one of the largest Buddhist movements in the world at present, with over twenty thousand temples in Japan and a century-old institutional presence in North America. His writings have been studied in a commentarial tradition going back to his early descendants in the fourteenth century, burgeoning during the Edo period, and continuing in recent times with prominent nonsectarian philosophers such as NISHIDA Kitarō西田幾多郎(1870–1945), SUZUKI Daisetsu 鈴木大拙 (1870–1966), TANABE Hajime 田辺元 (1885–1962), MIKI Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897–1945), and NISHITANI Keiji 西谷啓治 (1900–1990). Shinran’s concern in his writings is less to impart doctrinally validated teachings or methods of proper conduct than to articulate and enable a fundamental transformation of awareness. This is because it is precisely such an “overturning” of ordinary awareness and entry into a transformed mode of existence that signals the authentic encounter with enlightening activity that lies at the core of his Buddhist thought. His focal issues are, therefore, the nature of a person’s interaction with the Pure Land path and the distinction between provisional and genuine modes of engagement. He recognizes that it is usual for persons initially encountering Pure Land teachings to seek a coherent intellectual understanding of the doctrines from the perspective of the conventional self and to pursue means to assimilate the advantages of the path into their ongoing lives. Shinran, however, views such efforts as a continued assertion of the false discrimination and self-attachment that propel ordinary human life in anxious and painful existence. Thus, he seeks in his writings to precipitate a shift in apprehension that leads to authentic engagement with, and indeed itself arises from, the working of the Pure Land path. In other words, Shinran views the distinctive accessibility and effectiveness of Pure Land Buddhism as rooted in its transformative functioning within the realm of mundane, illusive thought and language. In this essay, I focus on aspects of reading Shinran, first taking up the overarching issues of Mahāyāna and Pure Land Buddhist thought that contextualize the basic problems in doctrinal understanding he feels compelled to address in his own writings. I then go on to consider the character of his methods of composition in formulating and communicating his own religious awareness. I close by highlighting several of the major philosophically relevant themes and issues in his thought.

attainment of shinjin and truth The primary issue regarding knowledge that Shinran (1173–1263) treats in his writings concerns the commonplace, “natural” presupposition that it is constituted by an ego-subject relating itself to stable objects in the world. From his stance within Buddhist tradition, Shinran identifies the crucial problem as the human tendency toward the reification of both sides of this dichotomy—resulting in an autonomous self and substantial things—with the consequent attachments fueling the afflictions (“blind passions”) of habitual pain and conflict for oneself and others. The focus of Shinran’s treatment of this basic Buddhist concern is the point of engagement with dharma or true reality. In this, he draws into the arena of religious faith the probing scrutiny of lingering attachments to self, even in the dedicated practitioner, that is fundamental to the critical attitude of Mahayana Buddhist tradition. My aim in taking up the issue of truth in my article “Shinran and Heidegger on Truth” in The Boundaries of Knowledge in Buddhism, Christianity, and Science 1 is to suggest a way of reading Shinran that both avoids a common pitfall that Shinran himself cautions against—an engagement with Pure Land teachings that adheres to the subject-object dichotomy of ordinary awareness—and opens up his vision to resonances with contemporary western thought, particularly continental philosophy. This latter concern is not to claim that Shinran adumbrates contemporary thought or is affirmed by resemblances, but rather seeks to cast light on compelling aspects of his thought not often treated in traditional Shin scholastics. There are, therefore, both therapeutic and constructive sides in my attempt to engage Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) thought from a perspective rooted in Shinran’s Buddhism. The pitfall in reading Shinran indicated in my article is crystallized in the assumption, prevalent in Western scholarship but also widely seen in Japan, that his Shin Buddhist path centers on a simple faith in the Pure Land teachings, with such faith understood as the subjective acceptance of the truth of doctrinal propositions. In

Shinran is widely recognized as one of the most original and seminal figures in the Japan ese intellectual tradition. His importance in the Buddhist tradition turns on his insight in to the recalcitrance of self-attachment even in religious discipline and on his self-reflec tive exploration of unenlightened, conditioned existence in vigorous engagement with the Buddhist path. These enable him to trace, from an existential perspective, the nonduality of the karmically created and the uncreated that is taught to characterize wisdom or real ity in Mahayana tradition. The pivotal themes of his thought-self-will or "selfpower" (jiriki), "calculative thinking" (hakarai), the linguisticality of human existence, "provisional" and "true" hermeneutical modes of Buddhist engagement, temporality, "nat uralness" or the self-giving of reality (jinen), and "the attainment of awakening by the person who is evil" (akunin jōbutsu)-resonate with several concerns of recent Western thought.

This article examines the Pure Land Buddhist thinker Shinran (1173–1263), from whose teachings the Shin Buddhist tradition emerged. Shinran's ideas provide an alternative model for considering moral judgments and issues related to violence. Since Shinran viewed violence as a mode of human action, the author asks how violence, whether inflicted or suffered, is to be understood by Shin Buddhists. This article further discusses how practitioners engaging the Pure Land path might deal with it, and the relevance of Shinran's understanding here and now. This line of inquiry expands to consider how Shinran's approach relates to norms used in modern discussions of violence. It scrutinizes the double structure of ethical awareness, discussing in particular how usual judgments of good and evil action can be contextualized and relativized. In the section dedicated to defusing the violence of ignorance, the author introduces Shinran's nonviolent, nonconfrontational response, and analyzes how Shinran recasts the Buddhist stories of Aj¯ ata´satru and A ˙ ngulim¯ ala in relation to his understanding of the " five grave offenses " —specifically murder and near matricide—usually understood as excluding practitioners from the benefits of Amida Buddha's Vows. The author shows that Shinran focuses on saving even the evil, not solely the worthy, thus rejecting the exclusion provision of the Eighteenth Vow.