International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 2009
Page 1. Chapter 9 Product Design, Pricing, and Capacity Investment in a Congested Production Syst... more Page 1. Chapter 9 Product Design, Pricing, and Capacity Investment in a Congested Production System Sergio Chayet, Panos Kouvelis, and Dennis Z. Yu Abstract We investigate a firm's product positioning and capacity investment ...
Page 1. Manufacturing Operations Manuscripts Published in the First 52 Issues of POM: Review, Tre... more Page 1. Manufacturing Operations Manuscripts Published in the First 52 Issues of POM: Review, Trends, and Opportunities Panos Kouvelis Chester Chambers Dennis Z. Yu Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. ...
We consider a centralized distribution network with multiple retailers who receive replenishment ... more We consider a centralized distribution network with multiple retailers who receive replenishment inventory to satisfy customer demand of the local markets. The operational flexibility of the network is defined as the opportunity that one retailer's excess inventory can be transferred to satisfy other retailers’ unmet customer demand due to stock-outs. A general modeling framework is developed to optimize retailers’ order
ABSTRACT We study a firm's joint decisions on product prices, delivery lead times, and ca... more ABSTRACT We study a firm's joint decisions on product prices, delivery lead times, and capacity investments of the production facility. We assume customers are strategic and heterogeneous in their sensitivity to waiting. The firm can offer a single service to all customers or two services with different delivery lead times and prices. We investigate a firm's optimal decisions when the firm is a monopolist or under a duopoly competition. We find that a monopoly firm's optimal capacity level decreases in service level. For a monopoly firm providing differentiated services, we find that the optimal facility utilization level does not depend on unit capacity cost. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a monopoly firm always gets more profits by providing differentiated services than a single service. For duopoly competition, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate that a firm offering shorter lead time quotation may earn less profit than one offering longer lead time quotation when two firms compete in an industry with discrete lead times.
International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 2009
Page 1. Chapter 9 Product Design, Pricing, and Capacity Investment in a Congested Production Syst... more Page 1. Chapter 9 Product Design, Pricing, and Capacity Investment in a Congested Production System Sergio Chayet, Panos Kouvelis, and Dennis Z. Yu Abstract We investigate a firm's product positioning and capacity investment ...
Page 1. Manufacturing Operations Manuscripts Published in the First 52 Issues of POM: Review, Tre... more Page 1. Manufacturing Operations Manuscripts Published in the First 52 Issues of POM: Review, Trends, and Opportunities Panos Kouvelis Chester Chambers Dennis Z. Yu Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. ...
We consider a centralized distribution network with multiple retailers who receive replenishment ... more We consider a centralized distribution network with multiple retailers who receive replenishment inventory to satisfy customer demand of the local markets. The operational flexibility of the network is defined as the opportunity that one retailer's excess inventory can be transferred to satisfy other retailers’ unmet customer demand due to stock-outs. A general modeling framework is developed to optimize retailers’ order
ABSTRACT We study a firm's joint decisions on product prices, delivery lead times, and ca... more ABSTRACT We study a firm's joint decisions on product prices, delivery lead times, and capacity investments of the production facility. We assume customers are strategic and heterogeneous in their sensitivity to waiting. The firm can offer a single service to all customers or two services with different delivery lead times and prices. We investigate a firm's optimal decisions when the firm is a monopolist or under a duopoly competition. We find that a monopoly firm's optimal capacity level decreases in service level. For a monopoly firm providing differentiated services, we find that the optimal facility utilization level does not depend on unit capacity cost. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a monopoly firm always gets more profits by providing differentiated services than a single service. For duopoly competition, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate that a firm offering shorter lead time quotation may earn less profit than one offering longer lead time quotation when two firms compete in an industry with discrete lead times.
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