Jonathan F Mitchell
Jonathan F. Mitchell is Principal at Mitchell Law PLLC. He received his law degree with high honors from the University of Chicago Law School, where he was an articles editor of The University of Chicago Law Review and a member of the Order of the Coif.
After graduating from law school, Mr. Mitchell clerked for Judge J. Michael Luttig of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United States. He then served as an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice from 2003 through 2006. After leaving the Department of Justice, Mr. Mitchell served as a Visiting Researcher at Georgetown University Law Center, a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago Law School from 2006 through 2008, and an Assistant Professor of Law at George Mason University from 2008 through 2010.
In 2010, Mr. Mitchell was appointed Solicitor General of Texas, a position he held until January 2015. After leaving the Texas Solicitor General’s office, Mr. Mitchell served as the Searle Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Texas School of Law before joining the Hoover Institution as a Visiting Fellow from 2015 to 2016. Mr. Mitchell also served as a Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford Law School before opening his own law firm in 2018.
Mr. Mitchell has published numerous works of scholarship in top-10 law journals, and he has written articles on textualism, national-security law, criminal law and procedure, judicial review and judicial federalism, and the legality of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.
Mr. Mitchell has argued five times before the Supreme Court of the United States, and more than 20 times in the federal courts of appeals. He has also argued before Supreme Court of Texas and in numerous trial courts. Mr. Mitchell has authored the principal merits brief in eight Supreme Court cases, and has written and submitted more than 20 amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court.
After graduating from law school, Mr. Mitchell clerked for Judge J. Michael Luttig of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United States. He then served as an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice from 2003 through 2006. After leaving the Department of Justice, Mr. Mitchell served as a Visiting Researcher at Georgetown University Law Center, a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago Law School from 2006 through 2008, and an Assistant Professor of Law at George Mason University from 2008 through 2010.
In 2010, Mr. Mitchell was appointed Solicitor General of Texas, a position he held until January 2015. After leaving the Texas Solicitor General’s office, Mr. Mitchell served as the Searle Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Texas School of Law before joining the Hoover Institution as a Visiting Fellow from 2015 to 2016. Mr. Mitchell also served as a Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford Law School before opening his own law firm in 2018.
Mr. Mitchell has published numerous works of scholarship in top-10 law journals, and he has written articles on textualism, national-security law, criminal law and procedure, judicial review and judicial federalism, and the legality of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.
Mr. Mitchell has argued five times before the Supreme Court of the United States, and more than 20 times in the federal courts of appeals. He has also argued before Supreme Court of Texas and in numerous trial courts. Mr. Mitchell has authored the principal merits brief in eight Supreme Court cases, and has written and submitted more than 20 amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court.
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Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.
But the federal judiciary has no authority to alter or annul a statute. The power of judicial review is more limited: It allows a court to decline to enforce a statute, and to enjoin the executive from enforcing that statute. But the judicially disapproved statute continues to exist as a law until it is repealed by the legislature that enacted it, even as it goes unenforced by the judiciary or the executive. And it is always possible that a future court might overrule the decision that declared the statute unconstitutional, thereby liberating the executive to resume enforcing the statute against anyone who has violated it. Judicial review is not a power to suspend or “strike down” legislation; it is a judicially imposed non-enforcement policy that lasts only as long as the courts adhere to the constitutional objections that persuaded them to thwart the statute’s enforcement.
When judges or elected officials mistakenly assume that a court decision has canceled or revoked a duly enacted statute, they commit the “writ-of-erasure fallacy”—the fallacy that equates judicial review with a veto-like power to “strike down” legislation or delay its effective start date. This article identifies the origins of the fallacy, describes the ways in which the writ-of-erasure mindset has improperly curtailed the enforcement of statutes, and explores the implications that follow when judicial review is (correctly) understood as a temporary non-enforcement policy that leaves the disapproved statute in effect.
Yet textualism has been enjoying a resurgence in both constitutional and statutory interpretation. This resurgence raises two questions for the Court's equality doctrines. The first is whether those who embrace textualism must reject the Court's equality jurisprudence as textually illegitimate. The second is whether those who embrace the Supreme Court's landmark equality pronouncements must reject textualism as incompatible with those rulings. The answer to both questions is no. Almost all of the Supreme Court's canonical racial-equality decisions have a firm textual foundation in congressional civil rights legislation—a fact that the Supreme Court has all but ignored by insisting on grounding its equality pronouncements exclusively in the Equal Protection Clause. And Congress enacted most of these civil rights statutes before the Supreme Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause to declare a discriminatory practice unconstitutional. So these civil rights statutes can and should be used to supply textual support for the Court’s decisions and doctrines, especially in cases where the Equal Protection Clause and other constitutional provisions are textually ill suited for the task.
This essay considers why Justice Scalia—who so profoundly changed the way the Supreme Court interprets statutes—was less successful in changing the Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation. And it contends that Justice Scalia’s most powerful critique of modern constitutional interpretation was not his attack on the idea of a living Constitution, but his challenge to the assumption that the judiciary (of all institutions) should hold the prerogative to impose its preferred interpretations of an evolving Constitution on the rest of us.
Those who wish to preserve a regime of constitutional federalism should think hard about ways to counteract the Supreme Court's unilateral nationwide policymaking. This is no easy task because the notion of judicial interpretive supremacy over the Constitution is well entrenched in our legal and political culture, and many of the Supreme Court's decisions to nationalize policies at the expense of state decisionmaking enjoy substantial political support. This Essay discusses the challenges that confront efforts to protect state prerogatives against the unilateral policymaking of the federal judiciary, and proposes some strategies that advocates of federalism might deploy in their efforts to chip away at the judiciary's incursions on state authority.
Rather than rely on a history-and-tradition test to distinguish Roe from other substantive-due-process rulings, the Court should instead ask whether the unenumerated rights that it has recognized can find textual support in other sources of supreme federal law, such as federal statutes and agency rules. And it should, when possible, invoke those extra-constitutional legal authorities to support the correctness of those substantive-due-process rulings or (at the very least) to rebuff efforts to overrule them. Many (though not all) of the rights that the Supreme Court has imposed under the rubric of substantive due process or equal protection are independently protected by non-constitutional sources of federal law. And that is all that is needed to distinguish those cases from Roe, which has never been codified as a federally protected right—and it explains why the Roe regime can and should be regarded as uniquely indefensible and an improper imposition of judge-held preferences.
But the federal judiciary has no authority to alter or annul a statute. The power of judicial review is more limited: It allows a court to decline to enforce a statute, and to enjoin the executive from enforcing that statute. But the judicially disapproved statute continues to exist as a law until it is repealed by the legislature that enacted it, even as it goes unenforced by the judiciary or the executive. And it is always possible that a future court might overrule the decision that declared the statute unconstitutional, thereby liberating the executive to resume enforcing the statute against anyone who has violated it. Judicial review is not a power to suspend or “strike down” legislation; it is a judicially imposed non-enforcement policy that lasts only as long as the courts adhere to the constitutional objections that persuaded them to thwart the statute’s enforcement.
When judges or elected officials mistakenly assume that a court decision has canceled or revoked a duly enacted statute, they commit the “writ-of-erasure fallacy”—the fallacy that equates judicial review with a veto-like power to “strike down” legislation or delay its effective start date. This article identifies the origins of the fallacy, describes the ways in which the writ-of-erasure mindset has improperly curtailed the enforcement of statutes, and explores the implications that follow when judicial review is (correctly) understood as a temporary non-enforcement policy that leaves the disapproved statute in effect.
Yet textualism has been enjoying a resurgence in both constitutional and statutory interpretation. This resurgence raises two questions for the Court's equality doctrines. The first is whether those who embrace textualism must reject the Court's equality jurisprudence as textually illegitimate. The second is whether those who embrace the Supreme Court's landmark equality pronouncements must reject textualism as incompatible with those rulings. The answer to both questions is no. Almost all of the Supreme Court's canonical racial-equality decisions have a firm textual foundation in congressional civil rights legislation—a fact that the Supreme Court has all but ignored by insisting on grounding its equality pronouncements exclusively in the Equal Protection Clause. And Congress enacted most of these civil rights statutes before the Supreme Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause to declare a discriminatory practice unconstitutional. So these civil rights statutes can and should be used to supply textual support for the Court’s decisions and doctrines, especially in cases where the Equal Protection Clause and other constitutional provisions are textually ill suited for the task.
This essay considers why Justice Scalia—who so profoundly changed the way the Supreme Court interprets statutes—was less successful in changing the Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation. And it contends that Justice Scalia’s most powerful critique of modern constitutional interpretation was not his attack on the idea of a living Constitution, but his challenge to the assumption that the judiciary (of all institutions) should hold the prerogative to impose its preferred interpretations of an evolving Constitution on the rest of us.
Those who wish to preserve a regime of constitutional federalism should think hard about ways to counteract the Supreme Court's unilateral nationwide policymaking. This is no easy task because the notion of judicial interpretive supremacy over the Constitution is well entrenched in our legal and political culture, and many of the Supreme Court's decisions to nationalize policies at the expense of state decisionmaking enjoy substantial political support. This Essay discusses the challenges that confront efforts to protect state prerogatives against the unilateral policymaking of the federal judiciary, and proposes some strategies that advocates of federalism might deploy in their efforts to chip away at the judiciary's incursions on state authority.