The most common explanations of cognition in sport rely on the idea that mental representation pl... more The most common explanations of cognition in sport rely on the idea that mental representation plays a central role in explaining athletic skill (Ericsson 2006, Sutton 2007; Beilock 2008). i Next ensues a straw-man account: sportspersons internally represent in their brain the situations they face. As they perceive changes in their environment, they process pertinent information and determine how to respond. Then, the brain organizes the motor response. We may ask regarding the skills of a white water kayaker going over a 100-foot waterfall, how is this possible? What many philosophers, and cognitive or sports scientists mean is, what mechanisms underlie the activity and are causally responsible for the behavior? It is often thought that an adequate explanation must involve the kayaker having an internal representation of his kayak, paddle, waterfall, and landing. His senses indicate where the waterfall lip is, and the brain, processing this information, directs his body to get in a position to safely hit the water below. Training has imprinted routines that allow for efficient moves in a fluid sequence. Embodied cognition and enactivism proponents argue that cognition does not fundamentally involve representation in this way. Rather, mental representation comes later as part of an acculturated and scaffolded framework. The above representational account, extremely simplified, even simplistic, could be filled in and strengthened with far more detail. Presently we limit ourselves to a contextualizing overview and circumvent enhancements to such accounts (Fodor 1990; Fodor and Pylyshyn 2014). Likewise, we sidestep an in-depth review of critiques of representational theories, as others have engaged in such dispute (Chemero 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013). Our goal is to explore new terrain. The problem to be solved concerns the cognitive engagements of expert performers in risky endeavors. Characterized by intense focus and the ability to react subtly and suitably to unexpected threats, they present challenges because they involve high-level functioning, intentionality, and creative spontaneity. Relying on an enactive stance, and following phenomenological accounts of martial arts masters and sportspersons as well as current empirical research in sport psychology, we argue that mental content or representation – in a traditional sense – is not involved, specifically during intense " full on " moments. To examine this, we develop two ideas. One, we evaluate the extent to which activities that require high levels of performance in dangerous contexts – presently outdoor risk sports and Japanese swordsmanship (kenjutsu) – may require a different sort of explanation, arguing that such cases do not result from processing internal representations. An enactive account mostly in agreement with Hutto and Myin's (2013) radically enactive cognition (REC), a view that considers that basic minds operate without recourse to mental content, is especially suited to this task. Two, we explore how this enactive understanding of cognition in highly skilled performance relates to cultural context in certain cognitive and performing states called flow and mushin (mindful fluid awareness) in the sports and martial worlds respectively. The first section specifies the kinds of sports and martial arts under consideration, and discusses the underlying holistic framework. The second one delves into mental representation, and introduces enactivism in order to set up the version we endorse, REC. Section three centers on REC then, delineating the relationship between cognition and high performance. Section four argues that flow and
Mental representation has long been central to standard accounts of action and cognition generall... more Mental representation has long been central to standard accounts of action and cognition generally, and in the context of sport. I argue for an enactive and embodied account that rejects the idea that representation is necessary for cognition, and posit instead that cognition arises, or is enacted, in certain types of interactions between organisms and their environment. More specifically, I argue that enactive theories explain some kinds of high-level cognition, those that underlie some of the best performances in sport and similar practices (dance, martial arts), better than representational accounts. Flow and mushin (mindfully fluid awareness) are explained enactively to this end. This results in a mutually beneficial analysis where enactivism offers theoretical and practical advantages as an explanation of high performance in sports, while the latter validates enactivism.
The most common explanations of cognition in sport rely on the idea that mental representation pl... more The most common explanations of cognition in sport rely on the idea that mental representation plays a central role in explaining athletic skill (Ericsson 2006, Sutton 2007; Beilock 2008). i Next ensues a straw-man account: sportspersons internally represent in their brain the situations they face. As they perceive changes in their environment, they process pertinent information and determine how to respond. Then, the brain organizes the motor response. We may ask regarding the skills of a white water kayaker going over a 100-foot waterfall, how is this possible? What many philosophers, and cognitive or sports scientists mean is, what mechanisms underlie the activity and are causally responsible for the behavior? It is often thought that an adequate explanation must involve the kayaker having an internal representation of his kayak, paddle, waterfall, and landing. His senses indicate where the waterfall lip is, and the brain, processing this information, directs his body to get in a position to safely hit the water below. Training has imprinted routines that allow for efficient moves in a fluid sequence. Embodied cognition and enactivism proponents argue that cognition does not fundamentally involve representation in this way. Rather, mental representation comes later as part of an acculturated and scaffolded framework. The above representational account, extremely simplified, even simplistic, could be filled in and strengthened with far more detail. Presently we limit ourselves to a contextualizing overview and circumvent enhancements to such accounts (Fodor 1990; Fodor and Pylyshyn 2014). Likewise, we sidestep an in-depth review of critiques of representational theories, as others have engaged in such dispute (Chemero 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013). Our goal is to explore new terrain. The problem to be solved concerns the cognitive engagements of expert performers in risky endeavors. Characterized by intense focus and the ability to react subtly and suitably to unexpected threats, they present challenges because they involve high-level functioning, intentionality, and creative spontaneity. Relying on an enactive stance, and following phenomenological accounts of martial arts masters and sportspersons as well as current empirical research in sport psychology, we argue that mental content or representation – in a traditional sense – is not involved, specifically during intense " full on " moments. To examine this, we develop two ideas. One, we evaluate the extent to which activities that require high levels of performance in dangerous contexts – presently outdoor risk sports and Japanese swordsmanship (kenjutsu) – may require a different sort of explanation, arguing that such cases do not result from processing internal representations. An enactive account mostly in agreement with Hutto and Myin's (2013) radically enactive cognition (REC), a view that considers that basic minds operate without recourse to mental content, is especially suited to this task. Two, we explore how this enactive understanding of cognition in highly skilled performance relates to cultural context in certain cognitive and performing states called flow and mushin (mindful fluid awareness) in the sports and martial worlds respectively. The first section specifies the kinds of sports and martial arts under consideration, and discusses the underlying holistic framework. The second one delves into mental representation, and introduces enactivism in order to set up the version we endorse, REC. Section three centers on REC then, delineating the relationship between cognition and high performance. Section four argues that flow and
Mental representation has long been central to standard accounts of action and cognition generall... more Mental representation has long been central to standard accounts of action and cognition generally, and in the context of sport. I argue for an enactive and embodied account that rejects the idea that representation is necessary for cognition, and posit instead that cognition arises, or is enacted, in certain types of interactions between organisms and their environment. More specifically, I argue that enactive theories explain some kinds of high-level cognition, those that underlie some of the best performances in sport and similar practices (dance, martial arts), better than representational accounts. Flow and mushin (mindfully fluid awareness) are explained enactively to this end. This results in a mutually beneficial analysis where enactivism offers theoretical and practical advantages as an explanation of high performance in sports, while the latter validates enactivism.
Uploads
Drafts by Kevin Krein
Papers by Kevin Krein