Honduras is a place of enormous contradictions. It is home to great beauty—beaches, mountains, wi... more Honduras is a place of enormous contradictions. It is home to great beauty—beaches, mountains, wildlife, and strong and resilient people—but also to a troubling array of social, governance, and human rights challenges. Endemic corruption, extreme violence, poverty and desperation, and a weak and broken government take a toll on its people. Both a product and a symbol of broken society are the prisons, where people are warehoused, forgotten, and even dying by the scores with almost no one taking notice. Honduran citizens and authorities, alike, struggle to cope under the weight of these problems. Between May 21 and 31, Professor Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera and I [Eric Olson] struck out on our second road trip together in the last nine months. The first was to the lower Rio Grande Valley on the Texas-Mexico border where we interviewed migrants, shelter workers, government officials, researchers and scholars, and law enforcement officers about border security, migrant smuggling, and trafficking of Central Americans in that area. On this occasion, we decided to travel to Honduras and venture across its northern coastal region to better understand the country’s security challenges and the issues driving internal displacement and migration northward. During the first week we spent time in San Pedro Sula and its surrounding communities of Choloma and Rivera Hernandez, El Progreso, which by some calculations is now the third most violent city in Honduras, and the port city of La Ceiba. We ended our journey in Tegucigalpa. Throughout the trip, we talked to community workers, young people, prisoners and prison officials, police, judges, local and national government officials, members of the Honduran Congress and opposition figures, representatives from international organizations, foreign embassies (including that of the United States), civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens we encountered along the way. From this experience we confirmed what we already suspected—that reality is far more complex than can be summarized in a policy memo or encapsulated in a soundbite.
El presente informe se divide en dos partes. La primera parte mantiene un enfoque en la niñez y l... more El presente informe se divide en dos partes. La primera parte mantiene un enfoque en la niñez y la juventud, así como en los esfuerzos para prevenir y reducir la violencia en regiones de alto riesgo o fuerte presencia de maras y pandillas. La segunda parte analiza fundamentalmente los temas de narcotráfico, corrupción, la pérdida del monopolio del uso legítimo de la violencia y la vida en los centros penitenciarios. Ambas secciones se desarrollan en espacios de elevados niveles de inseguridad, control de amplios territorios por parte de las maras y pandillas, tráfico de drogas y falta de Estado de Derecho. En la parte final del documento se abordan los temas de migración, drogas y pérdida de control por parte del Estado, y para terminar se hace una reflexión sobre el problema que parece ser el principal en Honduras: los elevados niveles de corrupción en distintos ámbitos de la vida en este país.
En los últimos años, Bolivia ha logrado un conjunto de transformaciones sociales y económicas imp... more En los últimos años, Bolivia ha logrado un conjunto de transformaciones sociales y económicas importantes. No sólo ha mantenido uno de los mayores niveles de crecimiento económico de Sudamérica, sino también es uno de los cuatro países de la región que en la década pasada, más ha reducido sus índices de pobreza. Junto con estos logros, se han observado cambios demográficos significativos en el país. Por ejemplo, el 67 por ciento de la población ahora vive en áreas urbanas y más de la mitad (57%) reside en las 9 ciudades capitales y El Alto, evidenciando un proceso migratorio campo–ciudad irreversible. A su vez, el crecimiento económico del país ha beneficiado a la poblaciones urbanas en los estratos de ingresos bajos, lo que ha implicado una ampliación de la clase media y como consecuencia, la emergencia de nuevas demandas y necesidades por parte de esta población. No obstante, estos cambios sociales y económicos no se han traducido en su totalidad en mejores condiciones de bienestar de la ciudadanía. Por un lado, la calidad del empleo no ha evidenciado mejoras, la inserción laboral de los jóvenes continúa precaria y la participación de las mujeres en el mercado de trabajo permanece por debajo de la de los hombres. Por otro, la calidad de los servicios de salud, vivienda y educación siguen siendo un reto para el país. Del mismo modo, este patrón de crecimiento ha venido acompañado de importantes retos en materia de seguridad ciudadana. Evidencia de esto es que la inseguridad y la delincuencia se han ubicado entre las principales preocupaciones de los ciudadanos bolivianos en los últimos años. Este fenómeno se puede explicar por una parte debido a que el crecimiento urbano en el país no ha sido incluyente. Es decir, si bien ha existido una ampliación de la clase media, todavía existe un cúmulo de personas que no ha podido integrarse completamente a este grupo. En los hechos, esta clase media “vulnerable” tiende a experimentar mayores expectativas en su calidad de vida, pero sin oportunidades para concretarlas. A su vez, las transformaciones sociodemográficas como resultado del crecimiento económico y los cambios sociales han constituido la existencia de nuevas estructuras familiares, la presencia de facilitadores del delito como el alcohol, las drogas y las armas y se ha presenciado la degradación de los espacios urbanos. Este contexto ha dificultado y evidenciado la falta de capacidad institucional de los gobiernos locales para llevar a cabo políticas efectivas para la prevención y el control del delito.
Este documento busca 1) sintetizar los datos cuantitativos sobre denuncia y victimización disponi... more Este documento busca 1) sintetizar los datos cuantitativos sobre denuncia y victimización disponibles para los principales delitos y formas de violencia en Lima, para 2) establecer preguntas de investigación e hipótesis de trabajo sobre la situación y tendencia de dichos fenómenos.
El documento se sostiene en la revisión de datos estadísticos de varias fuentes, recogidos y organizados mediante fichas de registro cuantitativo y tablas de contingencia. Es evidente que un ejercicio de inventario se traduce en una lista amplia de elementos con fenomenologías y estructuras diferentes. A su vez, cada uno de esos elementos requiere profundidad e implica modelos analíticos propios. Por eso, se requiere determinar qué fenómenos son recurrentes en la literatura, así como discriminar aquellos sobre los cuáles no se puede hacer aproximaciones basadas en evidencia, de aquellos que reportan datos cuantitativos que permitan establecer una aproximación epidemiológica (tasas muy altas de denuncia o porcentajes altos de victimización, por ejemplo, tasas mayores a 10X por 100.000) (Van Dijk, Van Kesteren y Smit, 2008) o una disposición analítica relevante, relacionada con indicios de alta prevalencia o de subregistro (Alvazzi, 2003; Sozzo, 2003). Ello ha permitido seleccionar ciertos fenómenos para el registro y para ilustrar ideas e hipótesis que se plantean en tres grupos: datos sobre denuncia y victimización criminal, datos sobre formas de violencia no criminal y datos sobre percepciones sobre el sistema control formal del delito y la violencia.
Los Seminarios Violencias y criminalidad en las principales ciudades
andinas: Caracterización y p... more Los Seminarios Violencias y criminalidad en las principales ciudades andinas: Caracterización y políticas públicas, realizados en el marco del Programa Latinoamericano del Woodrow Wilson Center y subvencionados por el Corporación Andina de Fomento – Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina (en adelante CAF), propone cuatro objetivos: 1. Realizar un análisis actualizado y comparado de la evolución de los problemas de seguridad ciudadana en varias ciudades de los países andinos buscando entender causas comunes de la altísima victimización y de las diferencias en niveles de violencia; 2. Hacer un análisis comparado de la institucionalidad del Estado en relación a la seguridad ciudadana en esas ciudades, incluyendo la situación de los gobiernos locales, policías, administración de justicia y sistemas penitenciarios; 3. Revisar las políticas de convivencia y prevención del delito en las ciudades estudiadas, señalando sus éxitos, sus desafíos y su sostenibilidad; y 4. Contar con un conjunto de recomendaciones de política pública sobre políticas de seguridad ciudadana en base a la experiencia comparada de los países estudiados.
Los dos seminarios contaron con la participación de representantes de entidades públicas de Ecuador y Perú, tales como el Ministerio del Interior, Policía Nacional y el Congreso de la República. Asimismo, contaron con la asistencia de miembros de la sociedad civil y academia. Los encuentros se dividieron en dos momentos, luego de la mesa inaugural: Por la mañana, las exposiciones de los expertos. Por la tarde, una sesión de trabajo con los asistentes, para el intercambio de impresiones sobre los estudios expuestos. El presente documento de relatoría, resume las principales ideas expuestas durante ambos Seminarios.
Ubicándonos geográfica y analíticamente en la ciudad de Quito (Ecuador), en este informe presenta... more Ubicándonos geográfica y analíticamente en la ciudad de Quito (Ecuador), en este informe presentaremos algunas ideas en torno a los procesos, espacios, tiempos y racionalidades que actualmente estructuran las violencias en Quito, con la aspiración de que aporten a la comprensión de un fenómeno regional que a todas luces, hoy más que nunca, debe ser debatido y problematizado. En otras palabras, vemos que Quito se puede convertir en un caso interesante para comprender este proceso de existencia y persistencia de varias violencias en un mismo contexto; de allí el título del presente trabajo: Quito, un ensamble de violencias.
El objetivo del presente documento es identificar los avances y desafíos en la temática de la vio... more El objetivo del presente documento es identificar los avances y desafíos en la temática de la violencia y la inseguridad en Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia, así como proponer algunos ejes fundantes de iniciativas de política que pudieran servir para aumentar la seguridad de sus habitantes. Se pone especial énfasis en el contexto de las ciudades capitales y su situación de inseguridad y criminalidad.
In this paper, we seek to summarize some of the principal characteristics and drivers of urban vi... more In this paper, we seek to summarize some of the principal characteristics and drivers of urban violence in order to develop more targeted and effective policies to address it. First, we discuss how major structural problems like youth unemployment and inequality are related to common crime, organized crime, and violence. We emphasize the importance of understanding the local nature of urban violence and its tendency to occur and persist in specific geographic locations. Next, we look at some examples from the region that shed light on, and in some cases, confirm these ideas. Finally, we offer a series of policy options for addressing one of the region’s most persistent and vexing challenges.
Venezuela’s downward spiral has left the country poised between crisis and collapse.
Over the ... more Venezuela’s downward spiral has left the country poised between crisis and collapse.
Over the last three years, the country’s economy fell into a depression marked by severe shortages and hyperinflation; social protest frequently erupted into violent instability; and the little that remained of one of Latin America’s oldest democracies vanished, yielding an authoritarian regime. Worse yet, the already acute political crisis took a turn for the worse. The government now openly relies on military force and institutionalized repression to maintain a modicum of stability. The government of President Nicolás Maduro blocked the opposition’s constitutional push for a recall referendum, using its control over the judiciary and electoral institutions to suspend a process that mobilized millions. Then, after Vatican- and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)-sponsored talks between the Maduro Government and the opposition’s Mesa de la Unidad (The Democratic Roundtable) coalition broke down, the country’s human rights crisis escalated. Among other illegal detentions, the government arbitrarily jailed an elected member of Congress. As the rule of law further collapsed, the number of political prisoners rose to 116. Great uncertainty persists about whether gubernatorial elections postponed in 2016 will take place in 2017. Without any elections this year, Venezuela would likely experience a significant, but ultimately not destabilizing, street clash.
This sharp decline has brought the country, and the hemisphere, to a moment of truth.
Venezuela’s descent is the direct result of chavismo’s failed model. Yet Venezuelans must recognize that crafting a new, sustainable governance framework will require broad-based participation from political and civil society, including chavistas. For the hemisphere, the country’s current trajectory constitutes an unacceptable interruption of democracy while the possibility of collapse into civil strife poses an enormous danger for regional stability.
This report on the Venezuelan crisis and Latin America’s future considers what the United States and the inter-American community, acting diplomatically, including through the Organization of American States, can do in response to the current crisis, specifically with regards to the erosion of democratic norms and practice in Venezuela.
The aim of this research is to understand the role of transnational organized crime in human traf... more The aim of this research is to understand the role of transnational organized crime in human trafficking along Mexico’s eastern migration routes, from Central America to Mexico’s northeastern border. In this region, drug traffickers are smuggling and trafficking unauthorized migrants in order to diversify their revenue streams. This project analyzes the new role of Central American gangs and Mexican-origin drug trafficking organizations—now known as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)—in the trafficking of persons from Central America to Mexico’s northeastern border.
There are no simple or easy ways to understand the results of Colombia’s October 2 plebiscite on ... more There are no simple or easy ways to understand the results of Colombia’s October 2 plebiscite on the peace agreement between the government and the FARC.
The plebiscite results reflect the profound regional differences within the country. The “yes” vote won in regions that are the most isolated from the State and the market; in these places, the armed conflict with the FARC has had the greatest impact but the dividends of the ceasefire have yet to be experienced. The “no” vote, by contrast, took the lead in regions with greater access to the State and the market, areas where institutions exist and function more effectively.
Clearly, the “no” victory took many people by surprise. Although all of the polls leading up to the plebiscite indicated that the “yes” vote would win with a significant margin, the “no” eked out a victory with slightly more than 53,000 votes. The results reflect a country with profound differences between the center and periphery and between those who see the peace agreements as an opportunity and those who perceive them as a threat.
Added to this context is the indifference and disinterest of a significant portion of the population. Voter abstention rates were the highest they have been in the past 22 years. With 62.59 percent of voters sitting out the election, the rate of abstention of registered voters was higher even than during the most recent presidential elections in 2014; at that time, 59.91 percent of voters abstained in the first round and 52.03 percent did so in the second.
The victory of the “no” vote provides a strong dose of realism in a polarized, fragmented, and unequal country that now faces the task of finding a viable way to build peace in the midst of profound and persistent differences.
In April 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that annual growth in Latin Americ... more In April 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that annual growth in Latin America and the Caribbean would contract for a second straight year, the worst performance since the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Yet regional averages, dragged down by recession in Brazil and sharp economic decline in Venezuela, tell only part of the story. The countries of the Pacific Alliance—Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru—are not the region’s top performers in terms of GDP growth (that distinction falls to Panama and the Dominican Republic). But according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), their average annual growth rate between 2014 and 2016 is expected to total 2.6 percent, more than double the regional average. Together, the four Pacific Alliance (PA) countries constitute almost 40 percent of the regional economy but their collective exports are 55 percent of the region’s total.
The framework accord creating the Pacific Alliance was signed in 2012, aimed at increasing “the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people,” while also providing a unified platform for deeper integration with the Asia-Pacific region. A review of trade data from 2012 to 2014 suggests that progress toward these goals has been uneven.
Trade has almost uniformly and across multiple sectors decreased within the PA since 2013. Pacific Alliance countries have to a large extent continued to trade more substantially with their longstanding trading partners in large outside markets such as the United States and Europe. Overall, however, and at a time of economic slowdown throughout Latin America, the reductions in trade between and among Pacific Alliance countries in 2013 and 2014 have been smaller than the reductions in each country’s bilateral trade with Argentina and Brazil, South America’s two largest markets. This points to the greater stability of trade within the Pacific Alliance.
A closer look at the data indicates that some countries have performed better that the aggregate PA figures would suggest. Particularly noteworthy is the case of Colombia, which between 2013 and 2014 was the only country to increase its percentage of exports to and imports from Asia’s three largest markets: China, Japan, and South Korea. Some of the increase in bilateral trade as a percentage of total trade is due to the fact that Colombia is rather new to Asian markets. Nevertheless, the increase is nothing short of impressive.
While the aggregate picture of the PA shows little across-the-board success in improving intra-industry trade (the kind that creates value chains), Peru is performing relatively well in comparison to the other Pacific Alliance countries in terms of increasing exports to other Alliance members and achieving major improvements in the level of intra-industry trade, especially in the food products sector.
Exports from Brazil and Argentina—South America’s two largest economies—to China, Japan, and South Korea decreased across the board from 2013 to 2014, while some Pacific Alliance members were able to increase exports to the three largest Asian markets. Thus, in relative terms, members of the Pacific Alliance exhibited stronger export performance vis-à-vis Asian markets than did the two largest South American economies.
All in all, the relatively stronger performance of Pacific Alliance members vis-à-vis several Asian countries during a period of recessionary shocks indicates that Alliance members are—despite obstacles—making headway in bolstering trade relations with Asian partners, a key goal of Pacific Alliance integration.
Data over a longer period of time are needed to shed light on the future potential of the agreement as Latin America and the global economy continue to navigate a complex and challenging environment.
In spite of an all-encompassing economic and humanitarian crisis, Venezuela’s President Nicolás M... more In spite of an all-encompassing economic and humanitarian crisis, Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro is likely to emerge victorious in the upcoming May 2018 presidential elections, consolidating a fully authoritarian regime. Maduro has dismantled any vestige of the rule of law: he has incarcerated opposition leaders, banned political parties, stripped the popularly-elected National Assembly of its powers, and coerced voters. In addition, the Maduro regime has now put in place a powerful and effective mechanism for securing favorable electoral outcomes: the manipulation of hunger as a means to condition voting preferences. In a new study for the Wilson Center, Latin American Program Global Fellow Michael Penfold analyzes in detail the positioning of polling stations next to booths where people have to renew their chip-embedded “Fatherland Card” (Carnet de la Patria), used by the government to allot subsidized bags of food. This electronic card is linked in real time to big data related to an individual’s access to social security, public housing, public employment, health services, and direct cash transfers. It therefore has tremendous value for those dependent on these state benefits. Penfold also examines the likelihood that this new electoral and authoritarian technology will hinder future opposition victories.
In the past few years, Mexico has taken a number of steps to prevent and prosecute trafficking in... more In the past few years, Mexico has taken a number of steps to prevent and prosecute trafficking in persons, and to protect its victims. The country’s government has signed international anti-trafficking conventions and taken some aspects of widely-accepted international definitions of this crime into account when drafting its anti-trafficking legislation. However, Mexico’s current legislation is based on a broad definition of trafficking in persons that is inconsistent with international norms which, in turn, has led to misidentification of traffickers and victims, as well as their re-victimization. Mexico’s weak rule of law and corrupt institutions compound the issue. The present analysis demonstrates the imperative to modify the current anti-trafficking legislation in Mexico and provides some suggestions for this much-needed reform.
An effective justice system creates confidence in the rule of law, provides for legal certainty, ... more An effective justice system creates confidence in the rule of law, provides for legal certainty, and diffuses conflicts in society. To be effective, a justice system’s personnel must meet multiple criteria including professional competence and professional standards, especially for those with direct responsibility for the functioning of the justice system. Additional important criteria include the independence, impartiality, and autonomy of these public officeholders to ensure that they serve the public interest. Meeting these standards is directly linked to the quality of the selection process for judicial officials. Consequently, the selection process is crucial to the proper functioning of the state. In Guatemala, the appointment process for the officials who head the judiciary and the Attorney General’s Office (Ministerio Público) is regulated by the Political Constitution of the Republic. This body of law was enacted in 1985 after the country had undergone several military governments that led to coups d’états, 20 years of internal armed conflict, and a high degree of political instability. The new Constitution ushered in a democratic era that led to peace negotiations, which resulted in accords that brought an end to the civil conflict. In today’s context where new battles are waged on a daily basis to eradicate corruption and reduce violence, the selection of the next Attorney General is a main concern for Guatemalans and the international community. The United States has been an ally in the fight against corruption and has provided financial support to the institutions combatting it. A bipartisan group from the United States Congress has expressed its concern over the choice of the next Attorney General. Current Attorney General Thelma Aldana’s term in office is coming to a close. The Attorney General was appointed in May 2014 to a four-year term (2014-2018) and, accordingly, will step down from her position in mid-May 2018. She has played a leading role in prosecuting corruption-related cases. It is essential that her replacement continue the efforts she has led and take decisive action against lawbreakers.
Violence against women is one of the world’s greatest public health problems and one of Latin Ame... more Violence against women is one of the world’s greatest public health problems and one of Latin America’s major development challenges. Intrafamily violence is widespread in the region, affecting between 14 and 38 percent of all women throughout their lifetime. A series of studies commissioned by the Wilson Center and supported by the Inter-American Development Bank have begun to shed new light on the complex nature of this violence. Together, they contribute to evidence-based policy recommendations that could prevent the incidence of intrafamily violence and reduce the risks of future criminal behavior by affected children as they grow up. Read policy brief to learn more. / La violencia contra la mujer es uno de los mayores problemas de salud pública en el mundo, así como uno de los principales retos para el desarrollo de Latinoamérica. La violencia intrafamiliar se encuentra generalizada en la región y afecta de un 14 a un 38 por ciento de las mujeres en el transcurso de sus vidas. Gracias a una serie de estudios encargados por el Wilson Center con el apoyo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo se ha comenzado a arrojar luz respecto del carácter complejo de este tipo de violencia. En su conjunto, presentan recomendaciones de políticas con base en la evidencia que podrían prevenir la incidencia de la violencia intrafamiliar y reducir los riesgos de conductas delictivas futuras en los niños. Para aprender más, lea el resumen de políticas.
Biotechnology, widely believed to be “the next technological frontier,” is experiencing dynamic g... more Biotechnology, widely believed to be “the next technological frontier,” is experiencing dynamic growth in Argentina. The nation’s R&D expenditures exceed $80 million, compatible with those of countries of intermediate economic development (many of which have a per capita GDP above that of Argentina). Argentina produces 14 percent of the world’s biotech crops, making it the third largest producer after the United States and Brazil. Its 200+ biotech firms earn well over $2 billion and cover sectors such as human health, animal health, food processing, and agriculture. Despite the economic and political volatility in Argentina in recent decades, biotech firms have suffered very few failures and have attracted interest from the leading investment groups in the country.
In a new report, Global Fellow Jerry Haar discusses the ecosystem of biotechnology in Argentina, its structure and dynamics, and offers policy recommendations for the country to continue its role as a regional leader in the field.
Over the past decade, there has been a greater appreciation of how “following the money trail” di... more Over the past decade, there has been a greater appreciation of how “following the money trail” directly contributes to the fight against terrorism, crime, and corruption around the world. Money serves as the oxygen for any activity, licit or illicit; it is the critical enabler for any organization, from international crime syndicates like the Mexican cartels to terrorist groups like the FARC, ISIS, and Hezbollah. Financial intelligence has helped governments to better understand, detect, disrupt, and counter criminal and terrorist networks and expose political corruption.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and its Latin American partners have strengthened their ability to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and consciously incorporated the financial instrument of national power into their national security strategies. “Following the money trail,” counterterrorism, and Drug Kingpin sanctions and asset forfeiture have become particularly important to attack narco-insurgencies, dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and address political corruption scandals that have reached the highest levels of governments across Latin America.
This report focuses on the threats from money laundering and terrorist financing, distinguishing the two, and explains government efforts to counter illicit financing. It describes the ways illicit actors raise, move, store, and use money to pursue their dangerous agendas. Specific cases examining the FARC in Colombia, the 2015 fall of the Guatemalan government, and Brazil’s “Operation Car Wash” corruption scandal illustrate how governments use financial intelligence to pursue terrorists, criminals, corrupt politicians, and their financiers in Latin America. Finally, the report emphasizes the need to design, implement, and constantly update national and international strategies to combat the financing of emerging threats like terrorism, crime, and corruption and to safeguard our financial systems.
About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence... more About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence from their partners. Through a quantitative analysis, this report explores how violence rates against women vary by ethnic group and over time. Based on a nationally representative sample of more than 75,000 women surveyed between 2003 and 2012 and a review of the literature on ethnic classification in Peru, a typology is applied to measure ethnicity, based on women’s linguistic backgrounds, allowing for a consistent ethnic characterization throughout the period of analysis. In this typology, the first group is made up of women who speak an indigenous language at home and do not speak Spanish. A second group, called “historic” Spanish speakers, is composed of women who learned Spanish during childhood and still use it today, while the third group, called “recent” Spanish speakers, includes women who grew up speaking an indigenous language but now speak Spanish. The highest rate of all types of violence is found in this last group, with a much greater difference in sexual and severe physical violence. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model developed in this study in which violence depends on the type of couple. The model finds that women who speak “recent” Spanish—and who have what is termed a lower “outside option” than their “historic” Spanish-speaking male partners—experience greater violence. The study found that the gap in rates of violence against women among these three language groupings has remained constant over time despite an overall reduction in violence. This shows that current policies to provide care for victims and prevent violence against women are insufficient because the policies do not necessarily target groups with a greater risk of violence. This is unlike other areas of public health, where interventions are directly targeted at the most vulnerable populations. / Cerca de la mitad de las mujeres peruanas de entre 15 y 49 años han sufrido algún acto de violencia por parte de sus parejas. En este trabajo se explora mediante un análisis cuantitativo de qué manera las tasas de violencia contra la mujer varían por grupo étnico y en el tiempo. A partir de una muestra representativa a nivel nacional de más de 75.000 mujeres encuestadas entre 2003 y 2012 y de una revisión de la literatura sobre la clasificación étnica en Perú, se utilizó una tipología para medir la etnicidad a partir de los antecedentes lingüísticos de las mujeres. Esto permite una caracterización étnica consistente durante todo el periodo de análisis. En esta tipología, un primer grupo lo conforman mujeres que actualmente hablan una lengua indígena en el hogar y que no usan el castellano. Un segundo grupo, denominado castellano antiguo, está compuesto por mujeres para quienes el castellano fue el idioma aprendido en la niñez y el cual sigue siendo usado actualmente, mientras que el tercer grupo, llamado castellano reciente, agrupa a las mujeres que crecieron hablando una lengua indígena pero que ahora hablan castellano. Es en este último grupo donde se encuentran las tasas más altas en todos los tipos de violencia. Esta diferencia es mucho mayor en la violencia física severa y la sexual. Esto es consistente con las predicciones del modelo teórico desarrollado en el documento donde la violencia depende del tipo de emparejamiento y donde las mujeres con un outside option menor que el de sus parejas (por ejemplo, aquellas con castellano reciente) experimentan una mayor violencia. Se muestra además que la brecha en las tasas de violencia contra la mujer entre estos tres grupos se ha mantenido constante en el tiempo a pesar de la reducción global. A partir de estos hallazgos, el documento muestra que las actuales políticas para atender a las víctimas y prevenir la violencia contra la mujer serían insuficientes ya que no están necesariamente dirigidas a los grupos con mayor riesgo de violencia, como los definidos en este documento. Esto difiere de los enfoques aplicados en otras áreas de la salud pública donde las intervenciones apuntan directamente a las poblaciones más vulnerables.
This article, based on an analysis of the Survey of Convicted Prisoners from eight Latin American... more This article, based on an analysis of the Survey of Convicted Prisoners from eight Latin American countries, helps to expand knowledge about the association between victimization in childhood and the criminal behavior of individuals who have been incarcerated. The results of the multivariate regression models show that having grown up in a home in which the father/partner beat the mother (indirect violence) mainly affects women when it comes to future criminal behavior (both their likelihood of being repeat offenders and of having possessed firearms). / A partir del análisis de la Encuesta de Presos Condenados de ochos países de América Latina, el artículo contribuye a expandir el conocimiento sobre la asociación entre la victimización en la infancia y la conducta delictiva de los individuos privados de libertad. Los resultados de los modelos de regresión multivariada muestran que haber crecido en un hogar en donde el padre/pareja le pegaba a la madre (violencia indirecta) afecta principalmente a las mujeres en relación con su conducta delictiva (tanto en lo que respecta a su probabilidad de ser reincidentes como a la tenencia de armas de fuego). A la vez, se pone de manifiesto que haber sido víctima directa de maltrato es un factor que afecta tanto a mujeres como a varones en lo que respecta a la posibilidad de reincidir, pero en mayor proporción a los varones cuando se trata de la tenencia de armas de fuego. El artículo sugiere que las intervenciones orientadas a la prevención deben tener en cuenta estas diferencias de género para alcanzar una mayor efectividad. Las mujeres parecen estar afectadas por ambos tipos de victimización en la infancia, lo que conlleva a considerar que las estrategias de intervención para la población femenina deben estar orientadas en atender las dos modalidades de violencia (directa e indirecta). En cambio, las intervenciones en virtud de la prevención de conductas delictivas masculinas podrían focalizarse específicamente sobre la violencia familiar directa.
Honduras is a place of enormous contradictions. It is home to great beauty—beaches, mountains, wi... more Honduras is a place of enormous contradictions. It is home to great beauty—beaches, mountains, wildlife, and strong and resilient people—but also to a troubling array of social, governance, and human rights challenges. Endemic corruption, extreme violence, poverty and desperation, and a weak and broken government take a toll on its people. Both a product and a symbol of broken society are the prisons, where people are warehoused, forgotten, and even dying by the scores with almost no one taking notice. Honduran citizens and authorities, alike, struggle to cope under the weight of these problems. Between May 21 and 31, Professor Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera and I [Eric Olson] struck out on our second road trip together in the last nine months. The first was to the lower Rio Grande Valley on the Texas-Mexico border where we interviewed migrants, shelter workers, government officials, researchers and scholars, and law enforcement officers about border security, migrant smuggling, and trafficking of Central Americans in that area. On this occasion, we decided to travel to Honduras and venture across its northern coastal region to better understand the country’s security challenges and the issues driving internal displacement and migration northward. During the first week we spent time in San Pedro Sula and its surrounding communities of Choloma and Rivera Hernandez, El Progreso, which by some calculations is now the third most violent city in Honduras, and the port city of La Ceiba. We ended our journey in Tegucigalpa. Throughout the trip, we talked to community workers, young people, prisoners and prison officials, police, judges, local and national government officials, members of the Honduran Congress and opposition figures, representatives from international organizations, foreign embassies (including that of the United States), civil society organizations, and ordinary citizens we encountered along the way. From this experience we confirmed what we already suspected—that reality is far more complex than can be summarized in a policy memo or encapsulated in a soundbite.
El presente informe se divide en dos partes. La primera parte mantiene un enfoque en la niñez y l... more El presente informe se divide en dos partes. La primera parte mantiene un enfoque en la niñez y la juventud, así como en los esfuerzos para prevenir y reducir la violencia en regiones de alto riesgo o fuerte presencia de maras y pandillas. La segunda parte analiza fundamentalmente los temas de narcotráfico, corrupción, la pérdida del monopolio del uso legítimo de la violencia y la vida en los centros penitenciarios. Ambas secciones se desarrollan en espacios de elevados niveles de inseguridad, control de amplios territorios por parte de las maras y pandillas, tráfico de drogas y falta de Estado de Derecho. En la parte final del documento se abordan los temas de migración, drogas y pérdida de control por parte del Estado, y para terminar se hace una reflexión sobre el problema que parece ser el principal en Honduras: los elevados niveles de corrupción en distintos ámbitos de la vida en este país.
En los últimos años, Bolivia ha logrado un conjunto de transformaciones sociales y económicas imp... more En los últimos años, Bolivia ha logrado un conjunto de transformaciones sociales y económicas importantes. No sólo ha mantenido uno de los mayores niveles de crecimiento económico de Sudamérica, sino también es uno de los cuatro países de la región que en la década pasada, más ha reducido sus índices de pobreza. Junto con estos logros, se han observado cambios demográficos significativos en el país. Por ejemplo, el 67 por ciento de la población ahora vive en áreas urbanas y más de la mitad (57%) reside en las 9 ciudades capitales y El Alto, evidenciando un proceso migratorio campo–ciudad irreversible. A su vez, el crecimiento económico del país ha beneficiado a la poblaciones urbanas en los estratos de ingresos bajos, lo que ha implicado una ampliación de la clase media y como consecuencia, la emergencia de nuevas demandas y necesidades por parte de esta población. No obstante, estos cambios sociales y económicos no se han traducido en su totalidad en mejores condiciones de bienestar de la ciudadanía. Por un lado, la calidad del empleo no ha evidenciado mejoras, la inserción laboral de los jóvenes continúa precaria y la participación de las mujeres en el mercado de trabajo permanece por debajo de la de los hombres. Por otro, la calidad de los servicios de salud, vivienda y educación siguen siendo un reto para el país. Del mismo modo, este patrón de crecimiento ha venido acompañado de importantes retos en materia de seguridad ciudadana. Evidencia de esto es que la inseguridad y la delincuencia se han ubicado entre las principales preocupaciones de los ciudadanos bolivianos en los últimos años. Este fenómeno se puede explicar por una parte debido a que el crecimiento urbano en el país no ha sido incluyente. Es decir, si bien ha existido una ampliación de la clase media, todavía existe un cúmulo de personas que no ha podido integrarse completamente a este grupo. En los hechos, esta clase media “vulnerable” tiende a experimentar mayores expectativas en su calidad de vida, pero sin oportunidades para concretarlas. A su vez, las transformaciones sociodemográficas como resultado del crecimiento económico y los cambios sociales han constituido la existencia de nuevas estructuras familiares, la presencia de facilitadores del delito como el alcohol, las drogas y las armas y se ha presenciado la degradación de los espacios urbanos. Este contexto ha dificultado y evidenciado la falta de capacidad institucional de los gobiernos locales para llevar a cabo políticas efectivas para la prevención y el control del delito.
Este documento busca 1) sintetizar los datos cuantitativos sobre denuncia y victimización disponi... more Este documento busca 1) sintetizar los datos cuantitativos sobre denuncia y victimización disponibles para los principales delitos y formas de violencia en Lima, para 2) establecer preguntas de investigación e hipótesis de trabajo sobre la situación y tendencia de dichos fenómenos.
El documento se sostiene en la revisión de datos estadísticos de varias fuentes, recogidos y organizados mediante fichas de registro cuantitativo y tablas de contingencia. Es evidente que un ejercicio de inventario se traduce en una lista amplia de elementos con fenomenologías y estructuras diferentes. A su vez, cada uno de esos elementos requiere profundidad e implica modelos analíticos propios. Por eso, se requiere determinar qué fenómenos son recurrentes en la literatura, así como discriminar aquellos sobre los cuáles no se puede hacer aproximaciones basadas en evidencia, de aquellos que reportan datos cuantitativos que permitan establecer una aproximación epidemiológica (tasas muy altas de denuncia o porcentajes altos de victimización, por ejemplo, tasas mayores a 10X por 100.000) (Van Dijk, Van Kesteren y Smit, 2008) o una disposición analítica relevante, relacionada con indicios de alta prevalencia o de subregistro (Alvazzi, 2003; Sozzo, 2003). Ello ha permitido seleccionar ciertos fenómenos para el registro y para ilustrar ideas e hipótesis que se plantean en tres grupos: datos sobre denuncia y victimización criminal, datos sobre formas de violencia no criminal y datos sobre percepciones sobre el sistema control formal del delito y la violencia.
Los Seminarios Violencias y criminalidad en las principales ciudades
andinas: Caracterización y p... more Los Seminarios Violencias y criminalidad en las principales ciudades andinas: Caracterización y políticas públicas, realizados en el marco del Programa Latinoamericano del Woodrow Wilson Center y subvencionados por el Corporación Andina de Fomento – Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina (en adelante CAF), propone cuatro objetivos: 1. Realizar un análisis actualizado y comparado de la evolución de los problemas de seguridad ciudadana en varias ciudades de los países andinos buscando entender causas comunes de la altísima victimización y de las diferencias en niveles de violencia; 2. Hacer un análisis comparado de la institucionalidad del Estado en relación a la seguridad ciudadana en esas ciudades, incluyendo la situación de los gobiernos locales, policías, administración de justicia y sistemas penitenciarios; 3. Revisar las políticas de convivencia y prevención del delito en las ciudades estudiadas, señalando sus éxitos, sus desafíos y su sostenibilidad; y 4. Contar con un conjunto de recomendaciones de política pública sobre políticas de seguridad ciudadana en base a la experiencia comparada de los países estudiados.
Los dos seminarios contaron con la participación de representantes de entidades públicas de Ecuador y Perú, tales como el Ministerio del Interior, Policía Nacional y el Congreso de la República. Asimismo, contaron con la asistencia de miembros de la sociedad civil y academia. Los encuentros se dividieron en dos momentos, luego de la mesa inaugural: Por la mañana, las exposiciones de los expertos. Por la tarde, una sesión de trabajo con los asistentes, para el intercambio de impresiones sobre los estudios expuestos. El presente documento de relatoría, resume las principales ideas expuestas durante ambos Seminarios.
Ubicándonos geográfica y analíticamente en la ciudad de Quito (Ecuador), en este informe presenta... more Ubicándonos geográfica y analíticamente en la ciudad de Quito (Ecuador), en este informe presentaremos algunas ideas en torno a los procesos, espacios, tiempos y racionalidades que actualmente estructuran las violencias en Quito, con la aspiración de que aporten a la comprensión de un fenómeno regional que a todas luces, hoy más que nunca, debe ser debatido y problematizado. En otras palabras, vemos que Quito se puede convertir en un caso interesante para comprender este proceso de existencia y persistencia de varias violencias en un mismo contexto; de allí el título del presente trabajo: Quito, un ensamble de violencias.
El objetivo del presente documento es identificar los avances y desafíos en la temática de la vio... more El objetivo del presente documento es identificar los avances y desafíos en la temática de la violencia y la inseguridad en Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia, así como proponer algunos ejes fundantes de iniciativas de política que pudieran servir para aumentar la seguridad de sus habitantes. Se pone especial énfasis en el contexto de las ciudades capitales y su situación de inseguridad y criminalidad.
In this paper, we seek to summarize some of the principal characteristics and drivers of urban vi... more In this paper, we seek to summarize some of the principal characteristics and drivers of urban violence in order to develop more targeted and effective policies to address it. First, we discuss how major structural problems like youth unemployment and inequality are related to common crime, organized crime, and violence. We emphasize the importance of understanding the local nature of urban violence and its tendency to occur and persist in specific geographic locations. Next, we look at some examples from the region that shed light on, and in some cases, confirm these ideas. Finally, we offer a series of policy options for addressing one of the region’s most persistent and vexing challenges.
Venezuela’s downward spiral has left the country poised between crisis and collapse.
Over the ... more Venezuela’s downward spiral has left the country poised between crisis and collapse.
Over the last three years, the country’s economy fell into a depression marked by severe shortages and hyperinflation; social protest frequently erupted into violent instability; and the little that remained of one of Latin America’s oldest democracies vanished, yielding an authoritarian regime. Worse yet, the already acute political crisis took a turn for the worse. The government now openly relies on military force and institutionalized repression to maintain a modicum of stability. The government of President Nicolás Maduro blocked the opposition’s constitutional push for a recall referendum, using its control over the judiciary and electoral institutions to suspend a process that mobilized millions. Then, after Vatican- and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)-sponsored talks between the Maduro Government and the opposition’s Mesa de la Unidad (The Democratic Roundtable) coalition broke down, the country’s human rights crisis escalated. Among other illegal detentions, the government arbitrarily jailed an elected member of Congress. As the rule of law further collapsed, the number of political prisoners rose to 116. Great uncertainty persists about whether gubernatorial elections postponed in 2016 will take place in 2017. Without any elections this year, Venezuela would likely experience a significant, but ultimately not destabilizing, street clash.
This sharp decline has brought the country, and the hemisphere, to a moment of truth.
Venezuela’s descent is the direct result of chavismo’s failed model. Yet Venezuelans must recognize that crafting a new, sustainable governance framework will require broad-based participation from political and civil society, including chavistas. For the hemisphere, the country’s current trajectory constitutes an unacceptable interruption of democracy while the possibility of collapse into civil strife poses an enormous danger for regional stability.
This report on the Venezuelan crisis and Latin America’s future considers what the United States and the inter-American community, acting diplomatically, including through the Organization of American States, can do in response to the current crisis, specifically with regards to the erosion of democratic norms and practice in Venezuela.
The aim of this research is to understand the role of transnational organized crime in human traf... more The aim of this research is to understand the role of transnational organized crime in human trafficking along Mexico’s eastern migration routes, from Central America to Mexico’s northeastern border. In this region, drug traffickers are smuggling and trafficking unauthorized migrants in order to diversify their revenue streams. This project analyzes the new role of Central American gangs and Mexican-origin drug trafficking organizations—now known as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)—in the trafficking of persons from Central America to Mexico’s northeastern border.
There are no simple or easy ways to understand the results of Colombia’s October 2 plebiscite on ... more There are no simple or easy ways to understand the results of Colombia’s October 2 plebiscite on the peace agreement between the government and the FARC.
The plebiscite results reflect the profound regional differences within the country. The “yes” vote won in regions that are the most isolated from the State and the market; in these places, the armed conflict with the FARC has had the greatest impact but the dividends of the ceasefire have yet to be experienced. The “no” vote, by contrast, took the lead in regions with greater access to the State and the market, areas where institutions exist and function more effectively.
Clearly, the “no” victory took many people by surprise. Although all of the polls leading up to the plebiscite indicated that the “yes” vote would win with a significant margin, the “no” eked out a victory with slightly more than 53,000 votes. The results reflect a country with profound differences between the center and periphery and between those who see the peace agreements as an opportunity and those who perceive them as a threat.
Added to this context is the indifference and disinterest of a significant portion of the population. Voter abstention rates were the highest they have been in the past 22 years. With 62.59 percent of voters sitting out the election, the rate of abstention of registered voters was higher even than during the most recent presidential elections in 2014; at that time, 59.91 percent of voters abstained in the first round and 52.03 percent did so in the second.
The victory of the “no” vote provides a strong dose of realism in a polarized, fragmented, and unequal country that now faces the task of finding a viable way to build peace in the midst of profound and persistent differences.
In April 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that annual growth in Latin Americ... more In April 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that annual growth in Latin America and the Caribbean would contract for a second straight year, the worst performance since the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Yet regional averages, dragged down by recession in Brazil and sharp economic decline in Venezuela, tell only part of the story. The countries of the Pacific Alliance—Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru—are not the region’s top performers in terms of GDP growth (that distinction falls to Panama and the Dominican Republic). But according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), their average annual growth rate between 2014 and 2016 is expected to total 2.6 percent, more than double the regional average. Together, the four Pacific Alliance (PA) countries constitute almost 40 percent of the regional economy but their collective exports are 55 percent of the region’s total.
The framework accord creating the Pacific Alliance was signed in 2012, aimed at increasing “the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people,” while also providing a unified platform for deeper integration with the Asia-Pacific region. A review of trade data from 2012 to 2014 suggests that progress toward these goals has been uneven.
Trade has almost uniformly and across multiple sectors decreased within the PA since 2013. Pacific Alliance countries have to a large extent continued to trade more substantially with their longstanding trading partners in large outside markets such as the United States and Europe. Overall, however, and at a time of economic slowdown throughout Latin America, the reductions in trade between and among Pacific Alliance countries in 2013 and 2014 have been smaller than the reductions in each country’s bilateral trade with Argentina and Brazil, South America’s two largest markets. This points to the greater stability of trade within the Pacific Alliance.
A closer look at the data indicates that some countries have performed better that the aggregate PA figures would suggest. Particularly noteworthy is the case of Colombia, which between 2013 and 2014 was the only country to increase its percentage of exports to and imports from Asia’s three largest markets: China, Japan, and South Korea. Some of the increase in bilateral trade as a percentage of total trade is due to the fact that Colombia is rather new to Asian markets. Nevertheless, the increase is nothing short of impressive.
While the aggregate picture of the PA shows little across-the-board success in improving intra-industry trade (the kind that creates value chains), Peru is performing relatively well in comparison to the other Pacific Alliance countries in terms of increasing exports to other Alliance members and achieving major improvements in the level of intra-industry trade, especially in the food products sector.
Exports from Brazil and Argentina—South America’s two largest economies—to China, Japan, and South Korea decreased across the board from 2013 to 2014, while some Pacific Alliance members were able to increase exports to the three largest Asian markets. Thus, in relative terms, members of the Pacific Alliance exhibited stronger export performance vis-à-vis Asian markets than did the two largest South American economies.
All in all, the relatively stronger performance of Pacific Alliance members vis-à-vis several Asian countries during a period of recessionary shocks indicates that Alliance members are—despite obstacles—making headway in bolstering trade relations with Asian partners, a key goal of Pacific Alliance integration.
Data over a longer period of time are needed to shed light on the future potential of the agreement as Latin America and the global economy continue to navigate a complex and challenging environment.
In spite of an all-encompassing economic and humanitarian crisis, Venezuela’s President Nicolás M... more In spite of an all-encompassing economic and humanitarian crisis, Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro is likely to emerge victorious in the upcoming May 2018 presidential elections, consolidating a fully authoritarian regime. Maduro has dismantled any vestige of the rule of law: he has incarcerated opposition leaders, banned political parties, stripped the popularly-elected National Assembly of its powers, and coerced voters. In addition, the Maduro regime has now put in place a powerful and effective mechanism for securing favorable electoral outcomes: the manipulation of hunger as a means to condition voting preferences. In a new study for the Wilson Center, Latin American Program Global Fellow Michael Penfold analyzes in detail the positioning of polling stations next to booths where people have to renew their chip-embedded “Fatherland Card” (Carnet de la Patria), used by the government to allot subsidized bags of food. This electronic card is linked in real time to big data related to an individual’s access to social security, public housing, public employment, health services, and direct cash transfers. It therefore has tremendous value for those dependent on these state benefits. Penfold also examines the likelihood that this new electoral and authoritarian technology will hinder future opposition victories.
In the past few years, Mexico has taken a number of steps to prevent and prosecute trafficking in... more In the past few years, Mexico has taken a number of steps to prevent and prosecute trafficking in persons, and to protect its victims. The country’s government has signed international anti-trafficking conventions and taken some aspects of widely-accepted international definitions of this crime into account when drafting its anti-trafficking legislation. However, Mexico’s current legislation is based on a broad definition of trafficking in persons that is inconsistent with international norms which, in turn, has led to misidentification of traffickers and victims, as well as their re-victimization. Mexico’s weak rule of law and corrupt institutions compound the issue. The present analysis demonstrates the imperative to modify the current anti-trafficking legislation in Mexico and provides some suggestions for this much-needed reform.
An effective justice system creates confidence in the rule of law, provides for legal certainty, ... more An effective justice system creates confidence in the rule of law, provides for legal certainty, and diffuses conflicts in society. To be effective, a justice system’s personnel must meet multiple criteria including professional competence and professional standards, especially for those with direct responsibility for the functioning of the justice system. Additional important criteria include the independence, impartiality, and autonomy of these public officeholders to ensure that they serve the public interest. Meeting these standards is directly linked to the quality of the selection process for judicial officials. Consequently, the selection process is crucial to the proper functioning of the state. In Guatemala, the appointment process for the officials who head the judiciary and the Attorney General’s Office (Ministerio Público) is regulated by the Political Constitution of the Republic. This body of law was enacted in 1985 after the country had undergone several military governments that led to coups d’états, 20 years of internal armed conflict, and a high degree of political instability. The new Constitution ushered in a democratic era that led to peace negotiations, which resulted in accords that brought an end to the civil conflict. In today’s context where new battles are waged on a daily basis to eradicate corruption and reduce violence, the selection of the next Attorney General is a main concern for Guatemalans and the international community. The United States has been an ally in the fight against corruption and has provided financial support to the institutions combatting it. A bipartisan group from the United States Congress has expressed its concern over the choice of the next Attorney General. Current Attorney General Thelma Aldana’s term in office is coming to a close. The Attorney General was appointed in May 2014 to a four-year term (2014-2018) and, accordingly, will step down from her position in mid-May 2018. She has played a leading role in prosecuting corruption-related cases. It is essential that her replacement continue the efforts she has led and take decisive action against lawbreakers.
Violence against women is one of the world’s greatest public health problems and one of Latin Ame... more Violence against women is one of the world’s greatest public health problems and one of Latin America’s major development challenges. Intrafamily violence is widespread in the region, affecting between 14 and 38 percent of all women throughout their lifetime. A series of studies commissioned by the Wilson Center and supported by the Inter-American Development Bank have begun to shed new light on the complex nature of this violence. Together, they contribute to evidence-based policy recommendations that could prevent the incidence of intrafamily violence and reduce the risks of future criminal behavior by affected children as they grow up. Read policy brief to learn more. / La violencia contra la mujer es uno de los mayores problemas de salud pública en el mundo, así como uno de los principales retos para el desarrollo de Latinoamérica. La violencia intrafamiliar se encuentra generalizada en la región y afecta de un 14 a un 38 por ciento de las mujeres en el transcurso de sus vidas. Gracias a una serie de estudios encargados por el Wilson Center con el apoyo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo se ha comenzado a arrojar luz respecto del carácter complejo de este tipo de violencia. En su conjunto, presentan recomendaciones de políticas con base en la evidencia que podrían prevenir la incidencia de la violencia intrafamiliar y reducir los riesgos de conductas delictivas futuras en los niños. Para aprender más, lea el resumen de políticas.
Biotechnology, widely believed to be “the next technological frontier,” is experiencing dynamic g... more Biotechnology, widely believed to be “the next technological frontier,” is experiencing dynamic growth in Argentina. The nation’s R&D expenditures exceed $80 million, compatible with those of countries of intermediate economic development (many of which have a per capita GDP above that of Argentina). Argentina produces 14 percent of the world’s biotech crops, making it the third largest producer after the United States and Brazil. Its 200+ biotech firms earn well over $2 billion and cover sectors such as human health, animal health, food processing, and agriculture. Despite the economic and political volatility in Argentina in recent decades, biotech firms have suffered very few failures and have attracted interest from the leading investment groups in the country.
In a new report, Global Fellow Jerry Haar discusses the ecosystem of biotechnology in Argentina, its structure and dynamics, and offers policy recommendations for the country to continue its role as a regional leader in the field.
Over the past decade, there has been a greater appreciation of how “following the money trail” di... more Over the past decade, there has been a greater appreciation of how “following the money trail” directly contributes to the fight against terrorism, crime, and corruption around the world. Money serves as the oxygen for any activity, licit or illicit; it is the critical enabler for any organization, from international crime syndicates like the Mexican cartels to terrorist groups like the FARC, ISIS, and Hezbollah. Financial intelligence has helped governments to better understand, detect, disrupt, and counter criminal and terrorist networks and expose political corruption.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and its Latin American partners have strengthened their ability to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and consciously incorporated the financial instrument of national power into their national security strategies. “Following the money trail,” counterterrorism, and Drug Kingpin sanctions and asset forfeiture have become particularly important to attack narco-insurgencies, dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and address political corruption scandals that have reached the highest levels of governments across Latin America.
This report focuses on the threats from money laundering and terrorist financing, distinguishing the two, and explains government efforts to counter illicit financing. It describes the ways illicit actors raise, move, store, and use money to pursue their dangerous agendas. Specific cases examining the FARC in Colombia, the 2015 fall of the Guatemalan government, and Brazil’s “Operation Car Wash” corruption scandal illustrate how governments use financial intelligence to pursue terrorists, criminals, corrupt politicians, and their financiers in Latin America. Finally, the report emphasizes the need to design, implement, and constantly update national and international strategies to combat the financing of emerging threats like terrorism, crime, and corruption and to safeguard our financial systems.
About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence... more About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence from their partners. Through a quantitative analysis, this report explores how violence rates against women vary by ethnic group and over time. Based on a nationally representative sample of more than 75,000 women surveyed between 2003 and 2012 and a review of the literature on ethnic classification in Peru, a typology is applied to measure ethnicity, based on women’s linguistic backgrounds, allowing for a consistent ethnic characterization throughout the period of analysis. In this typology, the first group is made up of women who speak an indigenous language at home and do not speak Spanish. A second group, called “historic” Spanish speakers, is composed of women who learned Spanish during childhood and still use it today, while the third group, called “recent” Spanish speakers, includes women who grew up speaking an indigenous language but now speak Spanish. The highest rate of all types of violence is found in this last group, with a much greater difference in sexual and severe physical violence. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model developed in this study in which violence depends on the type of couple. The model finds that women who speak “recent” Spanish—and who have what is termed a lower “outside option” than their “historic” Spanish-speaking male partners—experience greater violence. The study found that the gap in rates of violence against women among these three language groupings has remained constant over time despite an overall reduction in violence. This shows that current policies to provide care for victims and prevent violence against women are insufficient because the policies do not necessarily target groups with a greater risk of violence. This is unlike other areas of public health, where interventions are directly targeted at the most vulnerable populations. / Cerca de la mitad de las mujeres peruanas de entre 15 y 49 años han sufrido algún acto de violencia por parte de sus parejas. En este trabajo se explora mediante un análisis cuantitativo de qué manera las tasas de violencia contra la mujer varían por grupo étnico y en el tiempo. A partir de una muestra representativa a nivel nacional de más de 75.000 mujeres encuestadas entre 2003 y 2012 y de una revisión de la literatura sobre la clasificación étnica en Perú, se utilizó una tipología para medir la etnicidad a partir de los antecedentes lingüísticos de las mujeres. Esto permite una caracterización étnica consistente durante todo el periodo de análisis. En esta tipología, un primer grupo lo conforman mujeres que actualmente hablan una lengua indígena en el hogar y que no usan el castellano. Un segundo grupo, denominado castellano antiguo, está compuesto por mujeres para quienes el castellano fue el idioma aprendido en la niñez y el cual sigue siendo usado actualmente, mientras que el tercer grupo, llamado castellano reciente, agrupa a las mujeres que crecieron hablando una lengua indígena pero que ahora hablan castellano. Es en este último grupo donde se encuentran las tasas más altas en todos los tipos de violencia. Esta diferencia es mucho mayor en la violencia física severa y la sexual. Esto es consistente con las predicciones del modelo teórico desarrollado en el documento donde la violencia depende del tipo de emparejamiento y donde las mujeres con un outside option menor que el de sus parejas (por ejemplo, aquellas con castellano reciente) experimentan una mayor violencia. Se muestra además que la brecha en las tasas de violencia contra la mujer entre estos tres grupos se ha mantenido constante en el tiempo a pesar de la reducción global. A partir de estos hallazgos, el documento muestra que las actuales políticas para atender a las víctimas y prevenir la violencia contra la mujer serían insuficientes ya que no están necesariamente dirigidas a los grupos con mayor riesgo de violencia, como los definidos en este documento. Esto difiere de los enfoques aplicados en otras áreas de la salud pública donde las intervenciones apuntan directamente a las poblaciones más vulnerables.
This article, based on an analysis of the Survey of Convicted Prisoners from eight Latin American... more This article, based on an analysis of the Survey of Convicted Prisoners from eight Latin American countries, helps to expand knowledge about the association between victimization in childhood and the criminal behavior of individuals who have been incarcerated. The results of the multivariate regression models show that having grown up in a home in which the father/partner beat the mother (indirect violence) mainly affects women when it comes to future criminal behavior (both their likelihood of being repeat offenders and of having possessed firearms). / A partir del análisis de la Encuesta de Presos Condenados de ochos países de América Latina, el artículo contribuye a expandir el conocimiento sobre la asociación entre la victimización en la infancia y la conducta delictiva de los individuos privados de libertad. Los resultados de los modelos de regresión multivariada muestran que haber crecido en un hogar en donde el padre/pareja le pegaba a la madre (violencia indirecta) afecta principalmente a las mujeres en relación con su conducta delictiva (tanto en lo que respecta a su probabilidad de ser reincidentes como a la tenencia de armas de fuego). A la vez, se pone de manifiesto que haber sido víctima directa de maltrato es un factor que afecta tanto a mujeres como a varones en lo que respecta a la posibilidad de reincidir, pero en mayor proporción a los varones cuando se trata de la tenencia de armas de fuego. El artículo sugiere que las intervenciones orientadas a la prevención deben tener en cuenta estas diferencias de género para alcanzar una mayor efectividad. Las mujeres parecen estar afectadas por ambos tipos de victimización en la infancia, lo que conlleva a considerar que las estrategias de intervención para la población femenina deben estar orientadas en atender las dos modalidades de violencia (directa e indirecta). En cambio, las intervenciones en virtud de la prevención de conductas delictivas masculinas podrían focalizarse específicamente sobre la violencia familiar directa.
Uploads
Papers by Latin American Program Wilson Center
El documento se sostiene en la revisión de datos estadísticos de varias fuentes, recogidos y organizados mediante fichas de registro cuantitativo y tablas de contingencia. Es evidente que un ejercicio de inventario se traduce en una lista amplia de elementos con fenomenologías y estructuras diferentes. A su vez, cada uno de esos elementos requiere profundidad e implica modelos analíticos propios. Por eso, se requiere determinar qué fenómenos son recurrentes en la literatura, así como discriminar aquellos sobre los cuáles no se puede hacer aproximaciones basadas en evidencia, de aquellos que reportan datos cuantitativos que permitan establecer una aproximación epidemiológica (tasas muy altas de denuncia o porcentajes altos de victimización, por ejemplo, tasas mayores a 10X por 100.000) (Van Dijk, Van Kesteren y Smit, 2008) o una disposición analítica relevante, relacionada con indicios de alta prevalencia o de subregistro (Alvazzi, 2003; Sozzo, 2003). Ello ha permitido seleccionar ciertos fenómenos para el registro y para ilustrar ideas e hipótesis que se plantean en tres grupos: datos sobre denuncia y victimización criminal, datos sobre formas de violencia no criminal y datos sobre percepciones sobre el sistema control formal del delito y la violencia.
andinas: Caracterización y políticas públicas, realizados en el marco del Programa Latinoamericano del Woodrow Wilson Center y subvencionados por el Corporación Andina de Fomento – Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina (en adelante CAF), propone cuatro objetivos:
1. Realizar un análisis actualizado y comparado de la evolución de los problemas de seguridad ciudadana en varias ciudades de los países andinos buscando entender causas comunes de la altísima victimización y de las diferencias en niveles de violencia;
2. Hacer un análisis comparado de la institucionalidad del Estado en relación a la seguridad ciudadana en esas ciudades, incluyendo la situación de los gobiernos locales, policías, administración de justicia y sistemas penitenciarios;
3. Revisar las políticas de convivencia y prevención del delito en las ciudades estudiadas, señalando sus éxitos, sus desafíos y su sostenibilidad; y
4. Contar con un conjunto de recomendaciones de política pública sobre políticas de seguridad ciudadana en base a la experiencia comparada de los países estudiados.
Los dos seminarios contaron con la participación de representantes de entidades públicas de Ecuador y Perú, tales como el Ministerio del Interior, Policía Nacional y el Congreso de la República. Asimismo, contaron con la asistencia de miembros de la sociedad civil y academia. Los encuentros se dividieron en dos momentos, luego de la mesa inaugural: Por la mañana, las exposiciones de los expertos. Por la tarde, una sesión de trabajo con los asistentes, para el intercambio de impresiones sobre los estudios expuestos. El presente documento de relatoría, resume las principales ideas expuestas durante ambos Seminarios.
Over the last three years, the country’s economy fell into a depression marked by severe shortages and hyperinflation; social protest frequently erupted into violent instability; and the little that remained of one of Latin America’s oldest democracies vanished, yielding an authoritarian regime. Worse yet, the already acute political crisis took a turn for the worse. The government now openly relies on military force and institutionalized repression to maintain a modicum of stability. The government of President Nicolás Maduro blocked the opposition’s constitutional push for a recall referendum, using its control over the judiciary and electoral institutions to suspend a process that mobilized millions. Then, after Vatican- and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)-sponsored talks between the Maduro Government and the opposition’s Mesa de la Unidad (The Democratic Roundtable) coalition broke down, the country’s human rights crisis escalated. Among other illegal detentions, the government arbitrarily jailed an elected member of Congress. As the rule of law further collapsed, the number of political prisoners rose to 116. Great uncertainty persists about whether gubernatorial elections postponed in 2016 will take place in 2017. Without any elections this year, Venezuela would likely experience a significant, but ultimately not destabilizing, street clash.
This sharp decline has brought the country, and the hemisphere, to a moment of truth.
Venezuela’s descent is the direct result of chavismo’s failed model. Yet Venezuelans must recognize that crafting a new, sustainable governance framework will require broad-based participation from political and civil society, including chavistas. For the hemisphere, the country’s current trajectory constitutes an unacceptable interruption of democracy while the possibility of collapse into civil strife poses an enormous danger for regional stability.
This report on the Venezuelan crisis and Latin America’s future considers what the United States and the inter-American community, acting diplomatically, including through the Organization of American States, can do in response to the current crisis, specifically with regards to the erosion of democratic norms and practice in Venezuela.
The plebiscite results reflect the profound regional differences within the country. The “yes” vote won in regions that are the most isolated from the State and the market; in these places, the armed conflict with the FARC has had the greatest impact but the dividends of the ceasefire have yet to be experienced. The “no” vote, by contrast, took the lead in regions with greater access to the State and the market, areas where institutions exist and function more effectively.
Clearly, the “no” victory took many people by surprise. Although all of the polls leading up to the plebiscite indicated that the “yes” vote would win with a significant margin, the “no” eked out a victory with slightly more than 53,000 votes. The results reflect a country with profound differences between the center and periphery and between those who see the peace agreements as an opportunity and those who perceive them as a threat.
Added to this context is the indifference and disinterest of a significant portion of the population. Voter abstention rates were the highest they have been in the past 22 years. With 62.59 percent of voters sitting out the election, the rate of abstention of registered voters was higher even than during the most recent presidential elections in 2014; at that time, 59.91 percent of voters abstained in the first round and 52.03 percent did so in the second.
The victory of the “no” vote provides a strong dose of realism in a polarized, fragmented, and unequal country that now faces the task of finding a viable way to build peace in the midst of profound and persistent differences.
The framework accord creating the Pacific Alliance was signed in 2012, aimed at increasing “the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people,” while also providing a unified platform for deeper integration with the Asia-Pacific region. A review of trade data from 2012 to 2014 suggests that progress toward these goals has been uneven.
Trade has almost uniformly and across multiple sectors decreased within the PA since 2013. Pacific Alliance countries have to a large extent continued to trade more substantially with their longstanding trading partners in large outside markets such as the United States and Europe. Overall, however, and at a time of economic slowdown throughout Latin America, the reductions in trade between and among Pacific Alliance countries in 2013 and 2014 have been smaller than the reductions in each country’s bilateral trade with Argentina and Brazil, South America’s two largest markets. This points to the greater stability of trade within the Pacific Alliance.
A closer look at the data indicates that some countries have performed better that the aggregate PA figures would suggest. Particularly noteworthy is the case of Colombia, which between 2013 and 2014 was the only country to increase its percentage of exports to and imports from Asia’s three largest markets: China, Japan, and South Korea. Some of the increase in bilateral trade as a percentage of total trade is due to the fact that Colombia is rather new to Asian markets. Nevertheless, the increase is nothing short of impressive.
While the aggregate picture of the PA shows little across-the-board success in improving intra-industry trade (the kind that creates value chains), Peru is performing relatively well in comparison to the other Pacific Alliance countries in terms of increasing exports to other Alliance members and achieving major improvements in the level of intra-industry trade, especially in the food products sector.
Exports from Brazil and Argentina—South America’s two largest economies—to China, Japan, and South Korea decreased across the board from 2013 to 2014, while some Pacific Alliance members were able to increase exports to the three largest Asian markets. Thus, in relative terms, members of the Pacific Alliance exhibited stronger export performance vis-à-vis Asian markets than did the two largest South American economies.
All in all, the relatively stronger performance of Pacific Alliance members vis-à-vis several Asian countries during a period of recessionary shocks indicates that Alliance members are—despite obstacles—making headway in bolstering trade relations with Asian partners, a key goal of Pacific Alliance integration.
Data over a longer period of time are needed to shed light on the future potential of the agreement as Latin America and the global economy continue to navigate a complex and challenging environment.
In a new report, Global Fellow Jerry Haar discusses the ecosystem of biotechnology in Argentina, its structure and dynamics, and offers policy recommendations for the country to continue its role as a regional leader in the field.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and its Latin American partners have strengthened their ability to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and consciously incorporated the financial instrument of national power into their national security strategies. “Following the money trail,” counterterrorism, and Drug Kingpin sanctions and asset forfeiture have become particularly important to attack narco-insurgencies, dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and address political corruption scandals that have reached the highest levels of governments across Latin America.
This report focuses on the threats from money laundering and terrorist financing, distinguishing the two, and explains government efforts to counter illicit financing. It describes the ways illicit actors raise, move, store, and use money to pursue their dangerous agendas. Specific cases examining the FARC in Colombia, the 2015 fall of the Guatemalan government, and Brazil’s “Operation Car Wash” corruption scandal illustrate how governments use financial intelligence to pursue terrorists, criminals, corrupt politicians, and their financiers in Latin America. Finally, the report emphasizes the need to design, implement, and constantly update national and international strategies to combat the financing of emerging threats like terrorism, crime, and corruption and to safeguard our financial systems.
El documento se sostiene en la revisión de datos estadísticos de varias fuentes, recogidos y organizados mediante fichas de registro cuantitativo y tablas de contingencia. Es evidente que un ejercicio de inventario se traduce en una lista amplia de elementos con fenomenologías y estructuras diferentes. A su vez, cada uno de esos elementos requiere profundidad e implica modelos analíticos propios. Por eso, se requiere determinar qué fenómenos son recurrentes en la literatura, así como discriminar aquellos sobre los cuáles no se puede hacer aproximaciones basadas en evidencia, de aquellos que reportan datos cuantitativos que permitan establecer una aproximación epidemiológica (tasas muy altas de denuncia o porcentajes altos de victimización, por ejemplo, tasas mayores a 10X por 100.000) (Van Dijk, Van Kesteren y Smit, 2008) o una disposición analítica relevante, relacionada con indicios de alta prevalencia o de subregistro (Alvazzi, 2003; Sozzo, 2003). Ello ha permitido seleccionar ciertos fenómenos para el registro y para ilustrar ideas e hipótesis que se plantean en tres grupos: datos sobre denuncia y victimización criminal, datos sobre formas de violencia no criminal y datos sobre percepciones sobre el sistema control formal del delito y la violencia.
andinas: Caracterización y políticas públicas, realizados en el marco del Programa Latinoamericano del Woodrow Wilson Center y subvencionados por el Corporación Andina de Fomento – Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina (en adelante CAF), propone cuatro objetivos:
1. Realizar un análisis actualizado y comparado de la evolución de los problemas de seguridad ciudadana en varias ciudades de los países andinos buscando entender causas comunes de la altísima victimización y de las diferencias en niveles de violencia;
2. Hacer un análisis comparado de la institucionalidad del Estado en relación a la seguridad ciudadana en esas ciudades, incluyendo la situación de los gobiernos locales, policías, administración de justicia y sistemas penitenciarios;
3. Revisar las políticas de convivencia y prevención del delito en las ciudades estudiadas, señalando sus éxitos, sus desafíos y su sostenibilidad; y
4. Contar con un conjunto de recomendaciones de política pública sobre políticas de seguridad ciudadana en base a la experiencia comparada de los países estudiados.
Los dos seminarios contaron con la participación de representantes de entidades públicas de Ecuador y Perú, tales como el Ministerio del Interior, Policía Nacional y el Congreso de la República. Asimismo, contaron con la asistencia de miembros de la sociedad civil y academia. Los encuentros se dividieron en dos momentos, luego de la mesa inaugural: Por la mañana, las exposiciones de los expertos. Por la tarde, una sesión de trabajo con los asistentes, para el intercambio de impresiones sobre los estudios expuestos. El presente documento de relatoría, resume las principales ideas expuestas durante ambos Seminarios.
Over the last three years, the country’s economy fell into a depression marked by severe shortages and hyperinflation; social protest frequently erupted into violent instability; and the little that remained of one of Latin America’s oldest democracies vanished, yielding an authoritarian regime. Worse yet, the already acute political crisis took a turn for the worse. The government now openly relies on military force and institutionalized repression to maintain a modicum of stability. The government of President Nicolás Maduro blocked the opposition’s constitutional push for a recall referendum, using its control over the judiciary and electoral institutions to suspend a process that mobilized millions. Then, after Vatican- and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)-sponsored talks between the Maduro Government and the opposition’s Mesa de la Unidad (The Democratic Roundtable) coalition broke down, the country’s human rights crisis escalated. Among other illegal detentions, the government arbitrarily jailed an elected member of Congress. As the rule of law further collapsed, the number of political prisoners rose to 116. Great uncertainty persists about whether gubernatorial elections postponed in 2016 will take place in 2017. Without any elections this year, Venezuela would likely experience a significant, but ultimately not destabilizing, street clash.
This sharp decline has brought the country, and the hemisphere, to a moment of truth.
Venezuela’s descent is the direct result of chavismo’s failed model. Yet Venezuelans must recognize that crafting a new, sustainable governance framework will require broad-based participation from political and civil society, including chavistas. For the hemisphere, the country’s current trajectory constitutes an unacceptable interruption of democracy while the possibility of collapse into civil strife poses an enormous danger for regional stability.
This report on the Venezuelan crisis and Latin America’s future considers what the United States and the inter-American community, acting diplomatically, including through the Organization of American States, can do in response to the current crisis, specifically with regards to the erosion of democratic norms and practice in Venezuela.
The plebiscite results reflect the profound regional differences within the country. The “yes” vote won in regions that are the most isolated from the State and the market; in these places, the armed conflict with the FARC has had the greatest impact but the dividends of the ceasefire have yet to be experienced. The “no” vote, by contrast, took the lead in regions with greater access to the State and the market, areas where institutions exist and function more effectively.
Clearly, the “no” victory took many people by surprise. Although all of the polls leading up to the plebiscite indicated that the “yes” vote would win with a significant margin, the “no” eked out a victory with slightly more than 53,000 votes. The results reflect a country with profound differences between the center and periphery and between those who see the peace agreements as an opportunity and those who perceive them as a threat.
Added to this context is the indifference and disinterest of a significant portion of the population. Voter abstention rates were the highest they have been in the past 22 years. With 62.59 percent of voters sitting out the election, the rate of abstention of registered voters was higher even than during the most recent presidential elections in 2014; at that time, 59.91 percent of voters abstained in the first round and 52.03 percent did so in the second.
The victory of the “no” vote provides a strong dose of realism in a polarized, fragmented, and unequal country that now faces the task of finding a viable way to build peace in the midst of profound and persistent differences.
The framework accord creating the Pacific Alliance was signed in 2012, aimed at increasing “the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people,” while also providing a unified platform for deeper integration with the Asia-Pacific region. A review of trade data from 2012 to 2014 suggests that progress toward these goals has been uneven.
Trade has almost uniformly and across multiple sectors decreased within the PA since 2013. Pacific Alliance countries have to a large extent continued to trade more substantially with their longstanding trading partners in large outside markets such as the United States and Europe. Overall, however, and at a time of economic slowdown throughout Latin America, the reductions in trade between and among Pacific Alliance countries in 2013 and 2014 have been smaller than the reductions in each country’s bilateral trade with Argentina and Brazil, South America’s two largest markets. This points to the greater stability of trade within the Pacific Alliance.
A closer look at the data indicates that some countries have performed better that the aggregate PA figures would suggest. Particularly noteworthy is the case of Colombia, which between 2013 and 2014 was the only country to increase its percentage of exports to and imports from Asia’s three largest markets: China, Japan, and South Korea. Some of the increase in bilateral trade as a percentage of total trade is due to the fact that Colombia is rather new to Asian markets. Nevertheless, the increase is nothing short of impressive.
While the aggregate picture of the PA shows little across-the-board success in improving intra-industry trade (the kind that creates value chains), Peru is performing relatively well in comparison to the other Pacific Alliance countries in terms of increasing exports to other Alliance members and achieving major improvements in the level of intra-industry trade, especially in the food products sector.
Exports from Brazil and Argentina—South America’s two largest economies—to China, Japan, and South Korea decreased across the board from 2013 to 2014, while some Pacific Alliance members were able to increase exports to the three largest Asian markets. Thus, in relative terms, members of the Pacific Alliance exhibited stronger export performance vis-à-vis Asian markets than did the two largest South American economies.
All in all, the relatively stronger performance of Pacific Alliance members vis-à-vis several Asian countries during a period of recessionary shocks indicates that Alliance members are—despite obstacles—making headway in bolstering trade relations with Asian partners, a key goal of Pacific Alliance integration.
Data over a longer period of time are needed to shed light on the future potential of the agreement as Latin America and the global economy continue to navigate a complex and challenging environment.
In a new report, Global Fellow Jerry Haar discusses the ecosystem of biotechnology in Argentina, its structure and dynamics, and offers policy recommendations for the country to continue its role as a regional leader in the field.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and its Latin American partners have strengthened their ability to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and consciously incorporated the financial instrument of national power into their national security strategies. “Following the money trail,” counterterrorism, and Drug Kingpin sanctions and asset forfeiture have become particularly important to attack narco-insurgencies, dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and address political corruption scandals that have reached the highest levels of governments across Latin America.
This report focuses on the threats from money laundering and terrorist financing, distinguishing the two, and explains government efforts to counter illicit financing. It describes the ways illicit actors raise, move, store, and use money to pursue their dangerous agendas. Specific cases examining the FARC in Colombia, the 2015 fall of the Guatemalan government, and Brazil’s “Operation Car Wash” corruption scandal illustrate how governments use financial intelligence to pursue terrorists, criminals, corrupt politicians, and their financiers in Latin America. Finally, the report emphasizes the need to design, implement, and constantly update national and international strategies to combat the financing of emerging threats like terrorism, crime, and corruption and to safeguard our financial systems.