Brentano and Marty on Content: A Synthesis suggested by Brentano.- 1 Brentano's Final View.- ... more Brentano and Marty on Content: A Synthesis suggested by Brentano.- 1 Brentano's Final View.- 2 Attribution in Modo Recto and in Modo Obliquo.- 3 Object and Content.- 4 Other Intentional Attitudes.- 5 Immanent Objects and Transcendent Objects.- 6 Conclusion.- Marty's Philosophical Grammar.- 1 Introduction.- 2 The Descriptive Psychology of Meaning: Linguistic Functions.- 3 Propositions Show What would be the Case were they True.- 4 Vagueness.- 5 Meaning Change, Inner Form and Universals.- 6 Marty and Wittgenstein: Two Conceptions of Philosophical Grammar.- Meaning and Expression: Marty and Grice on Intentional Semantics.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Philosophy of Language as a General Theory.- 3 Natural and Non-Natural Meaning.- 4 Primary and Secondary Intentions.- 5 Auto-Semantic Language Devices.- 6 Conclusion.- Marty on Form and Content in Language.- 1 Inner Speech Form in some of Marty's Early Works.- 2 Logic, Grammar and Psychology.- 3 Form and Content in Marty's Later Works.- 4 Some Fundamental Tenets of Universal Grammar.- Why a Proper Name has a Meaning: Marty and Landgrebe vs. Kripke.- 1 Preliminaries.- 2 Kripke's View.- 3 The Question of the Semantic Status of Proper Names.- 4 Meaning and Lexical Meaning.- 5 Reference and Meaning in Marty.- 6 Ambiguity and Vagueness.- 7 Landgrebe's Solution.- 8 Conclusion.- The Categorical and the Thetic Judgement Reconsidered.- 1 Marty and Transformational Grammar.- 2 Categorical and Thetic Judgements.- 3 Reinterpreting the Categorical-Thetic Distinction.- 4 Conclusion.- Classical and Modern Work on Universals: The Philosophical Background and Marty's Contribution.- 1 Categories of Meaning vs. Categories of Expression.- 2 Relativism and Colour.- 3 Natural Non-Absolute Universals.- Marty and Magnus on Colours.- Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth.- 1 Aristotle and Brentano.- 2 Existence and Reality.- 3 Bases and Operations.- 4 Collectives are Non-Real.- 5 Relations are Non-Real.- 6 Space is Non-Real.- 7 States of Affairs are Non-Real.- 8 On the Origins of our Concepts of Existence and Truth.- 9 A Correspondence Theory of Intentionality.- 10 The Ontology of Truth.- 11 Wertverhalte or Value-Contents.- 12 A Postscript on Martian Aesthetics.- Marty on Grounded Relations.- Marty on Time.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Tasks of a Philosophy of Time.- 3 Marty on the Ontology of Time.- 4 Marty on the Consciousness of Time.- 5 Conclusion.- Marty's Theory of Space.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Marty's Two Basic Metaphysical Theses.- 3 A Sketch of Marty's Argument.- 4 Conclusion.- Judgement-Contents.- 1 Preliminary Remark.- 2 Conceptual Framework.- 3 Marty's Judgement-Contents.- 4 Comments.- 5 Final Remark.- of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Daubert and Marty.- 1 Phenomenologists and Brentanists.- 2 Marty on Subjectless Sentences.- 3 Daubert's Discussion of Marty.- 4 Shortcomings in Marty.- 5 Marty's Theory in Phenomenological Perspective.- Marty and the Lvov-Warsaw School.- Two Letters from Marty to Husserl.- A Bibliography of Works by and on Anton Marty.- 1 Works by Marty.- 2 Works on Marty.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.
Introduction Realism and Idealism Absolutism and Relativism Pragmatism The Coherence Theory Defla... more Introduction Realism and Idealism Absolutism and Relativism Pragmatism The Coherence Theory Deflationism The Correspondence Theory Truth and Knowledge Conclusion.
A theory of truth is supposed to tell us what it is for something to be true or false. But what k... more A theory of truth is supposed to tell us what it is for something to be true or false. But what kind of “something” is at issue here? What are the bearers of truth and falsehood? Philosophical discussions of truth tend to revolve around four broad categories of truth bearers: sentences (utterances), statements (assertions), beliefs (judgments, thoughts), and propositions. The significant differences among these four categories are responsible for a considerable amount of complexity in the theory of truth. It seems unlikely that a single feature could account for ‘x is true’ with ‘x’ ranging over truth bearers of arbitrary type. Instead, a general theory of truth will have to take the form of a disjunction: x is true just in case x is either a true sentence or a true statement or a true belief or a true proposition. Here the general notion of truth is partitioned into four subnotions, sentence-truth, statement-truth, belief-truth, and proposition-truth, each of which will have to be given its own account. Still, the over-all theory will aim to show that the general notion of truth is not just a bare disjunction; it will aim to show that the subnotions are all tied (each in its own manner) to a single explanatory ground. One way to achieve this is by selecting a category of basic truth bearers and taking the associated subnotion of truth as primary, while treating the others as derived. The primary notion has to be explained in terms of some feature that does not itself contain any notion of truth. The derived notions have to be explained in terms of the primary notion together with certain relations that hold between the basic truth bearers, on the one hand, and the non-basic truth bearers on the other. A theory with this structure will give at least some unity to the general notion of truth.
This volume collects papers on central aspects of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of Obj... more This volume collects papers on central aspects of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of Objects) and its transformation in contemporary logic, semantics and ontology covering the impact of his views on grasping and representation, the status of nonexistent or inconsistent objects and their incorporation in theories like Noneism and Possible-World-Semantics, as well as studies on Meinong's notion of probability.
The paper explores Lehrer’s notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between t... more The paper explores Lehrer’s notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them; it adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer’s views on these topics have evolved over the years.
Brentano and Marty on Content: A Synthesis suggested by Brentano.- 1 Brentano's Final View.- ... more Brentano and Marty on Content: A Synthesis suggested by Brentano.- 1 Brentano's Final View.- 2 Attribution in Modo Recto and in Modo Obliquo.- 3 Object and Content.- 4 Other Intentional Attitudes.- 5 Immanent Objects and Transcendent Objects.- 6 Conclusion.- Marty's Philosophical Grammar.- 1 Introduction.- 2 The Descriptive Psychology of Meaning: Linguistic Functions.- 3 Propositions Show What would be the Case were they True.- 4 Vagueness.- 5 Meaning Change, Inner Form and Universals.- 6 Marty and Wittgenstein: Two Conceptions of Philosophical Grammar.- Meaning and Expression: Marty and Grice on Intentional Semantics.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Philosophy of Language as a General Theory.- 3 Natural and Non-Natural Meaning.- 4 Primary and Secondary Intentions.- 5 Auto-Semantic Language Devices.- 6 Conclusion.- Marty on Form and Content in Language.- 1 Inner Speech Form in some of Marty's Early Works.- 2 Logic, Grammar and Psychology.- 3 Form and Content in Marty's Later Works.- 4 Some Fundamental Tenets of Universal Grammar.- Why a Proper Name has a Meaning: Marty and Landgrebe vs. Kripke.- 1 Preliminaries.- 2 Kripke's View.- 3 The Question of the Semantic Status of Proper Names.- 4 Meaning and Lexical Meaning.- 5 Reference and Meaning in Marty.- 6 Ambiguity and Vagueness.- 7 Landgrebe's Solution.- 8 Conclusion.- The Categorical and the Thetic Judgement Reconsidered.- 1 Marty and Transformational Grammar.- 2 Categorical and Thetic Judgements.- 3 Reinterpreting the Categorical-Thetic Distinction.- 4 Conclusion.- Classical and Modern Work on Universals: The Philosophical Background and Marty's Contribution.- 1 Categories of Meaning vs. Categories of Expression.- 2 Relativism and Colour.- 3 Natural Non-Absolute Universals.- Marty and Magnus on Colours.- Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth.- 1 Aristotle and Brentano.- 2 Existence and Reality.- 3 Bases and Operations.- 4 Collectives are Non-Real.- 5 Relations are Non-Real.- 6 Space is Non-Real.- 7 States of Affairs are Non-Real.- 8 On the Origins of our Concepts of Existence and Truth.- 9 A Correspondence Theory of Intentionality.- 10 The Ontology of Truth.- 11 Wertverhalte or Value-Contents.- 12 A Postscript on Martian Aesthetics.- Marty on Grounded Relations.- Marty on Time.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Tasks of a Philosophy of Time.- 3 Marty on the Ontology of Time.- 4 Marty on the Consciousness of Time.- 5 Conclusion.- Marty's Theory of Space.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Marty's Two Basic Metaphysical Theses.- 3 A Sketch of Marty's Argument.- 4 Conclusion.- Judgement-Contents.- 1 Preliminary Remark.- 2 Conceptual Framework.- 3 Marty's Judgement-Contents.- 4 Comments.- 5 Final Remark.- of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Daubert and Marty.- 1 Phenomenologists and Brentanists.- 2 Marty on Subjectless Sentences.- 3 Daubert's Discussion of Marty.- 4 Shortcomings in Marty.- 5 Marty's Theory in Phenomenological Perspective.- Marty and the Lvov-Warsaw School.- Two Letters from Marty to Husserl.- A Bibliography of Works by and on Anton Marty.- 1 Works by Marty.- 2 Works on Marty.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.
Introduction Realism and Idealism Absolutism and Relativism Pragmatism The Coherence Theory Defla... more Introduction Realism and Idealism Absolutism and Relativism Pragmatism The Coherence Theory Deflationism The Correspondence Theory Truth and Knowledge Conclusion.
A theory of truth is supposed to tell us what it is for something to be true or false. But what k... more A theory of truth is supposed to tell us what it is for something to be true or false. But what kind of “something” is at issue here? What are the bearers of truth and falsehood? Philosophical discussions of truth tend to revolve around four broad categories of truth bearers: sentences (utterances), statements (assertions), beliefs (judgments, thoughts), and propositions. The significant differences among these four categories are responsible for a considerable amount of complexity in the theory of truth. It seems unlikely that a single feature could account for ‘x is true’ with ‘x’ ranging over truth bearers of arbitrary type. Instead, a general theory of truth will have to take the form of a disjunction: x is true just in case x is either a true sentence or a true statement or a true belief or a true proposition. Here the general notion of truth is partitioned into four subnotions, sentence-truth, statement-truth, belief-truth, and proposition-truth, each of which will have to be given its own account. Still, the over-all theory will aim to show that the general notion of truth is not just a bare disjunction; it will aim to show that the subnotions are all tied (each in its own manner) to a single explanatory ground. One way to achieve this is by selecting a category of basic truth bearers and taking the associated subnotion of truth as primary, while treating the others as derived. The primary notion has to be explained in terms of some feature that does not itself contain any notion of truth. The derived notions have to be explained in terms of the primary notion together with certain relations that hold between the basic truth bearers, on the one hand, and the non-basic truth bearers on the other. A theory with this structure will give at least some unity to the general notion of truth.
This volume collects papers on central aspects of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of Obj... more This volume collects papers on central aspects of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of Objects) and its transformation in contemporary logic, semantics and ontology covering the impact of his views on grasping and representation, the status of nonexistent or inconsistent objects and their incorporation in theories like Noneism and Possible-World-Semantics, as well as studies on Meinong's notion of probability.
The paper explores Lehrer’s notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between t... more The paper explores Lehrer’s notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them; it adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer’s views on these topics have evolved over the years.
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