The classic explanation for the persistence and volatility of real exchange rates is that they ar... more The classic explanation for the persistence and volatility of real exchange rates is that they are the result of nominal shocks in an economy with sticky goods prices. A key implication of this explanation is that if goods in different sectors differing degrees of price stickiness then goods in the relatively sticky sectors tend to have relatively more persistent and volatile good-level real exchange rates. Using panel data, we find only modest support for these key implications. The predictions of the theory for persistence have some modest support: in the data, the stickier is the price of a good the more persistent is its real exchange rate, but the theory predicts much more variation in persistence than is in the data. The predictions of the theory for volatiity fare less well: in the data, the stickier is the price of a good the smaller is its conditional variance while in the theory the opposite holds. An alternative explanation is that the real exchange rates are driven by real productivity shocks, so that goods with more volatile and persistent real exchange rates should be in sectors with more volatile and persistent productivity shocks. We find little evidence for this explanation as well. In sum, cross section data is puzzling for existing models of real exchange rates.
We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constra... more We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.
The classic explanation for the persistence and volatility of real exchange rates is that they ar... more The classic explanation for the persistence and volatility of real exchange rates is that they are the result of nominal shocks in an economy with sticky goods prices. A key implication of this explanation is that if goods in different sectors differing degrees of price stickiness then goods in the relatively sticky sectors tend to have relatively more persistent and volatile good-level real exchange rates. Using panel data, we find only modest support for these key implications. The predictions of the theory for persistence have some modest support: in the data, the stickier is the price of a good the more persistent is its real exchange rate, but the theory predicts much more variation in persistence than is in the data. The predictions of the theory for volatiity fare less well: in the data, the stickier is the price of a good the smaller is its conditional variance while in the theory the opposite holds. An alternative explanation is that the real exchange rates are driven by real productivity shocks, so that goods with more volatile and persistent real exchange rates should be in sectors with more volatile and persistent productivity shocks. We find little evidence for this explanation as well. In sum, cross section data is puzzling for existing models of real exchange rates.
We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constra... more We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.
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