Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '99, 1999
Abstract In a secure multi - party computation a set of mutually distrustful parties interact in ... more Abstract In a secure multi - party computation a set of mutually distrustful parties interact in order to evaluate a pre - de ned function of their inputs, without revealing the inputs to each other In this scenario, the trust in other parties should be minimal In the classic formulation of this problem, most of the parties are trusted to exactly follow the prescribed protocol, except for a limited number of parties that are corrupted by a centralized adversary and are allowed to deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way However, an assumption of a totally honest behavior of most parties can not be veri ed In particular, if an \honest - looking" party diverges from its protocol in a way that is indistinguishable from a totally honest player, it can do so with \impunity" In this paper, we consider the situation where all parties (even uncorrupted ones) may deviate from their protocol in arbitrary ways, under the sole restriction that most of the parties do not risk being detected by other parties as deviating from the protocol execution The question whether secure protocols exist in this scenario was raised in the past, and solutions for very limited deviations from the protocol (i e , refraining from erasing data) were given Yet, solving the general problem was believed hard, if at all possible Contrary to this belief, we show that if secure communication channels are provided (and one - way functions exist) then any polynomial function can be securely computed in this scenario
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '93, 1993
The Byzantine Agreement problem is one of the most ... [~1-resilient. The only known asynchronous... more The Byzantine Agreement problem is one of the most ... [~1-resilient. The only known asynchronous ([~1 - l)- ... A long standing open question is whether there exists a fast asynchronous ([:1 1)-resilient BA protocol. We answer this question in the affirmative. We con-
Abstract. Extractable functions are functions where any adversary that outputs a point in the ran... more Abstract. Extractable functions are functions where any adversary that outputs a point in the range of the function is guaranteed to “know” a corresponding preimage. Here, knowledge is captured by the existence of an efficient extractor that recovers the preimage,from the internal state of the adversary. Extractability of functions was defined by the authors (ICALP’08) in the context of perfectly
Previous work on program obfuscation gives strong negative results for general-purpose obfuscator... more Previous work on program obfuscation gives strong negative results for general-purpose obfuscators, and positive results for obfuscating simple functions such as equality testing (point functions). In this work, we construct an obfuscator for a more complex algebraic functionality: testing for membership in a hyperplane (of constant dimension). We prove the security of the obfuscator under a new strong variant of
Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '99, 1999
Abstract In a secure multi - party computation a set of mutually distrustful parties interact in ... more Abstract In a secure multi - party computation a set of mutually distrustful parties interact in order to evaluate a pre - de ned function of their inputs, without revealing the inputs to each other In this scenario, the trust in other parties should be minimal In the classic formulation of this problem, most of the parties are trusted to exactly follow the prescribed protocol, except for a limited number of parties that are corrupted by a centralized adversary and are allowed to deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way However, an assumption of a totally honest behavior of most parties can not be veri ed In particular, if an \honest - looking" party diverges from its protocol in a way that is indistinguishable from a totally honest player, it can do so with \impunity" In this paper, we consider the situation where all parties (even uncorrupted ones) may deviate from their protocol in arbitrary ways, under the sole restriction that most of the parties do not risk being detected by other parties as deviating from the protocol execution The question whether secure protocols exist in this scenario was raised in the past, and solutions for very limited deviations from the protocol (i e , refraining from erasing data) were given Yet, solving the general problem was believed hard, if at all possible Contrary to this belief, we show that if secure communication channels are provided (and one - way functions exist) then any polynomial function can be securely computed in this scenario
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '93, 1993
The Byzantine Agreement problem is one of the most ... [~1-resilient. The only known asynchronous... more The Byzantine Agreement problem is one of the most ... [~1-resilient. The only known asynchronous ([~1 - l)- ... A long standing open question is whether there exists a fast asynchronous ([:1 1)-resilient BA protocol. We answer this question in the affirmative. We con-
Abstract. Extractable functions are functions where any adversary that outputs a point in the ran... more Abstract. Extractable functions are functions where any adversary that outputs a point in the range of the function is guaranteed to “know” a corresponding preimage. Here, knowledge is captured by the existence of an efficient extractor that recovers the preimage,from the internal state of the adversary. Extractability of functions was defined by the authors (ICALP’08) in the context of perfectly
Previous work on program obfuscation gives strong negative results for general-purpose obfuscator... more Previous work on program obfuscation gives strong negative results for general-purpose obfuscators, and positive results for obfuscating simple functions such as equality testing (point functions). In this work, we construct an obfuscator for a more complex algebraic functionality: testing for membership in a hyperplane (of constant dimension). We prove the security of the obfuscator under a new strong variant of
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Papers by Ran Canetti