Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existen... more Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existence and significance of an analogy between biological phenomena and socio-cultural phenomena (the "biology-culture analogy"). Mesoudi (2017) seems to argue that it is the accuracy of the analogy, and the magnitude of accurate instances of this analogy at work, which provides warrant for an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena, and, thus, for CET. An implication of this is that if there is evidence to suggest that the analogy is not accurate, or that there aren't many cases where it is accurate, this would constitute evidence to reject an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena. As such, opponents of CET raise objections highlighting the weakness of the biology-culture. These objections, in turn, have standard replies in the literature that serve to reinforce the realism of the biology-culture analogy. Curiously, this situation would appear to support a position in the philosophy of social science called "Ontology Matters" (Lauer 2019). It is the view that social ontology can contribute to the empirical success of the social sciences (among Cultural Evolutionary Theory and the Significance of the Biology-Culture Analogy __________________________________________________________________________________ which I include CET) by providing an accurate account of what there is in the domain of the social world which can be used to generate better explanations and/or predictions of social phenomena. If ontology matters, in this sense, perhaps they can help to clarify and resolve the dispute regarding the realism of the biology-culture analogy. In turn, perhaps this can help us determine what warrant there is for CET. However, I think this situation is indicative of severe confusion and misunderstanding as to the significance of the biology-culture analogy. This confusion is caused by inattention to two things. First, the useful distinction between it's methodological, epistemological, and ontological significance. Second, the abstract (ontologically minimalist) nature of Darwinian evolution by natural selection. By drawing attention to these two things, I hope to take the sting out of, and deflate the significance of, disputes regarding the accuracy of the analogy, for both proponents and opponents of CET, as well as to bring into contact a classical dispute in the philosophy of social science with some relevant aspects of theoretical biology.
Fiery Cushman argues that "[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious ment... more Fiery Cushman argues that "[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious mental states, but to construct new ones; it is not a discovery, but a fiction". While we agree in broad strokes with the characterization of rationalization as a 'useful fiction', we think that Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (i) the reality of beliefs and desires, i.e. the fictional status of folk psychological entities, and (ii) the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. Our aim here is to clarify both points and illuminate how rationalization could be understood as a useful fiction. In doing so, we aim to explicate the Rationale of Rationalization. Commentary: Post-hoc rationalisation, i.e., retrospectively attributing or constructing 'hidden' beliefs and desires inferred from how one has behaved in the past, has traditionally been seen to threaten the idea that humans are 'rational', since it happens subsequent to the process under consideration. If the relevant mental states that are supposed to rationalize an action only come into existence after the action has occurred, then they cannot be treated as the cause of that action. However, Cushman argues that a post-hoc process of this kind can still be seen as 'rational' in the sense that it constructs new beliefs and desires that both serve a useful function and track some underlying adaptive rationales that have shaped the behaviour being rationalized. Rationalization, according to Cushman, is supposed to be a 'useful fiction'. We think that this proposal invites two serious ambiguities, firstly to do with the ontological status of the mental states that are the outputs of rationalisation (i.e., folk psychological states like beliefs and desires), and secondly to do with the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. We will address each ambiguity in turn, using our resolution of the latter to help resolve the former.
Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existen... more Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existence and significance of an analogy between biological phenomena and socio-cultural phenomena (the “biology-culture analogy”). Mesoudi (2017) seems to argue that it is the accuracy of the analogy, and the magnitude of accurate instances of this analogy at work, which provides warrant for an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena, and, thus, for CET. An implication of this is that if there is evidence to suggest that the analogy is not accurate, or that there aren’t many cases where it is accurate, this would constitute evidence to reject an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena. As such, opponents of CET raise objections highlighting the weakness of the biology-culture analogy. These objections, in turn, have standard replies in the literature that serve to reinforce the realism of the biology-culture analogy. Curiously, this situation would...
Fiery Cushman argues that “[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious ment... more Fiery Cushman argues that “[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious mental states, but to construct new ones; it is not a discovery, but a fiction”. While we agree in broad strokes with the characterization of rationalization as a ‘useful fiction’, we think that Cushman’s claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (i) the reality of beliefs and desires, i.e. the fictional status of folk psychological entities, and (ii) the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. Our aim here is to clarify both points and illuminate how rationalization could be understood as a useful fiction. In doing so, we aim to explicate the Rationale of Rationalization.
Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existen... more Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existence and significance of an analogy between biological phenomena and socio-cultural phenomena (the "biology-culture analogy"). Mesoudi (2017) seems to argue that it is the accuracy of the analogy, and the magnitude of accurate instances of this analogy at work, which provides warrant for an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena, and, thus, for CET. An implication of this is that if there is evidence to suggest that the analogy is not accurate, or that there aren't many cases where it is accurate, this would constitute evidence to reject an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena. As such, opponents of CET raise objections highlighting the weakness of the biology-culture. These objections, in turn, have standard replies in the literature that serve to reinforce the realism of the biology-culture analogy. Curiously, this situation would appear to support a position in the philosophy of social science called "Ontology Matters" (Lauer 2019). It is the view that social ontology can contribute to the empirical success of the social sciences (among Cultural Evolutionary Theory and the Significance of the Biology-Culture Analogy __________________________________________________________________________________ which I include CET) by providing an accurate account of what there is in the domain of the social world which can be used to generate better explanations and/or predictions of social phenomena. If ontology matters, in this sense, perhaps they can help to clarify and resolve the dispute regarding the realism of the biology-culture analogy. In turn, perhaps this can help us determine what warrant there is for CET. However, I think this situation is indicative of severe confusion and misunderstanding as to the significance of the biology-culture analogy. This confusion is caused by inattention to two things. First, the useful distinction between it's methodological, epistemological, and ontological significance. Second, the abstract (ontologically minimalist) nature of Darwinian evolution by natural selection. By drawing attention to these two things, I hope to take the sting out of, and deflate the significance of, disputes regarding the accuracy of the analogy, for both proponents and opponents of CET, as well as to bring into contact a classical dispute in the philosophy of social science with some relevant aspects of theoretical biology.
Fiery Cushman argues that "[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious ment... more Fiery Cushman argues that "[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious mental states, but to construct new ones; it is not a discovery, but a fiction". While we agree in broad strokes with the characterization of rationalization as a 'useful fiction', we think that Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (i) the reality of beliefs and desires, i.e. the fictional status of folk psychological entities, and (ii) the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. Our aim here is to clarify both points and illuminate how rationalization could be understood as a useful fiction. In doing so, we aim to explicate the Rationale of Rationalization. Commentary: Post-hoc rationalisation, i.e., retrospectively attributing or constructing 'hidden' beliefs and desires inferred from how one has behaved in the past, has traditionally been seen to threaten the idea that humans are 'rational', since it happens subsequent to the process under consideration. If the relevant mental states that are supposed to rationalize an action only come into existence after the action has occurred, then they cannot be treated as the cause of that action. However, Cushman argues that a post-hoc process of this kind can still be seen as 'rational' in the sense that it constructs new beliefs and desires that both serve a useful function and track some underlying adaptive rationales that have shaped the behaviour being rationalized. Rationalization, according to Cushman, is supposed to be a 'useful fiction'. We think that this proposal invites two serious ambiguities, firstly to do with the ontological status of the mental states that are the outputs of rationalisation (i.e., folk psychological states like beliefs and desires), and secondly to do with the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. We will address each ambiguity in turn, using our resolution of the latter to help resolve the former.
Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existen... more Throughout the literature on Cultural Evolutionary Theory (CET) attention is drawn to the existence and significance of an analogy between biological phenomena and socio-cultural phenomena (the “biology-culture analogy”). Mesoudi (2017) seems to argue that it is the accuracy of the analogy, and the magnitude of accurate instances of this analogy at work, which provides warrant for an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena, and, thus, for CET. An implication of this is that if there is evidence to suggest that the analogy is not accurate, or that there aren’t many cases where it is accurate, this would constitute evidence to reject an evolutionary approach to the study of socio-cultural phenomena. As such, opponents of CET raise objections highlighting the weakness of the biology-culture analogy. These objections, in turn, have standard replies in the literature that serve to reinforce the realism of the biology-culture analogy. Curiously, this situation would...
Fiery Cushman argues that “[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious ment... more Fiery Cushman argues that “[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious mental states, but to construct new ones; it is not a discovery, but a fiction”. While we agree in broad strokes with the characterization of rationalization as a ‘useful fiction’, we think that Cushman’s claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (i) the reality of beliefs and desires, i.e. the fictional status of folk psychological entities, and (ii) the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. Our aim here is to clarify both points and illuminate how rationalization could be understood as a useful fiction. In doing so, we aim to explicate the Rationale of Rationalization.
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