Human embryonic stem cell research raises a raft of legal issues that cut across substantive area... more Human embryonic stem cell research raises a raft of legal issues that cut across substantive areas of law. This paper categorizes and analyzes issues concerning the regulation of research, patent protection for stem cell innovations, informed consent of research subjects, and property rights in human tissue. Each part attempts to identify the most important and salient legal issues for researchers and policy makers, describe the current state of the law, and critically analyze that law.
1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding prope... more 1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding property 3. Persons and their bodies 4. Body rights and the constitution Part II. From Individuals to Social Context: 5. Incorporation and projection 6. Control, privacy and individuality 7. Property and moral character 8. Alienation and society Part III. Justification and Distributive Equity: 9. Utility and efficiency 10. Justice and equality 11. Labor and desert 12. Conflict and resolution Part IV. Applications: 13. Business corporations 14. Gratuitous transfers 15. A moral and political theory of takings 16. Takings and the constitution Table of cases Index of names Index of subjects.
The American journal of pediatric hematology/oncology, May 1, 2001
Advertisement. Close Window. Close Window. Thank you for choosing to subscribe to the eTOC for Jo... more Advertisement. Close Window. Close Window. Thank you for choosing to subscribe to the eTOC for Journal of Pediatric Hematology/Oncology. Enter your Email address: Wolters Kluwer Health may email you for journal alerts ...
1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding prope... more 1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding property 3. Persons and their bodies 4. Body rights and the constitution Part II. From Individuals to Social Context: 5. Incorporation and projection 6. Control, privacy and individuality 7. Property and moral character 8. Alienation and society Part III. Justification and Distributive Equity: 9. Utility and efficiency 10. Justice and equality 11. Labor and desert 12. Conflict and resolution Part IV. Applications: 13. Business corporations 14. Gratuitous transfers 15. A moral and political theory of takings 16. Takings and the constitution Table of cases Index of names Index of subjects.
Despite first impressions to the contrary, religions as radically different as Jainism and Christ... more Despite first impressions to the contrary, religions as radically different as Jainism and Christianity can shed light on each other's practices of mendicancy and almsgiving. They can do so because of a trio of general categories under which certain elements of Jain and Christian practices can be subsumed. The categories are heroism, spiritual development, and triadic bonds among mendicants, almsgivers, and one or more supernatural or superhuman beings. There are at least two reasons why scholars of comparative religion, students of spirituality, philosophers of religion, and others should care whether it is possible to compare Jain and Christian mendicancy and almsgiving. First, the categories used to examine Jain and Christian practices reveal an underlying structure that might be used to analyze other varieties of religious mendicancy and almsgiving. Second, demonstrating similarities between Jainism and Christianity provides empirical evidence that even quite different religions and cultures are not so self-contained that it is impossible to compare them. The demonstration undermines one sort of relativism in anthropology.
The problem with which we are faced in this chapter is to determine how valid law is identified. ... more The problem with which we are faced in this chapter is to determine how valid law is identified. We shall see that the solution to this problem has important implications in regard to the unity of a legal system. In our discussion of Kelsen and Hart we noted the central role played by the basic norm and the rule of recognition respectively. Whatever their differences, both thinkers hold that in every legal system there must be some single, ultimate rule by which the validity of all putative members of the system is to be assessed. This rule serves to identify valid law. Their discussion of the problem of identifying valid law proceeds always in terms of identifying valid legal rules. Though the word “valid” also has application to what I have called “acts in the law” and “legal instruments,” I shall to simplify matters follow Kelsen and Hart in considering the case of legal rules only. My conclusions can be applied mutatis mutandis to the cases of acts in the law and legal instruments.
Recent work on the commons and the anticommons is novel and promising. Briefly, a commons is a re... more Recent work on the commons and the anticommons is novel and promising. Briefly, a commons is a resource which all have a liberty-right to use, from which no one has a normative power to exclude others, and which no one has a duty to refrain from exploiting. By contrast, an anticommons is, preliminarily, a resource from which each person has a normative power to exclude others and which no one has a liberty-right to use without the permission of others. This article explains how commons and anticommons analysis illuminates property law as well as property theory, shows why the analysis is novel, explores some further developments of the analysis, and ventures a critical appraisal of it. Although Buchanan and Yoon identify economic symmetries between the common and the anticommons, no general combined legal and philosophical examination of them yet exists, which is what this article provides. Prominent figures in the literature include Hardin, Heller, Dagan, Merrill, H. Smith, and Frantz. The article assesses their work and that of others. Neither all commons nor all anticommons are tragic. The commons and the anticommons, as extremes on a spectrum, illuminate the boundaries of private property. Yet anticommons analysis helps only modestly with governmental takings of private property and the numerus clausus principle. The further account of the liberal commons by Dagan and Heller runs into general difficulties and its extension to marital property encounters pitfalls. The next several decades will reveal much about the intellectual staying power of work in these areas. For the moment, it suffices to be grateful for work, much of it published within the last seven years, that pushes forward speculation about the theory of property and helps to solve real-world problems in property law.
The problem before us in this chapter is to determine what validity is. Its solution requires tha... more The problem before us in this chapter is to determine what validity is. Its solution requires that we elucidate the notion of validity which figures in most modern legal systems. The tests to be applied to any purported solution are logical consistency and empirical adequacy. That is, any account of legal validity we give, if it is to count as a solution, must be free from contradiction and satisfactorily cover and illuminate the concept of legal validity with which judges and lawyers operate. Although the nature and importance of the first test will be clear enough, some comment may be desirable on the second. I do not take the test of empirical adequacy to require that an account of validity follow in every detail the use of that concept in legal practice. That would be setting the standard for a philosophical, rather than a legal, inquiry unwarrantedly high. It will be sufficient in a philosophical study such as this to bring out the main features of the legal use of validity. But to set this sort of test for empirical adequacy is to make two important assumptions. First, to refer as I have done to the notion of validity involved in legal practice presupposes that one and only one notion figures, or at least figures predominantly, in the law. I think this assumption is justifiable, and I shall try to show it to be correct in Section 5 of this chapter. Second, to set this sort of test for empirical adequacy presupposes that the primary aim of any account of legal validity is that it should pass such a test. This supposition may be questioned in some contexts. But it must be conceded, I think, if we treat legal validity as a topic in analytical jurisprudence.1 For, if the first assumption mentioned is correct, and if this study is conceived as an essay in analytical jurisprudence, then its central aim must be to illuminate the notion of validity to be found in the law. Thus, the nature and approach of the present study justify the second assumption.
Human embryonic stem cell research raises a raft of legal issues that cut across substantive area... more Human embryonic stem cell research raises a raft of legal issues that cut across substantive areas of law. This paper categorizes and analyzes issues concerning the regulation of research, patent protection for stem cell innovations, informed consent of research subjects, and property rights in human tissue. Each part attempts to identify the most important and salient legal issues for researchers and policy makers, describe the current state of the law, and critically analyze that law.
1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding prope... more 1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding property 3. Persons and their bodies 4. Body rights and the constitution Part II. From Individuals to Social Context: 5. Incorporation and projection 6. Control, privacy and individuality 7. Property and moral character 8. Alienation and society Part III. Justification and Distributive Equity: 9. Utility and efficiency 10. Justice and equality 11. Labor and desert 12. Conflict and resolution Part IV. Applications: 13. Business corporations 14. Gratuitous transfers 15. A moral and political theory of takings 16. Takings and the constitution Table of cases Index of names Index of subjects.
The American journal of pediatric hematology/oncology, May 1, 2001
Advertisement. Close Window. Close Window. Thank you for choosing to subscribe to the eTOC for Jo... more Advertisement. Close Window. Close Window. Thank you for choosing to subscribe to the eTOC for Journal of Pediatric Hematology/Oncology. Enter your Email address: Wolters Kluwer Health may email you for journal alerts ...
1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding prope... more 1. Property and justification Part I. Property Rights and Personal Rights: 2. Understanding property 3. Persons and their bodies 4. Body rights and the constitution Part II. From Individuals to Social Context: 5. Incorporation and projection 6. Control, privacy and individuality 7. Property and moral character 8. Alienation and society Part III. Justification and Distributive Equity: 9. Utility and efficiency 10. Justice and equality 11. Labor and desert 12. Conflict and resolution Part IV. Applications: 13. Business corporations 14. Gratuitous transfers 15. A moral and political theory of takings 16. Takings and the constitution Table of cases Index of names Index of subjects.
Despite first impressions to the contrary, religions as radically different as Jainism and Christ... more Despite first impressions to the contrary, religions as radically different as Jainism and Christianity can shed light on each other's practices of mendicancy and almsgiving. They can do so because of a trio of general categories under which certain elements of Jain and Christian practices can be subsumed. The categories are heroism, spiritual development, and triadic bonds among mendicants, almsgivers, and one or more supernatural or superhuman beings. There are at least two reasons why scholars of comparative religion, students of spirituality, philosophers of religion, and others should care whether it is possible to compare Jain and Christian mendicancy and almsgiving. First, the categories used to examine Jain and Christian practices reveal an underlying structure that might be used to analyze other varieties of religious mendicancy and almsgiving. Second, demonstrating similarities between Jainism and Christianity provides empirical evidence that even quite different religions and cultures are not so self-contained that it is impossible to compare them. The demonstration undermines one sort of relativism in anthropology.
The problem with which we are faced in this chapter is to determine how valid law is identified. ... more The problem with which we are faced in this chapter is to determine how valid law is identified. We shall see that the solution to this problem has important implications in regard to the unity of a legal system. In our discussion of Kelsen and Hart we noted the central role played by the basic norm and the rule of recognition respectively. Whatever their differences, both thinkers hold that in every legal system there must be some single, ultimate rule by which the validity of all putative members of the system is to be assessed. This rule serves to identify valid law. Their discussion of the problem of identifying valid law proceeds always in terms of identifying valid legal rules. Though the word “valid” also has application to what I have called “acts in the law” and “legal instruments,” I shall to simplify matters follow Kelsen and Hart in considering the case of legal rules only. My conclusions can be applied mutatis mutandis to the cases of acts in the law and legal instruments.
Recent work on the commons and the anticommons is novel and promising. Briefly, a commons is a re... more Recent work on the commons and the anticommons is novel and promising. Briefly, a commons is a resource which all have a liberty-right to use, from which no one has a normative power to exclude others, and which no one has a duty to refrain from exploiting. By contrast, an anticommons is, preliminarily, a resource from which each person has a normative power to exclude others and which no one has a liberty-right to use without the permission of others. This article explains how commons and anticommons analysis illuminates property law as well as property theory, shows why the analysis is novel, explores some further developments of the analysis, and ventures a critical appraisal of it. Although Buchanan and Yoon identify economic symmetries between the common and the anticommons, no general combined legal and philosophical examination of them yet exists, which is what this article provides. Prominent figures in the literature include Hardin, Heller, Dagan, Merrill, H. Smith, and Frantz. The article assesses their work and that of others. Neither all commons nor all anticommons are tragic. The commons and the anticommons, as extremes on a spectrum, illuminate the boundaries of private property. Yet anticommons analysis helps only modestly with governmental takings of private property and the numerus clausus principle. The further account of the liberal commons by Dagan and Heller runs into general difficulties and its extension to marital property encounters pitfalls. The next several decades will reveal much about the intellectual staying power of work in these areas. For the moment, it suffices to be grateful for work, much of it published within the last seven years, that pushes forward speculation about the theory of property and helps to solve real-world problems in property law.
The problem before us in this chapter is to determine what validity is. Its solution requires tha... more The problem before us in this chapter is to determine what validity is. Its solution requires that we elucidate the notion of validity which figures in most modern legal systems. The tests to be applied to any purported solution are logical consistency and empirical adequacy. That is, any account of legal validity we give, if it is to count as a solution, must be free from contradiction and satisfactorily cover and illuminate the concept of legal validity with which judges and lawyers operate. Although the nature and importance of the first test will be clear enough, some comment may be desirable on the second. I do not take the test of empirical adequacy to require that an account of validity follow in every detail the use of that concept in legal practice. That would be setting the standard for a philosophical, rather than a legal, inquiry unwarrantedly high. It will be sufficient in a philosophical study such as this to bring out the main features of the legal use of validity. But to set this sort of test for empirical adequacy is to make two important assumptions. First, to refer as I have done to the notion of validity involved in legal practice presupposes that one and only one notion figures, or at least figures predominantly, in the law. I think this assumption is justifiable, and I shall try to show it to be correct in Section 5 of this chapter. Second, to set this sort of test for empirical adequacy presupposes that the primary aim of any account of legal validity is that it should pass such a test. This supposition may be questioned in some contexts. But it must be conceded, I think, if we treat legal validity as a topic in analytical jurisprudence.1 For, if the first assumption mentioned is correct, and if this study is conceived as an essay in analytical jurisprudence, then its central aim must be to illuminate the notion of validity to be found in the law. Thus, the nature and approach of the present study justify the second assumption.
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Papers by Stephen R. Munzer