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Terrill Bouricius

    Terrill Bouricius

    • Terry is a recovering politician (having served 20 years in elective office), who discovered the history and use of s... moreedit
    Structural problems are examined with pairing two chambers, one selected by election and the other by sortition, into a traditional bicameral system. It is argued that an all-purpose legislative chamber modeled on existing elected... more
    Structural problems are examined with pairing two chambers, one selected by election and the other by sortition, into a traditional bicameral system. It is argued that an all-purpose legislative chamber modeled on existing elected chambers is a mismatch for sortition and that purported benefits of maintaining partisan elections alongside sortition are illusory. Alleged benefits of a hybrid bicameral system are shown to be outweighed by a variety of harmful effects. Furthermore, even if those harms are not substantiated, the continued existence of an elected chamber will likely result in the delimitation of the sortition chamber. Combining many different sorts of minipublics with different characteristics and functions is preferable, and a possible multibody sortition legislative system is presented. Finally, an alternative way forward for sortition is proposed by peeling away individual topic areas from elected bodies and transferring them to sortition bodies.
    Mature Classical Athenian democracy is presented as a representative system, rather than the commonly described form of “direct democracy. ” When viewed in this way, the commonly assumed problem of scale in applying Athenian democracy to... more
    Mature Classical Athenian democracy is presented as a representative system, rather than the commonly described form of “direct democracy. ” When viewed in this way, the commonly assumed problem of scale in applying Athenian democracy to modern nation states is solved, and principles and practices of the Athenian model of democracy continue to have relevance today. The key role of sortition (selection by lot) to form multiple deliberative bodies is explained. Five dilemmas faced by modern proposals for the use of sortition are examined. Finally, a new model of lawmaking using multiple allotted bodies is presented, which resolves these dilemmas and which can be implemented in many ways, from a small addition to an existing system to a more fundamental reform such as replacing one or both elected chambers of a legislature.
    Mature Classical Athenian democracy is presented as a representative system, rather than the commonly described form of “direct democracy.” When viewed in this way, the commonly assumed problem of scale in applying Athenian democracy to... more
    Mature Classical Athenian democracy is presented as a representative system, rather than the commonly described form of “direct democracy.” When viewed in this way, the commonly assumed problem of scale in applying Athenian democracy to modern nation states is solved, and principles and practices of the Athenian model of democracy continue to have relevance today. The key role of sortition (selection by lot) to form multiple deliberative bodies is explained. Five dilemmas faced by modern proposals for the use of sortition are examined. Finally, a new model of lawmaking using multiple allotted bodies is presented, which resolves these dilemmas and which can be implemented in many ways, from a small addition to an existing system to a more fundamental reform such as replacing one or both elected chambers of a legislature.
    In this paper, the authors continue to build on their proposed model for incorporating randomly selected citizens into the decision-making processes of government. The first article presented a case for the benefits of random selection;... more
    In this paper, the authors continue to build on their proposed model for incorporating randomly selected
    citizens into the decision-making processes of government. The first article presented a case for the benefits
    of random selection; proposed a lawmaking process that replaces elected, all-purpose legislatures with
    multiple, limited-function bodies composed of randomly selected citizens; and identified possible objections
    to the model (see An Idealized Design for the Legislative Branch of Government, http://stwj.systemswiki.org
    /?p=140). In the current article, the authors extend the model to the executive branch, discussing how
    redesigning the executive branch could improve accountability to the legislature and to the people.The
    potentialfor current executive branch designs to negatively affect performance and accountability is used to
    propose a new model that reduces the power of the executive branch, increases accountability, and has the
    potential to reduce corruption. The benefits of the model are outlined, and possible objections are
    addressed.
    Research Interests:
    In this paper I examine structural problems with simply incorporating sortition into a traditional bicameral system. I argue that utilizing an all-purpose legislative chamber, modeled on existing elected chambers, is a mismatch for... more
    In this paper I examine structural problems with simply incorporating sortition into a traditional bicameral system. I argue that utilizing an all-purpose legislative chamber, modeled on existing elected chambers, is a mismatch for sortition, and that combining many different sorts of mini-publics with different characteristics and functions is preferable. I argue that the purported benefits of maintaining partisan elections alongside sortition are illusory. I then argue that any alleged benefits of maintaining parallel elected and sortition chambers within a hybrid bicameral system are outweighed by a variety of harmful effects, including negative effects on; agenda setting, active aptitude, descriptive representativeness, diversity, and resistance to corruption. Further more, even if these harms are not substantiated, the continued existence of an elected chamber dealing with the same bills as the sortition chamber will likely lead to the delegitimation of the sortition chamber. I conclude with a proposed alternative way forward for sortition by peeling away topic areas one at a time from elected bodies and transferring them to sortition bodies.
    Research Interests: