Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM)

Refugee movements are not a new phenomenon in the Middle East and North Africa. The history of
the region has been shaped by waves of displacement and refugee crises, and the most recent, the
dramatic case of Syria, is still in process. This article investigates refugee movements in the region
and their impact on regional dynamics by focusing on two important case studies: Lebanon and
Turkey. It explores each country’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis in detail, while addressing
the role of relevant stakeholders, such as international organizations, civil society and government,
in humanitarian relief efforts as well as in refugee protection and management.

The global and regional contexts surrounding EU–Mediterranean relations have substantially
changed since the 1995 Barcelona process, and the EU’s strategic view of the Mediterranean
has correspondingly changed with them. The current setting of the Mediterranean appears to
necessitate a reset on the understanding of the region from the perspective of local societies
and also of the EU, which is one of the principal objectives of the MEDRESET project. The aim
of this work is thus to reflect the results of the Elite Survey that addressed nine Mediterranean
countries, and to offer a policy-oriented analysis for a renewed EU–Mediterranean partnership.
Subsequently, the report (1) provides a detailed description of the survey and its execution;
(2) shows how the Mediterranean is constructed in the narratives of local elite stakeholders
and (3) how they see and evaluate the EU’s actorness in the region as well as its substance
and policy instruments. The report concludes with policy recommendations to the EU at the
regional and country-specific level.

This report, entitled “The Syrian Community in Turkey: Perspectives, Prospects, and Policies”,
centers on the environment accommodating the Syrian community in Turkey by understanding
and analyzing the policies made to regulate the influx of Syrians fleeing from the civil war and
to facilitate their social integration into society.
As the civil war in Syria reaches its seven-year mark, the conflict is a continuing cause of
suffering for millions in need of humanitarian assistance. Since its onset in 2011, the number
of Syrians fleeing their homes has continuously grown, resulting in the largest refugee crisis
since World War II. The conflict has torn apart the lives of the Syrians now taking shelter in
neighboring countries including Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, as well as in Europe.
Among all the other countries, Turkey hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees and
shoulders a heavy responsibility in ensuring their protection, safety, residence, and access to
basic services. This has had a sizeable impact on the country’s domestic and foreign policy
and also, affected public perception towards Syrians. Therefore, introducing effective policies
at the domestic level is key to facilitating the integration of Syrians into Turkish society under
good conditions.
To examine how the policies targeting Syrians have tended to address the process of
integration on legal, economic, and social levels, a fieldwork study was conducted from
September 2017 to December 2017 with Syrians in the cities of Gaziantep and Istanbul.
Additionally, two workshops—the first in Gaziantep and the second in Istanbul—were
organized with Syrians in October 2017 and December 2017, respectively. The interviews were
held in Gaziantep and Istanbul by Joullanar Darouiche of Gaziantep-based research center
RMTeam, and Assistant Professor Fulya Memişoğlu of Çukurova University. Dr. Memişoğlu,
who specializes in migration studies, authored this report using the data collected from the
fieldwork study.
Throughout the fieldwork, in-depth interviews were conducted with a total of 40 Syrians from
diverse professional backgrounds including educators, journalists, legal experts, civil society
representatives, business owners, physicians, and students. It should be noted that the goal
of this qualitative study is not to generalize but rather to provide an up-to-date understanding
of a case that is relevant to the context of Turkey. The main motivation while building the
sample was therefore to capture the insights of Syrians as to what extent domestic policies and
regulations have facilitated an efficient integration process, and how they affect the lives of
members of the Syrian community in public space.
7
Using the findings derived from in-depth interviews and workshops, this report presents Syrians’
key insights and assessments on the integration process from different angles including, but not
limited to, legal status and the implications of the Temporary Protection Regulation; employment
and education opportunities; and relations with the local community and institutions. The report
also surveys the challenges facing the Syrian community in the public space as well as their
prioritized demands and expectations for the future, offering an enriched, detailed look into the
issue from the eyes of Syrians.
The report aims to contribute to the policy-making process pertinent to migration management
and social integration of the Syrian community with actionable policy recommendations. We hope
that these insights inform the relevant decision-makers and officials on their policy actions and raise
awareness towards Syrians among the public to foster positive relations between both sides.

Since Fall 2017, as military clashes in Syria gradually diminish and the parameters of a political
solution are beginning to be debated, the activities of peripheral countries, like Qatar, that had
taken important roles in the beginning of the conflict, have markedly decreased. Especially
after the major political crisis in the Gulf, Qatar, which had started out seeking regional
unanimity and harmony, has largely lost its interest in the Syria issue. Qatar’s most important
ally and partner in the region, Turkey, is currently side by side with Russia and Iran in the field,
and carrying forward negotiations for a political solution, which suggests in a sense that there
is no longer a need for Qatar as an intermediary. The Syria crisis, as one of the most important
manifestations of Qatar’s active foreign policy and its desire to give support to the movement
for social change and transformation in the Middle East, will carry importance for Qatar
because it has nonetheless demonstrated that it should be recognized as a notable actor in
regional politics, although it would not be able to dictate the outcome of the crisis. Qatar’s fate
in regional politics has indeed shaped in accordance with the wave of change that came with
the Arab Spring. In the present environment, Qatar’s primary goal for its regional policy is first
of all to overcome the isolation it has suffered, and correspondingly to set about searching for
new alliances in pursuit of this goal.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been beset by a series of external interventions,
regional crises and local conflicts – most recently precipitated by the Arab uprisings – that have led
to major uncertainties and changes in the existing order. The aim of this paper – which launches
Work Package 5 within the MENARA project – is to provide a general framework within which to
understand and contextualize the transformations in regional dynamics, particularly since the
uprisings. It is divided into four parts, focusing on the major regional actors (state and non-state);
regional conflicts (Arab–Israeli, Syrian, Moroccan–Algerian and Sahel); themes (i.e. refugees
and illegal trafficking); and key regional cooperation platforms (i.e. the Arab League, the Gulf
Cooperation Council, the Arab Maghreb Union and the African Union). By introducing the basic
background literature, approaches and research questions, this paper, in turn, paves the way for
more in-depth and focused research papers within the MENARA project.

In Syria, European countries typically find themselves revolving in the Russian-American orbit,
where it is not possible for them to take any action outside of the sphere already determined
or to be determined by the US and Russia. Not only do European countries lack the required
military power to be ‘playmakers’, but they also lack the political appetite to be more engaged
in the conflict. This reality is rooted in the European public’s general stance against military
involvement in foreign conflicts due to their values and bitter past experiences.
Given this framework, the political role assumed by the European countries to assist or confront
the US and Russia in formulating and implementing their policies in Syria remains limited. Europe
will settle for a resolution formula agreed upon by these superpowers as long as it prevents
war and instability. The UK – having a closer relationship with the US – works in alliance with
the American government in policy formulation, whereas Germany and France, act with a view
to steer Russia in the ‘right direction’. France, however, can especially be expected to play a
significant role vis-à-vis the Russian strategy.
The European Union’s political stance is additionally burdened by the national interests of its
members. Therefore, lacking the means and measures to assume an engaged stance, it suffices
with supporting the Geneva Process for a political settlement. Its most important and effective
engagement, however, is providing humanitarian aid and assistance to Syrian citizens, in many
parts of Syria and its neighboring regions.
The EU and its member states are heavily criticized for not being more engaged in Syria, not
putting enough pressure on Bashar al-Assad and not even intervening militarily at a stage when
it was possible. Nevertheless, given the above framework, these expectations do not appear to
have been realistic. In fact, most of the Syrians we spoke to during this research were pragmatic
and reasonable in their expectations regarding an EU military involvement, without a Russian-
American deal.
Accordingly, it would be fair to say that the EU has indeed acted in a rational manner, allowing it
to maintain a position that would make it possible to embrace its role when a settlement is being
negotiated and enforced.
In the context of policy-making and conflict resolution, the most value added role the EU should
be expected to play is being a ‘conciliator’ during the peace talks and transition. To attain this
main aim, the EU has acted in a way that will allow it to communicate and negotiate with all the
parties involved. Together with the UN, the EU will also be the overarching agency to monitor the
legitimacy of the transitional period and the new form of government to be instituted in Syria.
A second, imperative role the EU is set to play – which will also take place after a resolution – is
the political, economic and infrastructural reconstruction of Syria. The EU is, however, persistent
on one condition: that it will not pay for reconstruction without a transition and sustainable
resolution; a condition which the EU can leverage for its political role as well.
Briefly stated, European countries – while refraining from being militarily involved in the conflict
– are waiting for the parties to reach a settlement. In the meantime, they are exerting efforts to
adeptly steer the settlement process to meet their priorities, through their relations with the US,
Europe and the Syrian Conflict: Policies and Perceptions 10Introduction
Russia and other regional countries. Europe awaits its time to come, investing its assets in the
future and the future of Syria.

This paper outlines the ways in which the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been
embedded in global identity processes and structures in the post-2011 period. It assesses MENA
social and political developments in relation to global ideational and identity factors. Important
among these is the imagined yet increasingly widespread and pernicious idea of a clash between
“Islam” and “the West”, (mis)conceived as homogeneous identities. However, as the paper shows,
global or universalist identity perceptions, in the form of support for human rights and democratic
values, also influence the MENA region. Dynamic global youth identities and cultures also
influence an exceptionally “young” region and vie for the loyalty of youth against other identities.
Changing dynamics of ethnic and religious identities among diasporas, which link the region with
the wider world, modify social and political contexts within the MENA, especially some of its post-
2011 conflicts.

Since independence, states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have been dominant
players in shaping the regional order. The purpose of this paper is to explore and define challenges
to the state and their role in shaping identities in the MENA region, and to evaluate their regional
roots. The paper emphasizes two key aspects of nationalism in the region. The first concerns the
existence of multiple identities and layers of identity that co-exist in the MENA region and which
do not necessarily clash with each other. The second is that nationalism and national identities
are not a recent phenomenon in the region. This paper shows that there are similarities as well
as differences among the three major sub-regions of MENA in terms of the impact of identities at
three levels of analysis.

With the dramatic changes in the political sphere of the Mediterranean countries, new
challenges have emerged in the existing framework of relations between the EU and its
southern neighbours. In order to thoroughly understand how the EU practices have affected
the Mediterranean countries, and identify the outcomes of the adopted policies, MEDRESET
introduces the Elite Survey within its Work Package 3, which will enable us to explore Euro–
Mediterranean relations through fieldwork in selected countries. The survey findings will serve
as background to develop alternative visions for a more inclusive partnership between the EU
and the Mediterranean. In consideration of this, the present paper is devoted to the conceptual
and methodological framework of the MEDRESET Work Package 3, which incorporates the
Elite Survey and its design into a relevant scope of research. To this end, the paper reviews
existing surveys conducted in the Mediterranean in order to define the current outlook. It also
identifies the gaps in these studies to discuss how the Elite Survey can contribute to the existing
literature through the fieldwork data, and details the analytical framework and methodology
for the survey.

This paper examines Turkey’s construction of its Mediterranean policy, starting from the period
when the country’s foreign policy began to undergo a significant reinvigoration. Employing
discourse analysis methods, the study tries to present Turkey’s priorities in key policy areas
towards the region, while indicating changes in its position to the region both before and after
the Arab uprisings. The analysis also demonstrates that Turkey has been unable to introduce
a well-defined and structured Mediterranean policy although it has been able to establish
a deeper level of engagement with the region in political, economic and social aspects.
Furthermore, the article examines how Turkey’s policies match, contrast or overlap with those
of the EU through a case-based approach and puts forward the possible implications for
Turkey and the Union.

Between November 2016 and March 2017, Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies
(PODEM) conducted a study to understand how key social groups in Turkey perceived
developments in the political and social fields following the July 15th coup attempt. In the
context of the present report, researchers staged in-depth interviews and a workshop, each
involving representatives from groups in the “laicist/secular demographic in Istanbul. The
current report reflects the most significant findings from these two sources, including the views
of a broad range of secularists representing the media, civil society organizations, academics
and the business world.
The “laicist” demographic is not a homogenous group, but includes great variety and diversity
in its own right. It is not possible to conduct research from the assumption that everyone in
“the secular community” holds the same ideology or viewpoint, or to claim that all people with
laicist/secular concerns in Turkey represent a laicist bloc.
One of the main reasons behind this is that secular-minded individuals across this spectrum
are further divided across a variety of social identity groups. For example, secularists in
Turkey cannot be neatly defined in the same way as more distinct identity groups, such as the
Kurds. Similarly, the vast majority of Alevis highly value secularism, but for many Alevis the
predominant element in their identity is Alevi, rather than “secularist.”
Despite these complex social dynamics, we intended this report as a snapshot of July 15th
and its aftermath from the “secular” worldview, reflecting as many of the perspectives in
this diverse demographic as possible. We do not claim that the findings of this report or the
perspectives contained in it form a comprehensive depiction of the views of the laicist/secular
community in Turkey,

The Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), conducted a study centered on
the Alevi community as part of a project aimed toward understanding how events of the July
15th coup attempt in 2016 and in its aftermath have been understood in different parts of Turkish
society. The aim of this report is to understand the sentiments of the Alevis regarding the July
15th coup attempt, the process leading to the constitutional referendum to be held in April,
2017, their perspectives on amending the constitution, and their expectations and hopes for
Turkey’s future.
The study employed two methods aimed at revealing a general picture of the Alevi agenda
in the post-July 15th period. First, in-depth interviews were held in Istanbul with opinion
leaders representing a number of subsets of the Alevi community. Later, a meeting was held,
also in Istanbul, to debate issues covered by the research, with the participation of NGO
representatives, businesspeople, and opinion leaders. In total, the study involved representatives
of various Alevi civil and professional groups, including cemevi and Alevi association directors,
youth group leaders, lawyers, and journalists.
It is possible to summarize the research findings into the following major categories, which cast
light on the perspectives and demands of Alevis on the recent political and social events in Turkey.

Between September 2015 and May 2016, PODEM carried out a two-phase field research in six
European countries with large populations of immigrants from Turkey. The aim of the study
was to understand the needs, demands, and expectations of the immigrant communities from
Turkey in Europe and address the gap in research towards policy-making.
The first phase of the field research that looks into European states’ immigrant policies, as
well as socio-economic structures and policy demands of immigrant groups, was conducted
by Ayşe Yırcalı and Etyen Mahçupyan. The full report of this research was published in
Turkish as “Avrupa’da ‘Türkiyeli’ Olmak: Kimlikler, Bireyler, Vatandaşlar” and can be reached
at http://podem.org.tr/yayinlar/raporlar/avrupadaturkiyeliolmak/.
The second phase of the research focused on young people from Alevi and Sunni
communities in the above-listed countries. A total of 428 young people took part in in-depth
interviews about their experiences in acculturating, developing individual personalities and
forming their identities, as well as in their social and economic lives. The second phase of
the research was conducted by Ahmet Taşğın, Aybars Görgülü, Berat Özipek, Beril Bahadır,
İbrahim Bahadır and Vahap Coşkun and their report, titled “Avrupa’da Yaşayan Türkiye Kökenli
Gençler: Alevilik/Sünnilik Temelinde Kimlik, Aidiyet, Sosyal Hayat, Siyaset”, can be found at
http://podem.org.tr/yayinlar/raporlar/avrupada-yasayan-turkiye-kokenli-gencler-pdf/.
The report at hand presents the evaluation chapters of the two research reports, which
summarize the findings of the research and policy proposals. Both chapters are authored by
Etyen Mahçupyan.
We hope the insights and proposals presented in this report will be useful not only for policymaking
but also for academic and civil society fields both in Turkey and Europe.

This report is a product of PODEM’s “business community for social peace” project, launched in
2015 in partnership with the Berghof Foundation. During the two years of the project, PODEM
and the Berghof Foundation brought together business people from Turkey’s western and
eastern provinces in a series of meetings in Istanbul, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa and Van to discuss
regional development for social peace.
Within this framework, the following report shares the findings from a recent field research
carried out with business people from Istanbul and Diyarbakır who closely followed the regional
economic developments during the peace process. Besides the prospects of regional economic
development, the report details business people’s views on contemporary political issues,
with specific reference to the Kurdish issue. In addition, it examines the business communities’
potential for contributing to peace.
With this, the report aims to lay out the contemporary issues that business people from Istanbul
and Diyarbakır agree and diverge on, and compare the similarities and differences in their
perceptions. The ultimate objective of this report is to encourage collaborative projects that will
promote and strengthen links between the business communities in the two regions.

The Istanbul Youth Mapping Series, conducted by PODEM in partnership with Berghof
Foundation, focuses on youth politicized around Alevi, Kurdish, and Sunni/Islamist identities,
and looks into their lives, expectations, and relations with their neighborhood, city, and
country they inhabit. Not unlike many of the metropoles around the world, Istanbul is a city
that leaves its mark on the lives of young people with social problems, such as exclusion,
isolation, poverty, social inequality, and drug abuse. The adverse impacts of these problems
generally tend to concentrate in the outskirts of the city. On top of these problems, the oversecuritization
of youth from the peripheral neighborhoods comprises an important problem.
As security policies trump social policies, youth may find themselves at a dead-end where
they resort to violence, or at least adopt a tougher rhetoric.

The Istanbul Youth Mapping Series, conducted by PODEM in partnership with Berghof
Foundation, focuses on youth politicized around Alevi, Kurdish, and Sunni/Islamist identities,
and looks into their lives, expectations, and relations with their neighborhood, city, and
country they inhabit. Not unlike many of the metropoles around the world, Istanbul is a city
that leaves its mark on the lives of young people with social problems, such as exclusion,
isolation, poverty, social inequality, and drug abuse. The adverse impacts of these problems
generally tend to concentrate in the outskirts of the city. On top of these problems, the oversecuritization
of youth from the peripheral neighborhoods comprises an important problem.
As security policies trump social policies, youth may find themselves at a dead-end where
they resort to violence, or at least adopt a tougher rhetoric.
The series, of which the current report is a chapter, is a product of several field studies
aiming to demonstrate the potential within young people to reinforce social agreement
and peace in society. It aims to provide guidance in this regard for adults, legislators, and
decision-makers, who view young people as a group that needs to be managed. It focuses
on the transformative power of youth on hierarchical, authoritative structures, congregational
models, and on gender and parent-child relations. Young individuals are taken into
consideration as active subjects rather than passive objects. The political recommendations
presented in this report are based on this approach.

This report aims to understand the modes of politicization among young people from different
identity groups in Turkey. To this end, it presents comparative analyses of four pieces of
qualitative field research in Istanbul and two in Diyarbakır, in dimensions of ideology, identity,
class, individualization, and action/violence. The report seeks to highlight the similarities and
differences between Alevi, Kurdish, Islamist youth in Istanbul and Kurdish youth in Diyarbakır in
the above-mentioned dimensions.
The first piece of research in Istanbul was conducted with young people from low-income,
Alevi-populated neighbourhoods, inhabited also by left-wing movements. On top of interviews
with opinion leaders, one-on-one, in-depth interviews were conducted with 38 people between
ages 16-35, whose families had migrated from the Anatolian provinces of Erzincan, Sivas,
Tokat, Kahramanmaraş and Tunceli to the neighbourhoods under the scope of the research.
Semi-ethnographic data was also collected in Cemevis, tea gardens and coffee houses in the
neighbourhoods.
The second research in Istanbul took place in the Küçükçekmece district where various ethnic
identities, namely Kurds, Albanians and Bulgarians, are dominant. The research analyses the
sense of identity among young people from these neighbourhoods through its socioeconomic,
social and political dimensions. To this end, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 23
people between ages 17-28. Semi-ethnographic data was also collected in parks, coffee houses,
craft stores and markets in the neighbourhoods.
The third research in Istanbul aims to explore the social relations, spatial factors, and
socioeconomic conditions that shape the senses of belonging of Kurdish youth from Kurdishmajority
neighbourhoods, where they live with their parents that moved from eastern and southeastern
provinces due to forced immigration and economic need. As a part of the research, indepth,
semi-structured interviews were conducted with 33 Kurdish youths between ages 19-29.
The last piece of research in Istanbul was conducted around Islamist groups/circles in Istanbul.
Instead of the focus on neighbourhoods, this time interviews were conducted among 30 people
that are members of various Islamist organizations and their offshoots. The sample was formed
to reflect the wide spectrum of Islamist thought.
The Diyarbakır research encompasses two fields— first, with young people close to Kurdish
political life; second, with young people close to Islamist organizations active in the region.
7
In the first part of the Diyarbakır field, in-depth interviews were held with a total of 20 young
people between ages 18 - 29 that are close to Kurdish politics. Interviewees were met with in
houses, cafés, and associations. In the second part of the field, which focuses on youth close
to Islamist organizations/movements in Diyarbakır, in-depth interviews were conducted with 18
people between ages 20 – 32 that carry out civil society activities in Islamist circles.
The research in Istanbul was carried out throughout 2015, while the research in Diyarbakır was
carried out in the summer of 2016.

After six years of détente, on June 2016 Israel and Turkey finally reached a deal to normalize
diplomatic relations and signed a reconciliation agreement. Israel-Turkey relations had already
been broken after Israel’s offensive in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009. Turkey
voiced strong disapproval of this attack, which killed more than a thousand civilians. When, at the
2009 Davos Summit, Turkey’s then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli President
Simon Peres sat on the same panel, Erdoğan criticized Peres severely for his country’s offensive in
Gaza, accusing Israel of conducting “state terrorism” and walked out of the panel. But diplomatic
relations were still in place between the two countries until the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis of May
2010.

1915 and Beyond: Public Perception in Turkey is framed around understanding and analysing
public perceptions in Turkey on the so-called ‘Armenian Question’. This report shares the
findings of 10 focus group workshops organised between 12-27 May 2015 in Istanbul, Ankara,
Izmir, Adana, Kayseri, Diyarbakır, Trabzon and Kars, and 26 in-depth interviews conducted in
Istanbul and Ankara between May 2015 and January 2016.
Social Research Center (Sosyal Araştırma Merkezi, SAM) coordinated the organisation of
focus group workshops in 8 cities with a total of 82 participants (36 women and 46 men) aged
between 18 and 55. One of the focus group meetings brought together participants who were
Armenians of Turkey. The in-depth interviews carried out by the authors were with lawyers,
civil society representatives, academics, journalists, authors, politicians, business people and
former diplomats of all ages and political leanings. Of the 26 in-depth interviewees, five were
Armenians of Turkey. Our main motivation while building this sample was to capture broad
insights on a very specific research question. Thus, we do not—and never will—attempt to
pursue research that would lead to generalised or categorical conclusions about a particular
community or communities.
This report portrays the public perception in Turkey towards 1915, Armenians of Turkey’s
perceptions of their presence in the country and the perceptions of Turkish society towards
Armenians in both Turkey and Armenia. The 24th of April, 1915 signifies a historical process
whereby Armenians within the Ottoman Empire were deported and massacred during World
War I. While Armenians across the world recognise and commemorate April 24, 1915, and the
subsequent events as a genocide, both official accounts of history in Turkey and the majority of
Turkey’s society oppose this characterisation.
When we refer to 1915, we are not simply talking about a point in time and the events
surrounding it. Until recently, our politics were tainted by feelings of animosity towards
Armenians and this perception of the Armenian as the ‘enemy’ caused far too many
grievances. The on-going debate on 1915 has a sizeable impact on Turkey’s domestic and
foreign policy, and on the public perceptions towards Armenians. Thus, our objectives with this
report are to shed light on the ‘Armenian Question’, which remains under-addressed by the
majority of the society in Turkey and continues to manifest itself as a ‘problem’, and capture
the myriad public perceptions, thoughts and expectations surrounding it.
9
The ‘Armenian Question’ covers not just a historical reading of 1915, but also the rights of
Armenians of Turkey and minorities; cross-border relations between Turkey, Armenia and
Azerbaijan; and even Turkey’s relationship with the ‘West’. We find that after a century since
1915, the events surrounding that particular cross-section of history and how they are defined
still determine perceptions of the society towards Armenians, Armenia and the West.
The ‘Armenian Question’ may be more easily and widely discussed today but the public
debate on this issue will need to be expanded and deepened. 1915 and Beyond: Public
Perception in Turkey aims to contribute to the deepening of the public discourse around the
‘Armenian Question’. The research brings together several key insights on how the genocide
debates are being perceived by the wider public. We expect these insights to inform the
decision-makers seeking to place the society and the individual at the heart of their policies.
This research report does not limit its scope to the more commonplace questions around the
‘Armenian Question’; it also delivers deeper insights drawn from the personal narratives and
histories of its interviewees and their current political views. Through these personal narratives,
this research report conveys an honest account of the differences and similarities between
perceptions and offers actionable policy solutions.

Türkiyelilerin Avrupa’ya sistematik ve düzenli göçü, Almanya’yla Türkiye arasında 30 Ekim
1961’de imzalanan İşgücü Göçü Antlaşması uyarınca aynı yıl Almanya’ya 7.116 Türkiyeli işçinin
gitmesiyle başlar. Avusturya, Belçika ve Hollanda’yla 1964’te, Fransa’yla 1965’te imzalanan
işgücü anlaşmalarıyla birlikte Türkiye’den göç Avrupa’nın diğer ülkelerine de yayılır. 1980’li
yıllara gelindiğinde ekonomik sebeplere ek olarak Türkiye’de meydana gelen siyasi gelişmeler,
binlerce Türkiyelinin Avrupa’nın çeşitli yerlerine göç kararlarında etkili olur. Siyasi ilticalar
1990’lar boyunca ve 2000’li yılların başlarında yoğun olarak devam eder.
Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanlığı verilerine göre, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde Türkiye kökenli nüfus
günümüzde 4.6 milyonu bulmuşken, gayri resmi rakamların 6 milyon mertebesinde olduğu
tahmin edilmektedir. Göç tecrübesi çerçevesinde, uyum ve entegrasyon, ayrımcılık/yabancı
düşmanlığı, ülkelerin göçmen siyasetleri ve izledikleri çok-kültürlülük politikaları gibi konular,
Türkiye ve Avrupa’da birçok araştırmanın ve toplantının konusu olmuştur. Ancak aradan geçen
55 yıllık zamanda Avrupa’daki Türkiyelilerin göç tecrübeleri, yerleştikleri ülkelerdeki konumları
ve yaşam şartları, gündelik hayatlarında karşılaştıkları zorluklar ve en önemlisi nesillerle kat
edilen yol, Avrupa ve Türkiye kamuoyunda etraflıca ele alınmamıştır. Münferit “gurbetçi”
hikayeleri dışında topluma mal olmuş ortak bir göç tarihçesi oluşmazken, Avrupa’daki
Türkiyelilerin göç tecrübeleri bireysel örnekler dışında medyada yer bulmamıştır. Gelinen
noktada, Avrupa’daki Türkiyeliler üzerine yapılan akademik araştırmaların bulgularının da siyasa
yapımında etkili bir şekilde kullanılmadığı görülmektedir.
Öte yandan, son on yıllık dönemde Avrupa’daki Türkiyeli toplumla Türkiye Devletinin temas
yoğunluğu kayda değer bir artış göstermiştir. Türkiyeli siyasetçiler ve kamu kurumları tarafından
Avrupa’ya yapılan ziyaretler sıklaşmış, buna paralel olarak buradaki toplumun Türkiye’den
beklentileri, sosyal ve ekonomik imkanlar alanında talepleri daha somut bir zemine oturmuştur.
Araştırma bulgularından görülebileceği üzere, konsoloslukların halkla teması ve verilen
hizmetler halkın gözünde epey olumlu bir ilerleme göstermiştir. Önceki dönemlerde Türkiyeli
devlet kurumlarının ayrımcı ve üstten bakan yaklaşımı, son dönemde tüm kesimlerle temas
eden ve eşitlikçi bir ilişki kurma yönünde çaba sarf eden bir yaklaşıma yönelmiştir.
Bu olumlu gelişmelerin yapıcı politikalara dönüşebilmesi için Türkiye’deki siyaset yapıcıların
ve devlet kurumlarının geçmişte hakim olan yaklaşım ve söylemlerini değiştirmenin ötesinde,
atmaları gereken kritik adımlar bulunmakta. Bunların başında, Avrupa’daki Türkiyelilerin
homojen bir grup oldukları varsayımından yola çıkan uygulamaların ve girişimlerin tümüyle bir
kenara koyulması gerekmekte. Türkiye, Avrupa’daki Türkiyeli toplumun inanç farklılıklarını ve
Çalışmanın gerekçe ve amacı
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kültürel çeşitliliğini gerçekçi bir biçimde okumalı, doğru anlamlandırmalı ve devlet olarak tüm
kesimlere eşit mesafede duran politikalar geliştirmelidir.
Araştırma, bu meseleyi ön plana alarak Avrupa’daki Alevi ve Sünni kesimler özelinde oluşan
gruplar/kurumlar, bireysel hayatlar ve beklentiler üzerinde durmaktadır. Bunun da ötesinde
çalışma ile çeşitli kesimler (Türkler, Kürtler, dini cemaatler, diğer etnik gruplar) arasındaki
sosyal etkileşimler üzerine yoğunlaşarak, bu kesimlerin örtüşen ve farklılık gösteren talep ve
beklentileri hakkında hem Türkiye hem de Avrupa kamuoyundaki bilgi açığını kapatmaya
yönelik bir derleme sunulmaktadır.
Elinizdeki rapor, Türkiye’nin her köşesinden ve her kesiminden gelen göçmenlerin Avrupa
ülkelerinde kurdukları hayat, karşılaştıkları zorluklar, bunlarla baş ederken edindikleri gelişim
ve tecrübe ile sosyal ve siyasi alanlardaki sorun ve beklentilerin bir yelpazesini sunuyor. Ayrıca
Avrupa ülkelerinin göçmenlerin uyumuna yönelik uyguladığı başarılı ve başarısız politikaları
irdeleyerek hem bu ülkeler hem de Türkiye için önemli referans noktaları sağlıyor. Ek olarak bu
ülkelerin Türkiyeli göçmenlere bakışından hareketle, Türkiye’nin bu ülkelerde hayata geçireceği
projelerde elverişli yaklaşımlar geliştirebilmesi için yol gösterici bir kaynak oluşturuyor.
Diğer taraftan, Avrupa’da iş hayatında başarılı olmuş, Avrupa standartları ve çalışma etiği
çerçevesinde yetişmiş ikinci ve üçüncü nesillerin oluşturduğu insan sermayesinin Türkiye’ye
hangi alanlarda katkı sağlayabileceği konusunda öneriler getiriyor.
En önemli nokta, Avrupa’daki Türkiyeli toplumun sosyal alanda el uzatılması, destek olunması
gereken birçok sorununun olduğu gerçeği. Buradaki toplum, karşılaştığı zorluklara günümüzün
Türkiye Devleti’nin bütünlüklü bir strateji çerçevesinde çözüm politikaları geliştirmesini ve
bunları eşitlikçi bir yaklaşımla uygulamasını bekliyor. Türkiye’nin Avrupa’daki Türkiyelilere
yönelik sosyal politika çalışmalarının başarılı olabilmesi için, hem Türkiyelilerin yaşadıkları
devletlerin özelliklerinin hem de bu ülkelerde yaşamakta olan Türkiyelilerin sosyoekonomik
durumlarının anlaşılması ve ihtiyaçlarının irdelenmesi gerek.
PODEM olarak gerçekleştirdiğimiz bu araştırmayla Avrupa’da yaşamakta olan Türkiye kökenli
insanların hikayelerini kamuoyuna yansıtarak; yaşanan zorluklar, elde edilen başarılar ve
halihazırdaki ihtiyaçlar üzerine farkındalık yaratabilmeyi amaçlıyoruz. Bu farkındalık üzerinden
Avrupa’daki Türkiye kökenli vatandaşların ihtiyaçlarına yönelik politikalar geliştirilmesine katkıda
bulunabilmeyi umuyoruz.

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Özet
PODEM, Norveç Helsinki Komitesi İnanç Özgürlüğü Girişimi’yle birlikte, Yaşama Dair Vakıf (YADA)
ve Gündem Çocuk Derneği’nin katkılarıyla okullarda çoğulculuk, zorunlu ve seçmeli din dersleri
ve dinin görünümleri hakkında 2016 yılında Mart ve Ağustos ayları arasında farklı illerden ebeveyn
ve öğrencilerin katılımıyla bir saha çalışması yürüttü. Bu saha çalışmasında İstanbul, Ankara,
Kayseri ve Diyarbakır’da yaşayan farklı inanç gruplarından ve farklı dini pratik seviyelerine sahip
toplamda 124 ebeveynle yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine mülakatlar gerçekleştirildi. Çocuklarla
yürütülen çalışmada ise İstanbul, Ankara ve Kayseri’de yine farklı inanç gruplarından ailelerden
gelen çocukların katılımıyla toplamda 38 lise öğrencisi çocukla atölye çalışmaları ve birebir
görüşmeler yapıldı.