International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015
In this paper, we offer a novel explanation to the surge in patenting observed during the last fe... more In this paper, we offer a novel explanation to the surge in patenting observed during the last few years. When PTOs (Patent and Trademark Offices) award bad patents, not only do "false innovators" have the incentive to file applications but also, and more interestingly, "true innovators" are forced to patent more intensively in an attempt to signal their type. However, if they are liquidity constrained, true innovators may fail to separate and this fact reduces the incentives to exert effort in R&D. In addition, drawing on the signaling role of patents highlighted by the model, we investigate some of the proposals that have been put forward in order to mitigate the bad patents problem. We provide an intuitive condition under which a tightening of the patentability standards ("raising the bar") reduces the distortions caused by bad patents. Moreover, we show that introducing a two-tiered patent system is unlikely to improve market outcomes.
In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic al... more In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic alliances. We use a database with 1,344 worldwide alliances in several industrial sectors. In contrast with previous empirical studies, we find that alliances undertaking R&D activities are more likely to use loose forms of organization (contractual agreements) than more hierarchical ones (joint ventures), and this result is even stronger when the alliance takes place in technologically sophisticated sectors. Moreover, we show that alliances between rival firms tend also to be organized with forms closer to arm’s length transactions. When the scope of an alliance is multidimensional or the alliance is an international one, however, firms prefer more hierarchical organizations such as joint ventures.
This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source so... more This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source software (OSS). Mass-market consumers can be divided between those who are informed about the existence of OSS and those who are uninformed. Since OSS producers have little incentive to advertise, there may be a substantial mass of uniformed consumers, leading to market failures that may justify government intervention. We study three government policies: (a) mandated adoption, whereby the government forces public agencies, schools, and universities to adopt OSS, (b) information provision, whereby the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS, and (c) subsidy, whereby the government makes a payment to consumers if they adopt OSS. We show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare, but the subsidy always reduces it. When network externalities are added to the model, we show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare if they help the market to tip towards standardization.
This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source so... more This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source software (OSS). Mass-market consumers can be divided between those who are informed about the existence of OSS and those who are uninformed. Since OSS producers have little incentive to advertise, there may be a substantial mass of uniformed consumers, leading to market failures that may justify government intervention. We study three government policies: (a) mandated adoption, whereby the government forces public agencies, schools, and universities to adopt OSS, (b) information provision, whereby the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS, and (c) subsidy, whereby the government makes a payment to consumers if they adopt OSS. We show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare, but the subsidy always reduces it. When network externalities are added to the model, we show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare if they help the market to tip towards standardization.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015
In this paper, we offer a novel explanation to the surge in patenting observed during the last fe... more In this paper, we offer a novel explanation to the surge in patenting observed during the last few years. When PTOs (Patent and Trademark Offices) award bad patents, not only do "false innovators" have the incentive to file applications but also, and more interestingly, "true innovators" are forced to patent more intensively in an attempt to signal their type. However, if they are liquidity constrained, true innovators may fail to separate and this fact reduces the incentives to exert effort in R&D. In addition, drawing on the signaling role of patents highlighted by the model, we investigate some of the proposals that have been put forward in order to mitigate the bad patents problem. We provide an intuitive condition under which a tightening of the patentability standards ("raising the bar") reduces the distortions caused by bad patents. Moreover, we show that introducing a two-tiered patent system is unlikely to improve market outcomes.
In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic al... more In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic alliances. We use a database with 1,344 worldwide alliances in several industrial sectors. In contrast with previous empirical studies, we find that alliances undertaking R&D activities are more likely to use loose forms of organization (contractual agreements) than more hierarchical ones (joint ventures), and this result is even stronger when the alliance takes place in technologically sophisticated sectors. Moreover, we show that alliances between rival firms tend also to be organized with forms closer to arm’s length transactions. When the scope of an alliance is multidimensional or the alliance is an international one, however, firms prefer more hierarchical organizations such as joint ventures.
This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source so... more This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source software (OSS). Mass-market consumers can be divided between those who are informed about the existence of OSS and those who are uninformed. Since OSS producers have little incentive to advertise, there may be a substantial mass of uniformed consumers, leading to market failures that may justify government intervention. We study three government policies: (a) mandated adoption, whereby the government forces public agencies, schools, and universities to adopt OSS, (b) information provision, whereby the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS, and (c) subsidy, whereby the government makes a payment to consumers if they adopt OSS. We show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare, but the subsidy always reduces it. When network externalities are added to the model, we show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare if they help the market to tip towards standardization.
This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source so... more This paper analyzes the impact on social welfare of government policies supporting open source software (OSS). Mass-market consumers can be divided between those who are informed about the existence of OSS and those who are uninformed. Since OSS producers have little incentive to advertise, there may be a substantial mass of uniformed consumers, leading to market failures that may justify government intervention. We study three government policies: (a) mandated adoption, whereby the government forces public agencies, schools, and universities to adopt OSS, (b) information provision, whereby the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS, and (c) subsidy, whereby the government makes a payment to consumers if they adopt OSS. We show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare, but the subsidy always reduces it. When network externalities are added to the model, we show that mandated adoption and information provision may increase social welfare if they help the market to tip towards standardization.
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