The article analyses selected aspects of the biography of Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), a Germa... more The article analyses selected aspects of the biography of Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), a German historian and theoretician of history. In particular, it brings to the fore significant traces of the Second World War experiences of the author of Kritik und Krise. Further, it looks at their influence on Koselleck's critical approach to the concept of collective memory and on the anti-utopian thrust of his historical theory. K e y w o r d s: Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), biography, theory of history, collective and individual memory, criticism of utopia.
Celem artykułu jest nowe spojrzenie na biografię Reinharta Kosellecka, wybitnego niemieckiego his... more Celem artykułu jest nowe spojrzenie na biografię Reinharta Kosellecka, wybitnego niemieckiego historyka i teoretyka historii, z perspektywy jego wieloletniej korespondencji z Carlem Schmittem, teoretykiem prawa III Rzeszy i wybitnym myślicielem konserwatywnym. Na tle nowszej, szybko rozrastającej się literatury poświęconej analizie myśli Kosellecka autor analizuje poszczególne fazy korespondencji Koselleck – Schmitt (1953–1983) nie tylko jako przyczynek do biografii historyka, ale jako ważny dokument historii intelektualnej Niemiec i całej Europy w XX w.
The article presents the main geopolitical concepts of Polish foreign politics and military strat... more The article presents the main geopolitical concepts of Polish foreign politics and military strategy between 1918 and 1921. The author discusses two general programmes of policy towards Poland’s neighbours to the East: the ‘federalist’ option associated with Józef Piłsudski, and the ‘incorporationist’ option of Roman Dmowski. The analysis is concentrated around the efforts to realize the former programme. Starting from a detailed analysis of Piłsudski’s instructions to the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference at the end of 1918, through a special mission of Michał Römer sent to Lithuania in April 1919, and reasons of its failure, the author turns to a history of the ‘Ukrainian card’, played by Piłsudski in 1919 and 1920 in order to achieve a geopolitical counter-balance to any Russian/Soviet imperialism. Finally, the article deals with the meaning of the Piłsudski’s eastern policy as one of the main factors which stopped the westward drive of Soviet Russia for the next 20...
The text [published in: L’héritage de la Res Publica des Deux Nations, eds. Jerzy Kłoczowski, Iwo... more The text [published in: L’héritage de la Res Publica des Deux Nations, eds. Jerzy Kłoczowski, Iwona Goral (Lublin-Paris: Société de l'Institut de l'Europe du Centre-Est, 2009), p. 123-144] analyses geopolitical, ideological and structural aspects of Jozef Pilsudski's policy in Eastern Europe, between 1918 and 1921.
A ghost was haunting the 19 th-century Europe – a ghost of the Polish Commonwealth: a great count... more A ghost was haunting the 19 th-century Europe – a ghost of the Polish Commonwealth: a great country, with centuries-old tradition of statehood within more or less stable borders, although borders that would constantly and gradually be cut out in the East. The borders from the year 1772, that is from before the first partition, were strongly ingrained in the historical consciousness of not only the country's citizens or their heirs, but equally in the memory of the political elites of the great powers that executed the partitions and benefited from them. The Commonwealth, through an unprecedented act, was erased from the map of the continent at the moment when her elites have already undertaken – as the first political community in Central and Eastern Europe – to construct a modern nation. Yet what nation precisely? A Polish nation, naturally. One that would write in and speak the Polish language (as proved with the textbooks prepared by the Commission of National Education), and would be less decentralized politically than before (the Constitution of May 3, 1791, made no reference to Lithuania). Should the Poland have survived the European crises at the end of the 18 th century, and continued to implement the program of modernization, it would have to face, sooner or later, the great tensions rooted in those very matters: the language of education, administration, army – the three institutions, which in other 19 th-century states were turning " peasants into French " , or into Germans, or Italians… Under the partitions, the birth of new national projects, competing with the Polish efforts on the territories of the former Commonwealth, run in parallel to yet a different phenomenon: a more or less systematic attempts by the administrations of the partitioning powers, to " de-Polonize " the territories under their control, to weaken the still-dominant Polish cultural and economic elements – in order to strengthen control over them by the imperial center, which was founded on a much different cultural and ethnic substrate: Russian and German. The competition between the new masters and the legacy of the former ones, allowed the national programs of the ethnic inhabitants of those territories to come to maturity, particularly the Lithuanian and Ukrainian ones, but also Belarusian. On the other hand, in the process of modernizing and educating – in the sphere of politics as well – the " masses " , formerly passive in their public life, the Polish elements were moving westward, beyond the 1772 borders, onto the territories long-lost by the Polish state to her western, German-speaking neighbors – onto Pomerania and Silesia. Bound by the historical obligation in the form of pre-partition borders, by the consequences of the de-Polonization policies pursued for over a century by the partitioning powers (with the exception of Austro-Hungary in the post-1866 period), and finally by the realities springing from the changes in the concept of a nation – as the legitimizing fundament for creating and shaping the statehood – the new " mental map " of Poland would be constructed at the turn of the 20 th century. A map with vague contours. The real map of the reconstructed Polish Republic was the result of struggles. The primary forces in that struggle were the geopolitical successors to the partitioning powers: Soviet Russia (for a time the " white " Russia as well) and Germany. Partaking in that struggle were also those forces, which supported the political-national programs competing with the Polish one on the eastern borderlands of the former Commonwealth: Ukrainian, Lithuanian and, the weakest of them, the Belarusian program. A significant influence on the events and the results of that struggle was exerted by the western powers, victors of World War I – mainly Great Britain and France, and to a lesser extent the United States – which nourished the ambitions of dictating the new European order founded on the compromise between the proclaimed principles (the right of nations to self-determination) and their own strategic and economic interests. Quite naturally, the Polish society was a part to that struggle, with its choices and determination, with the competing (yet at the same time – a fact to remember – essentially convergent in their aims) political programs and visions of the reconstructed Poland, and foremost with the Polish army, which, through its " spirit " and organization, was the key to those programs being either implemented or, conversely, remaining unfulfilled.
The text analyses Polish historical memories after 1989 connected with imperial or anti-imperial ... more The text analyses Polish historical memories after 1989 connected with imperial or anti-imperial past, as well as political contexts of these memories
Russian imperial center and non-Russian peripheries, as well as agents operating in their relatio... more Russian imperial center and non-Russian peripheries, as well as agents operating in their relationships in the times of Catherine the Great - this is the subject. The text presents an approach in which the Russian Empire’s politics tested on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the eighteenth century is seen as an element of another entity: an entity created by the experience of expansion, control, assimilation and extermination gathered in the Empire’s centre by connecting the impulses reaching there and sent from there to Vilnius, Warsaw, Bakhchisaray, Baku, Tiflis, Orenburg, Tashkent and many other places situated on the map of Eurasia. To what extent did the experiences gained in one place and influenced by the said politics — social, economic, religious cultural — affect other places? Those from the Polish lands — did they affect the Crimea, Caucasus, or Russian borderlands in Central Asia? And, on the other hand, those taken from Kabarda or Georgia — did they influence somehow Lithuania or Volhynia? Finally, what is more, to what extent did being the subject of that imperial policy and its detailed practices create a sense of common fate or situation between the inhabitants (elites?) of different, distant — not only geographically, but also when it comes to civilisation — Russian peripheries? These are the questions which I wish to put forward for a preliminary consideration drawn on the basis of examples from the second half of the eighteenth century.
What should be done with former victims, who subsequently fall prey to accusations of political a... more What should be done with former victims, who subsequently fall prey to accusations of political abuse in presenting ther case, or to academic indifference? Where to find a place for them in the new-fangled discipline of “imperiology”? Perhaps, we need research going further than history, that examines the anthropological sources of the phenomenon of violence in human relations, that extends to sources showing this phenomenon in myths? Let’s begin our discussion from that perspective.
Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries. Histories Revived or Improvised?, ed. by Kimitaka Matsuzato
The text, published in : Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries. Histories Revived... more The text, published in : Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries. Histories Revived or Improvised?, ed. by Kimitaka Matsuzato, Sapporo 2005, p. 247-284 - analyses Polish history in imperial context: from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth period, through the nineteenth century clash with partitioning empires (Russia, Prussia, Austria), to the Polish II Republic (1918-1939) and late-twentieth century memories.
… The project of remoulding the way people think and act [and remember] requires a significant er... more … The project of remoulding the way people think and act [and remember] requires a significant erosion of people’s right to assent to, or reject, policies. This approach clearly presupposes the elimination of a two-way process of discussion between citizens and their rulers’. They are not citizens and their (democratically elected) rulers any more, but just patients and therapists. The latter know better how to protect the former from ‘the wrong choices’ in words and memories (still nurtured by the deviant national past), and how to protect people from themselves. Governments and intergovernmental, ‘European’ task forces take an ever-increasing part in this process, playing the role of a caring Big Brother
Memory events begin at graves, especially mass graves. 1 War cemeteries form a natural environmen... more Memory events begin at graves, especially mass graves. 1 War cemeteries form a natural environment for both memorial clashes and reconciliations. Here I intend to rethink the story of one such event and its victims: the dead. Dead bodies are not infrequently changed into bones of contention between private and public, between politics, histories, and religions, between power, knowledge, and the sacred. 2 But can the dead be murdered again? … in:
In the course o f its history, the idea o f Slavdom as a certain entirety assum ed various forms:... more In the course o f its history, the idea o f Slavdom as a certain entirety assum ed various forms: cultural-scientific interests, political conceptions and histo-riosophic reflections. For Polish em igres after the N ovem ber U prising, the m ost im portant was the political interpretation. The Uprising revealed with particular acuteness the problem of the eventual unity of the Slav w orld in the face o f the obvious P olish-R ussian divorce. N aturally, this was the central topic o f debates conducted by the em igre supporters and opponents o f Panslavism. The first and most know n event in this field was caused by the national apostasy suggested by A dam G urow ski, m otivated by the very idea o f Panslavism (1834). The central core of the controversy concerning the Slavic idea were the Parisian lectures given by Adam M ickiew icz (1840-1844). Betw een these two events, and as if in their shadow, several other voices could be heard also dealing with the issue o f Panslavism. In this essay, I would like to recall three such opinions w hich appear to be the m ost original and w hich express three different possibilities of a political interpretation o f Panslavism : anti-G erm an, conservative-m onarchic and revolutionary. All three must be considered against a special background which was created for them by the form of Slav unity, at tim es described in literature on the subject as " Polish Slavism " 1, dom inating in em igre publicistics 1 F ro m the o ld e r literatu re see: M. H andelsm an, Polityka słowiańska Polski w X V III i X IX stuleciu (Polish Slav Policy in the E ighteenth and Nineteenth Century) in: Pamiętnik VI Powszech nego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Wilnie (The D iary o f the VI General Convention o f Polish H istorians in Wilno),
The article analyses selected aspects of the biography of Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), a Germa... more The article analyses selected aspects of the biography of Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), a German historian and theoretician of history. In particular, it brings to the fore significant traces of the Second World War experiences of the author of Kritik und Krise. Further, it looks at their influence on Koselleck's critical approach to the concept of collective memory and on the anti-utopian thrust of his historical theory. K e y w o r d s: Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), biography, theory of history, collective and individual memory, criticism of utopia.
Celem artykułu jest nowe spojrzenie na biografię Reinharta Kosellecka, wybitnego niemieckiego his... more Celem artykułu jest nowe spojrzenie na biografię Reinharta Kosellecka, wybitnego niemieckiego historyka i teoretyka historii, z perspektywy jego wieloletniej korespondencji z Carlem Schmittem, teoretykiem prawa III Rzeszy i wybitnym myślicielem konserwatywnym. Na tle nowszej, szybko rozrastającej się literatury poświęconej analizie myśli Kosellecka autor analizuje poszczególne fazy korespondencji Koselleck – Schmitt (1953–1983) nie tylko jako przyczynek do biografii historyka, ale jako ważny dokument historii intelektualnej Niemiec i całej Europy w XX w.
The article presents the main geopolitical concepts of Polish foreign politics and military strat... more The article presents the main geopolitical concepts of Polish foreign politics and military strategy between 1918 and 1921. The author discusses two general programmes of policy towards Poland’s neighbours to the East: the ‘federalist’ option associated with Józef Piłsudski, and the ‘incorporationist’ option of Roman Dmowski. The analysis is concentrated around the efforts to realize the former programme. Starting from a detailed analysis of Piłsudski’s instructions to the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference at the end of 1918, through a special mission of Michał Römer sent to Lithuania in April 1919, and reasons of its failure, the author turns to a history of the ‘Ukrainian card’, played by Piłsudski in 1919 and 1920 in order to achieve a geopolitical counter-balance to any Russian/Soviet imperialism. Finally, the article deals with the meaning of the Piłsudski’s eastern policy as one of the main factors which stopped the westward drive of Soviet Russia for the next 20...
The text [published in: L’héritage de la Res Publica des Deux Nations, eds. Jerzy Kłoczowski, Iwo... more The text [published in: L’héritage de la Res Publica des Deux Nations, eds. Jerzy Kłoczowski, Iwona Goral (Lublin-Paris: Société de l'Institut de l'Europe du Centre-Est, 2009), p. 123-144] analyses geopolitical, ideological and structural aspects of Jozef Pilsudski's policy in Eastern Europe, between 1918 and 1921.
A ghost was haunting the 19 th-century Europe – a ghost of the Polish Commonwealth: a great count... more A ghost was haunting the 19 th-century Europe – a ghost of the Polish Commonwealth: a great country, with centuries-old tradition of statehood within more or less stable borders, although borders that would constantly and gradually be cut out in the East. The borders from the year 1772, that is from before the first partition, were strongly ingrained in the historical consciousness of not only the country's citizens or their heirs, but equally in the memory of the political elites of the great powers that executed the partitions and benefited from them. The Commonwealth, through an unprecedented act, was erased from the map of the continent at the moment when her elites have already undertaken – as the first political community in Central and Eastern Europe – to construct a modern nation. Yet what nation precisely? A Polish nation, naturally. One that would write in and speak the Polish language (as proved with the textbooks prepared by the Commission of National Education), and would be less decentralized politically than before (the Constitution of May 3, 1791, made no reference to Lithuania). Should the Poland have survived the European crises at the end of the 18 th century, and continued to implement the program of modernization, it would have to face, sooner or later, the great tensions rooted in those very matters: the language of education, administration, army – the three institutions, which in other 19 th-century states were turning " peasants into French " , or into Germans, or Italians… Under the partitions, the birth of new national projects, competing with the Polish efforts on the territories of the former Commonwealth, run in parallel to yet a different phenomenon: a more or less systematic attempts by the administrations of the partitioning powers, to " de-Polonize " the territories under their control, to weaken the still-dominant Polish cultural and economic elements – in order to strengthen control over them by the imperial center, which was founded on a much different cultural and ethnic substrate: Russian and German. The competition between the new masters and the legacy of the former ones, allowed the national programs of the ethnic inhabitants of those territories to come to maturity, particularly the Lithuanian and Ukrainian ones, but also Belarusian. On the other hand, in the process of modernizing and educating – in the sphere of politics as well – the " masses " , formerly passive in their public life, the Polish elements were moving westward, beyond the 1772 borders, onto the territories long-lost by the Polish state to her western, German-speaking neighbors – onto Pomerania and Silesia. Bound by the historical obligation in the form of pre-partition borders, by the consequences of the de-Polonization policies pursued for over a century by the partitioning powers (with the exception of Austro-Hungary in the post-1866 period), and finally by the realities springing from the changes in the concept of a nation – as the legitimizing fundament for creating and shaping the statehood – the new " mental map " of Poland would be constructed at the turn of the 20 th century. A map with vague contours. The real map of the reconstructed Polish Republic was the result of struggles. The primary forces in that struggle were the geopolitical successors to the partitioning powers: Soviet Russia (for a time the " white " Russia as well) and Germany. Partaking in that struggle were also those forces, which supported the political-national programs competing with the Polish one on the eastern borderlands of the former Commonwealth: Ukrainian, Lithuanian and, the weakest of them, the Belarusian program. A significant influence on the events and the results of that struggle was exerted by the western powers, victors of World War I – mainly Great Britain and France, and to a lesser extent the United States – which nourished the ambitions of dictating the new European order founded on the compromise between the proclaimed principles (the right of nations to self-determination) and their own strategic and economic interests. Quite naturally, the Polish society was a part to that struggle, with its choices and determination, with the competing (yet at the same time – a fact to remember – essentially convergent in their aims) political programs and visions of the reconstructed Poland, and foremost with the Polish army, which, through its " spirit " and organization, was the key to those programs being either implemented or, conversely, remaining unfulfilled.
The text analyses Polish historical memories after 1989 connected with imperial or anti-imperial ... more The text analyses Polish historical memories after 1989 connected with imperial or anti-imperial past, as well as political contexts of these memories
Russian imperial center and non-Russian peripheries, as well as agents operating in their relatio... more Russian imperial center and non-Russian peripheries, as well as agents operating in their relationships in the times of Catherine the Great - this is the subject. The text presents an approach in which the Russian Empire’s politics tested on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the eighteenth century is seen as an element of another entity: an entity created by the experience of expansion, control, assimilation and extermination gathered in the Empire’s centre by connecting the impulses reaching there and sent from there to Vilnius, Warsaw, Bakhchisaray, Baku, Tiflis, Orenburg, Tashkent and many other places situated on the map of Eurasia. To what extent did the experiences gained in one place and influenced by the said politics — social, economic, religious cultural — affect other places? Those from the Polish lands — did they affect the Crimea, Caucasus, or Russian borderlands in Central Asia? And, on the other hand, those taken from Kabarda or Georgia — did they influence somehow Lithuania or Volhynia? Finally, what is more, to what extent did being the subject of that imperial policy and its detailed practices create a sense of common fate or situation between the inhabitants (elites?) of different, distant — not only geographically, but also when it comes to civilisation — Russian peripheries? These are the questions which I wish to put forward for a preliminary consideration drawn on the basis of examples from the second half of the eighteenth century.
What should be done with former victims, who subsequently fall prey to accusations of political a... more What should be done with former victims, who subsequently fall prey to accusations of political abuse in presenting ther case, or to academic indifference? Where to find a place for them in the new-fangled discipline of “imperiology”? Perhaps, we need research going further than history, that examines the anthropological sources of the phenomenon of violence in human relations, that extends to sources showing this phenomenon in myths? Let’s begin our discussion from that perspective.
Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries. Histories Revived or Improvised?, ed. by Kimitaka Matsuzato
The text, published in : Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries. Histories Revived... more The text, published in : Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries. Histories Revived or Improvised?, ed. by Kimitaka Matsuzato, Sapporo 2005, p. 247-284 - analyses Polish history in imperial context: from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth period, through the nineteenth century clash with partitioning empires (Russia, Prussia, Austria), to the Polish II Republic (1918-1939) and late-twentieth century memories.
… The project of remoulding the way people think and act [and remember] requires a significant er... more … The project of remoulding the way people think and act [and remember] requires a significant erosion of people’s right to assent to, or reject, policies. This approach clearly presupposes the elimination of a two-way process of discussion between citizens and their rulers’. They are not citizens and their (democratically elected) rulers any more, but just patients and therapists. The latter know better how to protect the former from ‘the wrong choices’ in words and memories (still nurtured by the deviant national past), and how to protect people from themselves. Governments and intergovernmental, ‘European’ task forces take an ever-increasing part in this process, playing the role of a caring Big Brother
Memory events begin at graves, especially mass graves. 1 War cemeteries form a natural environmen... more Memory events begin at graves, especially mass graves. 1 War cemeteries form a natural environment for both memorial clashes and reconciliations. Here I intend to rethink the story of one such event and its victims: the dead. Dead bodies are not infrequently changed into bones of contention between private and public, between politics, histories, and religions, between power, knowledge, and the sacred. 2 But can the dead be murdered again? … in:
In the course o f its history, the idea o f Slavdom as a certain entirety assum ed various forms:... more In the course o f its history, the idea o f Slavdom as a certain entirety assum ed various forms: cultural-scientific interests, political conceptions and histo-riosophic reflections. For Polish em igres after the N ovem ber U prising, the m ost im portant was the political interpretation. The Uprising revealed with particular acuteness the problem of the eventual unity of the Slav w orld in the face o f the obvious P olish-R ussian divorce. N aturally, this was the central topic o f debates conducted by the em igre supporters and opponents o f Panslavism. The first and most know n event in this field was caused by the national apostasy suggested by A dam G urow ski, m otivated by the very idea o f Panslavism (1834). The central core of the controversy concerning the Slavic idea were the Parisian lectures given by Adam M ickiew icz (1840-1844). Betw een these two events, and as if in their shadow, several other voices could be heard also dealing with the issue o f Panslavism. In this essay, I would like to recall three such opinions w hich appear to be the m ost original and w hich express three different possibilities of a political interpretation o f Panslavism : anti-G erm an, conservative-m onarchic and revolutionary. All three must be considered against a special background which was created for them by the form of Slav unity, at tim es described in literature on the subject as " Polish Slavism " 1, dom inating in em igre publicistics 1 F ro m the o ld e r literatu re see: M. H andelsm an, Polityka słowiańska Polski w X V III i X IX stuleciu (Polish Slav Policy in the E ighteenth and Nineteenth Century) in: Pamiętnik VI Powszech nego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Wilnie (The D iary o f the VI General Convention o f Polish H istorians in Wilno),
Uploads
Perhaps, we need research going further than history, that examines the anthropological sources of the phenomenon of violence in human relations, that extends to sources showing this phenomenon in myths? Let’s begin our discussion from that perspective.
Perhaps, we need research going further than history, that examines the anthropological sources of the phenomenon of violence in human relations, that extends to sources showing this phenomenon in myths? Let’s begin our discussion from that perspective.