In 2016, I left my position as Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St Louis. Below you will find a selection of academic papers I published during my time as a philosophy professor.
I now work as a Content Consultant for horticultural and environmental organisations. If you'd like to get in touch, I'd be happy to hear from you!
Traces the wide history of philosophical thought regarding animals, from ancient Greece and India... more Traces the wide history of philosophical thought regarding animals, from ancient Greece and India to contemporary times.
Includes discussions of the historical roots of the some the most contentious, on-going debates surrounding treatment of animals and animal consciousness.
Includes several Reflection essays which examine the depiction of animals in artwork from China, Africa, and Europe.
Part of the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series - The History of Philosophy's Most Important Ideas.
Like many philosophers before them, Plutarch and Porphyry refused to eat animals, but unlike thei... more Like many philosophers before them, Plutarch and Porphyry refused to eat animals, but unlike their predecessors, each sets out numerous arguments in favour of vegetarianism in their writings. Their arguments are many and varied. Some tell us that we should not eat animals because killing and eating them makes us more likely to kill and eat human beings, some tell us that it is because human beings may reincarnate as animals, others tell us that it is because animals are rational creatures that are owed moral consideration from humans, and yet others say that it is because meat-eating has negative effects on the bodies and souls of human meat-eaters. Notably, while in some cases, meat-eating is presented as wrong because of what it does to animals, in others, it is so only because of what it does to human beings. In the following paper, I argue that Plutarch and Porphyry are, in fact, more concerned about the effect that meat-eating has on human beings than they are about the effect that it has on non-human animals. In particular, they consider meat-eating an act of human intemperance, which distracts one's higher soul from contemplation of the Platonic forms. Thus, while their reasoning results in a number of practical recommendations regarding the treatment of animals, the Platonists are not particularly concerned about the fate of the animals themselves.
Porphyry is taken by most scholars to be committed to the belief that (i) all animals are rationa... more Porphyry is taken by most scholars to be committed to the belief that (i) all animals are rational, and that (ii) this makes it unjust to kill them for food. This argument appears in book 3 of his treatise 'On Abstinence from Animal Food.' In this paper, however, I argue that most scholars are wrong to understand Porphyry in this way. As I understand him, Porphyry believes neither that (ii) it is unjust to eat animals because they are rational, nor even that (i) all animals are rational. Instead, I suggest, Porphyry's book 3 argument is a dialectical attack on the Stoic position, which argues that, given the Stoic theory of rationality, the Stoics ought to admit that (i) all animals are rational, and, given the Stoic theory of justice, the Stoics ought also to admit that (ii) eating animals is unjust. If I am right about this, then everything we thought we knew about Porphyry's approach to animals is wrong.
In the 'Euthyphro', Socrates claims that, if he were to acquire knowledge of piety, he would have... more In the 'Euthyphro', Socrates claims that, if he were to acquire knowledge of piety, he would have grounds for requesting acquittal on charges of impiety. This paper examines why Socrates thinks that gaining such knowledge is reasonable grounds for acquittal. It offers and decides between two readings: the first, is that Socrates is innocent of impiety and will use knowledge of piety to prove that this is the case, and the second, is that Socrates believes that knowledge of piety will make him pious henceforth (intellectualism) and that instruction in piety is a suitable punishment for any past impiety of which he may have been guilty. It suggests that Socrates is best understood as endorsing a functional definition of punishment in this dialogue, according to which whatsoever reforms a wrongdoer constitutes punishment for their wrongdoing, and argues that this speaks in favour of Penner and Rowe’s understanding of Socrates’ views on punishment, and against those of Brickhouse and Smith.
Traces the wide history of philosophical thought regarding animals, from ancient Greece and India... more Traces the wide history of philosophical thought regarding animals, from ancient Greece and India to contemporary times.
Includes discussions of the historical roots of the some the most contentious, on-going debates surrounding treatment of animals and animal consciousness.
Includes several Reflection essays which examine the depiction of animals in artwork from China, Africa, and Europe.
Part of the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series - The History of Philosophy's Most Important Ideas.
Like many philosophers before them, Plutarch and Porphyry refused to eat animals, but unlike thei... more Like many philosophers before them, Plutarch and Porphyry refused to eat animals, but unlike their predecessors, each sets out numerous arguments in favour of vegetarianism in their writings. Their arguments are many and varied. Some tell us that we should not eat animals because killing and eating them makes us more likely to kill and eat human beings, some tell us that it is because human beings may reincarnate as animals, others tell us that it is because animals are rational creatures that are owed moral consideration from humans, and yet others say that it is because meat-eating has negative effects on the bodies and souls of human meat-eaters. Notably, while in some cases, meat-eating is presented as wrong because of what it does to animals, in others, it is so only because of what it does to human beings. In the following paper, I argue that Plutarch and Porphyry are, in fact, more concerned about the effect that meat-eating has on human beings than they are about the effect that it has on non-human animals. In particular, they consider meat-eating an act of human intemperance, which distracts one's higher soul from contemplation of the Platonic forms. Thus, while their reasoning results in a number of practical recommendations regarding the treatment of animals, the Platonists are not particularly concerned about the fate of the animals themselves.
Porphyry is taken by most scholars to be committed to the belief that (i) all animals are rationa... more Porphyry is taken by most scholars to be committed to the belief that (i) all animals are rational, and that (ii) this makes it unjust to kill them for food. This argument appears in book 3 of his treatise 'On Abstinence from Animal Food.' In this paper, however, I argue that most scholars are wrong to understand Porphyry in this way. As I understand him, Porphyry believes neither that (ii) it is unjust to eat animals because they are rational, nor even that (i) all animals are rational. Instead, I suggest, Porphyry's book 3 argument is a dialectical attack on the Stoic position, which argues that, given the Stoic theory of rationality, the Stoics ought to admit that (i) all animals are rational, and, given the Stoic theory of justice, the Stoics ought also to admit that (ii) eating animals is unjust. If I am right about this, then everything we thought we knew about Porphyry's approach to animals is wrong.
In the 'Euthyphro', Socrates claims that, if he were to acquire knowledge of piety, he would have... more In the 'Euthyphro', Socrates claims that, if he were to acquire knowledge of piety, he would have grounds for requesting acquittal on charges of impiety. This paper examines why Socrates thinks that gaining such knowledge is reasonable grounds for acquittal. It offers and decides between two readings: the first, is that Socrates is innocent of impiety and will use knowledge of piety to prove that this is the case, and the second, is that Socrates believes that knowledge of piety will make him pious henceforth (intellectualism) and that instruction in piety is a suitable punishment for any past impiety of which he may have been guilty. It suggests that Socrates is best understood as endorsing a functional definition of punishment in this dialogue, according to which whatsoever reforms a wrongdoer constitutes punishment for their wrongdoing, and argues that this speaks in favour of Penner and Rowe’s understanding of Socrates’ views on punishment, and against those of Brickhouse and Smith.
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Books by G. Fay Edwards
Includes discussions of the historical roots of the some the most contentious, on-going debates surrounding treatment of animals and animal consciousness.
Includes several Reflection essays which examine the depiction of animals in artwork from China, Africa, and Europe.
Part of the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series - The History of Philosophy's Most Important Ideas.
Papers by G. Fay Edwards
Book Reviews by G. Fay Edwards
Includes discussions of the historical roots of the some the most contentious, on-going debates surrounding treatment of animals and animal consciousness.
Includes several Reflection essays which examine the depiction of animals in artwork from China, Africa, and Europe.
Part of the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series - The History of Philosophy's Most Important Ideas.