King's College London
Philosophy
Is it ethically permissible to use deception in psychological experiments? We argue that, provided some requirements are satisfied, it is possible to use deceptive methods without producing significant harm to research participants and... more
Is it ethically permissible to use deception in psychological experiments? We argue that, provided some requirements are satisfied, it is possible to use deceptive methods without producing significant harm to research participants and without any significant violation of their autonomy. We also argue that methodological deception is at least at the moment the only effective means by which one can acquire morally significant information about certain behavioral tendencies. Individuals in general, and research participants in particular, gain self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play a role in shaping education, informing policies and in general creating a more efficient and just society.
Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the... more
Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the evolution and cognitive structure of mindreading indicates that human ascriptions of mental states to non-human animals are very inaccurate. The accuracy of human mindreading can be improved with the help of scientific studies of animal minds. But the scientific studies by themselves do not by themselves solve the problem of how to map psychological similarities (and differences) between humans and animals onto a distinction between morally relevant and morally irrelevant mental properties. The current limitations of human mindreading – whether scientifically aided or not – have practical consequences for the rational justification of claims about which rights (if any) non-human animals should be accorded.
It is far too early to say what global impact the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences will have on our intuitions about moral responsibility. And it is far too early to say whether the notion of moral responsibility will survive... more
It is far too early to say what global impact the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences will have on our intuitions about moral responsibility. And it is far too early to say whether the notion of moral responsibility will survive this impact (and if so, in what form). But it is certainly worth starting to think about the local impact that these sciences can or should have on some of our distinctions and criteria. It might be possible to use some of the tools offered by these sciences in order to refine or revise some of the categories currently used, without – for the time being at least – worrying too much about the fate of the notion of moral responsibility. This is an area where a piecemeal approach might be more productive: only after an evaluation of many distinct cases and situations it will be possible to say something general about the current notion of moral responsibility.
In this article, we will focus on a single clinical case: a young man who has been convicted for assault on a neighbour and whose sentence was affected by a pre-existing diagnosis of mental illness. We will use this case, and an analysis of the similarities and differences between this case and other possible cases, in order to raise some (local but important) issues about the implications that discoveries in neuropsychology and neuropsychiatry can have for the way moral responsibility is attributed to agents and, more specifically, to agents with diagnoses of mental illnesses.
In this article, we will focus on a single clinical case: a young man who has been convicted for assault on a neighbour and whose sentence was affected by a pre-existing diagnosis of mental illness. We will use this case, and an analysis of the similarities and differences between this case and other possible cases, in order to raise some (local but important) issues about the implications that discoveries in neuropsychology and neuropsychiatry can have for the way moral responsibility is attributed to agents and, more specifically, to agents with diagnoses of mental illnesses.
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the epistemic faults of delusions and confabulations for the autonomy of the people affected by these conditions. The issue whether autonomy is compromised and to what... more
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the epistemic faults of delusions and confabulations for the autonomy of the people affected by these conditions. The issue whether autonomy is compromised and to what extent is of great practical relevance. Do people affected by psychiatric disorders that manifest with delusions and confabulations have capacity to consent to treatment? More generally, should they be allowed to make, and deemed responsible for, significant decisions that affect their well-being?
We propose to look at autonomy as self-governance and to make a distinction between (a) whether one has the capacity to govern oneself and (b) whether one is successful at governing oneself. We argue that the capacity for self-governance depends on the capacity to develop a self-narrative which encompasses the capacity to endorse attitudes and actions on the basis of reasons. Success in self-governance depends on the coherence of self-narratives and on their correspondence to real life events.
Our thesis is that, in most cases, people with delusions or confabulations have the capacity for self-governance, but are unlikely to be successful at governing themselves. This is because they are likely to demonstrate failures of rationality and self-knowledge that impact on the coherence of their self-narratives and the correspondence between these narratives and real life events. Although in some cases the very capacity for self-governance may be compromised (e.g., in ‘primary’ delusions where no reasons are offered in support of the delusion or in delusions and confabulations which occur at advanced stages of dementia) our claim is that having delusions and confabulations does not necessarily imply a lack of capacity for self-governance. That said, delusions and confabulations interfere with the exercise of self-governance.
We propose to look at autonomy as self-governance and to make a distinction between (a) whether one has the capacity to govern oneself and (b) whether one is successful at governing oneself. We argue that the capacity for self-governance depends on the capacity to develop a self-narrative which encompasses the capacity to endorse attitudes and actions on the basis of reasons. Success in self-governance depends on the coherence of self-narratives and on their correspondence to real life events.
Our thesis is that, in most cases, people with delusions or confabulations have the capacity for self-governance, but are unlikely to be successful at governing themselves. This is because they are likely to demonstrate failures of rationality and self-knowledge that impact on the coherence of their self-narratives and the correspondence between these narratives and real life events. Although in some cases the very capacity for self-governance may be compromised (e.g., in ‘primary’ delusions where no reasons are offered in support of the delusion or in delusions and confabulations which occur at advanced stages of dementia) our claim is that having delusions and confabulations does not necessarily imply a lack of capacity for self-governance. That said, delusions and confabulations interfere with the exercise of self-governance.
- by Lisa Bortolotti and +2
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- Self-Knowledge, Autonomy, Delusions, Confabulation
Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense... more
Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes (e.g., someone being harmed), the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully responsible for the bad outcome (and deserves to be punished accordingly) and circumstances in which the agent is not at all responsible for the bad outcome (and thereby the agent does not deserve to be punished).
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have been arguing for what they named libertarian paternalism (henceforth LP). Their proposal generated extensive debate as to how and whether LP might lead down a full-blown paternalistic slippery slope.... more
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have been arguing for what they named libertarian paternalism (henceforth LP). Their proposal generated extensive debate as to how and whether LP might lead down a full-blown paternalistic slippery slope. LP has the indubitable merit of having hardwired the best of the empirical psychological and sociological evidence into public and private policy making. It is unclear, though, to what extent the implementation of policies so constructed could enhance the capability for the exercise of an autonomous citizenship. Sunstein and Thaler submit it that in most of the cases in which one is confronted with a set of choices, some default option must be picked out. In those cases whoever devises the features of the set of options ought to rank them according to the moral principle of non-maleficence and possibly to that of beneficence. In this paper we argue that LP can be better implemented if there is a preliminary deliberative debate among the stakeholders that elicits their preferences, and makes it possible to rationally defend them.
- by Giuseppe Schiavone and +2
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In this paper we explore two aspects of gradualism as they apply to the phenomenon of delusions, that is, the acknowledgement that it is difficult to distinguish pathological from non-pathological beliefs and the defence of the view that... more
In this paper we explore two aspects of gradualism as they apply to the phenomenon of delusions, that is, the acknowledgement that it is difficult to distinguish pathological from non-pathological beliefs and the defence of the view that there is considerable continuity between delusional and other epistemically faulty beliefs. We also identify the implications of these two aspects of gradualism for questions about one’s moral and legal responsibility for action that is motivated by one’s delusional beliefs. In the first section of the paper, we argue that an effective demarcation between pathological and non-pathological beliefs cannot be successfully achieved on mere epistemic grounds, that is, on the basis of the epistemic quality of the relevant belief-forming and belief-maintaining processes. We offer some reasons to endorse the thesis that delusional beliefs are continuous with other epistemically faulty beliefs. In the second section of the paper, we examine the implications of the continuity thesis for the association—common in everyday thinking but also in ethical and legal frameworks—between being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder featuring delusions and having reduced or no responsibility for action that is motivated by one’s delusions. We consider some interesting cases of agents who committed crimes related to the content of their epistemically faulty beliefs, and ask whether their beliefs qualifying as delusions makes a difference to whether such agents were responsible for their actions. Finally, we make some suggestions about how the continuity thesis can inform attributions of moral and legal responsibility for action.
- by Ema Sullivan-Bissett and +3
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- Epistemology, Delusions
Prendendo come spunto alcuni aspetti della Legge 40/2004 in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita e il suo tortuoso iter legislativo e giudiziario, in questo articolo sosteniamo come la delega democratica e gli strumenti classici... more
Prendendo come spunto alcuni aspetti della Legge 40/2004 in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita e il suo tortuoso iter legislativo e giudiziario, in questo articolo sosteniamo come la delega democratica e gli strumenti classici di partecipazione diretta della popolazione si mostrino inadatti a trattare delicati temi bioetici. Di assoluta rilevanza, in questo senso, potrebbe essere la funzione svolta dal Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica (CNB). In questo articolo sosteniamo, tuttavia, che il CNB sta svolgendo in maniera inadeguata il ruolo che potrebbe e dovrebbe ricoprire e sviluppiamo quindi una proposta di sua riforma in senso deliberativo e realmente partecipativo. L’efficacia delle linee guida che proponiamo in questo contributo è attualmente oggetto di una sperimentazione che prevede l’implementazione di un forum online per la discussione della regolamentazione nazionale del mercato dei test genetici di suscettibilità medica.
'Normativity and Reason' explores what might be involved in the claim that the normativity of moral standards is a normativity of reason. Taking the accounts of moral normativity given by a range of moral theorists, including Hume,... more
'Normativity and Reason' explores what might be involved in the claim that the normativity of moral standards is a normativity of reason.
Taking the accounts of moral normativity given by a range of moral theorists, including Hume, Pufendorf, Locke, Sidgwick and Scanlon, and comparing these with medieval and early modern scholastic natural law theory, the paper argues that normative standards on action involve a variety of distinct kinds of justificatory force - and that standards of moral right and wrong or of moral obligation involve, in particular, a distinctive justificatory force of Demand.
Using this theory of obligation, the paper argues for a new account of moral rationality, and of the relation of moral and legal obligation.
Taking the accounts of moral normativity given by a range of moral theorists, including Hume, Pufendorf, Locke, Sidgwick and Scanlon, and comparing these with medieval and early modern scholastic natural law theory, the paper argues that normative standards on action involve a variety of distinct kinds of justificatory force - and that standards of moral right and wrong or of moral obligation involve, in particular, a distinctive justificatory force of Demand.
Using this theory of obligation, the paper argues for a new account of moral rationality, and of the relation of moral and legal obligation.
- by Thomas Pink
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- Law, Hume, Natural Law, Locke
'Moral obligation' discusses Elizabeth Anscombe's account of moral obligation. The paper argues that account of moral obligation she favoured is quite different from that taught by early modern and late medieval Catholic scholasticism.... more
'Moral obligation' discusses Elizabeth Anscombe's account of moral obligation. The paper argues that account of moral obligation she favoured is quite different from that taught by early modern and late medieval Catholic scholasticism. She regarded moral obligatoriness as a reason-giving feature, akin to the feature of being commanded by a law-giver. But the scholastic tradition viewed moral obligatoriness as a justificatory force.
The paper explains what hangs on this distinction between a reason-giving feature and a justificatory force, and examines the implications of this distinction for a divine command theory of ethics.
The paper explains what hangs on this distinction between a reason-giving feature and a justificatory force, and examines the implications of this distinction for a divine command theory of ethics.
- by Thomas Pink
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- Law, Morality, Anscombe, Obligation
'Promising and Obligation' criticizes the view, defended by Joseph Raz, John Finnis, David Owens and many others, that one's moral obligation to keep a promise is created by one's expression, through the act of promising, of an intention... more
'Promising and Obligation' criticizes the view, defended by Joseph Raz, John Finnis, David Owens and many others, that one's moral obligation to keep a promise is created by one's expression, through the act of promising, of an intention so to obligate oneself.
The moral obligation to keep promises arises instead out of either of two contrasting aspects of the morality of human nature: from our mutual moral independence, which consists in our natural right to determine for ourselves what we do for others; or from our mutual moral interdependence, which consists in our natural interest in the trustworthiness of others.
The paper opposes David Hume's theory that the moral obligation to keep promises is part of convention-dependent or artificial morality. Instead the obligation is part of pre-conventional natural morality.
The moral obligation to keep promises arises instead out of either of two contrasting aspects of the morality of human nature: from our mutual moral independence, which consists in our natural right to determine for ourselves what we do for others; or from our mutual moral interdependence, which consists in our natural interest in the trustworthiness of others.
The paper opposes David Hume's theory that the moral obligation to keep promises is part of convention-dependent or artificial morality. Instead the obligation is part of pre-conventional natural morality.
- by Thomas Pink
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- Law, Hume, Trust, Natural Law
'Reason, voluntariness and moral responsibility' argues against the theory of responsibility and blame of T.M. Scanlon, that reduces moral responsibility to a form of rational appraisability for our psychological attitudes generally - as... more
'Reason, voluntariness and moral responsibility' argues against the theory of responsibility and blame of T.M. Scanlon, that reduces moral responsibility to a form of rational appraisability for our psychological attitudes generally - as opposed to leaving it a distinctive kind of responsibility for how we act, dependent on a power to determine for ourselves which actions we perform.
Scanlon's theory is shown to ignore obvious and central features of blame; and to be the result of a theory of action defended by Hobbes, Davidson and others, and widely held in English-language philosophy - a 'voluntariness-based' theory that action is by its nature an expression and effect of prior motivating pro attitudes to its performance.
To accommodate our ordinary understanding of blame and moral responsibility, we need instead to adopt a 'practical reason-based' theory of action: intentional action consists in a distinctively practical mode of exercising reason.
Scanlon's theory is shown to ignore obvious and central features of blame; and to be the result of a theory of action defended by Hobbes, Davidson and others, and widely held in English-language philosophy - a 'voluntariness-based' theory that action is by its nature an expression and effect of prior motivating pro attitudes to its performance.
To accommodate our ordinary understanding of blame and moral responsibility, we need instead to adopt a 'practical reason-based' theory of action: intentional action consists in a distinctively practical mode of exercising reason.
Our moral responsibility for our actions seems to depend on our possession of a power to determine for ourselves what actions we perform - a power of self-determination. What kind of power is this? The paper discusses what power in... more
Our moral responsibility for our actions seems to depend on our possession of a power to determine for ourselves what actions we perform - a power of self-determination. What kind of power is this?
The paper discusses what power in general might involve, what differing kinds of power there might be, and the nature of self-determination in particular. A central question is whether this power on which our moral responsibility depends is by its nature a two-way
power, involving a power over alternatives or a freedom to do otherwise.
Criticism is made of various attempts to understand self-determination in one-way terms, whether as a capacity for rationality (McDowell) or as a form of voluntariness (Frankfurt). It is argued in particular that Frankfurt's arguments to show that moral responsibility does not depend on a freedom to do otherwise beg the question against his opponents.
The paper discusses what power in general might involve, what differing kinds of power there might be, and the nature of self-determination in particular. A central question is whether this power on which our moral responsibility depends is by its nature a two-way
power, involving a power over alternatives or a freedom to do otherwise.
Criticism is made of various attempts to understand self-determination in one-way terms, whether as a capacity for rationality (McDowell) or as a form of voluntariness (Frankfurt). It is argued in particular that Frankfurt's arguments to show that moral responsibility does not depend on a freedom to do otherwise beg the question against his opponents.
The paper examines Catholic doctrine and theology on religious liberty from the Council of Trent to Vatican II. At all times Catholic theology supports a right not to be coerced based on the metaphysical dignity and freedom of the human... more
The paper examines Catholic doctrine and theology on religious liberty from the Council of Trent to Vatican II. At all times Catholic theology supports a right not to be coerced based on the metaphysical dignity and freedom of the human person. But how to understand this right?
In person-centred terms, as fixed and determined just by the dignity of the person, and as a right not to be coerced religiously by any authority? Or in jurisdiction-centred terms, as qualified and limited depending on the coercive jurisdiction under which a person falls? Does the Church have the authority to use punishment to pressure those subject to her jurisdiction - the baptized - into fidelity of belief and practice?
The teaching of Trent and of Vatican II is compared. Vatican II is shown not to support the person-centred model, which model is anyway inconsistent with Trent.
In person-centred terms, as fixed and determined just by the dignity of the person, and as a right not to be coerced religiously by any authority? Or in jurisdiction-centred terms, as qualified and limited depending on the coercive jurisdiction under which a person falls? Does the Church have the authority to use punishment to pressure those subject to her jurisdiction - the baptized - into fidelity of belief and practice?
The teaching of Trent and of Vatican II is compared. Vatican II is shown not to support the person-centred model, which model is anyway inconsistent with Trent.
Freedom in the sense of free will is a multiway power to do any one of a number of things, leaving it up to us which one of a range of options by way of action we perform. What are the ethical implications of our possession of such a... more
Freedom in the sense of free will is a multiway power to do any one of a number of things, leaving it up to us which one of a range of options by way of action we perform. What are the ethical implications of our possession of such a power? The paper examines the pre-Hobbesian scholastic view of writers such as Peter Lombard and Francisco Suarez: freedom as a multiway power is linked to the right to liberty understood as a right to exercise that power, and to liberation as a desirable goal involving the perfection of that power. Freedom as a power, liberty as a right, and liberation as a desirable goal, are all linked within this scholastic view to a distinctive theory of law as constituting, in its primary form of natural law, the normative recognition of human freedom.
Hobbes's denial of the very existence of freedom as a power led him to a radical revision both of the theory of law and of the relation of law to liberty. Law and liberty were no longer harmonious phenomena, but were left in essential conflict.
One legacy of Hobbes is the attempt to base a theory of law and liberty not on freedom as a multiway power, but on rationality. Instead of an ethics of freedom, we have an ethics of reason as involving autonomy. The paper expresses some scepticism about the prospects for such an appeal to reason as a replacement for multiway freedom.
Hobbes's denial of the very existence of freedom as a power led him to a radical revision both of the theory of law and of the relation of law to liberty. Law and liberty were no longer harmonious phenomena, but were left in essential conflict.
One legacy of Hobbes is the attempt to base a theory of law and liberty not on freedom as a multiway power, but on rationality. Instead of an ethics of freedom, we have an ethics of reason as involving autonomy. The paper expresses some scepticism about the prospects for such an appeal to reason as a replacement for multiway freedom.
Martin Rhonheimer has argued that in condemning religious coercion by the state, Vatican II's Dignitatis Humanae was a reform of previous Catholic teaching on the authority of the state. The paper argues, by contrast, that past... more
Martin Rhonheimer has argued that in condemning religious coercion by the state, Vatican II's Dignitatis Humanae was a reform of previous Catholic teaching on the authority of the state.
The paper argues, by contrast, that past Catholic endorsement of religious coercion in defence of the faith was not based on any doctrine of state authority. It was the Church, not the state, that had the authority to coerce religiously, the state acting only as the Church's agent. Vatican II said nothing to contradict the traditional understanding of the Church as a religiously coercive authority, which looks dogmatic, and which is still central to modern canon law.
The paper examines traditional doctrine on the coercive authority of the Church and its relations to the state, and shows how Dignitatis Humanae did nothing to amend or reform this teaching. In particular Dignitatis Humanae did not deny previous and highly authoritative papal teaching on the desirability of a Catholic state. Leo XIII's hylemorphic theory of the ideal Church-state relation as that of a soul-body union is shown to be based on dogmatic teaching on grace and nature.
The paper argues, by contrast, that past Catholic endorsement of religious coercion in defence of the faith was not based on any doctrine of state authority. It was the Church, not the state, that had the authority to coerce religiously, the state acting only as the Church's agent. Vatican II said nothing to contradict the traditional understanding of the Church as a religiously coercive authority, which looks dogmatic, and which is still central to modern canon law.
The paper examines traditional doctrine on the coercive authority of the Church and its relations to the state, and shows how Dignitatis Humanae did nothing to amend or reform this teaching. In particular Dignitatis Humanae did not deny previous and highly authoritative papal teaching on the desirability of a Catholic state. Leo XIII's hylemorphic theory of the ideal Church-state relation as that of a soul-body union is shown to be based on dogmatic teaching on grace and nature.
""The paper examines the natural law tradition in ethics and legal theory. This tradition is shown to address two questions. The first question is to do with the nature of law, and the kind of human capacity that is subject to legal... more
""The paper examines the natural law tradition in ethics and legal theory. This tradition is shown to address two questions.
The first question is to do with the nature of law, and the kind of human capacity that is subject to legal direction. Is law directive of the voluntary – of what is subject to the will, or what can be done or refrained from on the basis of a decision so to do? Or is law directive of some other kind of capacity? The second question is about the nature of ethical normativity, and the relation within normativity of its directive and appraisive aspects. Is direction primary, and appraisal to be explained in terms of a theory of direction; or must a theory of ethical direction be based on a theory of ethical appraisal? Both issues are introduced by reference to Hume’s ethical theory, which raises them in a particularly sharp form.
The natural law tradition, in the form it reached by the early modern period, is shown to combine giving a primacy to the appraisive in normative theory, with, in legal theory, a detachment of law from any exclusive tie to the direction of the voluntary. At the heart of the theory of natural law is the idea of law as a distinctive form of normativity directive of a capacity not for voluntariness, but for self-determination. Combined with a view of the state not just as a coordinative authority but as a coercive teacher, this led to a distinctive and highly controversial view of the scope of positive law. The paper ends with Hobbes’s sharp opposition to this view of positive law – an opposition that focussed, in particular, on the coercive legal direction of belief.
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The first question is to do with the nature of law, and the kind of human capacity that is subject to legal direction. Is law directive of the voluntary – of what is subject to the will, or what can be done or refrained from on the basis of a decision so to do? Or is law directive of some other kind of capacity? The second question is about the nature of ethical normativity, and the relation within normativity of its directive and appraisive aspects. Is direction primary, and appraisal to be explained in terms of a theory of direction; or must a theory of ethical direction be based on a theory of ethical appraisal? Both issues are introduced by reference to Hume’s ethical theory, which raises them in a particularly sharp form.
The natural law tradition, in the form it reached by the early modern period, is shown to combine giving a primacy to the appraisive in normative theory, with, in legal theory, a detachment of law from any exclusive tie to the direction of the voluntary. At the heart of the theory of natural law is the idea of law as a distinctive form of normativity directive of a capacity not for voluntariness, but for self-determination. Combined with a view of the state not just as a coordinative authority but as a coercive teacher, this led to a distinctive and highly controversial view of the scope of positive law. The paper ends with Hobbes’s sharp opposition to this view of positive law – an opposition that focussed, in particular, on the coercive legal direction of belief.
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