Roger N McDermott is a leading authority on the Russian military. He is Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, Research Associate, Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies (MECACS), University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and guest lecturer on Russian military strategy, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg, Germany. McDermott is also assistant editor, Journal of Slavic Military Studies. He publishes widely and frequently on issues related to Russian military strategy and military modernization.
This article discusses the status and recent evolution of Georgian intelligence agencies, and in ... more This article discusses the status and recent evolution of Georgian intelligence agencies, and in particular how well they have performed with respect to the Russian challenge since President Saakashvili assumed power in 2004. The article also discusses Georgian intelligence with respect to its international engagement, and recommends options for NATO that would assist Georgia in reforming and professionalizing its intelligence agencies along the lines of advanced or more mature democracies.
German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2020
The study explores the complex contours of the process of decision-making in the Russian militar... more The study explores the complex contours of the process of decision-making in the Russian military, as well as the various influences involved and how this differs so vividly at times from the approaches or standard methods used in NATO militaries. The study avoids examining the theory of military decision-making, and concentrates instead on the practicalities of who is involved and how this complex process is handled. It aims to inform defense planners and military decision-makers within the transatlantic Alliance, providing for a better understanding of the nature of this complex process in Russia’s Armed Forces. Particular focus lies on identifying the areas in which Russia’s Armed Forces are making progress to improve the speed and effectiveness of military decision-making, as well as on exploring some of the challenges and potential vulnerabilities.
Russia’s Armed Forces have long struggled in combat operations to fix and locate enemy targets an... more Russia’s Armed Forces have long struggled in combat operations to fix and locate enemy targets and follow up with precision strikes. The new Reconnaissance-Fire System (ROS) allows combined-arms units to conduct operations in real time and greatly increases the speed and accuracy of Russian fires on the future battlefield. This process has already made significant progress, with its future development earmarked as a high priority in Moscow’s defense planning. The ROS is a network-centric capability offering vastly enhanced target acquisition and strikes across the range of Russian systems capable of targeting ground targets and especially benefits artillery systems. This article examines the evolution of the concept of the ROS and the progress towards its development but does not assess the problems and challenges its use encountered in the Russia-Ukraine War that began in February 2022.
Since the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 1992, the Kremlin has grapple... more Since the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 1992, the Kremlin has grappled, struggled or even procrastinated on addressing the question of what type of force structure may best suit the state’s security environment. A number of initiatives frequently represented as ‘reform’ have come and gone, falling by the wayside due to internal inertia, institutional resistance to root and branch reform or, indeed, as a result of the politicalmilitary elite failing to come to terms with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Transitioning from the Soviet legacy force to something more akin to the forces needed to protect the Russian state and adapt to the modern warfare environment to meet a number of differing challenges ranging from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping or dealing with an unforeseen military crisis plagued Moscow’s defense planning. At heart, the Russian political leadership to varying degrees understood that the state had inherited an unwieldy, top-heavy military force structure that was largely fashioned in another era. Increasingly in the 2000s the Kremlin reached the conclusion that possessing a force structure modeled on large-scale mobilization and rooted in the industrial era failed to take account of the wider transition in the world’s leading economies to information-based approaches to warfare. In short, as demonstrated in August 2008, the Russian Armed Forces were capable only of mounting a 20th-century-style combinedarms operation in the war with Georgia, and even then this took considerable pre-planning and revealed multiple deficiencies. The hard power tools at the Kremlin’s disposal were both limited and somewhat primitive. In the aftermath of that Five-Day War, Moscow embarked on another pre-planned initiative, to conduct a widescale reform of its Armed Forces, aimed at least notionally at abandoning the top-heavy structure of the military and creating smaller, mobile forces staffed with fewer officers, professional noncommissioned officers (NCOs) abolishing the cadre or paper units and
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2008
... In the Spotlight: The East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (Washington, DC: Center for Defense In... more ... In the Spotlight: The East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information's Terrorism Project), accessed at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/etim.cfm on 6 ... Russian Lieutenant General Boris Mylnikov was appointed its first head, with a staff of sixty. ...
This article discusses the status and recent evolution of Georgian intelligence agencies, and in ... more This article discusses the status and recent evolution of Georgian intelligence agencies, and in particular how well they have performed with respect to the Russian challenge since President Saakashvili assumed power in 2004. The article also discusses Georgian intelligence with respect to its international engagement, and recommends options for NATO that would assist Georgia in reforming and professionalizing its intelligence agencies along the lines of advanced or more mature democracies.
German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2020
The study explores the complex contours of the process of decision-making in the Russian militar... more The study explores the complex contours of the process of decision-making in the Russian military, as well as the various influences involved and how this differs so vividly at times from the approaches or standard methods used in NATO militaries. The study avoids examining the theory of military decision-making, and concentrates instead on the practicalities of who is involved and how this complex process is handled. It aims to inform defense planners and military decision-makers within the transatlantic Alliance, providing for a better understanding of the nature of this complex process in Russia’s Armed Forces. Particular focus lies on identifying the areas in which Russia’s Armed Forces are making progress to improve the speed and effectiveness of military decision-making, as well as on exploring some of the challenges and potential vulnerabilities.
Russia’s Armed Forces have long struggled in combat operations to fix and locate enemy targets an... more Russia’s Armed Forces have long struggled in combat operations to fix and locate enemy targets and follow up with precision strikes. The new Reconnaissance-Fire System (ROS) allows combined-arms units to conduct operations in real time and greatly increases the speed and accuracy of Russian fires on the future battlefield. This process has already made significant progress, with its future development earmarked as a high priority in Moscow’s defense planning. The ROS is a network-centric capability offering vastly enhanced target acquisition and strikes across the range of Russian systems capable of targeting ground targets and especially benefits artillery systems. This article examines the evolution of the concept of the ROS and the progress towards its development but does not assess the problems and challenges its use encountered in the Russia-Ukraine War that began in February 2022.
Since the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 1992, the Kremlin has grapple... more Since the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 1992, the Kremlin has grappled, struggled or even procrastinated on addressing the question of what type of force structure may best suit the state’s security environment. A number of initiatives frequently represented as ‘reform’ have come and gone, falling by the wayside due to internal inertia, institutional resistance to root and branch reform or, indeed, as a result of the politicalmilitary elite failing to come to terms with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Transitioning from the Soviet legacy force to something more akin to the forces needed to protect the Russian state and adapt to the modern warfare environment to meet a number of differing challenges ranging from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping or dealing with an unforeseen military crisis plagued Moscow’s defense planning. At heart, the Russian political leadership to varying degrees understood that the state had inherited an unwieldy, top-heavy military force structure that was largely fashioned in another era. Increasingly in the 2000s the Kremlin reached the conclusion that possessing a force structure modeled on large-scale mobilization and rooted in the industrial era failed to take account of the wider transition in the world’s leading economies to information-based approaches to warfare. In short, as demonstrated in August 2008, the Russian Armed Forces were capable only of mounting a 20th-century-style combinedarms operation in the war with Georgia, and even then this took considerable pre-planning and revealed multiple deficiencies. The hard power tools at the Kremlin’s disposal were both limited and somewhat primitive. In the aftermath of that Five-Day War, Moscow embarked on another pre-planned initiative, to conduct a widescale reform of its Armed Forces, aimed at least notionally at abandoning the top-heavy structure of the military and creating smaller, mobile forces staffed with fewer officers, professional noncommissioned officers (NCOs) abolishing the cadre or paper units and
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2008
... In the Spotlight: The East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (Washington, DC: Center for Defense In... more ... In the Spotlight: The East Turkestan Islamic Movement” (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information's Terrorism Project), accessed at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/etim.cfm on 6 ... Russian Lieutenant General Boris Mylnikov was appointed its first head, with a staff of sixty. ...
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Papers by Roger McDermott
and how this differs so vividly at times from the approaches or standard methods used in NATO militaries. The study avoids examining the theory of military decision-making, and concentrates instead on the practicalities of who is involved and how this complex process is handled. It aims to inform defense planners and military decision-makers within the transatlantic Alliance, providing for a better understanding of the nature of this complex process in Russia’s Armed Forces. Particular focus lies on identifying the areas in which Russia’s Armed Forces are making progress to improve the speed and effectiveness of military decision-making, as well as on exploring some of the challenges and potential vulnerabilities.
and how this differs so vividly at times from the approaches or standard methods used in NATO militaries. The study avoids examining the theory of military decision-making, and concentrates instead on the practicalities of who is involved and how this complex process is handled. It aims to inform defense planners and military decision-makers within the transatlantic Alliance, providing for a better understanding of the nature of this complex process in Russia’s Armed Forces. Particular focus lies on identifying the areas in which Russia’s Armed Forces are making progress to improve the speed and effectiveness of military decision-making, as well as on exploring some of the challenges and potential vulnerabilities.