In its first five chapters, this book offers a comparative assessment of Søren Kierkegaard and Ma... more In its first five chapters, this book offers a comparative assessment of Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, drawing out both similarities and differences. In the remaining three chapters, their views are subject to critique. The interpretation focuses on certain key ideas that are central to both thinkers, such as ‘life in the crowd’ or ‘das Man’; how this uniformity can be avoided; and what an authentic life requires instead. The critique argues that Kierkegaard holds that the only way to escape life in the crowd is through a relation to an infinite demand which is left empty, and Heidegger avoids offering any kind of ethics. In contrast to both, it is argued that it is instead possible to have an ethic which is not just a set of social rules on the one hand, but is more contentful than Kierkegaard’s infinite demand on the other: namely, the requirement or ethical demand to take on responsibility for the other person whose life is placed in your hands. This responsibility for the other, which sets the responsible individual apart, frees them from the crowd and thus offers an ethical route to an authentic existence, which both Kierkegaard and Heidegger overlook.
Williamson (1986) presents a troublesome example of the contingent a priori; troublesome, because... more Williamson (1986) presents a troublesome example of the contingent a priori; troublesome, because it does not involve indexicals, and hence cannot be defused via the usual two‐dimensional strategies. Here I explore how the example works, via an examination of crucial belief‐forming method M, partly in response to Hawthorne (2002) and the questions there raised for ‘hyperreliable’ belief‐forming methods. I suggest that, when used to form a belief, M does its special work through creating a verifying state of affairs which guarantees the truth of the belief thus formed. This creative link can be said to account for the knowledge‐conferring status of M. But it also provides us with a way to defuse the purported example of the contingent a priori. The knowledge at issue is only a priori in virtue of this creative link, an importantly different epistemic achievement from standard cases of a priori knowledge. One important moral to be drawn is that the a priori/a posteriori distinction does not appear to be slicing the epistemological beast at its joints.
This book sets out a Kant-inspired theory of modality, driven by a methodology which takes seriou... more This book sets out a Kant-inspired theory of modality, driven by a methodology which takes seriously questions about the function of modal judgment as a guide to a metaphysics of modality. It argues that we need logical modal concepts as a condition on our ability to think, and metaphysical modal concepts as a condition on our ability to think objectively. Concordant with this, it argues that logical necessity has its source in the laws of thought and that metaphysical necessity is relative to conditions on objective thought. This this account of metaphysical necessity, which is termed “Modal Transcendentalism”, is then further developed, covering questions concerning necessary and contingent existence, de re necessity, essentialism, and modal epistemology.
In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents ... more In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects.
One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have a... more One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have and alternative kinds of intellect concerns modal concepts. Whilst ‘it is absolutely necessary for the human understanding to distinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things’ (5: 401), the very distinction between possibility and actuality would not arise for an intuitive understanding. The aim of this paper is to explore in more detail how the functioning of these cognitive capacities relates to modal concepts, and to provide a model of the intuitive understanding, in order to draw some general lessons for our ability to make modal judgements, and the function of such judgements.
Kant distinguishes cognition and thought. Mere thoughts do not conform to the conditions that Kan... more Kant distinguishes cognition and thought. Mere thoughts do not conform to the conditions that Kant places on cognition and hence do not represent objects of experience. They are, nevertheless, inte...
According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of thought. This ... more According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of thought. This has been challenged by Tolley (2006). In this paper, I defend the received wisdom, but with an important modi cation: Kant's logical laws are constitutive norms for thought. The laws of logic do tell us what thinking is, not because all thoughts are in conformity with logical laws, but because all thoughts are, by nature, subject to the standard of logic. 1 Constitutive and normative laws There are di erent ways a law might govern some state or phenomenon. Laws can be normative, constitutive, or constitutive norms. Laws for F s are normative if they determine what is a good F or a bad F . For example, the laws of a nation determine what actions are legally permissible, legally obligatory, and legally impermissible. But they do not thereby determine what counts as an action: even illegal actions are actions. Laws for Fs are constitutive if they determine what is an F and what isn'...
An approach to explaining the nature and source of logic and its laws with a rich historical trad... more An approach to explaining the nature and source of logic and its laws with a rich historical tradition takes the laws of logic to be laws of thought. Such an approach can be found in Kant’s work, particularly Kant’s lectures on logic and his Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1992, 1998), and in the work of Boole and Frege. In the case of Boole (1854), the clue is in the title of his book: An Investigation of The Laws of Thought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities. MacFarlane (2002) presents an interpretation of Frege’s views on logical laws, whereby they are not straightforwardly laws of thought, but give rise to such laws. Both Kant and Frege placed themselves in opposition to psychologistic logicians who took logic to be a matter of how we actually think. They were interested not in how we actually reason, but in how we ought to reason.
According to an increasingly popular view, the source of logical necessity is to be found in the ... more According to an increasingly popular view, the source of logical necessity is to be found in the essences of logical entities. One might be tempted to extend the view further in using it to tackle fundamental questions surrounding logical consequence. This chapter enquires: how does a view according to which the facts about logical consequence are determined by the essences of logical entities look in detail? Are there any more or less obvious problems arising for such a view? The chapter uncovers a prima facie result in favour of logical pluralism. However, it then goes on to raise some concerns for this result. It argues that, considered generally, it is difficult to see how essence could do all of the requisite work alone. The chapter also shows how considering things from the perspective of disputes between particular rival logics makes an interesting and important difference to the picture of things presented by the essentialist account.
In its first five chapters, this book offers a comparative assessment of Søren Kierkegaard and Ma... more In its first five chapters, this book offers a comparative assessment of Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, drawing out both similarities and differences. In the remaining three chapters, their views are subject to critique. The interpretation focuses on certain key ideas that are central to both thinkers, such as ‘life in the crowd’ or ‘das Man’; how this uniformity can be avoided; and what an authentic life requires instead. The critique argues that Kierkegaard holds that the only way to escape life in the crowd is through a relation to an infinite demand which is left empty, and Heidegger avoids offering any kind of ethics. In contrast to both, it is argued that it is instead possible to have an ethic which is not just a set of social rules on the one hand, but is more contentful than Kierkegaard’s infinite demand on the other: namely, the requirement or ethical demand to take on responsibility for the other person whose life is placed in your hands. This responsibility for the other, which sets the responsible individual apart, frees them from the crowd and thus offers an ethical route to an authentic existence, which both Kierkegaard and Heidegger overlook.
Williamson (1986) presents a troublesome example of the contingent a priori; troublesome, because... more Williamson (1986) presents a troublesome example of the contingent a priori; troublesome, because it does not involve indexicals, and hence cannot be defused via the usual two‐dimensional strategies. Here I explore how the example works, via an examination of crucial belief‐forming method M, partly in response to Hawthorne (2002) and the questions there raised for ‘hyperreliable’ belief‐forming methods. I suggest that, when used to form a belief, M does its special work through creating a verifying state of affairs which guarantees the truth of the belief thus formed. This creative link can be said to account for the knowledge‐conferring status of M. But it also provides us with a way to defuse the purported example of the contingent a priori. The knowledge at issue is only a priori in virtue of this creative link, an importantly different epistemic achievement from standard cases of a priori knowledge. One important moral to be drawn is that the a priori/a posteriori distinction does not appear to be slicing the epistemological beast at its joints.
This book sets out a Kant-inspired theory of modality, driven by a methodology which takes seriou... more This book sets out a Kant-inspired theory of modality, driven by a methodology which takes seriously questions about the function of modal judgment as a guide to a metaphysics of modality. It argues that we need logical modal concepts as a condition on our ability to think, and metaphysical modal concepts as a condition on our ability to think objectively. Concordant with this, it argues that logical necessity has its source in the laws of thought and that metaphysical necessity is relative to conditions on objective thought. This this account of metaphysical necessity, which is termed “Modal Transcendentalism”, is then further developed, covering questions concerning necessary and contingent existence, de re necessity, essentialism, and modal epistemology.
In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents ... more In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects.
One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have a... more One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have and alternative kinds of intellect concerns modal concepts. Whilst ‘it is absolutely necessary for the human understanding to distinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things’ (5: 401), the very distinction between possibility and actuality would not arise for an intuitive understanding. The aim of this paper is to explore in more detail how the functioning of these cognitive capacities relates to modal concepts, and to provide a model of the intuitive understanding, in order to draw some general lessons for our ability to make modal judgements, and the function of such judgements.
Kant distinguishes cognition and thought. Mere thoughts do not conform to the conditions that Kan... more Kant distinguishes cognition and thought. Mere thoughts do not conform to the conditions that Kant places on cognition and hence do not represent objects of experience. They are, nevertheless, inte...
According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of thought. This ... more According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of thought. This has been challenged by Tolley (2006). In this paper, I defend the received wisdom, but with an important modi cation: Kant's logical laws are constitutive norms for thought. The laws of logic do tell us what thinking is, not because all thoughts are in conformity with logical laws, but because all thoughts are, by nature, subject to the standard of logic. 1 Constitutive and normative laws There are di erent ways a law might govern some state or phenomenon. Laws can be normative, constitutive, or constitutive norms. Laws for F s are normative if they determine what is a good F or a bad F . For example, the laws of a nation determine what actions are legally permissible, legally obligatory, and legally impermissible. But they do not thereby determine what counts as an action: even illegal actions are actions. Laws for Fs are constitutive if they determine what is an F and what isn'...
An approach to explaining the nature and source of logic and its laws with a rich historical trad... more An approach to explaining the nature and source of logic and its laws with a rich historical tradition takes the laws of logic to be laws of thought. Such an approach can be found in Kant’s work, particularly Kant’s lectures on logic and his Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1992, 1998), and in the work of Boole and Frege. In the case of Boole (1854), the clue is in the title of his book: An Investigation of The Laws of Thought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities. MacFarlane (2002) presents an interpretation of Frege’s views on logical laws, whereby they are not straightforwardly laws of thought, but give rise to such laws. Both Kant and Frege placed themselves in opposition to psychologistic logicians who took logic to be a matter of how we actually think. They were interested not in how we actually reason, but in how we ought to reason.
According to an increasingly popular view, the source of logical necessity is to be found in the ... more According to an increasingly popular view, the source of logical necessity is to be found in the essences of logical entities. One might be tempted to extend the view further in using it to tackle fundamental questions surrounding logical consequence. This chapter enquires: how does a view according to which the facts about logical consequence are determined by the essences of logical entities look in detail? Are there any more or less obvious problems arising for such a view? The chapter uncovers a prima facie result in favour of logical pluralism. However, it then goes on to raise some concerns for this result. It argues that, considered generally, it is difficult to see how essence could do all of the requisite work alone. The chapter also shows how considering things from the perspective of disputes between particular rival logics makes an interesting and important difference to the picture of things presented by the essentialist account.
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