Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and un... more Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and unconnected to facts and principles. Democratic Respect argues instead that we should approach the populist politics of resentment as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that are intimately connected to people's factual and moral beliefs. By associating populist resentment with alleged violations of democratic principles, we can discuss what citizens and governments owe one another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory provides a critical discussion of wh... more Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory provides a critical discussion of when and to what extent compromise is the best response to pluralism and disagreement in democratic decision-making and beyond. Christian F. Rostbøll and Theresa Scavenius draw together the work of ten established and emerging scholars to provide different perspectives on compromise.
Organized into four parts, the book begins by discussing the justification and limits of compromise. Part II discusses the practice of compromise and considers the ethics required for compromise as well as the institutions that facilitate compromise. Part III focuses on pluralism and connects the topic of compromise to current discussions in political theory on public reason, political liberalism, and respect for diversity. Part IV discusses different challenges to compromise in the context of the current political environment.
Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and un... more Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and unconnected to facts and principles. Democratic Respect argues instead that we should approach the populist politics of resentment as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that are intimately connected to people's factual and moral beliefs. By associating populist resentment with alleged violations of democratic principles, we can discuss what citizens and governments owe one another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
It is widely agreed that the increased polarization that many countries experience is bad for dem... more It is widely agreed that the increased polarization that many countries experience is bad for democracy. However, existing assessments of how polarization affects democracy operate with too unified understandings of both polarization and democracy. Bringing empirical studies and democratic theory into dialogue, this article argues that polarization cannot be understood as one phenomenon that can be evaluated in one way. Moreover, its different kinds affect different parts of the democratic system in distinct ways. First, we must distinguish between the question of the degree of polarization in a given context and the question of the different kinds of polarization at play. Second, we must consider whether people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior or whether it is entirely irrational. If people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior, the problem lies elsewhere than in polarization itself. Third, we must distinguish between the content of polarized opinions and the process of opinion formation. Both can be assessed with democratic criteria, but they raise different questions. Finally, it matters for democratic evaluation where polarization occurs and thus, we must differentiate between different sites of polarization: civil society, election campaigns, and legislatures. The article recommends a systemic approach to assessing the democratic implication of polarization, which analyzes both the effects of polarization at different sites and on democracy as a composite whole.
This lecture addresses the democratic signi cance of compromise. Are compromises merely an unfort... more This lecture addresses the democratic signi cance of compromise. Are compromises merely an unfortunate necessity in politics because citizens and legislators cannot achieve consensus? Does a majority have demo- cratic reasons for making concessions to a minority if it can make decisions on its own? In short, is com- promise a democratic value in and of itself? e lecture concludes that there are non-pragmatic democratic reasons for making compromises, which are based on respect towards fellow citizens and legislators. Compro- mises may make decisions more democratic, but only under certain conditions. We are not obliged to make compromises with anyone. Some compromises may undermine the very ideal of compromise. Moreover, by making compromises with someone, we grant them legitimacy, and there are limits as to which political opponents we should grant legitimacy.
The Circle is a novel written by the American author Dave Eggers (2013), and it tells the story a... more The Circle is a novel written by the American author Dave Eggers (2013), and it tells the story about a powerful Internet company that works with highly developed surveillance technologies to monitor workers as well as the local and global community. In discussions and research this novel often has been seen in the tradition of a dystopic and totalitarian view of society as we know from Orwell’s 1984 or Huxleys Brave New World. However, this article critically investigates a vision of democracy that is suggested in The Circle. Circlers call this political model “demoxie”, which embraces the idea that everybody who has a Circle account is also a registered voter. That means, the voter directly votes on issues via his or her Internet platform (such as decisions on healthcare, company policies, as well as international politics issues). Based on this work of fiction as well as recent discussions about cyber democracy, this article opens up a discussion about the benefits and risks of I...
It is common to ask whether populism is a threat or a corrective to democracy. In the empirical l... more It is common to ask whether populism is a threat or a corrective to democracy. In the empirical literature, the conclusion tends to be that it is both. Some normative accounts promote populism because of its alleged ability to deepen democracy. The shortcoming of these approaches is that they take an observer attitude to the question. This article instead takes a participant attitude and asks whether you as fellow participants in democracy can endorse and promote populism because it has positive effects on a non-populist understanding of democracy. Applying the publicity condition first suggested by Kant and latter expounded by Rawls, it argues that you cannot. You cannot publicly both endorse populism and say you do so because it improves democracy understood in non-populist terms. The publicity condition rules out the possibility of promoting one set of ideas (populism) for the sake of another set of ideas (non-populist democracy). The argument for promoting populism for the sake of non-populist ends cannot be made in public without frustrating that very end.
This chapter addresses the problem of the justification of democracy. It begins with an investiga... more This chapter addresses the problem of the justification of democracy. It begins with an investigation of political-legal instrumentalism in general and democratic instrumentalism in particular. This is followed by three sections, each of which presents and discusses the three kinds of democratic non-instrumentalism. The argument here proceeds progressively, in the sense that objections to the first kind of justification (Aristotelian non-instrumentalism) lead to the second kind (justice-first non-instrumentalism), and similarly with the transition from the second to the third kind of non-instrumentalism (Kantian non-instrumentalism). The chapter includes an extra section on Kantian non-instrumentalism, since this justification of democracy is the main contribution of the chapter. It argues that the Kantian justification is a justification of a specific form of democracy, namely, constitutional democracy.
An influential interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between ... more An influential interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between public right and freedom is constitutive rather than instrumental. The focus has been on domestic right and members’ relations to their own state. This has resulted in a statist bias which has not adequately dealt with the fact that Kant regards public right as a system composed of three levels – domestic, international and cosmopolitan right. This article suggests that the constitutive relationship is between all levels of right, on the one hand, and ‘freedom in the external relation’ of all human beings, on the other hand.
The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw f... more The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the United Kingdom decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all-affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the ‘all-affected status principle’ that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of cit...
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2017
Abstract Contemporary ‘realists’ attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main cha... more Abstract Contemporary ‘realists’ attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main charge is that Kantians fail to understand the specificity of politics and neglect to develop a ‘distinctively political thought’ that differs from moral philosophy. Instead, the critics say, Kantians are guilty of an ‘ethics-first approach to politics,’ in which political theory is a mere application of moral principles. But what does this ethics-first approach have to do with Kant himself? Very little. This article shows how Kant’s approach to political theory at a fundamental level includes political institutions, power, and coercion as well as disagreement, security, and coordination problems. In contrast to realists, Kant has a fundamental principle, which can explain why and guide how we ought to approach the political question, namely the norm of equal freedom. Yet, Kant’s theory does not take the form of a moralistic ought addressed to the isolated individual, but concerns a problem that we share as interdependent beings and that requires common institutions. The fruitfulness of the Kantian approach, then, is that it can take the political question seriously without being uncritical of actual politics and power, and that it can be normative without being moralistic.
Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and un... more Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and unconnected to facts and principles. Democratic Respect argues instead that we should approach the populist politics of resentment as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that are intimately connected to people's factual and moral beliefs. By associating populist resentment with alleged violations of democratic principles, we can discuss what citizens and governments owe one another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory provides a critical discussion of wh... more Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory provides a critical discussion of when and to what extent compromise is the best response to pluralism and disagreement in democratic decision-making and beyond. Christian F. Rostbøll and Theresa Scavenius draw together the work of ten established and emerging scholars to provide different perspectives on compromise.
Organized into four parts, the book begins by discussing the justification and limits of compromise. Part II discusses the practice of compromise and considers the ethics required for compromise as well as the institutions that facilitate compromise. Part III focuses on pluralism and connects the topic of compromise to current discussions in political theory on public reason, political liberalism, and respect for diversity. Part IV discusses different challenges to compromise in the context of the current political environment.
Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and un... more Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and unconnected to facts and principles. Democratic Respect argues instead that we should approach the populist politics of resentment as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that are intimately connected to people's factual and moral beliefs. By associating populist resentment with alleged violations of democratic principles, we can discuss what citizens and governments owe one another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
It is widely agreed that the increased polarization that many countries experience is bad for dem... more It is widely agreed that the increased polarization that many countries experience is bad for democracy. However, existing assessments of how polarization affects democracy operate with too unified understandings of both polarization and democracy. Bringing empirical studies and democratic theory into dialogue, this article argues that polarization cannot be understood as one phenomenon that can be evaluated in one way. Moreover, its different kinds affect different parts of the democratic system in distinct ways. First, we must distinguish between the question of the degree of polarization in a given context and the question of the different kinds of polarization at play. Second, we must consider whether people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior or whether it is entirely irrational. If people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior, the problem lies elsewhere than in polarization itself. Third, we must distinguish between the content of polarized opinions and the process of opinion formation. Both can be assessed with democratic criteria, but they raise different questions. Finally, it matters for democratic evaluation where polarization occurs and thus, we must differentiate between different sites of polarization: civil society, election campaigns, and legislatures. The article recommends a systemic approach to assessing the democratic implication of polarization, which analyzes both the effects of polarization at different sites and on democracy as a composite whole.
This lecture addresses the democratic signi cance of compromise. Are compromises merely an unfort... more This lecture addresses the democratic signi cance of compromise. Are compromises merely an unfortunate necessity in politics because citizens and legislators cannot achieve consensus? Does a majority have demo- cratic reasons for making concessions to a minority if it can make decisions on its own? In short, is com- promise a democratic value in and of itself? e lecture concludes that there are non-pragmatic democratic reasons for making compromises, which are based on respect towards fellow citizens and legislators. Compro- mises may make decisions more democratic, but only under certain conditions. We are not obliged to make compromises with anyone. Some compromises may undermine the very ideal of compromise. Moreover, by making compromises with someone, we grant them legitimacy, and there are limits as to which political opponents we should grant legitimacy.
The Circle is a novel written by the American author Dave Eggers (2013), and it tells the story a... more The Circle is a novel written by the American author Dave Eggers (2013), and it tells the story about a powerful Internet company that works with highly developed surveillance technologies to monitor workers as well as the local and global community. In discussions and research this novel often has been seen in the tradition of a dystopic and totalitarian view of society as we know from Orwell’s 1984 or Huxleys Brave New World. However, this article critically investigates a vision of democracy that is suggested in The Circle. Circlers call this political model “demoxie”, which embraces the idea that everybody who has a Circle account is also a registered voter. That means, the voter directly votes on issues via his or her Internet platform (such as decisions on healthcare, company policies, as well as international politics issues). Based on this work of fiction as well as recent discussions about cyber democracy, this article opens up a discussion about the benefits and risks of I...
It is common to ask whether populism is a threat or a corrective to democracy. In the empirical l... more It is common to ask whether populism is a threat or a corrective to democracy. In the empirical literature, the conclusion tends to be that it is both. Some normative accounts promote populism because of its alleged ability to deepen democracy. The shortcoming of these approaches is that they take an observer attitude to the question. This article instead takes a participant attitude and asks whether you as fellow participants in democracy can endorse and promote populism because it has positive effects on a non-populist understanding of democracy. Applying the publicity condition first suggested by Kant and latter expounded by Rawls, it argues that you cannot. You cannot publicly both endorse populism and say you do so because it improves democracy understood in non-populist terms. The publicity condition rules out the possibility of promoting one set of ideas (populism) for the sake of another set of ideas (non-populist democracy). The argument for promoting populism for the sake of non-populist ends cannot be made in public without frustrating that very end.
This chapter addresses the problem of the justification of democracy. It begins with an investiga... more This chapter addresses the problem of the justification of democracy. It begins with an investigation of political-legal instrumentalism in general and democratic instrumentalism in particular. This is followed by three sections, each of which presents and discusses the three kinds of democratic non-instrumentalism. The argument here proceeds progressively, in the sense that objections to the first kind of justification (Aristotelian non-instrumentalism) lead to the second kind (justice-first non-instrumentalism), and similarly with the transition from the second to the third kind of non-instrumentalism (Kantian non-instrumentalism). The chapter includes an extra section on Kantian non-instrumentalism, since this justification of democracy is the main contribution of the chapter. It argues that the Kantian justification is a justification of a specific form of democracy, namely, constitutional democracy.
An influential interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between ... more An influential interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between public right and freedom is constitutive rather than instrumental. The focus has been on domestic right and members’ relations to their own state. This has resulted in a statist bias which has not adequately dealt with the fact that Kant regards public right as a system composed of three levels – domestic, international and cosmopolitan right. This article suggests that the constitutive relationship is between all levels of right, on the one hand, and ‘freedom in the external relation’ of all human beings, on the other hand.
The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw f... more The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the United Kingdom decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all-affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the ‘all-affected status principle’ that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of cit...
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2017
Abstract Contemporary ‘realists’ attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main cha... more Abstract Contemporary ‘realists’ attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main charge is that Kantians fail to understand the specificity of politics and neglect to develop a ‘distinctively political thought’ that differs from moral philosophy. Instead, the critics say, Kantians are guilty of an ‘ethics-first approach to politics,’ in which political theory is a mere application of moral principles. But what does this ethics-first approach have to do with Kant himself? Very little. This article shows how Kant’s approach to political theory at a fundamental level includes political institutions, power, and coercion as well as disagreement, security, and coordination problems. In contrast to realists, Kant has a fundamental principle, which can explain why and guide how we ought to approach the political question, namely the norm of equal freedom. Yet, Kant’s theory does not take the form of a moralistic ought addressed to the isolated individual, but concerns a problem that we share as interdependent beings and that requires common institutions. The fruitfulness of the Kantian approach, then, is that it can take the political question seriously without being uncritical of actual politics and power, and that it can be normative without being moralistic.
Autonomy is increasingly rejected as a fundamental principle by liberal political theorists becau... more Autonomy is increasingly rejected as a fundamental principle by liberal political theorists because it is regarded as incompatible with respect for diversity. This article seeks, via an analysis of the Danish cartoon controversy, to show that the relationship between autonomy and diversity is more complex than often posited. Particularly, it asks whether the autonomy defense of freedom of expression encourages disrespect for religious feelings. Autonomy leads to disrespect for diversity only when it is understood as a character ideal that must be promoted as an end in itself. If it by contrast is understood as something we should presume everyone possesses, it provides a strong basis for equal respect among people from diverse cultures. A Kantian conception of autonomy can justify the right to freedom of expression while it at the same time requires that we in the exercise of freedom of expression show respect for others as equals.
I Eichmann in Jerusalem er det væsentligt for Hannah Arendt at slå fast, at Eichmanns forbrydelse... more I Eichmann in Jerusalem er det væsentligt for Hannah Arendt at slå fast, at Eichmanns forbrydelse" var en forbrydelse mod menneskeheden" og ikke kun en forbrydelse mod det jødiske folk. Forbrydelsen blev ganske rigtigt" begået mod det jødiske folk", men" kun valget af ofre, ikke forbrydelsens natur, kunne afledes af den lange historie af jødehad og antisemitisme"(Arendt, 1992: 269). Hvorfor er dette vigtigt for Arendt? I denne artikel vil jeg argumentere for, at det er vigtigt, fordi vi må forstå det særegne ved totalitarismen, både ...
An influential interpretation of Kant's Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between ... more An influential interpretation of Kant's Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between public Right and freedom is constitutive rather than instrumental. The focus has been domestic Right and members' relation to their own state and has resulted in a statist bias, which has not adequately dealt with the fact that Kant regards public Right as a system composed of three levels-domestic, international, and cosmopolitan Right. This article suggests that the constitutive relationship is between all levels of Right, on the one hand, and 'freedom in the external relation' of all human beings, on the other hand.
The literature often mentions that populism is in conflict with the politics of compromise. Howev... more The literature often mentions that populism is in conflict with the politics of compromise. However, the opposition remains vague and undertheorized. This article confronts populism and compromise in a novel way by analyzing them as types of second-order political thinking and ideologies of democracy. Second-order political thinking provides a set of ideas and concepts that frames and regulates how we relate to others and ourselves in politics, and how we make political decisions for, with, or against them. By contrasting populism and compromise as types of second-order political thinking, we will be able better to understand each and normatively compare them. Thus, we see that (1) compromise is inherently most attractive as second-order political thinking, and (2) populism fails as an ideology of democracy, because it cannot explain the meaning and value of the democratic system as a set of authoritative institutions and procedures.
"If the cultivation of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely... more "If the cultivation of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one's own opinions," J.S. Mill wrote. 1 A widespread opinion is that political legitimacy requires democracy. What are the grounds of this belief? My aim of exploring the justification of democracy is not only to cultivate the understanding but also to supply a critical standard for assessing our political and social institutions. What kind of justification of democracy we can provide matters for what model of democracy we should adopt, as well as for what we properly regard as the social preconditions of democracy. Thus, the question concerning the justification of democracy has both intellectual interest and practical consequences. Some political theorists insist that democracy is the right form of government not merely because of its superior consequences but because democracy is good in itself.
The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw f... more The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the UK decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the 'all affected status principle' that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of citizens to make decisions together regarding issues that affect their status as free and equal. On this basis, we conclude that it is undemocratic for a member state such as the UK to withdraw from the European Union. The British decision to leave the EU in the referendum held on the 23rd of June 2016 was made possible by article 50 in the Lisbon Treaty which allows member states to the leave the EU on their own decision. Before the Lisbon Treaty EU membership was in principle for eternity. The Brexit decision has been criticised for being based on a democratic process of poor quality due to manipulation of facts and unrealistic promises for the future. But few have questioned the democratic legitimacy of the British people unilaterally deciding on whether or not to remain in the EU. In this article, as part of a general argument, we will do exactly that. We argue that withdrawal from the EU
What democratic significance should we award compromise? If concessions to political opponents ar... more What democratic significance should we award compromise? If concessions to political opponents are not needed to create a majority, are there nevertheless democratic reasons to accommodate more positions through a compromise? These questions do not concern whether compromises are necessary for the well-functioning of democratic politics. No one would deny the latter; that is, no one denies that there are pragmatic reasons for compromise. The issue is whether there are reasons inherent in the democratic ideal that make compromise a democratic imperative and not merely a regrettable necessity. This paper explores these questions by analyzing the meaning and implications of a notion of democratic respect. In a seminal paper on compromise, Simon May has argued that there are many other ways to express respect than resorting to compromise, for example, by listening to and responding to one's opponents in deliberation and by awarding everyone the right to vote. However, if our concern is what is required by democratic respect, we cannot rely on a general idea of what it means to respect others; we need to specify what it means to respect one's opponents as fellow citizens. The paper considers three different ways of seeing one's opponents as fellow citizens, (1) simply as equals, (2) as members of the same community, and (3) as co-legislators. It is argued that (1) is insufficient to explain the value of democracy and that (2) imports a value that is external to the concept of democracy. Only (3) is sufficient to explain what is special about democratic respect, and only it relies on an idea inherent in the concept of democracy. The conclusion of the paper is that respect for citizens as co-legislators supplies a democratic reason for compromise. Compromise can be more democratic than a majority decision, because it shows respect for citizens as participants in collective self-legislation by representing their views in policy in a way that goes beyond what happens in uncompromising majority decisions.
Contemporary "realists" attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main charge is th... more Contemporary "realists" attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main charge is that Kantians fail to understand the specificity of politics and neglect to develop a "distinctively political thought" that differs from moral philosophy. Instead, the critics say, Kantians are guilty of what they call an "ethics-first approach to politics," in which political theory is a mere application of moral principles. But what does this ethics-first approach have to do with Kant himself? This article argues that Kant's Philosophy of Right cannot be characterized as an ethics-first approach to politics. I demonstrate how Kant's approach to political theory, even if it is an ideal theory, can explain the importance of and need for political institutions, power, and coercion to deal with disagreement, security, and coordination problems among interconnected and social beings. In contrast to realists, Kant has a fundamental principle, which can explain why and guide how we ought to approach the political question, namely the norm of equal freedom. Moreover, Kant's theory does not take the form of a moralistic ought addressed to the isolated individual, but concerns a problem that we share as interdependent beings and that requires common institutions. The fruitfulness of the Kantian approach, then, is that it can take the political question seriously without being uncritical of actual politics and power, and that it can be normative without being moralistic.
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another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique
interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
Organized into four parts, the book begins by discussing the justification and limits of compromise. Part II discusses the practice of compromise and considers the ethics required for compromise as well as the institutions that facilitate compromise. Part III focuses on pluralism and connects the topic of compromise to current discussions in political theory on public reason, political liberalism, and respect for diversity. Part IV discusses different challenges to compromise in the context of the current political environment.
another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique
interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.
Organized into four parts, the book begins by discussing the justification and limits of compromise. Part II discusses the practice of compromise and considers the ethics required for compromise as well as the institutions that facilitate compromise. Part III focuses on pluralism and connects the topic of compromise to current discussions in political theory on public reason, political liberalism, and respect for diversity. Part IV discusses different challenges to compromise in the context of the current political environment.