As the war in Ukraine unfolds, the Hungarian government seems less enthusiastic about the idea of... more As the war in Ukraine unfolds, the Hungarian government seems less enthusiastic about the idea of state sovereignty than one might have anticipated given Hungary's historic past. Moreover, there is a surge of pro-Russian sentiment among government supporters. This is counterintuitive in light of prevailing mnemonic practices which put heavy emphasis on Hungary's struggle for freedom and independence. The new developments suggest that the role of collective memory in collective identity formation needs to be reconsidered, especially concerning the apparent inhibition of otherwise persistent and widely shared memories. The article discusses the problem in the context of socially shared retrievalinduced forgetting and social identity complexity theory. It puts forward two complementary arguments: 1) this Janus-faced public behaviour might be accounted for by selective commemorative practices of the government, and 2) how memories of historical events sustain a shared sense of belonging and continuity is not only contingent on group membership but also on the ever-changing group interest.
The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were... more The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were they to remember alone is a phenomenon known as collaborative inhibition. The article offers a phenomenological account of this highly counterintuitive effect of group remembering. It argues that the mutual failure to live up to one's potential does not warrant the standard, strongly negative views about the role of others in recall. Rather, the phenomenon may imply that sharedness itself becomes constitutive of the process in the sense that interaction partners co-determine what and how to remember. Drawing on phenomenological approaches to remembering and second-person engagement, the article argues that individuals participating in shared remembering co-construct their memories by reciprocally and dynamically incorporating each other's perspectives, attitudes, and emotions about their shared past.
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology, 2024
Following superior orders or the crowd are commonly used excuses to avoid responsibility. Taking ... more Following superior orders or the crowd are commonly used excuses to avoid responsibility. Taking the case of border control in Hungary, this article explores how such inauthenticity can shape police professional identity and practice, both in the Sartrean and Heideggerian sense. It is interested in how police officers 1) have denied their freedom of choice in the face of their role expectations, and 2) have fallen prey to political discourse and anti-immigrant public sentiment. Interestingly, most participants in the study used the phrase "I am just following orders" only in relation to their mandatory deployment at the border but not regarding the ill-treatment of irregular migrants. The concept of excessive use of force no longer appeared to be applicable; physical abuse of migrants has become the norm and standard practice. The findings seem to suggest that officers have been overtaken and driven by public attitudes towards mass migration. The article argues that the real threat to authentic role play does not stem from a desire or temptation to conform. Rather, it manifests itself in dominant discourses that reinterpret the purpose of policing, thus underpinning the self-understanding of officers.
This article demonstrates that Alfred Schutz's theory of typification and relevance together have... more This article demonstrates that Alfred Schutz's theory of typification and relevance together have a great potential to conceptually clarify certain aspects of self-categorisation theory. More specifically, it focuses on the motivational bases of stereotyping, one of the core mechanisms underlying the categorisation of people into groups. Social psychologists have found that stereotyping of out-group members is motivated by factors, such as uncertainty reduction, or the enhancement of the self-esteem of in-group members. What categories and corresponding stereotypes are being activated and applied is ultimately a function of the goals and pragmatic interests of the perceiver in any given situation. The article argues that this phenomenon can be explained, and accounted for, by Schutz's tripartite system of relevances. To illustrate the theoretical issues at hand, the last section draws on the case of migrants arriving in Hungary and provides a potential explanation for why the ideal type of the Gypsy was triggered and facilitated the way in which migrants have been attended and understood.
This article explores the potential of historical narratives to inform and guide action, taking t... more This article explores the potential of historical narratives to inform and guide action, taking the case of border control in Hungary. The Hungarian government has recently criminalised irregular border crossing and made a comparison between the Ottoman Occupation and contemporary challenges of mass migration to legitimise its new measures. Qualitative interviews conducted in 2019 seem to suggest that some members of the border police, consciously or unconsciously, have drawn from this narrative repertoire to make sense of their own role in border control. Drawing on the concept of the narrative self, the article outlines how the collective memory of the Ottoman conquest may have shaped the understanding of mass migration and the self-interpretation of those involved in border control.
The report provides an insight into the most important hotspots of radicalisation in
Hungary: the... more The report provides an insight into the most important hotspots of radicalisation in Hungary: the 2008-2009 Roma Murders, the “migrant-hunting” of László Toroczkai and the assaults on LGBTQI people orchestrated by György Budaházy. It outlines the underlying mechanisms and facilitating conditions of the hotspots, and situates them on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum. Our findings show that the proliferation of right-wing radical movements, coupled with the wider sociopolitical context, has had a significant effect on perpetrators. The growing public intolerance towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the dominant political discourse, in tandem with the incompetence and/or ignorance of the authorities, are likely to have contributed to the outcome. As regards the IGAP spectrum, the feeling of grievance, injustice and, paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by the perpetrators, but also by a significant proportion of the society at the time of the Roma Murders. Similarly, there is a growing consensus among Hungarians that migrants and LGBTQI people should have limited access to the resources and privileges of the community. Not only the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also Toroczkai and Budaházy may have had a reasonable expectation to be appreciated for what they have done by many.
This report provides a brief presentation of the context, structures and stakeholders of (de-)rad... more This report provides a brief presentation of the context, structures and stakeholders of (de-)radicalisation in contemporary Hungary. The prevalent form of radicalisation in present-day Hungary is right-wing extremism mixed with ethno-nationalist, antiestablishment and religious elements, shaped by the legacy of Trianon, the Horthyera and the fascist Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt). The most significant events that prompted radicalisation were party politics right after the collapse of the one-party system in 1989; the socio-economic situation and subsequent crisis of the socialist-liberal government in 2006; and the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015. Rightwing polarisation led to the most shocking events in contemporary Hungary, the Roma murders in 2008-2009. Besides Roma, the usual targets of violence are Jews, migrants and the LGBTQI community. There have been several far-right group formations since the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. However, the FideszKDNP party alliance currently in power has systematically taken over the platform and narratives of Jobbik. While the latter has been moving to the centre, the former has become gradually more radical both in terms of political discourse and social policy. Fidesz has essentially closed the political space and monopolised right-wing radicalisation in Hungary; social-liberal values, the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI communities have been under constant attack by the government. As a consequence, efforts of de-radicalisation and reducing hate crime remain with stakeholders, such as NGOs, charities and religious organisations.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Sep 24, 2020
This article argues that phenomenological sociology has great potential to provide a strong theor... more This article argues that phenomenological sociology has great potential to provide a strong theoretical support to the Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) in Critical Discourse Studies. SCA is interested in the interconnections between knowledge, discourse and society while placing subjectivity in the centre of its framework. It looks into the correlative relationship between personal-and socially shared knowledge, and the significance of these correlations to discourse production and interpretation. Analogously , phenomenological sociology explores the interrelated structures of subjectivity, knowledge and the social world. It systematically analyses the conditions and forms of intersubjective understanding and the mutually constitutive relationship between subjective-and objective knowledge. Given the considerable overlap between the subject matter of phenomenological sociology and that of SCA, the purpose of the article is to draw the attention of critical discourse analysts to a neglected but extremely resourceful field. Following a brief introduction to SCA, the article will address some of SCA's key concepts in conjunction with the phenomenological-sociological insight.
This article analyses the migration control narrative in Italy and Hungary at the nexus of humani... more This article analyses the migration control narrative in Italy and Hungary at the nexus of humanitarianism and securitisation. We concentrate on how the humanitarian discourse is undervalued as the EU border states emphasise either full securitisation or else securitisation as a condition for humanitarianism when it comes to border management and refugee protection measures. We trace, first, how politicians conceptualise humanitarianism for the self and for the extension of the self; and, second, how they conditionalize humanitarianism for the other. Reflecting on the institutional and discursive nexus of humanitarianism and securitization in effect to migration controls, our aim is also to contextualise political narratives of Europe and how politicians use them to affect the public. We elaborate on this nexus considering how it foregrounds human rights for the self but challenges humanitarianism as it undervalues human rights for the other. In order to see how migration politics is framed for everyday consumption, we are referring to tropes emerging in major political speeches in Italy and Hungary, and develop two conceptual terms suggesting conditionalised humanitarianism and domesticised humanitarianism.
This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian gove... more This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.
Our preliminary fieldwork shows that there is large scale agreement between the migration and bor... more Our preliminary fieldwork shows that there is large scale agreement between the migration and border authorities of Hungary and Serbia on the names of asylum seekers before they are allowed into to the Hungarian transit zones and apply for international protection in Hungary. The list, proposed by the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) and approved by the Hungarian border authorities, is communicated through the use of community leaders from the Serbian reception centre. Hungary's motive behind keeping its cooperation with Serbia informal is to conceal the existence of cooperation between both states and to avoid legal challenges in the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Therefore, the paper argues that the informalisation of migration management constitutes a significant challenge for the authority of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (hereinafter referred as the Refugee Convention). The paper further argues that Hungary's informal cooperation with Serbia is a form of expansion of the Hungarian state authority under the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction of a state. Therefore, despite informal nature of Hungary's migration cooperation with Serbia, the responsibility for violations of asylum seekers rights in Serbia and their exclusion from international protection continues to engage Hungary for the reason of having effective control on the migration management in Serbia.
This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of Interpretative Phenomenological An... more This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA's interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA's failure to recognise the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA's phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA's consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.
The present collection of country reports represents the collective work of the following RESPOND... more The present collection of country reports represents the collective work of the following RESPOND national teams: Uppsala Universitet (Swedish report), the Glasgow Caledonian University (Hungarian report), Georg-August Universitat Gottigenstiftung Offentlichen Rechts (German report), University of Cambridge (British report), Svenska Forkningsinstitute i Istanbul (Turkish report), Università di Firenze (Italian report and European Union report), Panepistimio Aigaiou (Greek report), Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschafte (Austrian report), Uniwersytet Warszawski (Polish report), Lebanon Support (Lebanese report), Hammurabi Human Rights Organization (Iraqi report). The activities of this Work Package (WP1) have been coordinated by the University of Florence. We are indebted to all the authors for the competence and enthusiasm with which they fulfilled their tasks and for their collaborative approach.
Each report underwent a double review process: the review by a national expert appointed by national teams, and the review by the work package leader. We are grateful to all national experts that collaborated enhancing the quality of RESPOND research.
In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance... more In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance and management of migration in Hungary, the regulatory landscape, citing and reflecting on developments and events occurred between 2011 and 2018. Section 1) gives a statistical overview of international migration to Hungary. The data displayed shows the main patterns of asylum seeker flows, their recognition rates and the scale of people being expelled from the territory. Section 2) outlines the political, cultural and socio-economic context in which migration management enfolds. It briefly introduces the linguistic and religious cleavages and the political and institutional arrangements of the state. Without engaging in a thorough analysis, we will try to pin down those critical socio-economic and political factors that are accountable for the current escalation of tensions. In doing so, we move on to Section 3) that gives an insight on how the constitutional organization of the state has been altered and restructured over the past years, thus establishing an ideological, legal and institutional base for the transformation of the migration and asylum framework. Section 4) accounts for the legislative and institutional framework of immigration and asylum by introducing the major Acts that govern the field, the authorities that are responsible for the implementation of the policy, and the Government’s migration strategy. Since the recent developments fundamentally changed the scope of the framework, now representing its basic tenets, instead of discussing the amendments in a separate section, the refugee crisis driven reforms will be embedded here. In chronological order we will address all major amendments since 2015 that affected the legislative framework. Section 5) explains the legal status of foreigners, including asylum applicants, beneficiaries of international protection, the main categories of third country nationals legally residing in the country in terms of the type of residence permit they hold, irregular migrants, and unaccompanied minors. In describing the situation of asylum seekers, we will outline the first main stages of the application procedure. Finally, in Section 6) we will analyse the national framework compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights based on the Court’s case law in relation to migration and asylum.
By Daniel Gyollai (Glasgow Caledonian University) and Umut Korkut (Glasgow Caledonian University... more By Daniel Gyollai (Glasgow Caledonian University) and Umut Korkut (Glasgow Caledonian University)
The Syrian-born Canadian author and refugee activist, Danny Ramadan has been reported to be physically and verbally insulted due to his assumed Roma ethnicity at Sziget Festival in Budapest on 16th August 2018. The news perhaps comes with a shock to the general audience of the Festival, that is widely known for its cultural openness, the tolerance and respect for national diversity above all else. The assault may, nonetheless, be less surprising for those who are familiar with the current socio-political atmosphere of Hungary. The Fidesz government’s firm anti-immigrant stance and “hate campaign” brought a landslide victory for the governing party at the April 2018 General Election. Since that election the propaganda seems to have become incorrigible as the legislative machinery further curtails the rights of asylum seekers, targets civil society organizations, and threatens to dissipate the voice of dissent against the government. The most recent legislation creates a new criminal offence (‘Facilitating Illegal Migration’) that provides for the imprisonment of individuals, who extend legal assistance or humanitarian support for those third country nationals seeking asylum in Hungary. Notwithstanding the protest of a plethora of civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the so-called “Stop Soros” Bill and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution on June 20, World Refugee Day.
While the government has sought the opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft proposal for the legislation, spectacularly in the end the government has passed the Bill without even waiting for that very opinion. The Venice Commission, however, approached the Hungarian authorities to withdraw the new Bill eventually as it establishes criminal liability for advocacy activities, threatening members of civil society organizations who provide lawful assistance to asylum seekers. In doing this, as per the opinion of the Venice Commission, the law not only constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of association and expression, but also criminalizes the initiation of an asylum procedure on behalf of migrants. Furthermore, an earlier draft proposal of the bill, submitted in February, included a 25% tax on foreign-funded civil society organizations. While this tax was later dropped from the draft Bill, the Finance Ministry was still outspoken to impose the special tax on civil society organizations whose activities involve “organising migration”. They have asked for the introduction of this tax as a separate piece of legislation. According to the Ministry, the tax is necessary as the fight against illegal migration puts an “extra financial burden” on the state.
There have been a series of amendments to the Hungarian Constitution some of which referred to the issue of migration. The most recent, the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law went further than the previous one to ascertain that “no alien population would be settled in Hungary”, and it would be the responsibility of all public authorities to protect the “constitutional self-identity” and “Christian culture” of the state. As of now, it is unclear whether the EU is considering imposing sanctions of any sort against the new provisions of the Fundamental Law. According to its critics, however, the Amendment contradicts EU Law, and undermines human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, it provides that asylum seekers arriving at Hungary through the territory of a country “where they would not be exposed to persecution or a direct risk of persecution” shall not be entitled to receive asylum in Hungary. The Amendment further provides for the establishment of administrative courts. The new court system would fully substitute for the authority of regular courts in administrative cases, including asylum issues, and the President of the Administrative High Court shall be elected by the Parliament. This leaves the new court system to be monopolised by the government as it holds a two-thirds majority in the Parliament.
The EU has not been complicit with the developments in Hungary adversely affecting human rights of asylum seekers and the functioning of NGOs assisting asylum seekers. The most recent infringement procedure against Hungary by the European Commission is a response to the “Stop Soros” Bill and its incompatibility with the EU law, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. (N.B. further infringement procedures are ongoing against Hungary due to its non-compliance with, inter alia, the Asylum Procedures Directive, Return Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive.)
To make matters worse, those civil society organisations and activists who stand up for migrants’ rights are becoming increasingly under attack in Hungary. In June 2018, Hollik István MP, member of the governing coalition from KDNP Christian Democratic People Party, openly incited against Amnesty International right in front of its offices in Budapest. The politician marked the entrance with stickers, an action similar to when the Refugee Centre where the Jews lived during World War II was “signed” with a yellow star.
While at fieldwork in Southern Hungary in June 2018, we came across the impact of the fear and hatred campaign on everyday life. During our visit to Szeged, a county capital in Southeastern Hungary, we witnessed the complete oblivion of the locals of their proximity to the transit zone where asylum seekers are kept since September 2015 and the asylum seekers’ experience within. What is even more startling is that Szeged and the surrounding villages used to be at the forefront of the management of the 2015 refugee crisis, given its close proximity to the Western Balkan route across the Serbian border. During our visit many people expressed their relief that the city was no longer “occupied” by asylum seekers.
In conclusion, it looks as if despite the 2016 refugee quota referendum being inconclusive, the government has achieved its goal to foster a general feeling of fear among the public. While, on the one hand, the general public opinion on the European Union remains positive in Hungary, the anti-immigrant propaganda that has simultaneously bolstered anti-EU sentiments resulted in a victory for Fidesz, on the other. Witnessing these dual trajectories, we, therefore, raise the question, whether the conflicting attitudes towards EU policies are symptoms of the emergence of a new concept of Europeanisation that privileges the pursuit of certain conservative principles as opposed to those core liberal values the EU was founded upon and is to stand for.
As the war in Ukraine unfolds, the Hungarian government seems less enthusiastic about the idea of... more As the war in Ukraine unfolds, the Hungarian government seems less enthusiastic about the idea of state sovereignty than one might have anticipated given Hungary's historic past. Moreover, there is a surge of pro-Russian sentiment among government supporters. This is counterintuitive in light of prevailing mnemonic practices which put heavy emphasis on Hungary's struggle for freedom and independence. The new developments suggest that the role of collective memory in collective identity formation needs to be reconsidered, especially concerning the apparent inhibition of otherwise persistent and widely shared memories. The article discusses the problem in the context of socially shared retrievalinduced forgetting and social identity complexity theory. It puts forward two complementary arguments: 1) this Janus-faced public behaviour might be accounted for by selective commemorative practices of the government, and 2) how memories of historical events sustain a shared sense of belonging and continuity is not only contingent on group membership but also on the ever-changing group interest.
The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were... more The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were they to remember alone is a phenomenon known as collaborative inhibition. The article offers a phenomenological account of this highly counterintuitive effect of group remembering. It argues that the mutual failure to live up to one's potential does not warrant the standard, strongly negative views about the role of others in recall. Rather, the phenomenon may imply that sharedness itself becomes constitutive of the process in the sense that interaction partners co-determine what and how to remember. Drawing on phenomenological approaches to remembering and second-person engagement, the article argues that individuals participating in shared remembering co-construct their memories by reciprocally and dynamically incorporating each other's perspectives, attitudes, and emotions about their shared past.
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology, 2024
Following superior orders or the crowd are commonly used excuses to avoid responsibility. Taking ... more Following superior orders or the crowd are commonly used excuses to avoid responsibility. Taking the case of border control in Hungary, this article explores how such inauthenticity can shape police professional identity and practice, both in the Sartrean and Heideggerian sense. It is interested in how police officers 1) have denied their freedom of choice in the face of their role expectations, and 2) have fallen prey to political discourse and anti-immigrant public sentiment. Interestingly, most participants in the study used the phrase "I am just following orders" only in relation to their mandatory deployment at the border but not regarding the ill-treatment of irregular migrants. The concept of excessive use of force no longer appeared to be applicable; physical abuse of migrants has become the norm and standard practice. The findings seem to suggest that officers have been overtaken and driven by public attitudes towards mass migration. The article argues that the real threat to authentic role play does not stem from a desire or temptation to conform. Rather, it manifests itself in dominant discourses that reinterpret the purpose of policing, thus underpinning the self-understanding of officers.
This article demonstrates that Alfred Schutz's theory of typification and relevance together have... more This article demonstrates that Alfred Schutz's theory of typification and relevance together have a great potential to conceptually clarify certain aspects of self-categorisation theory. More specifically, it focuses on the motivational bases of stereotyping, one of the core mechanisms underlying the categorisation of people into groups. Social psychologists have found that stereotyping of out-group members is motivated by factors, such as uncertainty reduction, or the enhancement of the self-esteem of in-group members. What categories and corresponding stereotypes are being activated and applied is ultimately a function of the goals and pragmatic interests of the perceiver in any given situation. The article argues that this phenomenon can be explained, and accounted for, by Schutz's tripartite system of relevances. To illustrate the theoretical issues at hand, the last section draws on the case of migrants arriving in Hungary and provides a potential explanation for why the ideal type of the Gypsy was triggered and facilitated the way in which migrants have been attended and understood.
This article explores the potential of historical narratives to inform and guide action, taking t... more This article explores the potential of historical narratives to inform and guide action, taking the case of border control in Hungary. The Hungarian government has recently criminalised irregular border crossing and made a comparison between the Ottoman Occupation and contemporary challenges of mass migration to legitimise its new measures. Qualitative interviews conducted in 2019 seem to suggest that some members of the border police, consciously or unconsciously, have drawn from this narrative repertoire to make sense of their own role in border control. Drawing on the concept of the narrative self, the article outlines how the collective memory of the Ottoman conquest may have shaped the understanding of mass migration and the self-interpretation of those involved in border control.
The report provides an insight into the most important hotspots of radicalisation in
Hungary: the... more The report provides an insight into the most important hotspots of radicalisation in Hungary: the 2008-2009 Roma Murders, the “migrant-hunting” of László Toroczkai and the assaults on LGBTQI people orchestrated by György Budaházy. It outlines the underlying mechanisms and facilitating conditions of the hotspots, and situates them on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum. Our findings show that the proliferation of right-wing radical movements, coupled with the wider sociopolitical context, has had a significant effect on perpetrators. The growing public intolerance towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the dominant political discourse, in tandem with the incompetence and/or ignorance of the authorities, are likely to have contributed to the outcome. As regards the IGAP spectrum, the feeling of grievance, injustice and, paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by the perpetrators, but also by a significant proportion of the society at the time of the Roma Murders. Similarly, there is a growing consensus among Hungarians that migrants and LGBTQI people should have limited access to the resources and privileges of the community. Not only the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also Toroczkai and Budaházy may have had a reasonable expectation to be appreciated for what they have done by many.
This report provides a brief presentation of the context, structures and stakeholders of (de-)rad... more This report provides a brief presentation of the context, structures and stakeholders of (de-)radicalisation in contemporary Hungary. The prevalent form of radicalisation in present-day Hungary is right-wing extremism mixed with ethno-nationalist, antiestablishment and religious elements, shaped by the legacy of Trianon, the Horthyera and the fascist Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt). The most significant events that prompted radicalisation were party politics right after the collapse of the one-party system in 1989; the socio-economic situation and subsequent crisis of the socialist-liberal government in 2006; and the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015. Rightwing polarisation led to the most shocking events in contemporary Hungary, the Roma murders in 2008-2009. Besides Roma, the usual targets of violence are Jews, migrants and the LGBTQI community. There have been several far-right group formations since the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. However, the FideszKDNP party alliance currently in power has systematically taken over the platform and narratives of Jobbik. While the latter has been moving to the centre, the former has become gradually more radical both in terms of political discourse and social policy. Fidesz has essentially closed the political space and monopolised right-wing radicalisation in Hungary; social-liberal values, the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI communities have been under constant attack by the government. As a consequence, efforts of de-radicalisation and reducing hate crime remain with stakeholders, such as NGOs, charities and religious organisations.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Sep 24, 2020
This article argues that phenomenological sociology has great potential to provide a strong theor... more This article argues that phenomenological sociology has great potential to provide a strong theoretical support to the Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) in Critical Discourse Studies. SCA is interested in the interconnections between knowledge, discourse and society while placing subjectivity in the centre of its framework. It looks into the correlative relationship between personal-and socially shared knowledge, and the significance of these correlations to discourse production and interpretation. Analogously , phenomenological sociology explores the interrelated structures of subjectivity, knowledge and the social world. It systematically analyses the conditions and forms of intersubjective understanding and the mutually constitutive relationship between subjective-and objective knowledge. Given the considerable overlap between the subject matter of phenomenological sociology and that of SCA, the purpose of the article is to draw the attention of critical discourse analysts to a neglected but extremely resourceful field. Following a brief introduction to SCA, the article will address some of SCA's key concepts in conjunction with the phenomenological-sociological insight.
This article analyses the migration control narrative in Italy and Hungary at the nexus of humani... more This article analyses the migration control narrative in Italy and Hungary at the nexus of humanitarianism and securitisation. We concentrate on how the humanitarian discourse is undervalued as the EU border states emphasise either full securitisation or else securitisation as a condition for humanitarianism when it comes to border management and refugee protection measures. We trace, first, how politicians conceptualise humanitarianism for the self and for the extension of the self; and, second, how they conditionalize humanitarianism for the other. Reflecting on the institutional and discursive nexus of humanitarianism and securitization in effect to migration controls, our aim is also to contextualise political narratives of Europe and how politicians use them to affect the public. We elaborate on this nexus considering how it foregrounds human rights for the self but challenges humanitarianism as it undervalues human rights for the other. In order to see how migration politics is framed for everyday consumption, we are referring to tropes emerging in major political speeches in Italy and Hungary, and develop two conceptual terms suggesting conditionalised humanitarianism and domesticised humanitarianism.
This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian gove... more This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.
Our preliminary fieldwork shows that there is large scale agreement between the migration and bor... more Our preliminary fieldwork shows that there is large scale agreement between the migration and border authorities of Hungary and Serbia on the names of asylum seekers before they are allowed into to the Hungarian transit zones and apply for international protection in Hungary. The list, proposed by the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) and approved by the Hungarian border authorities, is communicated through the use of community leaders from the Serbian reception centre. Hungary's motive behind keeping its cooperation with Serbia informal is to conceal the existence of cooperation between both states and to avoid legal challenges in the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Therefore, the paper argues that the informalisation of migration management constitutes a significant challenge for the authority of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (hereinafter referred as the Refugee Convention). The paper further argues that Hungary's informal cooperation with Serbia is a form of expansion of the Hungarian state authority under the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction of a state. Therefore, despite informal nature of Hungary's migration cooperation with Serbia, the responsibility for violations of asylum seekers rights in Serbia and their exclusion from international protection continues to engage Hungary for the reason of having effective control on the migration management in Serbia.
This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of Interpretative Phenomenological An... more This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA's interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA's failure to recognise the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA's phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA's consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.
The present collection of country reports represents the collective work of the following RESPOND... more The present collection of country reports represents the collective work of the following RESPOND national teams: Uppsala Universitet (Swedish report), the Glasgow Caledonian University (Hungarian report), Georg-August Universitat Gottigenstiftung Offentlichen Rechts (German report), University of Cambridge (British report), Svenska Forkningsinstitute i Istanbul (Turkish report), Università di Firenze (Italian report and European Union report), Panepistimio Aigaiou (Greek report), Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschafte (Austrian report), Uniwersytet Warszawski (Polish report), Lebanon Support (Lebanese report), Hammurabi Human Rights Organization (Iraqi report). The activities of this Work Package (WP1) have been coordinated by the University of Florence. We are indebted to all the authors for the competence and enthusiasm with which they fulfilled their tasks and for their collaborative approach.
Each report underwent a double review process: the review by a national expert appointed by national teams, and the review by the work package leader. We are grateful to all national experts that collaborated enhancing the quality of RESPOND research.
In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance... more In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance and management of migration in Hungary, the regulatory landscape, citing and reflecting on developments and events occurred between 2011 and 2018. Section 1) gives a statistical overview of international migration to Hungary. The data displayed shows the main patterns of asylum seeker flows, their recognition rates and the scale of people being expelled from the territory. Section 2) outlines the political, cultural and socio-economic context in which migration management enfolds. It briefly introduces the linguistic and religious cleavages and the political and institutional arrangements of the state. Without engaging in a thorough analysis, we will try to pin down those critical socio-economic and political factors that are accountable for the current escalation of tensions. In doing so, we move on to Section 3) that gives an insight on how the constitutional organization of the state has been altered and restructured over the past years, thus establishing an ideological, legal and institutional base for the transformation of the migration and asylum framework. Section 4) accounts for the legislative and institutional framework of immigration and asylum by introducing the major Acts that govern the field, the authorities that are responsible for the implementation of the policy, and the Government’s migration strategy. Since the recent developments fundamentally changed the scope of the framework, now representing its basic tenets, instead of discussing the amendments in a separate section, the refugee crisis driven reforms will be embedded here. In chronological order we will address all major amendments since 2015 that affected the legislative framework. Section 5) explains the legal status of foreigners, including asylum applicants, beneficiaries of international protection, the main categories of third country nationals legally residing in the country in terms of the type of residence permit they hold, irregular migrants, and unaccompanied minors. In describing the situation of asylum seekers, we will outline the first main stages of the application procedure. Finally, in Section 6) we will analyse the national framework compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights based on the Court’s case law in relation to migration and asylum.
By Daniel Gyollai (Glasgow Caledonian University) and Umut Korkut (Glasgow Caledonian University... more By Daniel Gyollai (Glasgow Caledonian University) and Umut Korkut (Glasgow Caledonian University)
The Syrian-born Canadian author and refugee activist, Danny Ramadan has been reported to be physically and verbally insulted due to his assumed Roma ethnicity at Sziget Festival in Budapest on 16th August 2018. The news perhaps comes with a shock to the general audience of the Festival, that is widely known for its cultural openness, the tolerance and respect for national diversity above all else. The assault may, nonetheless, be less surprising for those who are familiar with the current socio-political atmosphere of Hungary. The Fidesz government’s firm anti-immigrant stance and “hate campaign” brought a landslide victory for the governing party at the April 2018 General Election. Since that election the propaganda seems to have become incorrigible as the legislative machinery further curtails the rights of asylum seekers, targets civil society organizations, and threatens to dissipate the voice of dissent against the government. The most recent legislation creates a new criminal offence (‘Facilitating Illegal Migration’) that provides for the imprisonment of individuals, who extend legal assistance or humanitarian support for those third country nationals seeking asylum in Hungary. Notwithstanding the protest of a plethora of civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the so-called “Stop Soros” Bill and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution on June 20, World Refugee Day.
While the government has sought the opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft proposal for the legislation, spectacularly in the end the government has passed the Bill without even waiting for that very opinion. The Venice Commission, however, approached the Hungarian authorities to withdraw the new Bill eventually as it establishes criminal liability for advocacy activities, threatening members of civil society organizations who provide lawful assistance to asylum seekers. In doing this, as per the opinion of the Venice Commission, the law not only constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of association and expression, but also criminalizes the initiation of an asylum procedure on behalf of migrants. Furthermore, an earlier draft proposal of the bill, submitted in February, included a 25% tax on foreign-funded civil society organizations. While this tax was later dropped from the draft Bill, the Finance Ministry was still outspoken to impose the special tax on civil society organizations whose activities involve “organising migration”. They have asked for the introduction of this tax as a separate piece of legislation. According to the Ministry, the tax is necessary as the fight against illegal migration puts an “extra financial burden” on the state.
There have been a series of amendments to the Hungarian Constitution some of which referred to the issue of migration. The most recent, the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law went further than the previous one to ascertain that “no alien population would be settled in Hungary”, and it would be the responsibility of all public authorities to protect the “constitutional self-identity” and “Christian culture” of the state. As of now, it is unclear whether the EU is considering imposing sanctions of any sort against the new provisions of the Fundamental Law. According to its critics, however, the Amendment contradicts EU Law, and undermines human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, it provides that asylum seekers arriving at Hungary through the territory of a country “where they would not be exposed to persecution or a direct risk of persecution” shall not be entitled to receive asylum in Hungary. The Amendment further provides for the establishment of administrative courts. The new court system would fully substitute for the authority of regular courts in administrative cases, including asylum issues, and the President of the Administrative High Court shall be elected by the Parliament. This leaves the new court system to be monopolised by the government as it holds a two-thirds majority in the Parliament.
The EU has not been complicit with the developments in Hungary adversely affecting human rights of asylum seekers and the functioning of NGOs assisting asylum seekers. The most recent infringement procedure against Hungary by the European Commission is a response to the “Stop Soros” Bill and its incompatibility with the EU law, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. (N.B. further infringement procedures are ongoing against Hungary due to its non-compliance with, inter alia, the Asylum Procedures Directive, Return Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive.)
To make matters worse, those civil society organisations and activists who stand up for migrants’ rights are becoming increasingly under attack in Hungary. In June 2018, Hollik István MP, member of the governing coalition from KDNP Christian Democratic People Party, openly incited against Amnesty International right in front of its offices in Budapest. The politician marked the entrance with stickers, an action similar to when the Refugee Centre where the Jews lived during World War II was “signed” with a yellow star.
While at fieldwork in Southern Hungary in June 2018, we came across the impact of the fear and hatred campaign on everyday life. During our visit to Szeged, a county capital in Southeastern Hungary, we witnessed the complete oblivion of the locals of their proximity to the transit zone where asylum seekers are kept since September 2015 and the asylum seekers’ experience within. What is even more startling is that Szeged and the surrounding villages used to be at the forefront of the management of the 2015 refugee crisis, given its close proximity to the Western Balkan route across the Serbian border. During our visit many people expressed their relief that the city was no longer “occupied” by asylum seekers.
In conclusion, it looks as if despite the 2016 refugee quota referendum being inconclusive, the government has achieved its goal to foster a general feeling of fear among the public. While, on the one hand, the general public opinion on the European Union remains positive in Hungary, the anti-immigrant propaganda that has simultaneously bolstered anti-EU sentiments resulted in a victory for Fidesz, on the other. Witnessing these dual trajectories, we, therefore, raise the question, whether the conflicting attitudes towards EU policies are symptoms of the emergence of a new concept of Europeanisation that privileges the pursuit of certain conservative principles as opposed to those core liberal values the EU was founded upon and is to stand for.
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Papers by Daniel Gyollai
Hungary: the 2008-2009 Roma Murders, the “migrant-hunting” of László Toroczkai
and the assaults on LGBTQI people orchestrated by György Budaházy. It outlines the
underlying mechanisms and facilitating conditions of the hotspots, and situates them
on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum. Our findings show
that the proliferation of right-wing radical movements, coupled with the wider sociopolitical context, has had a significant effect on perpetrators. The growing public
intolerance towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the dominant political
discourse, in tandem with the incompetence and/or ignorance of the authorities, are
likely to have contributed to the outcome. As regards the IGAP spectrum, the feeling
of grievance, injustice and, paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by
the perpetrators, but also by a significant proportion of the society at the time of the
Roma Murders. Similarly, there is a growing consensus among Hungarians that
migrants and LGBTQI people should have limited access to the resources and
privileges of the community. Not only the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also
Toroczkai and Budaházy may have had a reasonable expectation to be appreciated
for what they have done by many.
socialist-liberal government in 2006; and the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015. Rightwing polarisation led to the most shocking events in contemporary Hungary, the Roma murders in 2008-2009. Besides Roma, the usual targets of violence are Jews, migrants and the LGBTQI community. There have been several far-right group formations since the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. However, the FideszKDNP party alliance currently in power has systematically taken over the platform
and narratives of Jobbik. While the latter has been moving to the centre, the former has become gradually more radical both in terms of political discourse and social policy. Fidesz has essentially closed the political space and monopolised right-wing radicalisation in Hungary; social-liberal values, the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI communities have been under constant attack by the government. As a consequence, efforts of de-radicalisation and reducing hate crime remain with stakeholders, such as
NGOs, charities and religious organisations.
Each report underwent a double review process: the review by a national expert appointed by national teams, and the review by the work package leader. We are grateful to all national experts that collaborated enhancing the quality of RESPOND research.
The Syrian-born Canadian author and refugee activist, Danny Ramadan has been reported to be physically and verbally insulted due to his assumed Roma ethnicity at Sziget Festival in Budapest on 16th August 2018. The news perhaps comes with a shock to the general audience of the Festival, that is widely known for its cultural openness, the tolerance and respect for national diversity above all else. The assault may, nonetheless, be less surprising for those who are familiar with the current socio-political atmosphere of Hungary. The Fidesz government’s firm anti-immigrant stance and “hate campaign” brought a landslide victory for the governing party at the April 2018 General Election. Since that election the propaganda seems to have become incorrigible as the legislative machinery further curtails the rights of asylum seekers, targets civil society organizations, and threatens to dissipate the voice of dissent against the government. The most recent legislation creates a new criminal offence (‘Facilitating Illegal Migration’) that provides for the imprisonment of individuals, who extend legal assistance or humanitarian support for those third country nationals seeking asylum in Hungary. Notwithstanding the protest of a plethora of civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the so-called “Stop Soros” Bill and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution on June 20, World Refugee Day.
While the government has sought the opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft proposal for the legislation, spectacularly in the end the government has passed the Bill without even waiting for that very opinion. The Venice Commission, however, approached the Hungarian authorities to withdraw the new Bill eventually as it establishes criminal liability for advocacy activities, threatening members of civil society organizations who provide lawful assistance to asylum seekers. In doing this, as per the opinion of the Venice Commission, the law not only constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of association and expression, but also criminalizes the initiation of an asylum procedure on behalf of migrants. Furthermore, an earlier draft proposal of the bill, submitted in February, included a 25% tax on foreign-funded civil society organizations. While this tax was later dropped from the draft Bill, the Finance Ministry was still outspoken to impose the special tax on civil society organizations whose activities involve “organising migration”. They have asked for the introduction of this tax as a separate piece of legislation. According to the Ministry, the tax is necessary as the fight against illegal migration puts an “extra financial burden” on the state.
There have been a series of amendments to the Hungarian Constitution some of which referred to the issue of migration. The most recent, the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law went further than the previous one to ascertain that “no alien population would be settled in Hungary”, and it would be the responsibility of all public authorities to protect the “constitutional self-identity” and “Christian culture” of the state. As of now, it is unclear whether the EU is considering imposing sanctions of any sort against the new provisions of the Fundamental Law. According to its critics, however, the Amendment contradicts EU Law, and undermines human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, it provides that asylum seekers arriving at Hungary through the territory of a country “where they would not be exposed to persecution or a direct risk of persecution” shall not be entitled to receive asylum in Hungary. The Amendment further provides for the establishment of administrative courts. The new court system would fully substitute for the authority of regular courts in administrative cases, including asylum issues, and the President of the Administrative High Court shall be elected by the Parliament. This leaves the new court system to be monopolised by the government as it holds a two-thirds majority in the Parliament.
The EU has not been complicit with the developments in Hungary adversely affecting human rights of asylum seekers and the functioning of NGOs assisting asylum seekers. The most recent infringement procedure against Hungary by the European Commission is a response to the “Stop Soros” Bill and its incompatibility with the EU law, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. (N.B. further infringement procedures are ongoing against Hungary due to its non-compliance with, inter alia, the Asylum Procedures Directive, Return Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive.)
To make matters worse, those civil society organisations and activists who stand up for migrants’ rights are becoming increasingly under attack in Hungary. In June 2018, Hollik István MP, member of the governing coalition from KDNP Christian Democratic People Party, openly incited against Amnesty International right in front of its offices in Budapest. The politician marked the entrance with stickers, an action similar to when the Refugee Centre where the Jews lived during World War II was “signed” with a yellow star.
While at fieldwork in Southern Hungary in June 2018, we came across the impact of the fear and hatred campaign on everyday life. During our visit to Szeged, a county capital in Southeastern Hungary, we witnessed the complete oblivion of the locals of their proximity to the transit zone where asylum seekers are kept since September 2015 and the asylum seekers’ experience within. What is even more startling is that Szeged and the surrounding villages used to be at the forefront of the management of the 2015 refugee crisis, given its close proximity to the Western Balkan route across the Serbian border. During our visit many people expressed their relief that the city was no longer “occupied” by asylum seekers.
In conclusion, it looks as if despite the 2016 refugee quota referendum being inconclusive, the government has achieved its goal to foster a general feeling of fear among the public. While, on the one hand, the general public opinion on the European Union remains positive in Hungary, the anti-immigrant propaganda that has simultaneously bolstered anti-EU sentiments resulted in a victory for Fidesz, on the other. Witnessing these dual trajectories, we, therefore, raise the question, whether the conflicting attitudes towards EU policies are symptoms of the emergence of a new concept of Europeanisation that privileges the pursuit of certain conservative principles as opposed to those core liberal values the EU was founded upon and is to stand for.
Hungary: the 2008-2009 Roma Murders, the “migrant-hunting” of László Toroczkai
and the assaults on LGBTQI people orchestrated by György Budaházy. It outlines the
underlying mechanisms and facilitating conditions of the hotspots, and situates them
on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum. Our findings show
that the proliferation of right-wing radical movements, coupled with the wider sociopolitical context, has had a significant effect on perpetrators. The growing public
intolerance towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the dominant political
discourse, in tandem with the incompetence and/or ignorance of the authorities, are
likely to have contributed to the outcome. As regards the IGAP spectrum, the feeling
of grievance, injustice and, paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by
the perpetrators, but also by a significant proportion of the society at the time of the
Roma Murders. Similarly, there is a growing consensus among Hungarians that
migrants and LGBTQI people should have limited access to the resources and
privileges of the community. Not only the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also
Toroczkai and Budaházy may have had a reasonable expectation to be appreciated
for what they have done by many.
socialist-liberal government in 2006; and the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015. Rightwing polarisation led to the most shocking events in contemporary Hungary, the Roma murders in 2008-2009. Besides Roma, the usual targets of violence are Jews, migrants and the LGBTQI community. There have been several far-right group formations since the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. However, the FideszKDNP party alliance currently in power has systematically taken over the platform
and narratives of Jobbik. While the latter has been moving to the centre, the former has become gradually more radical both in terms of political discourse and social policy. Fidesz has essentially closed the political space and monopolised right-wing radicalisation in Hungary; social-liberal values, the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI communities have been under constant attack by the government. As a consequence, efforts of de-radicalisation and reducing hate crime remain with stakeholders, such as
NGOs, charities and religious organisations.
Each report underwent a double review process: the review by a national expert appointed by national teams, and the review by the work package leader. We are grateful to all national experts that collaborated enhancing the quality of RESPOND research.
The Syrian-born Canadian author and refugee activist, Danny Ramadan has been reported to be physically and verbally insulted due to his assumed Roma ethnicity at Sziget Festival in Budapest on 16th August 2018. The news perhaps comes with a shock to the general audience of the Festival, that is widely known for its cultural openness, the tolerance and respect for national diversity above all else. The assault may, nonetheless, be less surprising for those who are familiar with the current socio-political atmosphere of Hungary. The Fidesz government’s firm anti-immigrant stance and “hate campaign” brought a landslide victory for the governing party at the April 2018 General Election. Since that election the propaganda seems to have become incorrigible as the legislative machinery further curtails the rights of asylum seekers, targets civil society organizations, and threatens to dissipate the voice of dissent against the government. The most recent legislation creates a new criminal offence (‘Facilitating Illegal Migration’) that provides for the imprisonment of individuals, who extend legal assistance or humanitarian support for those third country nationals seeking asylum in Hungary. Notwithstanding the protest of a plethora of civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the so-called “Stop Soros” Bill and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution on June 20, World Refugee Day.
While the government has sought the opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft proposal for the legislation, spectacularly in the end the government has passed the Bill without even waiting for that very opinion. The Venice Commission, however, approached the Hungarian authorities to withdraw the new Bill eventually as it establishes criminal liability for advocacy activities, threatening members of civil society organizations who provide lawful assistance to asylum seekers. In doing this, as per the opinion of the Venice Commission, the law not only constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of association and expression, but also criminalizes the initiation of an asylum procedure on behalf of migrants. Furthermore, an earlier draft proposal of the bill, submitted in February, included a 25% tax on foreign-funded civil society organizations. While this tax was later dropped from the draft Bill, the Finance Ministry was still outspoken to impose the special tax on civil society organizations whose activities involve “organising migration”. They have asked for the introduction of this tax as a separate piece of legislation. According to the Ministry, the tax is necessary as the fight against illegal migration puts an “extra financial burden” on the state.
There have been a series of amendments to the Hungarian Constitution some of which referred to the issue of migration. The most recent, the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law went further than the previous one to ascertain that “no alien population would be settled in Hungary”, and it would be the responsibility of all public authorities to protect the “constitutional self-identity” and “Christian culture” of the state. As of now, it is unclear whether the EU is considering imposing sanctions of any sort against the new provisions of the Fundamental Law. According to its critics, however, the Amendment contradicts EU Law, and undermines human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, it provides that asylum seekers arriving at Hungary through the territory of a country “where they would not be exposed to persecution or a direct risk of persecution” shall not be entitled to receive asylum in Hungary. The Amendment further provides for the establishment of administrative courts. The new court system would fully substitute for the authority of regular courts in administrative cases, including asylum issues, and the President of the Administrative High Court shall be elected by the Parliament. This leaves the new court system to be monopolised by the government as it holds a two-thirds majority in the Parliament.
The EU has not been complicit with the developments in Hungary adversely affecting human rights of asylum seekers and the functioning of NGOs assisting asylum seekers. The most recent infringement procedure against Hungary by the European Commission is a response to the “Stop Soros” Bill and its incompatibility with the EU law, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. (N.B. further infringement procedures are ongoing against Hungary due to its non-compliance with, inter alia, the Asylum Procedures Directive, Return Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive.)
To make matters worse, those civil society organisations and activists who stand up for migrants’ rights are becoming increasingly under attack in Hungary. In June 2018, Hollik István MP, member of the governing coalition from KDNP Christian Democratic People Party, openly incited against Amnesty International right in front of its offices in Budapest. The politician marked the entrance with stickers, an action similar to when the Refugee Centre where the Jews lived during World War II was “signed” with a yellow star.
While at fieldwork in Southern Hungary in June 2018, we came across the impact of the fear and hatred campaign on everyday life. During our visit to Szeged, a county capital in Southeastern Hungary, we witnessed the complete oblivion of the locals of their proximity to the transit zone where asylum seekers are kept since September 2015 and the asylum seekers’ experience within. What is even more startling is that Szeged and the surrounding villages used to be at the forefront of the management of the 2015 refugee crisis, given its close proximity to the Western Balkan route across the Serbian border. During our visit many people expressed their relief that the city was no longer “occupied” by asylum seekers.
In conclusion, it looks as if despite the 2016 refugee quota referendum being inconclusive, the government has achieved its goal to foster a general feeling of fear among the public. While, on the one hand, the general public opinion on the European Union remains positive in Hungary, the anti-immigrant propaganda that has simultaneously bolstered anti-EU sentiments resulted in a victory for Fidesz, on the other. Witnessing these dual trajectories, we, therefore, raise the question, whether the conflicting attitudes towards EU policies are symptoms of the emergence of a new concept of Europeanisation that privileges the pursuit of certain conservative principles as opposed to those core liberal values the EU was founded upon and is to stand for.