Economic Philosophy by Nils Holtug
Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics, 2022
Books by Nils Holtug
National Identity and Social Cohesion, 2021
Political Philosophy by Nils Holtug
Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol. 6, David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne and Stephen Wall (eds.), 2020
Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics, Gina Gustavsson and David Miller (eds.), 2019
Journal of Political Philosophy, 2018
According to the national identity argument, the sharing of a national identity tends to facilita... more According to the national identity argument, the sharing of a national identity tends to facilitate social cohesion, including trust and solidarity. On this basis, nationalists have, for example, argued that states’ immigration and integration policies need to reflect a concern with their national identities and the forms of homogeneity on which they depend. First, the national identity argument is outlined in greater detail as is the concept of social cohesion. Second, different possible explanations of why shared identities might impact social cohesion are described. Third, the national identity argument is explained in terms of the commitments of nationalism, from which it derives. Fourth, this paves the way for a survey of the empirical evidence that may support or undermine the national identity argument. It is argued that this argument does not find support in the available empirical studies. Finally, it is briefly considered whether there are other identities, apart from national identities, that may contribute to social cohesion at the societal level. In particular, liberal and multicultural values are considered.
Social scientists and political theorists often claim that shared values are conducive to social ... more Social scientists and political theorists often claim that shared values are conducive to social cohesion, and trust and solidarity in particular. Furthermore, this idea is at the heart of what has been labeled the 'national identity argument', according to which religious and/or cultural diversity is a threat to the shared (national) values underpinning social cohesion and redistributive justice. However, there is no consensus among political theorists about what values we need to share to foster social cohesion and indeed, for example, nationalists, liberals, and multiculturalists provide different answers to this question. On the basis of a survey conducted in Denmark in 2014, this study empirically investigates the relation between, on the one hand, commitments to the community values of respectively conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism, liberal citizenship, and multiculturalism, and on the other, trust and solidarity. First, we investigate in what ways commitments to these four sets of values are correlated to trust and solidarity at the individual level and, then, whether the belief that others share one's values is correlated to these aspects of social cohesion for individuals committed to these four sets of values. We find that conservative and liberal nationalism are negatively correlated to our different measures of trust and solidarity, whereas liberal citizenship and (in particular) multiculturalism are positively correlated. In broad terms, this picture remains when we control for a number of socioeconomic factors and ideology (on a left-right scale). Finally, individuals who believe that others share their values do not, in general, have higher levels of trust and solidarity. Rather, this belief works in different ways when associated with different sets of community values.
Prioritarianism is a principle of distributive justice. Roughly, it states that we should give pr... more Prioritarianism is a principle of distributive justice. Roughly, it states that we should give priority to the worse off in the distribution of advantages. This principle has received a great deal of attention in political theory since Derek Parfit first introduced the distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism in his Lindley Lecture, published in 1991. In the present article, prioritarianism is defined in terms of a number of structural features of the principle. These structural features are also used to distinguish between this principle and other distributive principles such as utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and leximin. Prioritarianism is mostly discussed as an axiological principle that orders outcomes with respect to their (moral) value, but it is also clarified how it can be incorporated in a criterion of right actions, choices, or policies. Furthermore, different aspects of the principle that need to be further specified to arrive at a full-fledged distributive theory are discussed, including the weights that give priority to the worse off, currency (what kind of advantages should be distributed), temporal unit (the temporal span in which one has to be worse off in order to be entitled to priority), scope (whether the principle applies globally or only domestically, and whether, for example, future generations and non-human animals are covered by the principle), and risk. For each aspect, different possible views are distinguished and discussed. Finally, it is discussed how prioritarianism may be justified, for example, by outlining and discussing the argument that, unlike certain other distribution-sensitive principles such as egalitarianism, prioritarianism is not vulnerable to the so-called “leveling down objection.”
In light of the large recent inflow of refugees to the EU and the Commission’s efforts to relocat... more In light of the large recent inflow of refugees to the EU and the Commission’s efforts to relocate them, I raise the question of what a fair distribution of refugees between EU countries would look like. More specifically, I consider what concerns such a distributive scheme should be sensitive to. First, I put forward some arguments for why states are obligated to admit refugees and outline how I believe the EU should respond to the refugee crisis. This involves, among other things, resettling a proportion of refugees from countries neighbouring Syria in the EU. Second, I consider how the intake into the EU should be distributed between member states, that is, the shares different countries can be expected to admit. I discuss the relevance of a number of different factors that may be claimed to affect such shares, including population size, GDP, number of refugees admitted so far, unemployment rate, country-specific costs and cultural ‘closeness’. Third, I consider whether the distributive scheme should be restricted to reflect specific states’ responsibility for creating refugees in the first place, levels of racism and xenophobia, and whether other states are required to pick up the slack if some refuse to admit their fair share.
Les Ateliers de l'Éthique 6(2), 2011
Papers by Nils Holtug
Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 1, 2010
In Chapter 4, the Prudential View, according to which self‐interest is a function not just of wel... more In Chapter 4, the Prudential View, according to which self‐interest is a function not just of welfare but also of Relation M was proposed. This view has implications for our account of justice. For example, according to the ‘Compensation Argument’, it is possible for an individual to be compensated for her low welfare at one time by her high welfare at another time. Therefore, what matters for distributive justice is her welfare over her life taken as a whole. However, if we accept the Prudential View, what the Compensation Argument suggests is not Whole Lives Prioritarianism, but ‘Prudential Prioritarianism’. According to Prudential Prioritarianism, roughly, the moral value of a benefit to an individual at one time depends on both the size of the benefit and on the individual's self‐interest, at that time, in the other benefits that accrue to her at this and other times.
Aarhus University Press eBooks, Sep 30, 2015
Economics and Philosophy, Mar 1, 2007
Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but on... more Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called ‘levelling down’ objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I provide a more precise definition of conditional egalitarianism. Finally, I give two arguments against this principle. According to the first, it violates the transitivity of the betterness relation (or more specifically, ‘betterness with respect to equality’). According to the second, there is no plausible explanation of why equality must benefit at least one individual in order to be non-instrumentally valuable.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 23, 2021
This chapter turns to a normative premise in the social cohesion argument for restrictive immigra... more This chapter turns to a normative premise in the social cohesion argument for restrictive immigration policies, according to which states should bring about (substantive) equality. This premise assumes a particular version of egalitarianism, according to which equality has domestic scope only (the focus is, after all, only on the impact of immigration in the receiving society). However, it is argued that equality has global scope. It is also argued that immigration, and in particular South–North migration, has a positive impact on global equality, due to the fact that migrants can achieve a higher standard of living and tend to send back remittances to their families in their country of origin. A number of objections to this argument are also considered, and it is argued that while immigration policy is not the most important policy for improving global equality, more open borders nevertheless have a role to play.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 7, 2015
Springer eBooks, Nov 9, 2007
According to impersonal moralities, welfare is good, period. Therefore, it is good that welfare i... more According to impersonal moralities, welfare is good, period. Therefore, it is good that welfare is realised, whether by the benefiting of individuals who already exist or by the bringing of new (happy) individuals into existence. According to an impersonal morality, then, we can improve an outcome by seeing to it that extra individuals exist and it may even seem that, in certain circumstances, the welfare of such extra beings can outweigh benefits to ourselves. To avoid these implications, many theorists have defended person-affecting moralities that, in various ways, restrict our obligations to possible future people.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 23, 2021
This chapter explains what social cohesion is and why it is important. The case for thinking that... more This chapter explains what social cohesion is and why it is important. The case for thinking that trust and solidarity are especially important for egalitarian redistribution is presented, and different accounts of their sources are considered. This includes a discussion of strategic, institutional, and moral models for trust and solidarity, welfare regime theory, and how perceptions of deservingness are fundamental for solidarity. Initial reflections on how immigration and diversity might impact these dimensions of social cohesion are introduced. Furthermore, the ‘identity thesis’ is explained, according to which sharing an identity tends to promote such cohesion, and different types of mechanisms that might explain it are distinguished. Finally, the concept of a ‘community conception’ is introduced, and it is explained how different such conceptions differ as regards the values that, if shared, are thought conducive to social cohesion.
Uploads
Economic Philosophy by Nils Holtug
Books by Nils Holtug
Political Philosophy by Nils Holtug
Papers by Nils Holtug
Derek Parfit is prioritarianism’s most famous proponent. We have also defended prioritarianism. Not everyone is persuaded. Prioritarianism has been vigorously criticized, from a variety of perspectives, most visibly by John Broome, Campbell Brown, Lara Buchak, Roger Crisp, Hilary Greaves, David McCarthy, Michael Otsuka, Ingmar Persson, Shlomi Segall, Larry Temkin, and Alex Voorhoeve. In this Article, we answer the critics.