Numerous philosophers accept the differentiation condition, according to which one does not see a... more Numerous philosophers accept the differentiation condition, according to which one does not see an object unless one visually differentiates it from its immediate surroundings. This paper, however, sounds a sceptical note. Based on suggestions by Dretske (2007) and Gibson (2002 [1972]), I articulate two 'principles of occlusion' and argue that each principle admits of a reading on which it is both plausible and incompatible with the differentiation condition. To resolve the inconsistency, I suggest we abandon the differentiation condition.
In a recent issue of the JHP, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation o... more In a recent issue of the JHP, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.
In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, b... more In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, ‘the principles of occlusion are reversed’, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen’s arguments in support of those claims are flawed. After criticizing Sorensen’s arguments, I attempt to address a residual puzzle about backlit objects. The upshot of the paper is that cases of backlighting do have important philosophical lessons to teach us after all – lessons concerning the notion of perceptual occlusion.
There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve r... more There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and ‘conjunctivists’ (intentionalists), on the other. For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are to be located vis-à-vis this chasm. While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau-Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.
Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that ... more Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that reports. But the proposals they have made have one striking feature in common: they are demonstrably false. Going against the trend, I suggest we stop trying to lump together seeing-as and seeing-that. Instead, we need to realize that there is a deep logical kinship between seeing-as reports and seeing-objects reports.
Naive Realists have recently proposed that illusions occur in circumstances that are ‘non-paradig... more Naive Realists have recently proposed that illusions occur in circumstances that are ‘non-paradigmatic’ or with which we are insufficiently familiar. While this proposal may work for many of the illusions philosophers normally discuss, I argue in this paper that there are other illusions that do not fit this pattern. In particular, the vertical-horizontal illusion (VHI) occurs in circumstances that are both familiar and paradigmatic, while disappearing (or becoming attenuated) in more unusual circumstances.
“Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it re... more “Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it refers to something people do – for example, inferences they make about others’ expectations. On the other hand, it refers to a particular theoretical model of those things that people do. If the concept of TTOM is to have any future, this ambiguity must be redressed.
Perception seems like it puts us directly in touch with real things in our environment. But accor... more Perception seems like it puts us directly in touch with real things in our environment. But according to a popular view, perception actually does no such thing. Perceptual experiences are internally generated imagery, and we don’t see what is really out there. I call this view “the Hard-Nosed View,” and I argue that it is deeply problematic. In fact, the view is self-defeating: it undermines the very evidence supposed to establish or support the view. Indeed, if perceptual experiences are just internally generated images that generally don’t reflect what is really out there, the very notion of a scientific finding is put in jeopardy. So, the Hard-Nosed View had better be false.
Numerous philosophers accept the differentiation condition, according to which one does not see a... more Numerous philosophers accept the differentiation condition, according to which one does not see an object unless one visually differentiates it from its immediate surroundings. This paper, however, sounds a sceptical note. Based on suggestions by Dretske (2007) and Gibson (2002 [1972]), I articulate two 'principles of occlusion' and argue that each principle admits of a reading on which it is both plausible and incompatible with the differentiation condition. To resolve the inconsistency, I suggest we abandon the differentiation condition.
In a recent issue of the JHP, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation o... more In a recent issue of the JHP, Matt Bower argues forcefully against A. D. Smith's interpretation of Husserl as a disjunctivist. But I argue in this discussion note that the disjunctive reading of Husserl remains plausible. For it seems Husserl was committed to the idea that perceptions essentially have singular contents, while hallucinations do not.
In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, b... more In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, ‘the principles of occlusion are reversed’, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen’s arguments in support of those claims are flawed. After criticizing Sorensen’s arguments, I attempt to address a residual puzzle about backlit objects. The upshot of the paper is that cases of backlighting do have important philosophical lessons to teach us after all – lessons concerning the notion of perceptual occlusion.
There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve r... more There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and ‘conjunctivists’ (intentionalists), on the other. For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are to be located vis-à-vis this chasm. While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau-Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.
Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that ... more Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that reports. But the proposals they have made have one striking feature in common: they are demonstrably false. Going against the trend, I suggest we stop trying to lump together seeing-as and seeing-that. Instead, we need to realize that there is a deep logical kinship between seeing-as reports and seeing-objects reports.
Naive Realists have recently proposed that illusions occur in circumstances that are ‘non-paradig... more Naive Realists have recently proposed that illusions occur in circumstances that are ‘non-paradigmatic’ or with which we are insufficiently familiar. While this proposal may work for many of the illusions philosophers normally discuss, I argue in this paper that there are other illusions that do not fit this pattern. In particular, the vertical-horizontal illusion (VHI) occurs in circumstances that are both familiar and paradigmatic, while disappearing (or becoming attenuated) in more unusual circumstances.
“Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it re... more “Thinking through other minds,” or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it refers to something people do – for example, inferences they make about others’ expectations. On the other hand, it refers to a particular theoretical model of those things that people do. If the concept of TTOM is to have any future, this ambiguity must be redressed.
Perception seems like it puts us directly in touch with real things in our environment. But accor... more Perception seems like it puts us directly in touch with real things in our environment. But according to a popular view, perception actually does no such thing. Perceptual experiences are internally generated imagery, and we don’t see what is really out there. I call this view “the Hard-Nosed View,” and I argue that it is deeply problematic. In fact, the view is self-defeating: it undermines the very evidence supposed to establish or support the view. Indeed, if perceptual experiences are just internally generated images that generally don’t reflect what is really out there, the very notion of a scientific finding is put in jeopardy. So, the Hard-Nosed View had better be false.
In this chapter, I argue for two claims. First, creatures that cannot understand themselves as po... more In this chapter, I argue for two claims. First, creatures that cannot understand themselves as potentially moving or being moved cannot have visual experiences of three-dimensional, spatial objects “out there” in the world beyond their skin. Whilst we might be unable to detect an outright contradiction in the notion of creatures without such understanding enjoying perceptual experiences indiscriminable from ours, it is, as I will attempt to show in the first part of the chapter, highly doubtful whether we can make full sense of their experience as an experience of three-dimensional objects “out there” in space. Second, we should nevertheless not endorse what Noe terms an “enactive” account of perception. In other words, the idea that a creature cannot have visual experiences of three-dimensional objects without experiencing itself (or having experienced itself) as actively moving does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Keywords: perception; movement; perceptual presence; enactivism; Noe; Husserl
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