Professor Dr habil. Marcin Skladanowski, a researcher in the field of international security studies; a specialist in the field of the relationship between ideology, culture, and politics in the history of the Rus' and Russia and the present-day Russian Federation. He is the head of the Department of the University Strategy and Development at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and the director of the Doctoral School of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. He holds a PhD degree (2010) and habilitation (2014) in ecumenical theology (awarded by the Faculty of Theology of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin), and a PhD degree (2021) in social sciences, in the discipline of security studies, awarded by the War Studies University in Warsaw. In 2021 he was awarded the title of professor by the president of the Republic of Poland.
Since Vladimir Putin commenced his third presidential term in 2012, anti-Western and anti-Europea... more Since Vladimir Putin commenced his third presidential term in 2012, anti-Western and anti-European discourse has markedly intensified in both the Russian public sphere and the state-controlled media. Accusations levelled against the West and endeavours to underscore Russia's moral and cultural pre-eminence have escalated in concert with the burgeoning tensions in Russia’s relations with the West. This crescendo of official Russian anti-Western sentiment is manifest in the pronouncements of Putin and other government officials subsequent to the initiation of Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine. This article aims to elucidate how this formalised anti-Western narrative has permeated Russian strategic documents pertinent to the security and foreign policy of the Russian Federation. An examination of documents promulgated in successive phases of Russia’s escalating conflict with the West (Phase 1: 2007-2014; Phase 2: 2014-2022; Phase 3: post-24th February 2022) reveals that anti-Europeanism and anti-Westernism, concomitant with a historiosophical conception of Russia as a distinct civilisation, have transitioned from the realm of political discourse and propaganda to codification in documents that guide Russian security and foreign policy, thus constituting a salient ideological component therein.
This article analyses the recent Russian Orthodox discourse on the Solun Brothers. This analysis ... more This article analyses the recent Russian Orthodox discourse on the Solun Brothers. This analysis shows, on the one hand, that the politicised interpretation of the mission of Cyril and Methodius is not a recent ideological innovation, but appeals to the same motives that made their cult popular in 19th-century Russian Orthodoxy. On the other hand, the reinterpretation of the meaning of their mission that is currently taking place is acquiring additional political objectives harmonised with those of Russian state ideology, as well as cultural and foreign policy, especially in relation to the post-Soviet area. At the same time, however, the religious significance of Cyril and Methodius is almost disappearing from church discourse and theological reflection. A common element of Russian discourse on the Solun Brothers, in both the 19th and 21st centuries, is ahistoricity, understood as a complete disconnection from the actual historical context in which Cyril and Methodius lived and worked.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica, 2019
Rosyjskie działania propagandowe związane z konfliktem w Donbasie zmierzają do przedstawienia teg... more Rosyjskie działania propagandowe związane z konfliktem w Donbasie zmierzają do przedstawienia tego regionu w warstwie kulturowej, duchowej, aksjologicznej i religijnej jako nieodłącznej części tzw. ruskiego świata (русский мир), rozumianego jako rosyjska wspólnota cywilizacyjna. Ważnym elementem ideologicznej polityki Rosji względem Donbasu jest kształtowanie obrazu „ruskiego bohatera”. Przedstawiany artykuł poświęcony jest heroizacji i sakralizacji dwóch najgłośniejszych postaci związanych z konfliktem w Donbasie – Arsena Pawłowa („Motoroli”) oraz Michaiła Tołstycha („Giwiego”). Interesującym kontekstem ukazującym tło ideologiczne i konsekwencje heroizacji Pawłowa i Tołstycha są nacjonalistyczne poglądy Aleksandra Dugina, jednego z najbardziej znanych ideologów współczesnego rosyjskiego neoimperializmu. W artykule najpierw zarysowane są sylwetki obu postaci. W dalszej kolejności uwagę zwraca się na ideologiczny aspekt konfliktu w Donbasie, w który wpisuje się medialna kreacja Pawło...
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) presents itself as a defender of traditional Christian values. ... more The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) presents itself as a defender of traditional Christian values. Among these values, representatives of the ROC mention concern for marriage and family. To what extent is the position of the ROC an expression of commitment to the traditional Christian concept of marriage and family? In this article, we analyse the contemporary Orthodox discourse in Russia since Kirill Gundyayev became the Patriarch of Moscow in 2009. From a political science and security studies perspective, we highlight the main ideological elements of this discourse. We contrast these elements with similar content in Russian official documents and Vladimir Putin’s statements. An analysis of what the ROC says about the problems and protection of marriage and family in Russia, against the background of Putin’s statements and the actions of the state authorities, shows that the ROC’s discourse on marriage and family echoes the main themes of the political discourse controlled by the state authorities. In its understanding of marriage and in its efforts on behalf of the family, the ROC represents a conservative doctrinal position. Although, in doctrinal terms, it essentially expresses the traditional Christian teaching on marriage, the strong ideologisation and securitisation of demographic issues in Russia are also reflected in church discourse.
Artykuł rozpoczyna się krótką prezentacją najważniejszych momentów dziejowych chrześcijaństwa, kt... more Artykuł rozpoczyna się krótką prezentacją najważniejszych momentów dziejowych chrześcijaństwa, które ukształtowały dzisiejszą złożoną relację pomiędzy Kościołem, narodem i państwem. Następnie omawia główne kwestie związane z relacją pomiędzy Kościołem i wspólnotami narodowymi oraz pomiędzy Kościołem i państwem. Na zakończenie wskazuje implikacje różnych modeli relacji pomiędzy Kościołem, narodem i państwem dla dzisiejszego polskiego kontekstu społeczno-religijnego.
In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war... more In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, one can be surprised by the extent of support that President Putin enjoys in the Russian society. The author hypothesizes that this phenomenon cannot be explained with the help of political factors only. The article aims to demonstrate the ideological significance of Russian Orthodox tradition in the process of forming and reaffirming the Russian concept of state authority. After outlining the main issues related to the ideological legitimization of authority in Russia, two religiously rooted concepts are discussed: the "Third Rome" and "God-bearing." These concepts also explain why the Russian Orthodox Church has almost unequivocally supported Russia's military aggression against Ukraine.
In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war... more In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, one can be surprised by the extent of support that President Putin enjoys in Russian society. The author hypothesizes that this phenomenon cannot be explained with the help of political factors only. The article aims to demonstrate the ideological significance of Russian Orthodox tradition in the process of forming and reaffirming the Russian concept of state authority. After outlining the main issues related to the ideological legitimization of authority in Russia, two religiously rooted concepts are discussed: the "Third Rome" and "God-bearing." These concepts also explain why the Russian Orthodox Church has almost unequivocally supported Russia's military aggression against Ukraine.
The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless... more The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless, during Putin’s rule, a seemingly desecularising transition has taken place in Russia. This transition can be observed on legal, ideological, and social levels. This article presents the characteristics of a new secular-state model that has developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We claim that the evolution of the public role of religion in Russia and the state’s attitude towards religion cannot be considered in any way a symptom of the post-secularisation tendencies observed in some Western societies. Desecularisation in Russia takes place only at the verbal level. However, this façade desecularisation conceals a profound secularisation of religious institutions and organisations, understood as their total subordination to state policy objectives and, thus, their becoming elements of the state structure.
This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statemen... more This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statements by referring to selected examples characteristic of contemporary Russian identity politics. In order to demonstrate the importance of religious and mystical threads in Putin’s speeches, we chose five specific cases. The analysis of these statements indicates that religious and mystical motifs in Putin’s language are an attempt at self-creation for the purpose of domestic policy. We claim that this self-creation is more of an effort to strengthen Putin’s public support than proof that he borrows patterns for shaping Russia’s political life from the Russian religious and political tradition. Putin’s rhetoric is not so much a desire for an axiological renewal of Russian politics but an attempt to search for the new legitimization of the power system he created in confrontation with the West.
The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless... more The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless, during Putin’s rule, a seemingly desecularising transition has taken place in Russia. This transition can be observed on legal, ideological, and social levels. This article presents the characteristics of a new secular-state model that has developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We claim that the evolution of the public role of religion in Russia and the state’s attitude towards religion cannot be considered in any way a symptom of the post-secularisation tendencies observed in some Western societies. Desecularisation in Russia takes place only at the verbal level. However, this façade desecularisation conceals a profound secularisation of religious institutions and organisations, understood as their total subordination to state policy objectives and, thus, their becoming elements of the state structure.
This article compares the main aspects of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism with the content of two importa... more This article compares the main aspects of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism with the content of two important texts published in 2021: Putin's article 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians' and the new National Security Strategy. These texts can be understood as part of ideological preparations for the war against Ukraine in 2022. The presence of elements of Russian nationalist ideology in these texts will make it possible to answer the question of whether the neo-Eurasian ideology is the authentic basis of Russian neo-imperialist policy or whether it is merely a useful propaganda façade.
This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statemen... more This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statements by referring to selected examples characteristic of contemporary Russian identity politics. In order to demonstrate the importance of religious and mystical threads in Putin’s speeches, we chose five specific cases. The analysis of these statements indicates that religious and mystical motifs in Putin’s language are an attempt at self-creation for the purpose of domestic policy. We claim that this self-creation is more of an effort to strengthen Putin’s public support than proof that he borrows patterns for shaping Russia’s political life from the Russian religious and political tradition. Putin’s rhetoric is not so much a desire for an axiological renewal of Russian politics but an attempt to search for the new legitimization of the power system he created in confrontation with the West.
The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has gained, after the fall of the Soviet U... more The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has gained, after the fall of the Soviet Union, an exceptional position in the social and political life of the Russian Federation, which it had never occupied before. Formally, it is separate from the state. The Constitution of the Russian Federation in article 14 guarantees state ideological neutrality and acknowledges the separation of State and Church. At the same time, the Church representatives themselves, such as Patriarch Kirill (Gundyayev), consider this separation beneficial to the Church’s activity. Both the Patriarch and the representatives of Church hierarchy emphasise the religious and cultural role of the Church in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The Church’s purpose is, on the one hand, to restore religious life that was destroyed in the Soviet period and, on the other hand, to promote traditional values that form the foundation of Russian identity. In the extra-religious dimension, these values are supposed to ensure the stability of Russian society as well as its ability to oppose foreign (mostly Western) cultural, political, and religious influences. The article deals with the concept of ‘traditional values’ (traditsionnyye tsennosti) and ‘spiritual bonds’ (dukhovnyye skrepy) as a unifying factor for contemporary Russian society. According to Patriarch Kirill, the Russian Orthodox Church can propose an axiological system based on Christian beliefs, especially on the Orthodox concept of the human person and the human community. This system should become a foundation of social unity and peace as well as a factor which strengthens Russian national identity.
Demystifying the Sacred: Blasphemy and Violence from the French Revolution to Today, 2022
In the process of analysing the phenomenon of blasphemy in Russian public life, one encounters th... more In the process of analysing the phenomenon of blasphemy in Russian public life, one encounters the problem of anti-church protests being generally political. However, in recent years Russia has witnessed a protest which had the character of simple blasphemy and which was devoid of any political context. This chapter will analyse the context and consequences of Ruslan Sokolovskiy’s performance – an individual who was accused in 2016 of offending the feelings of religious believers after he had searched for Pokémon in the church na Krovi (‘on Blood’) in Yekaterinburg. Sokolovskiy aimed to check whether the game played in the church would result in legal consequences. The video made by Sokolovskiy during the performance and broadcast on YouTube also contained clear blasphemous elements, such as calling Jesus a “rare Pokémon.” In his public statements after the release of the video, Sokolovskiy portrayed his performance as openly anti-church and anti-religious. In 2017 Sokolovskiy was found guilty and sentenced to three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. Additionally, he was ordered to remove all the videos offending the feelings of religious believers. Sokolovskiy’s case will serve as an example to analyse the issue of offending the feelings of religious believers in the contemporary Russian Federation: the existing legislation, its flexible interpretation, selective and strongly politically determined implementation, as well as its role in shaping the image of the Orthodox church in Russian society.
Since Vladimir Putin commenced his third presidential term in 2012, anti-Western and anti-Europea... more Since Vladimir Putin commenced his third presidential term in 2012, anti-Western and anti-European discourse has markedly intensified in both the Russian public sphere and the state-controlled media. Accusations levelled against the West and endeavours to underscore Russia's moral and cultural pre-eminence have escalated in concert with the burgeoning tensions in Russia’s relations with the West. This crescendo of official Russian anti-Western sentiment is manifest in the pronouncements of Putin and other government officials subsequent to the initiation of Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine. This article aims to elucidate how this formalised anti-Western narrative has permeated Russian strategic documents pertinent to the security and foreign policy of the Russian Federation. An examination of documents promulgated in successive phases of Russia’s escalating conflict with the West (Phase 1: 2007-2014; Phase 2: 2014-2022; Phase 3: post-24th February 2022) reveals that anti-Europeanism and anti-Westernism, concomitant with a historiosophical conception of Russia as a distinct civilisation, have transitioned from the realm of political discourse and propaganda to codification in documents that guide Russian security and foreign policy, thus constituting a salient ideological component therein.
This article analyses the recent Russian Orthodox discourse on the Solun Brothers. This analysis ... more This article analyses the recent Russian Orthodox discourse on the Solun Brothers. This analysis shows, on the one hand, that the politicised interpretation of the mission of Cyril and Methodius is not a recent ideological innovation, but appeals to the same motives that made their cult popular in 19th-century Russian Orthodoxy. On the other hand, the reinterpretation of the meaning of their mission that is currently taking place is acquiring additional political objectives harmonised with those of Russian state ideology, as well as cultural and foreign policy, especially in relation to the post-Soviet area. At the same time, however, the religious significance of Cyril and Methodius is almost disappearing from church discourse and theological reflection. A common element of Russian discourse on the Solun Brothers, in both the 19th and 21st centuries, is ahistoricity, understood as a complete disconnection from the actual historical context in which Cyril and Methodius lived and worked.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica, 2019
Rosyjskie działania propagandowe związane z konfliktem w Donbasie zmierzają do przedstawienia teg... more Rosyjskie działania propagandowe związane z konfliktem w Donbasie zmierzają do przedstawienia tego regionu w warstwie kulturowej, duchowej, aksjologicznej i religijnej jako nieodłącznej części tzw. ruskiego świata (русский мир), rozumianego jako rosyjska wspólnota cywilizacyjna. Ważnym elementem ideologicznej polityki Rosji względem Donbasu jest kształtowanie obrazu „ruskiego bohatera”. Przedstawiany artykuł poświęcony jest heroizacji i sakralizacji dwóch najgłośniejszych postaci związanych z konfliktem w Donbasie – Arsena Pawłowa („Motoroli”) oraz Michaiła Tołstycha („Giwiego”). Interesującym kontekstem ukazującym tło ideologiczne i konsekwencje heroizacji Pawłowa i Tołstycha są nacjonalistyczne poglądy Aleksandra Dugina, jednego z najbardziej znanych ideologów współczesnego rosyjskiego neoimperializmu. W artykule najpierw zarysowane są sylwetki obu postaci. W dalszej kolejności uwagę zwraca się na ideologiczny aspekt konfliktu w Donbasie, w który wpisuje się medialna kreacja Pawło...
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) presents itself as a defender of traditional Christian values. ... more The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) presents itself as a defender of traditional Christian values. Among these values, representatives of the ROC mention concern for marriage and family. To what extent is the position of the ROC an expression of commitment to the traditional Christian concept of marriage and family? In this article, we analyse the contemporary Orthodox discourse in Russia since Kirill Gundyayev became the Patriarch of Moscow in 2009. From a political science and security studies perspective, we highlight the main ideological elements of this discourse. We contrast these elements with similar content in Russian official documents and Vladimir Putin’s statements. An analysis of what the ROC says about the problems and protection of marriage and family in Russia, against the background of Putin’s statements and the actions of the state authorities, shows that the ROC’s discourse on marriage and family echoes the main themes of the political discourse controlled by the state authorities. In its understanding of marriage and in its efforts on behalf of the family, the ROC represents a conservative doctrinal position. Although, in doctrinal terms, it essentially expresses the traditional Christian teaching on marriage, the strong ideologisation and securitisation of demographic issues in Russia are also reflected in church discourse.
Artykuł rozpoczyna się krótką prezentacją najważniejszych momentów dziejowych chrześcijaństwa, kt... more Artykuł rozpoczyna się krótką prezentacją najważniejszych momentów dziejowych chrześcijaństwa, które ukształtowały dzisiejszą złożoną relację pomiędzy Kościołem, narodem i państwem. Następnie omawia główne kwestie związane z relacją pomiędzy Kościołem i wspólnotami narodowymi oraz pomiędzy Kościołem i państwem. Na zakończenie wskazuje implikacje różnych modeli relacji pomiędzy Kościołem, narodem i państwem dla dzisiejszego polskiego kontekstu społeczno-religijnego.
In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war... more In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, one can be surprised by the extent of support that President Putin enjoys in the Russian society. The author hypothesizes that this phenomenon cannot be explained with the help of political factors only. The article aims to demonstrate the ideological significance of Russian Orthodox tradition in the process of forming and reaffirming the Russian concept of state authority. After outlining the main issues related to the ideological legitimization of authority in Russia, two religiously rooted concepts are discussed: the "Third Rome" and "God-bearing." These concepts also explain why the Russian Orthodox Church has almost unequivocally supported Russia's military aggression against Ukraine.
In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war... more In the context of Russia's confrontation with the West, especially after the beginning of the war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, one can be surprised by the extent of support that President Putin enjoys in Russian society. The author hypothesizes that this phenomenon cannot be explained with the help of political factors only. The article aims to demonstrate the ideological significance of Russian Orthodox tradition in the process of forming and reaffirming the Russian concept of state authority. After outlining the main issues related to the ideological legitimization of authority in Russia, two religiously rooted concepts are discussed: the "Third Rome" and "God-bearing." These concepts also explain why the Russian Orthodox Church has almost unequivocally supported Russia's military aggression against Ukraine.
The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless... more The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless, during Putin’s rule, a seemingly desecularising transition has taken place in Russia. This transition can be observed on legal, ideological, and social levels. This article presents the characteristics of a new secular-state model that has developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We claim that the evolution of the public role of religion in Russia and the state’s attitude towards religion cannot be considered in any way a symptom of the post-secularisation tendencies observed in some Western societies. Desecularisation in Russia takes place only at the verbal level. However, this façade desecularisation conceals a profound secularisation of religious institutions and organisations, understood as their total subordination to state policy objectives and, thus, their becoming elements of the state structure.
This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statemen... more This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statements by referring to selected examples characteristic of contemporary Russian identity politics. In order to demonstrate the importance of religious and mystical threads in Putin’s speeches, we chose five specific cases. The analysis of these statements indicates that religious and mystical motifs in Putin’s language are an attempt at self-creation for the purpose of domestic policy. We claim that this self-creation is more of an effort to strengthen Putin’s public support than proof that he borrows patterns for shaping Russia’s political life from the Russian religious and political tradition. Putin’s rhetoric is not so much a desire for an axiological renewal of Russian politics but an attempt to search for the new legitimization of the power system he created in confrontation with the West.
The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless... more The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless, during Putin’s rule, a seemingly desecularising transition has taken place in Russia. This transition can be observed on legal, ideological, and social levels. This article presents the characteristics of a new secular-state model that has developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We claim that the evolution of the public role of religion in Russia and the state’s attitude towards religion cannot be considered in any way a symptom of the post-secularisation tendencies observed in some Western societies. Desecularisation in Russia takes place only at the verbal level. However, this façade desecularisation conceals a profound secularisation of religious institutions and organisations, understood as their total subordination to state policy objectives and, thus, their becoming elements of the state structure.
This article compares the main aspects of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism with the content of two importa... more This article compares the main aspects of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism with the content of two important texts published in 2021: Putin's article 'On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians' and the new National Security Strategy. These texts can be understood as part of ideological preparations for the war against Ukraine in 2022. The presence of elements of Russian nationalist ideology in these texts will make it possible to answer the question of whether the neo-Eurasian ideology is the authentic basis of Russian neo-imperialist policy or whether it is merely a useful propaganda façade.
This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statemen... more This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statements by referring to selected examples characteristic of contemporary Russian identity politics. In order to demonstrate the importance of religious and mystical threads in Putin’s speeches, we chose five specific cases. The analysis of these statements indicates that religious and mystical motifs in Putin’s language are an attempt at self-creation for the purpose of domestic policy. We claim that this self-creation is more of an effort to strengthen Putin’s public support than proof that he borrows patterns for shaping Russia’s political life from the Russian religious and political tradition. Putin’s rhetoric is not so much a desire for an axiological renewal of Russian politics but an attempt to search for the new legitimization of the power system he created in confrontation with the West.
The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has gained, after the fall of the Soviet U... more The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has gained, after the fall of the Soviet Union, an exceptional position in the social and political life of the Russian Federation, which it had never occupied before. Formally, it is separate from the state. The Constitution of the Russian Federation in article 14 guarantees state ideological neutrality and acknowledges the separation of State and Church. At the same time, the Church representatives themselves, such as Patriarch Kirill (Gundyayev), consider this separation beneficial to the Church’s activity. Both the Patriarch and the representatives of Church hierarchy emphasise the religious and cultural role of the Church in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The Church’s purpose is, on the one hand, to restore religious life that was destroyed in the Soviet period and, on the other hand, to promote traditional values that form the foundation of Russian identity. In the extra-religious dimension, these values are supposed to ensure the stability of Russian society as well as its ability to oppose foreign (mostly Western) cultural, political, and religious influences. The article deals with the concept of ‘traditional values’ (traditsionnyye tsennosti) and ‘spiritual bonds’ (dukhovnyye skrepy) as a unifying factor for contemporary Russian society. According to Patriarch Kirill, the Russian Orthodox Church can propose an axiological system based on Christian beliefs, especially on the Orthodox concept of the human person and the human community. This system should become a foundation of social unity and peace as well as a factor which strengthens Russian national identity.
Demystifying the Sacred: Blasphemy and Violence from the French Revolution to Today, 2022
In the process of analysing the phenomenon of blasphemy in Russian public life, one encounters th... more In the process of analysing the phenomenon of blasphemy in Russian public life, one encounters the problem of anti-church protests being generally political. However, in recent years Russia has witnessed a protest which had the character of simple blasphemy and which was devoid of any political context. This chapter will analyse the context and consequences of Ruslan Sokolovskiy’s performance – an individual who was accused in 2016 of offending the feelings of religious believers after he had searched for Pokémon in the church na Krovi (‘on Blood’) in Yekaterinburg. Sokolovskiy aimed to check whether the game played in the church would result in legal consequences. The video made by Sokolovskiy during the performance and broadcast on YouTube also contained clear blasphemous elements, such as calling Jesus a “rare Pokémon.” In his public statements after the release of the video, Sokolovskiy portrayed his performance as openly anti-church and anti-religious. In 2017 Sokolovskiy was found guilty and sentenced to three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. Additionally, he was ordered to remove all the videos offending the feelings of religious believers. Sokolovskiy’s case will serve as an example to analyse the issue of offending the feelings of religious believers in the contemporary Russian Federation: the existing legislation, its flexible interpretation, selective and strongly politically determined implementation, as well as its role in shaping the image of the Orthodox church in Russian society.
Aleksandr Dugin is an extremely radical thinker. Nevertheless, it is worth dealing with his thoug... more Aleksandr Dugin is an extremely radical thinker. Nevertheless, it is worth dealing with his thought because it shows in an exaggerated form how the evolution of social and political ideas took place in the history of Russia, which led to Putin's contemporary neo-imperialism. This book presents the Russian discourse on national security against a broader background of global academic reflection, takes a closer look at the sources and ideological basis of the concept of Russia’s security developed by Dugin, discusses the subject and main dimensions of Russia’s national security in Dugin’s works, and shows the importance of Russia’s foreign policy for the creation of its national security. The author presents Dugin’s idea of Russia as a key element of a new, multi-polar world order and a guarantor of international security.
Demystifying the Sacred: Blasphemy and Violence from the French Revolution to Today offers a much... more Demystifying the Sacred: Blasphemy and Violence from the French Revolution to Today offers a much-needed analysis of a subject that historians have largely ignored, yet that has considerable relevance for today’s world: the powerful connection that exists between offences against the sacred and different forms of violence. Drawing on cases from revolutionary France to the Russia of Vladimir Putin, the international authors probe the nature and agency of local blasphemy accusations, the historical and legal framework in which they were expressed and the violence, both physical and symbolic, accompanying them. In doing so, the volume reveals how cultures of blasphemy, and related acts of heresy, apostasy and sacrilege, were a companion to or acted as a trigger for physical action but also a form of how violence was experienced. More generally, it shows the importance of religious sensibilities in modern society and the violent potential contained in criticism or ridicule of the sacred and secular alike.
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