From Husserl’s early critique of psychologism in the Prolegomena, to his criticism of both natura... more From Husserl’s early critique of psychologism in the Prolegomena, to his criticism of both naturalism and historicism in the Logos article, and his later diagnosis of the inner fragmentation of science and philosophy in the Crisis, phenomenology has confronted diverse forms of relativism and skepticism. As one strategy for facing this challenge, Husserl elaborated a phenomenology of reason embracing the theoretical sphere of being and truth, the axiological sphere of value and genuine evaluation, and the practical sphere of authentic ethical action. He thereby placed the rational ideals of autonomy and self-responsibility at the heart of his project of philosophy as a rigorous science. Moreover, he advanced investigations of social and cultural realities by developing a phenomenological science of what is often considered ‘merely’ relative: Culture, history, and community. For the 2023 Husserl-Arbeitstage, the Husserl-Archives Leuven are inviting contributions concerning “Reason and Relativity”. Papers on a wide range of thematic issues are welcome, including, but not limited to, experience and rational justification, moral and epistemic responsibility, normativity and rationality, cultural relativism and scientific universalism, essentialism and marginalization, scientific and philosophical thinking, foundations of social science, etc.
Please send a two-page abstract or full paper before December 11th, 2022 to husserl2023@kuleuven.be. All submissions should be anonymized. Notifications of acceptance will be issued on December 20th, 2022. The conference will be held in English.
BACK TO THE PAST ITSELF.
Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics
(PART I... more BACK TO THE PAST ITSELF. Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics (PART I)
We are pleased to announce the upcoming two-day workshop organized by KU Leuven and the University of Lille.
The workshop will take place in Leuven on Friday 25th and Saturday 26th of March and is part of the international project ‘Back to the Past Itself. Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics’ funded by the 3i Cross-border Collaborations grant (Foundation I-SITE ULNE).
The event in Leuven will be held in person (no registration is needed) and followed by a second two-day workshop that will take place at the University of Lille on Friday 24th and Saturday 25th of June.
Ever since its inaugural impulse in Brentano’s thinking, phenomenological philosophy has time and... more Ever since its inaugural impulse in Brentano’s thinking, phenomenological philosophy has time and again been reborn of an essential confrontation with Aristotle and Aristotelianism. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the development of phenomenological philosophy through its key figures—Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Patočka, and others—has sought to measure itself, its distance as well as proximity, in relation to the legacy of Aristotle’s thinking. This presence of Aristotle and Aristotelianism within phenomenological thought has taken different forms, with various thematic orientations (the body, time, language, metaphysics, etc.) and methods of engagement. Yet, an elemental form of this relationship is an incessant movement of departure and return, or searching. The history of phenomenological thought is as emphatically a departure from Aristotle (“metaphysics of presence,” “ontology of substance,” “logical prejudice,” etc.) as it is an emphatic return to the phenomenological yield of Aristotle’s thinking.
This conference is organized in the broader context of the celebration of the 2,400 years anniversary “Aristotle Today.” Under the auspices of the Center for Historical Ontology (Heidelberg – Helsinki – Leuven), 13 conferences on different aspects of Aristotle’s thinking and its reception were organized in 2016 (for a full list: www.c-h-o.eu) in major European universities (and in the USA).
The conference will held on December 12-14 in the Huis Bethlehem (Auditorium Wolfspoort), Schapenstraat 34, Leuven, 3000 Belgium.
Open workshop on Aristotle, Time, and Phenomenology organized by the KU Leuven's De Wulf-Mansion ... more Open workshop on Aristotle, Time, and Phenomenology organized by the KU Leuven's De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy and the Husserl-Archives Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy. The workshop will be be held on Friday, December 9th in Raadzaal (HIW), Leuven, 3000 Belgium, from 1 to 4 pm.
This article reconstructs and defends Husserl’s argument for the indubitability of the existence ... more This article reconstructs and defends Husserl’s argument for the indubitability of the existence of the world as grounded in ultimate principles. Responding to criticisms about the feasibility of a Husserlian-informed metaphysical cosmology, it offers a systematic account that explores the question of the world’s existence at three distinct levels (factual-empirical, eidetic, and transcendental), leading to a threefold characterisation of the world. First, the obviousness of the world’s existence serves as our point of departure. The analysis then moves from a conception of the world as (i) an ontic factum and pre-given ground of all theoretical and practical endeavours in the natural attitude, to a priori ontological considerations of (ii) the essence ‘world in general.’ However, the insufficiency of both factual-empirical and a priori investigations necessitates a further displacement of the analysis into the transcendental field of pure phenomena. In accordance with the fundamental principle of synthesis, the world is thus reconceived of as (iii) a phenomenological factum. In this context, the clarification of the existence of the world as both an irrational and a ‘rational’ fact provides all the elements necessary to demonstrate the relative apodicticity and empirical indubitability of the world. This justifies our doxic certainty of the world’s existence.
This article offers the first phenomenological clarification of the objective conditions for sens... more This article offers the first phenomenological clarification of the objective conditions for sensory illusions focusing on the noematic 'idea' and a priori ontological structure that regulate the appearances of illusory things in perception. First, I will show the necessity of eidetic and noematically oriented investigations, arguing that it is an analysis of how the essence 'Thinghood' functions transcendentally that leads to an a priori clarification of both illusory things and their corresponding multiplicities of appearances. Accordingly, I will consider the correlate of material perception according to both its formal and material ontological structures and focus on the a priori principle of coordination and the laws of mutability and reversibility that set the framework for an analysis a parte obiecti. I will then examine the process of typification, the psycho-physical conditionality of the lived-body, and the constitution of different levels of normality and abnormality. Within this expanded analysis, I will provide a clarification of 'false' sensory appearances showing how both deceptive and resilient illusory cases can be scientifically accounted for on a phenomenological basis and in accordance with natural-empirical laws.
There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The prob... more There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The problem of hallucination has de facto generated contrasting accounts of perception, led to opposing epistemic and metaphysical positions, and, most significantly, exposed a manifold of diverging views concerning the intentionality of experience, in general, and perceptual intentionality, in particular. In this article, I aim to clarify the controversial status, experiential possibility, and intentional structure of hallucination qua distinctive phenomenon. The analysis will first detect a phenomenological, Husserlian-informed concept of hallucination in its irreducibility to other kinds and modes of sensory experience. This will set the theoretical basis to develop an account of hallucination by means of a morphological description of those diversified structures of intentional consciousness that lend themselves to generate hallucinatory appearances. I will then describe both the turning of certain kinds of intentional experience into hallucinatory perceptions and the status of hallucinatory objects. This will support the possibility of hallucination in a strict and rigorous sense, elucidate the enigmatic claim that ‘in hallucination we are conscious of something while nothing truly appears,’ and offer a seminal perspective concerning the alleged problem that hallucinations pose on perceptual intentionality. With the aid of some crucial distinctions, I will then argue that hallucinations do not affect perceptual intentionality as a dyadic, relational structure.
Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussi... more Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a 'phenomenology of sense-deception.' On the other hand, it has generated contrasting-if not utterly incompatible-readings of Husserl's own account of sense perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl's reflection on sensory perception, and highlights the philosophical limits and structural deficiencies of the current debate in light of some of Husserl's insights. The analysis first provides a synopsis of the argumentative structures, aims, and assumptions informing the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. This assessment is then critically elaborated through the lens of Husserlian phenome-nology in its historical and theoretical distance from the recent debate. Contrary to certain readings of Husserl, the reconstruction of some cardinal phenomenological themes provides all the elements necessary to dislocate his own account from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism dispute, by means of both a 'global' and a 'local' analysis, and both exegetically and theoretically. Most importantly, a 'return' to Husserl shows the philosophical untenability of the whole controversy as not only leaving untouched the core problem of perception but also altering some of its essential traits. This critique of the image of experience portrayed in the contemporary discussion is conducted through a phenomenological clarification of perception as a distinct 'structure of rules' of consciousness and, more specifically, by means of a descriptive analysis centered on the core notion of horizonal-intentionality.
The present study seeks to accomplish three goals: to shed light on the problem of reason in Huss... more The present study seeks to accomplish three goals: to shed light on the problem of reason in Husserl's co-inherited philosophical project, to elucidate his transcendental critique of reason, and to present Husserl's idea of reason in its distinctive features. A historical excursus first provides a frame to understand the necessity of a critique of reason, its proper subject-matter, and its function for the project of genuine philosophy. In particular, this historical reflection identifies the form that a critique must assume in order to fulfil its philosophical-scientific task. The focus is then directed at Husserl's methodological recalibration of the problem of reason. Husserl's 'prinzipielle Kritik' is elucidated in his transcendental reas-sessment of the headings 'reason' and 'unreason,' and is thought in connection to the concept of Selbstbesinnung. Lastly, Husserl's idea of reason is reconstructed in relation to, and in disambiguation from, the concepts of self-evidence, logos, synthesis, fulfilment, positing, etc. Reason, as teleological rule and structural form of transcendental subjectivity, is clarified in its dependence on, and irreducibility to, the problems of constitution and in light of the question of its objective/subjective character.
The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucinati... more The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucination and disclose the significance of sense-deception in Husserl’s phenomenology. By clarifying the relation between the “leibhaftige presence” and “existence” of perceived objects, I shall be able to contend that illusion and hallucination are nullified, invalid perceptions. Non-existence or in-actuality is a form of invalidity: the Ungültigkeit of what demands its insertion in the totality of actual existence. Husserl elaborates an ex-negativo account of in-actuality, in which sensory deception refers to a modal modification, which is always relative and contextual in relation to the total nexus of experience in its intersubjectively validated and harmonious unfolding.
Various attempts have been recently made to project Husserl into the contemporary analytic discus... more Various attempts have been recently made to project Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a ‘phenomenology of sense-deception.’ On the other hand, it has generated contrasting—if not utterly incompatible—readings of Husserl’s own account of outer perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl’s reflection on sensory perception, and suggests important corrections to the current debate in light of some of Husserl’s insights. The analysis first provides a synopsis of the argumentative structures, aims, and assumptions informing the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. This assessment is then critically elaborated through the lens of Husserlian phenomenology in its historical and theoretical distance from the recent debate. Contrary to certain readings of Husserl, the reconstruction of some cardinal phenomenological themes provides all the elements necessary to dislocate his own account from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism dispute, by means of both a ‘global’ and a ‘local’ analysis, and both exegetically and theoretically. Most importantly, a ‘return’ to Husserl shows the philosophical untenability of the whole controversy as both leaving untouched the core problem of perception and altering some of its essential traits. This critique of the image of experience portrayed in the contemporary discussion is conducted through a phenomenological clarification of perception as a distinct ‘structure of rules’ of consciousness and, more specifically, by means of a descriptive analysis centered on the core notion of horizonal-intentionality.
From Husserl’s early critique of psychologism in the Prolegomena, to his criticism of both natura... more From Husserl’s early critique of psychologism in the Prolegomena, to his criticism of both naturalism and historicism in the Logos article, and his later diagnosis of the inner fragmentation of science and philosophy in the Crisis, phenomenology has confronted diverse forms of relativism and skepticism. As one strategy for facing this challenge, Husserl elaborated a phenomenology of reason embracing the theoretical sphere of being and truth, the axiological sphere of value and genuine evaluation, and the practical sphere of authentic ethical action. He thereby placed the rational ideals of autonomy and self-responsibility at the heart of his project of philosophy as a rigorous science. Moreover, he advanced investigations of social and cultural realities by developing a phenomenological science of what is often considered ‘merely’ relative: Culture, history, and community. For the 2023 Husserl-Arbeitstage, the Husserl-Archives Leuven are inviting contributions concerning “Reason and Relativity”. Papers on a wide range of thematic issues are welcome, including, but not limited to, experience and rational justification, moral and epistemic responsibility, normativity and rationality, cultural relativism and scientific universalism, essentialism and marginalization, scientific and philosophical thinking, foundations of social science, etc.
Please send a two-page abstract or full paper before December 11th, 2022 to husserl2023@kuleuven.be. All submissions should be anonymized. Notifications of acceptance will be issued on December 20th, 2022. The conference will be held in English.
BACK TO THE PAST ITSELF.
Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics
(PART I... more BACK TO THE PAST ITSELF. Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics (PART I)
We are pleased to announce the upcoming two-day workshop organized by KU Leuven and the University of Lille.
The workshop will take place in Leuven on Friday 25th and Saturday 26th of March and is part of the international project ‘Back to the Past Itself. Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics’ funded by the 3i Cross-border Collaborations grant (Foundation I-SITE ULNE).
The event in Leuven will be held in person (no registration is needed) and followed by a second two-day workshop that will take place at the University of Lille on Friday 24th and Saturday 25th of June.
Ever since its inaugural impulse in Brentano’s thinking, phenomenological philosophy has time and... more Ever since its inaugural impulse in Brentano’s thinking, phenomenological philosophy has time and again been reborn of an essential confrontation with Aristotle and Aristotelianism. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the development of phenomenological philosophy through its key figures—Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Patočka, and others—has sought to measure itself, its distance as well as proximity, in relation to the legacy of Aristotle’s thinking. This presence of Aristotle and Aristotelianism within phenomenological thought has taken different forms, with various thematic orientations (the body, time, language, metaphysics, etc.) and methods of engagement. Yet, an elemental form of this relationship is an incessant movement of departure and return, or searching. The history of phenomenological thought is as emphatically a departure from Aristotle (“metaphysics of presence,” “ontology of substance,” “logical prejudice,” etc.) as it is an emphatic return to the phenomenological yield of Aristotle’s thinking.
This conference is organized in the broader context of the celebration of the 2,400 years anniversary “Aristotle Today.” Under the auspices of the Center for Historical Ontology (Heidelberg – Helsinki – Leuven), 13 conferences on different aspects of Aristotle’s thinking and its reception were organized in 2016 (for a full list: www.c-h-o.eu) in major European universities (and in the USA).
The conference will held on December 12-14 in the Huis Bethlehem (Auditorium Wolfspoort), Schapenstraat 34, Leuven, 3000 Belgium.
Open workshop on Aristotle, Time, and Phenomenology organized by the KU Leuven's De Wulf-Mansion ... more Open workshop on Aristotle, Time, and Phenomenology organized by the KU Leuven's De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy and the Husserl-Archives Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy. The workshop will be be held on Friday, December 9th in Raadzaal (HIW), Leuven, 3000 Belgium, from 1 to 4 pm.
This article reconstructs and defends Husserl’s argument for the indubitability of the existence ... more This article reconstructs and defends Husserl’s argument for the indubitability of the existence of the world as grounded in ultimate principles. Responding to criticisms about the feasibility of a Husserlian-informed metaphysical cosmology, it offers a systematic account that explores the question of the world’s existence at three distinct levels (factual-empirical, eidetic, and transcendental), leading to a threefold characterisation of the world. First, the obviousness of the world’s existence serves as our point of departure. The analysis then moves from a conception of the world as (i) an ontic factum and pre-given ground of all theoretical and practical endeavours in the natural attitude, to a priori ontological considerations of (ii) the essence ‘world in general.’ However, the insufficiency of both factual-empirical and a priori investigations necessitates a further displacement of the analysis into the transcendental field of pure phenomena. In accordance with the fundamental principle of synthesis, the world is thus reconceived of as (iii) a phenomenological factum. In this context, the clarification of the existence of the world as both an irrational and a ‘rational’ fact provides all the elements necessary to demonstrate the relative apodicticity and empirical indubitability of the world. This justifies our doxic certainty of the world’s existence.
This article offers the first phenomenological clarification of the objective conditions for sens... more This article offers the first phenomenological clarification of the objective conditions for sensory illusions focusing on the noematic 'idea' and a priori ontological structure that regulate the appearances of illusory things in perception. First, I will show the necessity of eidetic and noematically oriented investigations, arguing that it is an analysis of how the essence 'Thinghood' functions transcendentally that leads to an a priori clarification of both illusory things and their corresponding multiplicities of appearances. Accordingly, I will consider the correlate of material perception according to both its formal and material ontological structures and focus on the a priori principle of coordination and the laws of mutability and reversibility that set the framework for an analysis a parte obiecti. I will then examine the process of typification, the psycho-physical conditionality of the lived-body, and the constitution of different levels of normality and abnormality. Within this expanded analysis, I will provide a clarification of 'false' sensory appearances showing how both deceptive and resilient illusory cases can be scientifically accounted for on a phenomenological basis and in accordance with natural-empirical laws.
There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The prob... more There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The problem of hallucination has de facto generated contrasting accounts of perception, led to opposing epistemic and metaphysical positions, and, most significantly, exposed a manifold of diverging views concerning the intentionality of experience, in general, and perceptual intentionality, in particular. In this article, I aim to clarify the controversial status, experiential possibility, and intentional structure of hallucination qua distinctive phenomenon. The analysis will first detect a phenomenological, Husserlian-informed concept of hallucination in its irreducibility to other kinds and modes of sensory experience. This will set the theoretical basis to develop an account of hallucination by means of a morphological description of those diversified structures of intentional consciousness that lend themselves to generate hallucinatory appearances. I will then describe both the turning of certain kinds of intentional experience into hallucinatory perceptions and the status of hallucinatory objects. This will support the possibility of hallucination in a strict and rigorous sense, elucidate the enigmatic claim that ‘in hallucination we are conscious of something while nothing truly appears,’ and offer a seminal perspective concerning the alleged problem that hallucinations pose on perceptual intentionality. With the aid of some crucial distinctions, I will then argue that hallucinations do not affect perceptual intentionality as a dyadic, relational structure.
Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussi... more Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a 'phenomenology of sense-deception.' On the other hand, it has generated contrasting-if not utterly incompatible-readings of Husserl's own account of sense perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl's reflection on sensory perception, and highlights the philosophical limits and structural deficiencies of the current debate in light of some of Husserl's insights. The analysis first provides a synopsis of the argumentative structures, aims, and assumptions informing the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. This assessment is then critically elaborated through the lens of Husserlian phenome-nology in its historical and theoretical distance from the recent debate. Contrary to certain readings of Husserl, the reconstruction of some cardinal phenomenological themes provides all the elements necessary to dislocate his own account from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism dispute, by means of both a 'global' and a 'local' analysis, and both exegetically and theoretically. Most importantly, a 'return' to Husserl shows the philosophical untenability of the whole controversy as not only leaving untouched the core problem of perception but also altering some of its essential traits. This critique of the image of experience portrayed in the contemporary discussion is conducted through a phenomenological clarification of perception as a distinct 'structure of rules' of consciousness and, more specifically, by means of a descriptive analysis centered on the core notion of horizonal-intentionality.
The present study seeks to accomplish three goals: to shed light on the problem of reason in Huss... more The present study seeks to accomplish three goals: to shed light on the problem of reason in Husserl's co-inherited philosophical project, to elucidate his transcendental critique of reason, and to present Husserl's idea of reason in its distinctive features. A historical excursus first provides a frame to understand the necessity of a critique of reason, its proper subject-matter, and its function for the project of genuine philosophy. In particular, this historical reflection identifies the form that a critique must assume in order to fulfil its philosophical-scientific task. The focus is then directed at Husserl's methodological recalibration of the problem of reason. Husserl's 'prinzipielle Kritik' is elucidated in his transcendental reas-sessment of the headings 'reason' and 'unreason,' and is thought in connection to the concept of Selbstbesinnung. Lastly, Husserl's idea of reason is reconstructed in relation to, and in disambiguation from, the concepts of self-evidence, logos, synthesis, fulfilment, positing, etc. Reason, as teleological rule and structural form of transcendental subjectivity, is clarified in its dependence on, and irreducibility to, the problems of constitution and in light of the question of its objective/subjective character.
The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucinati... more The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucination and disclose the significance of sense-deception in Husserl’s phenomenology. By clarifying the relation between the “leibhaftige presence” and “existence” of perceived objects, I shall be able to contend that illusion and hallucination are nullified, invalid perceptions. Non-existence or in-actuality is a form of invalidity: the Ungültigkeit of what demands its insertion in the totality of actual existence. Husserl elaborates an ex-negativo account of in-actuality, in which sensory deception refers to a modal modification, which is always relative and contextual in relation to the total nexus of experience in its intersubjectively validated and harmonious unfolding.
Various attempts have been recently made to project Husserl into the contemporary analytic discus... more Various attempts have been recently made to project Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a ‘phenomenology of sense-deception.’ On the other hand, it has generated contrasting—if not utterly incompatible—readings of Husserl’s own account of outer perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl’s reflection on sensory perception, and suggests important corrections to the current debate in light of some of Husserl’s insights. The analysis first provides a synopsis of the argumentative structures, aims, and assumptions informing the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. This assessment is then critically elaborated through the lens of Husserlian phenomenology in its historical and theoretical distance from the recent debate. Contrary to certain readings of Husserl, the reconstruction of some cardinal phenomenological themes provides all the elements necessary to dislocate his own account from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism dispute, by means of both a ‘global’ and a ‘local’ analysis, and both exegetically and theoretically. Most importantly, a ‘return’ to Husserl shows the philosophical untenability of the whole controversy as both leaving untouched the core problem of perception and altering some of its essential traits. This critique of the image of experience portrayed in the contemporary discussion is conducted through a phenomenological clarification of perception as a distinct ‘structure of rules’ of consciousness and, more specifically, by means of a descriptive analysis centered on the core notion of horizonal-intentionality.
Uploads
Conference Presentations by Andrea Cimino
Please send a two-page abstract or full paper before December 11th, 2022 to husserl2023@kuleuven.be. All submissions should be anonymized. Notifications of acceptance will be issued on December 20th, 2022. The conference will be held in English.
Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics
(PART I)
We are pleased to announce the upcoming two-day workshop organized by KU Leuven and the University of Lille.
The workshop will take place in Leuven on Friday 25th and Saturday 26th of March and is part of the international project ‘Back to the Past Itself. Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics’ funded by the 3i Cross-border Collaborations grant (Foundation I-SITE ULNE).
The event in Leuven will be held in person (no registration is needed) and followed by a second two-day workshop that will take place at the University of Lille on Friday 24th and Saturday 25th of June.
For more information, please contact backtothepastitself@gmail.com or visit the following webpage https://hiw.kuleuven.be/hua/events/agenda/international-workshop-back-to-the-past-itself-phenomenology-and-ancient-philosophy-logic-ethics-metaphysics
This conference is organized in the broader context of the celebration of the 2,400 years anniversary “Aristotle Today.” Under the auspices of the Center for Historical Ontology (Heidelberg – Helsinki – Leuven), 13 conferences on different aspects of Aristotle’s thinking and its reception were organized in 2016 (for a full list: www.c-h-o.eu) in major European universities (and in the USA).
The conference will held on December 12-14 in the Huis Bethlehem (Auditorium Wolfspoort), Schapenstraat 34, Leuven, 3000 Belgium.
For further information, please check the official website: http://aristotle2016.ophen.org/
Papers by Andrea Cimino
Drafts by Andrea Cimino
Please send a two-page abstract or full paper before December 11th, 2022 to husserl2023@kuleuven.be. All submissions should be anonymized. Notifications of acceptance will be issued on December 20th, 2022. The conference will be held in English.
Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics
(PART I)
We are pleased to announce the upcoming two-day workshop organized by KU Leuven and the University of Lille.
The workshop will take place in Leuven on Friday 25th and Saturday 26th of March and is part of the international project ‘Back to the Past Itself. Phenomenology and Ancient Philosophy: Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics’ funded by the 3i Cross-border Collaborations grant (Foundation I-SITE ULNE).
The event in Leuven will be held in person (no registration is needed) and followed by a second two-day workshop that will take place at the University of Lille on Friday 24th and Saturday 25th of June.
For more information, please contact backtothepastitself@gmail.com or visit the following webpage https://hiw.kuleuven.be/hua/events/agenda/international-workshop-back-to-the-past-itself-phenomenology-and-ancient-philosophy-logic-ethics-metaphysics
This conference is organized in the broader context of the celebration of the 2,400 years anniversary “Aristotle Today.” Under the auspices of the Center for Historical Ontology (Heidelberg – Helsinki – Leuven), 13 conferences on different aspects of Aristotle’s thinking and its reception were organized in 2016 (for a full list: www.c-h-o.eu) in major European universities (and in the USA).
The conference will held on December 12-14 in the Huis Bethlehem (Auditorium Wolfspoort), Schapenstraat 34, Leuven, 3000 Belgium.
For further information, please check the official website: http://aristotle2016.ophen.org/