He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame, where he also completed an MA in International Relations. He also has an MBA from American Graduate School of International Management. Before returning to academia, Dr. Thomas worked for over twenty years in the Balkans, Afghanistan and other countries in Europe and Central Asia.
The article provides a brief history of NATO and argues NATO's strength is its ability to adapt t... more The article provides a brief history of NATO and argues NATO's strength is its ability to adapt to the changing requirements and understanding of security in Europe. It includes the results of several NATO member-state officers, whose views of NATO in the years preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine that NATO was more an alliance aimed primarily a peace-keeping mission than it was oriented at deterring Russia.
Sometimes university students question basic assumptions which we as “seasoned academics” take as... more Sometimes university students question basic assumptions which we as “seasoned academics” take as givens. Such is the origin of these reflections on the origins of ethnic identity and its legitimacy as a legal concept in international law to justify the right to self-determination and the consequent right to formation of an independent, sovereign state. Ukrainian national identity is merely the case I, as the academic, have chosen. For the record, unequivocally I support Ukrainian national sovereignty and Ukrainians as a distinct national group deserving of a homeland of their own. The student raised the question of what distinguishes Kashubians, Silesians, and Poles versus Russians and Ukrainians; and why is it Ukrainians deserve national sovereignty while Kashubians and Silesians do not. I do not attempt to understand the reasons why Kashubians and Silesians have not and do not demand a separate nation-state from Poland. The student’s question did raise an academic question though, which as pedantic as it seems, ebbed into the question of the international legal grounds upon which the US supports Ukraine in its current war with Russia. Sometimes, encouraging critical thinking amongst our students can be both enlightening and aggravating.
In March 2023, presidential hopeful and current governor of Florida Ron DeSantis recently sparked... more In March 2023, presidential hopeful and current governor of Florida Ron DeSantis recently sparked controversary by claiming the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was merely a “territorial dispute”, which he did not consider as being in the US’ “vital interests”. Republican leaders quickly distanced themselves from DeSantis’ comment calling him either short-sighted or inexperience in foreign policy matters.This article highlights five major trends within the US body politic as it enters the 2024 Election season. At the apex of the policy questions is whether the US should pursue an isolationist or internationalist approach in its foreign policy. Layered on to the isolationist-internationalist foreign policy debate is a second question as to whether the Russia-Ukraine war need be a policy priority for the US. The third dividing line within the US electorate is what objective should US policymakers encourage Ukrainian leaders to pursue in their conflict with Russia. Fourth, the US electorate is becoming less willing to incur additional burdens. And finally, Finally, there is the question of how long the US should continue supporting Ukraine. The overall analysis of trends in US public support for Ukraine concludes that as the US enters its 2024 election cycle, the US electorate, especially those aligned with right-wing politicians, has waning support for continuing aid to Ukraine. As such. Ukrainian forces must re-gain as much Russian-occupied territory and as quickly as possible before the 2024 Election Year commences in full force..
That Russian forces have launched attacks and committed acts which offend humanity is irrefutable... more That Russian forces have launched attacks and committed acts which offend humanity is irrefutable. The challenge is whether these acts meet the legal standard to be labelled war crimes, crimes against humanity, or even genocide. Under public international humanitarian law, the three types of charges are not mutually exclusive; a war crime can also be a crime against humanity, and, if directed at eradicating a group based on ethnicity, national origin, religion or race, meets the standards of genocide. This article cannot document or validate the vast number of cases, which range from estimates of approximately 650 incidents at the low end to 74,000 at the high end as of April 2023. Rather, article will lay out the legal standards formalized in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the associated Additional Protocols of 1977. While this article focuses on jus in bello, a minor digression to jus ad bellum places Russian conduct in a broader context. The reader however must bear in mind that the United Nations, the ICC, and the international community separate violations of jus ad bellum from jus in bello. In terms of jus ad bellum, The article lists but a few examples of Russian activities and the corresponding articles of the Geneva Conventions and associated Additional Protocols, to include the attacks on the Oskil Reservoir and the Severnodonetsk chemical plant as well as the use of thermobaric (flamethrower) bombs.Russia’s 2023 invasion of Ukraine is a clear violation of terms laid out in the UN Charter. In terms of jus in bello, initial findings indicate that the incidents transcend mere war crimes and represent both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as well as meet the standard for crimes against humanity, and may border on genocide, especially considering Russia's expatriation and adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families.
Between the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the end of November 202... more Between the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the end of November 2022, Ukrainian officials estimate that ninety-seven percent of the approximately 16,000 Russian missile strikes have been directed at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Of that total number, approximately eighty-nine of the Russian missile attacks targeted Ukrainian houses, suburban areas or villages. Such strikes underline the inhumanity and the insidiousness of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That remainder is the percent which have struck sectors of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. The doctrinal underpinnings of attacking civilian sites and critical infrastructure is linked to that of “strategic bombardment”, a strategy adopted during World War II which uses such attacks to undermine both the adversary’s industrial capability but more importantly the civilian population’s will to continue the war. This article examines Russian strategic bombardment of the Ukrainian critical infrastructure, the cross-sector impacts, and the response of the Ukrainian people. It concludes that like the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, and the Afghan people during the Soviet-Afghanistan War, strategic bombardment only bolsters the political will of the defenders to resist.
On 24 June 2022, the European Council endorsed Ukraine and Moldova for candidate membership statu... more On 24 June 2022, the European Council endorsed Ukraine and Moldova for candidate membership status into the European Union, a decision which is far from formal and full membership. Ukraine faces several hurdles, both in terms of domestic policy reform and its foreign policy. In terms of its decisiveness of committing the EU to embrace Ukraine fully as a member, the EU decision is more expression of potentially, not actually. It places Ukraine within arm’s reach of western Europe’s markets and defense promises, but does not yet fully embrace Ukraine as a full member. Aspirations are one matter; reality another.
Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is not... more Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is not the case. Rather, it is the fact that the US and NATO/EU member-state governments made strategic errors starting in 1999 and culminating in 2014 which demonstrated both a lack of resolve to live up to its commitments under international law and in flaunting international law and norms in the post-Cold War period. Specifically, the US and NATO appeased Russia in 2008 when Russia intervened in Georgia; the US and NATO showed disregard for international law when it intervened in Kosovo and Iraq without a UN mandate; and finally neither the US nor UK abided by its commitments to defend Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum.
Foreign entities have long tried to influence the outcome of political events around the world. ... more Foreign entities have long tried to influence the outcome of political events around the world. This presentation offers some insights into the likely venues and means to combat Russian interference in the 2020 US elections.
Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is no... more Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is not the case. Rather, it is the fact that the US and NATO/EU member-state governments made strategic errors starting in 1999 and culminating in 2014 which demonstrated both a lack of resolve to live up to its commitments under international law and in flaunting international law and norms in the post-Cold War period. Specifically, the US and NATO appeased Russia in 2008 when Russia intervened in Georgia; the US and NATO showed disregard for international law when it intervened in Kosovo and Iraq without a UN mandate; and finally neither the US nor UK abided by its commitments to defend Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum.
The article examines Lukashenko's, as a proxy of Putin, motives in encouraging Middle Eastern and... more The article examines Lukashenko's, as a proxy of Putin, motives in encouraging Middle Eastern and Latin American refugees to mass on the Polish-Belarus border in November-December 2021. In doing so, Belarus and Russia sought to continue its information operations against the EU. In those information operations, they sought to discredit the European Union and its members states as champions of human rights; to deepen the divides between EU and its member-states and to sow domestic political discord, the latter of which is to polarize the political spectrum and strengthen the right-wing movements in the EU member-states
The article examines Ukraine's barriers to ascending to full-membership in the North Atlantic Tre... more The article examines Ukraine's barriers to ascending to full-membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The most common reasons presented revolve around the lack of a consolidated democratic regime, and high levels of corruption in Ukraine. However, a comparison using the World Bank Aggregate World Governance Indicators (WGI) shows that Ukraine generally met or surpassed the measures of good governance which existed in Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) when NATO granted them their membership action plans (MAP) and their (except) BiH) accession to NATO. In fact, current socio-political conditions in Ukraine are better than those which existed in Albania when it received its MAP. For that matter, though, the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter, the 2009 Declaration, and the associated assessment processes associated with amount to NATO giving Ukraine a de facto MAP. Ukraine has also met or surpassed existing member-states' minimum defense contributions (defense budget as percentage of GDP) and has consistently supported NATO out-of-area operations since the 1990's. The largest hurdle, the 800-pound gorilla, to Ukraine's (and Georgia's) accession to NATO is the fear of Russian reaction. The stated reason is Ukraine has a border dispute with its neighbor. For that matter, many NATO member-states were plagued with internal violence when the acceded, e.g. Greece and Turkey in Cyprus; and Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And, prior to Ostpolitik, détente, and the Helsinki Accords, West Germany had unresolved border claims with East Germany. The issue preventing NATO from admitting Ukraine is its failure to admit that the frontline of Cold War II is on the Ukraine-Russia border, not the Fulda Gap.
During its first 180 days, the Biden Administration's policy toward Ukraine has wavered between "... more During its first 180 days, the Biden Administration's policy toward Ukraine has wavered between "Speak softly and carry a big stick" and "Speak loudly and carry a little stick". The paper examines the most salient hurdles which the new Biden Administration must confront. First is Ukraine's "Tonio Kroeger Complex", a country caught between two worlds and at home in neither. The second is the US coming to terms with the political crises of 2020 and the associated reshaping of its foreign policy (image) in the wake of the previous president. The final issue is a more strategic matter of US geo-strategic calculations vis-à-vis Russia and its (re)pivot toward Asia.
In June 2020, President Vladimir Putin, delivered a speech entitled “The Real Lessons of the 75th... more In June 2020, President Vladimir Putin, delivered a speech entitled “The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II, which appeared in The National Interest. This speech dovetails with and is almost a verbatim recount of a speech he gave at an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States leaders in December 2019. All said, Putin’s June 2020 addresses first and foremost aligns in support of the goals set forth in Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy, namely re-asserting Russia’s role as a major player on the international stage, one whose influence and power should not be taken for granted. His statements also support the objective of establishing a multipolar world. On the other hand, they are reminiscent of the pre-1991 world order prior to the Soviet Union’s disintegration.
In the wake of active shooting, the commonly cited "See Something, Say Something" campaign is, by... more In the wake of active shooting, the commonly cited "See Something, Say Something" campaign is, by and large, ineffective, not because it lacks good intent. Rather, it fails insofar as it does not give the public clear criteria of what to see, what to say, to whom to say it and when. Terrorists and other types of armed assailants wishing to use violence, wreaking out death and destruction for political or personal ends, do not suddenly launch an attack. Prior to each attack, the could-be armed assailant does extensive research, And, even prior to deciding on becoming an armed assailant, the could-be armed assailant broadcasts clear and recognizable signals. While not predictable, active shootings are foreseeable. After debunking four popular myths, the article identifies a pyramid of five phases which the could-be armed assailant ascends and the respective indicators. The article concludes by discussing a proposed risk model and means by which to reduce that risk, not the least of which is an effective awareness and reporting program incorporating among others human resource personnel, psychologists, social workers and naturally law enforcement officials designed to mitigate the risk a could-be armed assailant ascend the pyramid. It ultimately challenges scholars in the fields of Psychology, Sociology, and Political Science to explore the underlying reasons which explain and thereby confront the underlying triggers which inspire could-be armed assailants to move toward the apex of the pyramid. But more it calls for raising the awareness of those who witness the broadcasts.
This paper will analyze how Russia has used and continues to use energy to impact the political s... more This paper will analyze how Russia has used and continues to use energy to impact the political situation in Ukraine. To do so, it will first illustrate how the Soviet Union used energy supplies as a carrot to bolster the Polish communist government during the Solidarity Crisis. Using the Polish case as a point of comparison, the paper will examine how Soviet/Russia has used energy policy toward Ukraine in the post-communist era as a stick to punish the country for seeking closer relations with the EU. Finally, the paper will examine the December 2019 Russian-Ukrainian energy agreement and the impact of recent price-changes, partly due to the economic shutdowns associated with COVID-19 but also due to Russia’s disagreement with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In this regard, economists have found that, unlike in other regions of the world, natural gas prices and oil prices tend to move in direct correlation to one another.While the December 2019 agreement does include many beneficial clauses, the “take or pay” clause and the declining prices of oil and natural gas have the potential to detrimentally impact the Ukrainian economy by reducing the proceeds Ukraine can procure from the deal. Second, by international contact law, the “take or pay clause” provides the seller (Russia) distinct advantages, namely any risk associated with falling prices gets passed on to the buyer (Ukraine) and obligates the buyer to purchase the quantity upon which the two parties agreed previously. Further, the December 2019 deal does not alter Russia’s intent to develop alternative transit pipelines which bypass Ukraine and thereby reducing income which Ukraine could earn by serving as a transit point for Russian energy supplies to the EU. All these factors combined substantiate the commonly held belief that Russia is using energy policy to influence the Ukrainian political situation.
In an era of austere defense budgets and hybrid warfare, NATO and coalition partners face signifi... more In an era of austere defense budgets and hybrid warfare, NATO and coalition partners face significant but surmountable challenges if they can adapt the necessary network-sharing process, and adapt their national doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) into a coalition capability.
The article addresses the challenges security personnel confront in the era of globalization in p... more The article addresses the challenges security personnel confront in the era of globalization in protecting and limiting proliferation of technologies in the Information Age. Ultimately, security personnel must adopt a holistic, flexible strategy which concisely identifies the most critical technologies and bases international cooperation and trade on a flexible risk management model.
The article provides a brief history of NATO and argues NATO's strength is its ability to adapt t... more The article provides a brief history of NATO and argues NATO's strength is its ability to adapt to the changing requirements and understanding of security in Europe. It includes the results of several NATO member-state officers, whose views of NATO in the years preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine that NATO was more an alliance aimed primarily a peace-keeping mission than it was oriented at deterring Russia.
Sometimes university students question basic assumptions which we as “seasoned academics” take as... more Sometimes university students question basic assumptions which we as “seasoned academics” take as givens. Such is the origin of these reflections on the origins of ethnic identity and its legitimacy as a legal concept in international law to justify the right to self-determination and the consequent right to formation of an independent, sovereign state. Ukrainian national identity is merely the case I, as the academic, have chosen. For the record, unequivocally I support Ukrainian national sovereignty and Ukrainians as a distinct national group deserving of a homeland of their own. The student raised the question of what distinguishes Kashubians, Silesians, and Poles versus Russians and Ukrainians; and why is it Ukrainians deserve national sovereignty while Kashubians and Silesians do not. I do not attempt to understand the reasons why Kashubians and Silesians have not and do not demand a separate nation-state from Poland. The student’s question did raise an academic question though, which as pedantic as it seems, ebbed into the question of the international legal grounds upon which the US supports Ukraine in its current war with Russia. Sometimes, encouraging critical thinking amongst our students can be both enlightening and aggravating.
In March 2023, presidential hopeful and current governor of Florida Ron DeSantis recently sparked... more In March 2023, presidential hopeful and current governor of Florida Ron DeSantis recently sparked controversary by claiming the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was merely a “territorial dispute”, which he did not consider as being in the US’ “vital interests”. Republican leaders quickly distanced themselves from DeSantis’ comment calling him either short-sighted or inexperience in foreign policy matters.This article highlights five major trends within the US body politic as it enters the 2024 Election season. At the apex of the policy questions is whether the US should pursue an isolationist or internationalist approach in its foreign policy. Layered on to the isolationist-internationalist foreign policy debate is a second question as to whether the Russia-Ukraine war need be a policy priority for the US. The third dividing line within the US electorate is what objective should US policymakers encourage Ukrainian leaders to pursue in their conflict with Russia. Fourth, the US electorate is becoming less willing to incur additional burdens. And finally, Finally, there is the question of how long the US should continue supporting Ukraine. The overall analysis of trends in US public support for Ukraine concludes that as the US enters its 2024 election cycle, the US electorate, especially those aligned with right-wing politicians, has waning support for continuing aid to Ukraine. As such. Ukrainian forces must re-gain as much Russian-occupied territory and as quickly as possible before the 2024 Election Year commences in full force..
That Russian forces have launched attacks and committed acts which offend humanity is irrefutable... more That Russian forces have launched attacks and committed acts which offend humanity is irrefutable. The challenge is whether these acts meet the legal standard to be labelled war crimes, crimes against humanity, or even genocide. Under public international humanitarian law, the three types of charges are not mutually exclusive; a war crime can also be a crime against humanity, and, if directed at eradicating a group based on ethnicity, national origin, religion or race, meets the standards of genocide. This article cannot document or validate the vast number of cases, which range from estimates of approximately 650 incidents at the low end to 74,000 at the high end as of April 2023. Rather, article will lay out the legal standards formalized in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the associated Additional Protocols of 1977. While this article focuses on jus in bello, a minor digression to jus ad bellum places Russian conduct in a broader context. The reader however must bear in mind that the United Nations, the ICC, and the international community separate violations of jus ad bellum from jus in bello. In terms of jus ad bellum, The article lists but a few examples of Russian activities and the corresponding articles of the Geneva Conventions and associated Additional Protocols, to include the attacks on the Oskil Reservoir and the Severnodonetsk chemical plant as well as the use of thermobaric (flamethrower) bombs.Russia’s 2023 invasion of Ukraine is a clear violation of terms laid out in the UN Charter. In terms of jus in bello, initial findings indicate that the incidents transcend mere war crimes and represent both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as well as meet the standard for crimes against humanity, and may border on genocide, especially considering Russia's expatriation and adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families.
Between the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the end of November 202... more Between the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the end of November 2022, Ukrainian officials estimate that ninety-seven percent of the approximately 16,000 Russian missile strikes have been directed at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Of that total number, approximately eighty-nine of the Russian missile attacks targeted Ukrainian houses, suburban areas or villages. Such strikes underline the inhumanity and the insidiousness of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That remainder is the percent which have struck sectors of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. The doctrinal underpinnings of attacking civilian sites and critical infrastructure is linked to that of “strategic bombardment”, a strategy adopted during World War II which uses such attacks to undermine both the adversary’s industrial capability but more importantly the civilian population’s will to continue the war. This article examines Russian strategic bombardment of the Ukrainian critical infrastructure, the cross-sector impacts, and the response of the Ukrainian people. It concludes that like the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, and the Afghan people during the Soviet-Afghanistan War, strategic bombardment only bolsters the political will of the defenders to resist.
On 24 June 2022, the European Council endorsed Ukraine and Moldova for candidate membership statu... more On 24 June 2022, the European Council endorsed Ukraine and Moldova for candidate membership status into the European Union, a decision which is far from formal and full membership. Ukraine faces several hurdles, both in terms of domestic policy reform and its foreign policy. In terms of its decisiveness of committing the EU to embrace Ukraine fully as a member, the EU decision is more expression of potentially, not actually. It places Ukraine within arm’s reach of western Europe’s markets and defense promises, but does not yet fully embrace Ukraine as a full member. Aspirations are one matter; reality another.
Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is not... more Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is not the case. Rather, it is the fact that the US and NATO/EU member-state governments made strategic errors starting in 1999 and culminating in 2014 which demonstrated both a lack of resolve to live up to its commitments under international law and in flaunting international law and norms in the post-Cold War period. Specifically, the US and NATO appeased Russia in 2008 when Russia intervened in Georgia; the US and NATO showed disregard for international law when it intervened in Kosovo and Iraq without a UN mandate; and finally neither the US nor UK abided by its commitments to defend Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum.
Foreign entities have long tried to influence the outcome of political events around the world. ... more Foreign entities have long tried to influence the outcome of political events around the world. This presentation offers some insights into the likely venues and means to combat Russian interference in the 2020 US elections.
Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is no... more Many politicians and academics attribute Russia's war with Ukraine to NATO expansion. That is not the case. Rather, it is the fact that the US and NATO/EU member-state governments made strategic errors starting in 1999 and culminating in 2014 which demonstrated both a lack of resolve to live up to its commitments under international law and in flaunting international law and norms in the post-Cold War period. Specifically, the US and NATO appeased Russia in 2008 when Russia intervened in Georgia; the US and NATO showed disregard for international law when it intervened in Kosovo and Iraq without a UN mandate; and finally neither the US nor UK abided by its commitments to defend Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum.
The article examines Lukashenko's, as a proxy of Putin, motives in encouraging Middle Eastern and... more The article examines Lukashenko's, as a proxy of Putin, motives in encouraging Middle Eastern and Latin American refugees to mass on the Polish-Belarus border in November-December 2021. In doing so, Belarus and Russia sought to continue its information operations against the EU. In those information operations, they sought to discredit the European Union and its members states as champions of human rights; to deepen the divides between EU and its member-states and to sow domestic political discord, the latter of which is to polarize the political spectrum and strengthen the right-wing movements in the EU member-states
The article examines Ukraine's barriers to ascending to full-membership in the North Atlantic Tre... more The article examines Ukraine's barriers to ascending to full-membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The most common reasons presented revolve around the lack of a consolidated democratic regime, and high levels of corruption in Ukraine. However, a comparison using the World Bank Aggregate World Governance Indicators (WGI) shows that Ukraine generally met or surpassed the measures of good governance which existed in Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) when NATO granted them their membership action plans (MAP) and their (except) BiH) accession to NATO. In fact, current socio-political conditions in Ukraine are better than those which existed in Albania when it received its MAP. For that matter, though, the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter, the 2009 Declaration, and the associated assessment processes associated with amount to NATO giving Ukraine a de facto MAP. Ukraine has also met or surpassed existing member-states' minimum defense contributions (defense budget as percentage of GDP) and has consistently supported NATO out-of-area operations since the 1990's. The largest hurdle, the 800-pound gorilla, to Ukraine's (and Georgia's) accession to NATO is the fear of Russian reaction. The stated reason is Ukraine has a border dispute with its neighbor. For that matter, many NATO member-states were plagued with internal violence when the acceded, e.g. Greece and Turkey in Cyprus; and Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And, prior to Ostpolitik, détente, and the Helsinki Accords, West Germany had unresolved border claims with East Germany. The issue preventing NATO from admitting Ukraine is its failure to admit that the frontline of Cold War II is on the Ukraine-Russia border, not the Fulda Gap.
During its first 180 days, the Biden Administration's policy toward Ukraine has wavered between "... more During its first 180 days, the Biden Administration's policy toward Ukraine has wavered between "Speak softly and carry a big stick" and "Speak loudly and carry a little stick". The paper examines the most salient hurdles which the new Biden Administration must confront. First is Ukraine's "Tonio Kroeger Complex", a country caught between two worlds and at home in neither. The second is the US coming to terms with the political crises of 2020 and the associated reshaping of its foreign policy (image) in the wake of the previous president. The final issue is a more strategic matter of US geo-strategic calculations vis-à-vis Russia and its (re)pivot toward Asia.
In June 2020, President Vladimir Putin, delivered a speech entitled “The Real Lessons of the 75th... more In June 2020, President Vladimir Putin, delivered a speech entitled “The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II, which appeared in The National Interest. This speech dovetails with and is almost a verbatim recount of a speech he gave at an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States leaders in December 2019. All said, Putin’s June 2020 addresses first and foremost aligns in support of the goals set forth in Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy, namely re-asserting Russia’s role as a major player on the international stage, one whose influence and power should not be taken for granted. His statements also support the objective of establishing a multipolar world. On the other hand, they are reminiscent of the pre-1991 world order prior to the Soviet Union’s disintegration.
In the wake of active shooting, the commonly cited "See Something, Say Something" campaign is, by... more In the wake of active shooting, the commonly cited "See Something, Say Something" campaign is, by and large, ineffective, not because it lacks good intent. Rather, it fails insofar as it does not give the public clear criteria of what to see, what to say, to whom to say it and when. Terrorists and other types of armed assailants wishing to use violence, wreaking out death and destruction for political or personal ends, do not suddenly launch an attack. Prior to each attack, the could-be armed assailant does extensive research, And, even prior to deciding on becoming an armed assailant, the could-be armed assailant broadcasts clear and recognizable signals. While not predictable, active shootings are foreseeable. After debunking four popular myths, the article identifies a pyramid of five phases which the could-be armed assailant ascends and the respective indicators. The article concludes by discussing a proposed risk model and means by which to reduce that risk, not the least of which is an effective awareness and reporting program incorporating among others human resource personnel, psychologists, social workers and naturally law enforcement officials designed to mitigate the risk a could-be armed assailant ascend the pyramid. It ultimately challenges scholars in the fields of Psychology, Sociology, and Political Science to explore the underlying reasons which explain and thereby confront the underlying triggers which inspire could-be armed assailants to move toward the apex of the pyramid. But more it calls for raising the awareness of those who witness the broadcasts.
This paper will analyze how Russia has used and continues to use energy to impact the political s... more This paper will analyze how Russia has used and continues to use energy to impact the political situation in Ukraine. To do so, it will first illustrate how the Soviet Union used energy supplies as a carrot to bolster the Polish communist government during the Solidarity Crisis. Using the Polish case as a point of comparison, the paper will examine how Soviet/Russia has used energy policy toward Ukraine in the post-communist era as a stick to punish the country for seeking closer relations with the EU. Finally, the paper will examine the December 2019 Russian-Ukrainian energy agreement and the impact of recent price-changes, partly due to the economic shutdowns associated with COVID-19 but also due to Russia’s disagreement with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In this regard, economists have found that, unlike in other regions of the world, natural gas prices and oil prices tend to move in direct correlation to one another.While the December 2019 agreement does include many beneficial clauses, the “take or pay” clause and the declining prices of oil and natural gas have the potential to detrimentally impact the Ukrainian economy by reducing the proceeds Ukraine can procure from the deal. Second, by international contact law, the “take or pay clause” provides the seller (Russia) distinct advantages, namely any risk associated with falling prices gets passed on to the buyer (Ukraine) and obligates the buyer to purchase the quantity upon which the two parties agreed previously. Further, the December 2019 deal does not alter Russia’s intent to develop alternative transit pipelines which bypass Ukraine and thereby reducing income which Ukraine could earn by serving as a transit point for Russian energy supplies to the EU. All these factors combined substantiate the commonly held belief that Russia is using energy policy to influence the Ukrainian political situation.
In an era of austere defense budgets and hybrid warfare, NATO and coalition partners face signifi... more In an era of austere defense budgets and hybrid warfare, NATO and coalition partners face significant but surmountable challenges if they can adapt the necessary network-sharing process, and adapt their national doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) into a coalition capability.
The article addresses the challenges security personnel confront in the era of globalization in p... more The article addresses the challenges security personnel confront in the era of globalization in protecting and limiting proliferation of technologies in the Information Age. Ultimately, security personnel must adopt a holistic, flexible strategy which concisely identifies the most critical technologies and bases international cooperation and trade on a flexible risk management model.
To paraphrase J.K. Rowlings’ Dumbledore, words are the greatest form of magic, holding the power ... more To paraphrase J.K. Rowlings’ Dumbledore, words are the greatest form of magic, holding the power both to heal as well as to divide. Hunczak’s Ukraine in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The Unending Complexities of Survival, which is a compilation of previously published articles plus three new articles written especially for this volume of works, expands Rowling’s witting aside from not only how words but which words are used to describe history as well as to influence perspectives on critical historical events. At the heart of Hunczak’s work, is his mission of shedding light on previously unknown or under-researched events, which historians either overlooked, ignored, or simply dismissed. The evidence, which he presents, adds substance to the previously anecdotal. More importantly, his research and narrative challenges perceptions of historical events, which Soviet and Russian scholars and officials have falsified and/or manipulated to justify their constantly evolving, domestic and international political, agenda. For it is the historian, who puts into writing, the ethnic myths, which lead either to peaceful or troubled relations between peoples. Hunczak’s work centers on events in the most recent history of the beleaguered country that is Ukraine. Focusing primarily on events of the Twentieth Century, Hunczak (re)examines events and the circumstances surrounding them on topics ranging from the roots of Ukrainian striving for national sovereignty in the years following the First World War to key Ukrainian policies toward Jews, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia. Hunczak delves into previously classified Soviet Ukrainian intelligence files, and western European archives to present new evidence supporting arguments about the character and motives of such politically sensitive personages as Symon Petliura, Stepan Bandera, Mikhailo Hrushevsky, and Roman Shukhevych. Finally, he confronts such emotionally charged events as those at Babyn Yar and the historically complex role of such organizations as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
Over thirty years have passed since the disaster at Chernobyl, but the consequences linger. Wlad... more Over thirty years have passed since the disaster at Chernobyl, but the consequences linger. Wladimir Tchertkoff's work examines the untold stories of doctors struggle to treat those who still suffer. He posits national governments, in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the World Health Organization, are engaged, at worst, in mutual complicity and, at best, a cover-up of the medium- and long-term effects of nuclear fallout, i.e. the radioactive isotopes ingested through foods and other types of environmental contamination. He recounts the story of nuclear scientist Vassili Nesterenko, Ukrainian-born, Russian-educated, Belarusian official, who introduced the idea of pouring liquid nitrogen into the foundation of the burning reactor, and whose persistent calls for study the aftermath and to aid the victims made him the target of Russian and Belarusian intelligence services. Tchertkoff's work places him in the same category of whistleblowers as the scientists who badgered the Big Tobacco companies over the long-term threats of smoking and Bennett Omalu, who went head to head with the US National Football League to address the plague of traumatic brain injury to US football players. Tschertkoff's work is an easy read for the scientist and non-scientists alike.
Oresta Losyk traces the beginnings of Postmodernist themes to the second half of the twentieth ce... more Oresta Losyk traces the beginnings of Postmodernist themes to the second half of the twentieth century, looking at them through the prism of literary criticism of the 1950s and 1960s. Oresta Losyk’s tome, The Phenomenon of Freedom and French Postmodernism, is tour de force of erudition and scholarship. Her careful, meticulous documentation – 753 footnotes and 320 bibliographical entrees – attest to her knowledge of the subject matter and her attention to detail in ensuring a comprehensive analysis of Postmodernism and its implications for society, art and morality. Her work is an intellectual eye-opener that should be made accessible to the scholarly world in general and not solely confined to the realm of Ukrainian intellectuals. So what depicts the current age? Postmodernism is the ultimate endorsement of the Individual, whose experience with science, technology, and progress renders lessons of the past irrelevant and the future so unfathomable that attempts to discern order only leads to chaos. Unleashed from his or her tethers, the individual is free to pursue his wants, desires, and dreams. As the title of her book indicates, Losyk's work in four chapters examines the postmodern interpretation of the phenomenon of freedom in French literature and culture and its significance for art, ideology, and historiography in relation to the contemporary status of art in Ukraine. The headings of these chapters clearly indicate the thrust of her analysis: I. Postmodernism – The Problem of Interpretation; Chapter II. Sources of Postmodernist Understanding of Freedom; Chapter III. Contextual Characteristics in Discourse on Freedom; and Chapter IV. Freedom as an Interpretative Phenomenon of French Postmodernism.
The presentation provides an overview of the Georgia election law reform. The bottom line is the... more The presentation provides an overview of the Georgia election law reform. The bottom line is the 2021 Georgia election law adjusts the potential means by which Georgians can vote, but not as drastically as the popular press depicts. The new law increases voter options compared to 2016 and 2018, but places limits on many of the adjustments made during 2020 election to make voting easier during the 2020 COVID crisis.
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