In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary ac... more In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices in eight 3 × 3 and four 4 × 4 normal-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost indistinguishable between the two conditions. These results are in line with earlier findings on individual decision making and with a parametric model, in which the incentive elasticity of effort is very small when compared with other factors, such as the complexity of the decision problem.
Most human relationships are characterized by reciprocal patterns of give-and-take that can be st... more Most human relationships are characterized by reciprocal patterns of give-and-take that can be studied using a decision making task called the Centipede game. The game involves two players alternating in choosing between cooperation and defection, with their choices affecting payoffs to themselves and the co-player. We compared trust and cooperation of Japanese and UK samples in the Centipede game. To increase the game's applicability to real-life decision situations, we added three treatment conditions to manipulate payoff information. Our between-subjects design comprised the following four conditions: (a) full payoff information, (b) full payoff information framed as percentages, (c) partial payoff information with absolute (own payoff) information only, and (d) partial payoff information with relative information only. Comparing Japanese and UK students' decisions, the Japanese cooperated significantly more frequently than the British. The manipulation of payoff information also affected decision making. In Japan, both treatment conditions with incomplete information yielded significantly higher cooperation levels than the control. In the UK, only the condition with absolute payoff information produced significantly higher cooperativeness. Overall, these findings suggest that Japanese samples cooperate more frequently in repeated interactions than British samples and that this may be due to the assurance-based trust elicited by reciprocal relationships that has been identified as a typical feature of Japanese culture. In situations with incomplete information, expectations about the stake size may guide decision making, with lower expectations resulting in higher cooperation levels.
The Centipede game provides a dynamic model of cooperation and competition in repeated dyadic int... more The Centipede game provides a dynamic model of cooperation and competition in repeated dyadic interactions. Two experiments investigated psychological factors driving cooperation in 20 rounds of a Centipede game with significant monetary incentives and anonymous and random re-pairing of players after every round. The main purpose of the research was to determine whether the pattern of strategic choices observed when no specific social value orientation is experimentally induced--the standard condition in all previous investigations of behavior in the Centipede and most other experimental games--is essentially individualistic, the orthodox game-theoretic assumption being that players are individualistically motivated in the absence of any specific motivational induction. Participants in whom no specific state social value orientation was induced exhibited moderately non-cooperative play that differed significantly from the pattern found when an individualistic orientation was induced. In both experiments, the neutral treatment condition, in which no orientation was induced, elicited competitive behavior resembling behavior in the condition in which a competitive orientation was explicitly induced. Trait social value orientation, measured with a questionnaire, influenced cooperation differently depending on the experimentally induced state social value orientation. Cooperative trait social value orientation was a significant predictor of cooperation and, to a lesser degree, experimentally induced competitive orientation was a significant predictor of non-cooperation. The experimental results imply that the standard assumption of individualistic motivation in experimental games may not be valid, and that the results of such investigations need to take into account the possibility that players are competitively motivated.
Player I chooses between rows C (cooperate) and row D (defect), Player II chooses between columns... more Player I chooses between rows C (cooperate) and row D (defect), Player II chooses between columns C and D, and the pair of numbers in each cell are the payoffs to Players I and II respectively in the corresponding outcome. Each player does better by choosing D than C irrespective of what the co-player chooses; the D strategy is the unconditionally best or dominant strategy for both players. The puzzle arises from the fact that if both players choose D, as they are bound to if they are rational, then each is worse off than if both choose C, and many people ...
In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary ac... more In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices in eight 3 × 3 and four 4 × 4 normal-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost indistinguishable between the two conditions. These results are in line with earlier findings on individual decision making and with a parametric model, in which the incentive elasticity of effort is very small when compared with other factors, such as the complexity of the decision problem.
Most human relationships are characterized by reciprocal patterns of give-and-take that can be st... more Most human relationships are characterized by reciprocal patterns of give-and-take that can be studied using a decision making task called the Centipede game. The game involves two players alternating in choosing between cooperation and defection, with their choices affecting payoffs to themselves and the co-player. We compared trust and cooperation of Japanese and UK samples in the Centipede game. To increase the game's applicability to real-life decision situations, we added three treatment conditions to manipulate payoff information. Our between-subjects design comprised the following four conditions: (a) full payoff information, (b) full payoff information framed as percentages, (c) partial payoff information with absolute (own payoff) information only, and (d) partial payoff information with relative information only. Comparing Japanese and UK students' decisions, the Japanese cooperated significantly more frequently than the British. The manipulation of payoff information also affected decision making. In Japan, both treatment conditions with incomplete information yielded significantly higher cooperation levels than the control. In the UK, only the condition with absolute payoff information produced significantly higher cooperativeness. Overall, these findings suggest that Japanese samples cooperate more frequently in repeated interactions than British samples and that this may be due to the assurance-based trust elicited by reciprocal relationships that has been identified as a typical feature of Japanese culture. In situations with incomplete information, expectations about the stake size may guide decision making, with lower expectations resulting in higher cooperation levels.
The Centipede game provides a dynamic model of cooperation and competition in repeated dyadic int... more The Centipede game provides a dynamic model of cooperation and competition in repeated dyadic interactions. Two experiments investigated psychological factors driving cooperation in 20 rounds of a Centipede game with significant monetary incentives and anonymous and random re-pairing of players after every round. The main purpose of the research was to determine whether the pattern of strategic choices observed when no specific social value orientation is experimentally induced--the standard condition in all previous investigations of behavior in the Centipede and most other experimental games--is essentially individualistic, the orthodox game-theoretic assumption being that players are individualistically motivated in the absence of any specific motivational induction. Participants in whom no specific state social value orientation was induced exhibited moderately non-cooperative play that differed significantly from the pattern found when an individualistic orientation was induced. In both experiments, the neutral treatment condition, in which no orientation was induced, elicited competitive behavior resembling behavior in the condition in which a competitive orientation was explicitly induced. Trait social value orientation, measured with a questionnaire, influenced cooperation differently depending on the experimentally induced state social value orientation. Cooperative trait social value orientation was a significant predictor of cooperation and, to a lesser degree, experimentally induced competitive orientation was a significant predictor of non-cooperation. The experimental results imply that the standard assumption of individualistic motivation in experimental games may not be valid, and that the results of such investigations need to take into account the possibility that players are competitively motivated.
Player I chooses between rows C (cooperate) and row D (defect), Player II chooses between columns... more Player I chooses between rows C (cooperate) and row D (defect), Player II chooses between columns C and D, and the pair of numbers in each cell are the payoffs to Players I and II respectively in the corresponding outcome. Each player does better by choosing D than C irrespective of what the co-player chooses; the D strategy is the unconditionally best or dominant strategy for both players. The puzzle arises from the fact that if both players choose D, as they are bound to if they are rational, then each is worse off than if both choose C, and many people ...
Abstract When we are uncertain we may turn to other people for their advice. The level of confide... more Abstract When we are uncertain we may turn to other people for their advice. The level of confidence they have in their advice can influence the choices we opt in and out of. Making decisions in this way indicates that confidence is used heuristically, whereby a speaker's confidence is taken as being a cue to their knowledge, competence or accuracy. This study considers whether people apply the confidence heuristic when provided with information relating to a speaker's performance, and hence their judgmental biases.
Need for Closure made no difference to participants' confidence in answers overall or on any of t... more Need for Closure made no difference to participants' confidence in answers overall or on any of the three tasks, F (1, 87)=. 11, p=. 74 and F (2, 174)=. 60, p=. 55. However, a significant Need for Cognition x Condition interaction indicated that High (vs. Low) Need for Cognition participants did not differ in their overall confidence in the control group (M= 41.44 vs.
Page 1. Whether it is Reality or Imaginary, People are Still Spurred on by their Previously Sunk ... more Page 1. Whether it is Reality or Imaginary, People are Still Spurred on by their Previously Sunk Costs Poonam Gill and Briony Pulford University of Leicester Theoretical Background The Sunk Cost Effect an increased tendency to continue in a particular venture, once resources (eg time, money, effort) have already been invested (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). It is mostly detrimental because as a result and function of sunk costs decision makers will continue to invest in losing endeavors.
Page 1. Confidence and communication in an E-FIT identification task FIT identification task Brio... more Page 1. Confidence and communication in an E-FIT identification task FIT identification task Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman University of Leicester Page 2. • Both the police and jurors in a courtroom are faced with making judgements about how confident and accurate a person is, for example, a witness to a crime. When faced with a confident eyewitness or a non-confident one, which one would you believe? confident one, which one would you believe? Page 3.
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