Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
Skip to main content

Modelling Congestion and Price Competition in EV Charging Markets

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
PRIMA 2024: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA 2024)

Abstract

This paper model the EV charging market, treating EVs and stations as players. Our findings indicate that the Nash equilibrium does not accurately reflect the real-world competition among charging stations. This discrepancy arises because the decision-making processes of EVs and charging stations are not simultaneous. In this paper, we model this hierarchical decision-making process as a Stackelberg game, where charging stations act as leaders and EVs as followers. We further demonstrate that, under certain conditions, the Stackelberg equilibrium not only exists but is also unique. To validate our model, we use EV charging data from the Sydney city road network to examine how changes in charging prices impact EV flows. The results show the dynamic interaction between EVs and charging stations, highlighting the balancing effect of charging queues and price variations.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 64.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    https://www.energy.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-09/nsw-electric-vehicle-strategy-210225.pdf.

References

  1. Amir, R., Grilo, I.: Stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium. Games Econom. Behav. 26(1), 1–21 (1999)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  2. Breton, M., Alj, A., Haurie, A.: Sequential stackelberg equilibria in two-person games. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 59, 71–97 (1988)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Cheng, S.F., Reeves, D.M., Vorobeychik, Y., Wellman, M.P.: Notes on equilibria in symmetric games (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Korzhyk, D., Yin, Z., Kiekintveld, C., Conitzer, V., Tambe, M.: Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: an extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 41, 297–327 (2011)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Maljkovic, M., Nilsson, G., Geroliminis, N.: On finding the leader’s strategy in quadratic aggregative stackelberg pricing games. In: 2023 European Control Conference, pp. 1–6 (2023)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Rosenthal, R.W.: A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Int. J. Game Theory 2(1), 65–67 (1973)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Tushar, W., Saad, W., Poor, H.V., Smith, D.B.: Economics of electric vehicle charging: a game theoretic approach. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 3(4), 1767–1778 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Qi Wang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2025 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Wang, Q., Zhang, D., Du, B. (2025). Modelling Congestion and Price Competition in EV Charging Markets. In: Arisaka, R., Sanchez-Anguix, V., Stein, S., Aydoğan, R., van der Torre, L., Ito, T. (eds) PRIMA 2024: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 15395. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-77367-9_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-77367-9_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-77366-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-77367-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics