Moritz Schuberth is a security and development expert with extensive experience managing projects and conducting research in fragile and conflict-affected settings. He completed a Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict Studies and has published widely on peacekeeping, non-state armed groups, security governance, and organized crime. He consults the US Institute of Peace on approaches towards community-based armed groups in Sub-Saharan Africa and his research on cultural cognitive diversity has been used to train US special forces. He is the author of recent articles in Africa Spectrum
Security Blurs: The Politics of Plural Security Provision, 2018
Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) are characterised by the proliferation of non-state a... more Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) are characterised by the proliferation of non-state armed groups that are not only causing insecurity, but have also taken over state security functions. Nevertheless, numerous academics and practitioners alike continue to frame security governance in FCAS through stringent analytical categories that are far removed from the blurriness of security actors in these settings. Based on empirical evidence from the informal settlements of Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince, this chapter challenges traditional understandings of security governance by focusing on security blurs, and specifically on the blurring between providers of security and providers of insecurity. More precisely, it is argued that whether a group is a source of security or a source of insecurity for the community in which they are nested depends primarily on the constantly shifting interests of their external sponsors.
Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding, 2020
Since 1927, the year Frederic Thrasher published his seminal work on gangs in Chicago, gang resea... more Since 1927, the year Frederic Thrasher published his seminal work on gangs in Chicago, gang research has produced numerous approaches across a variety of academic disciplines, highlighting different motivations behind a global phenomenon. Conventional criminological definitions of gangs tend to focus on their “involvement in illegal activity” (Klein, 1995; Covey, 2010, p. 4; Klein and Maxson, 2010). For instance, according to a classic definition offered by Criminal gangs as a global phenomenon have been the object of investigation in numerous studies in various parts of the world (Dowdney, 2005; Hagedorn, 2007b; Flynn and Brotherton, 2008). Yet, despite being increasingly recognized as a global and transnational challenge, most theoretical and conceptual approaches in gang research are still derived from specific case studies from the global North (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004; Klein and Maxson, 2010; Pitts, 2013). Based on an extensive literature review and field research on violent crime in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, this chapter provides empirical evidence on criminal gangs in the global South. Focusing on the case studies of Central America, Kenya and Haiti, this chapter discusses three aspects of contemporary global gangs: first, the motivation for members to join gangs; second, the transformation processes gangs typically undergo; and, third, the functions violence fulfils for various stakeholders of gangs, such as their politico-criminal sponsors and the community in which they are nested.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2022
Increasing the availability and reliability of community water sources is a primary pathway throu... more Increasing the availability and reliability of community water sources is a primary pathway through which many water supply interventions aim to achieve health gains in communities with limited access to water. While previous studies in rural settings have shown that greater access to water is associated both with increased overall consumption of water and use of water for hygiene related activities, there is limited evidence from urban environments. Using data collected from 1253 households during the evaluation of a community water supply governance and hygiene promotion intervention in the cities of Goma and Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo, we conducted a secondary analysis to determine the impact of these interventions on household water collection and use habits. Using multiple and logistic regression models we compared differences in outcomes of interest between households in quartiers with and without the intervention. Outcomes of interest included litres per capita day (lpcd) of water brought to the household, lpcd used at the household, and lpcd used for hygiene-related activities. Results demonstrated that intervention households were more likely to use community tapstands than households located in comparison quartiers and collected on average 16.3 lpcd of water, compared with 13.5 lpcd among comparison households (adj. coef: 3.2, 95 CI: 0.84 to 5.53, p = 0.008). However, reported usage of water in the household for domestic purposes was lower among intervention households (8.2 lpcd) when compared with comparison households (9.4 lpcd) (adj. coef: −1.11, 95 CI: −2.29 to 0.07), p = 0.066) and there was no difference between study groups in the amount of water allocated to hygiene activities. These results show that in this setting, implementation of a water supply governance and hygiene promotion intervention was associated with a modest increase in the amount of water being bought to the household, but that this did not translate into an increase in either overall per capita consumption of water or the per capita amount of water being allocated to hygiene related activities.
Humanitarian and development agencies intervening in Latin American cities increasingly face the ... more Humanitarian and development agencies intervening in Latin American cities increasingly face the challenge posed by criminal armed groups (CAGs). Yet, there is a need for evidencebased comparative studies on how international agencies deal with them. Drawing on data collected in Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Mexico, this paper presents a novel typology of humanitarian organisations' access strategies that distinguishes between different levels of interaction with CAGs. The paper shows how humanitarian agencies assess a variety of risks and balance the potential consequences of their engagement with CAGs with the need to maintain constructive and trustful relationships with the state and the community with which they work. It finds that indirect dialogue or negotiation with CAGs via community leaders who act as intermediaries might provide a low-risk alternative to direct negotiation with CAG leaders, provided that 'do no harm' and humanitarian protection considerations vis-à-vis communities and intermediaries play a central role.
Brazil’s role in UN peacekeeping operations has been subject to increasing attention from academi... more Brazil’s role in UN peacekeeping operations has been subject to increasing attention from academics and policy makers alike. While some authors praise Brazil’s engagement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a case of innovative South-South cooperation, others accuse Brazil of using Haiti as a ‘testing ground’ for repressive anti-gang tactics that have subsequently been introduced at home. This article challenges these two dominant views on Brazil’s role in Haiti. Based on a period of six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince and interviews with key Brazilian actors, the article draws a parallel between MINUSTAH’s military raids in gang-ruled neighbourhoods coupled with police reform in Haiti, on one hand, and the Pacifying Police Units (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora) plus the accompanying UPP Social in Rio de Janeiro, on the other hand. It is argued that Brazil’s peacekeeping strategy, at home and abroad, is a mix of coercive and cooperative measures reminiscent of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics already employed during the French colonial war in Algeria. Moreover, it is shown that policing techniques borrowed from the US are employed to ease the tension between carrots and sticks, notably so in the urban environment in which Brazilian peacekeeping is taking place.
With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-... more With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-gang efforts in Latin America has focused mainly on coercive mano dura policies and cooperative gang truces. Yet, there remains a paucity of studies going beyond such carrots-and-sticks approaches towards gangs. To fill this gap, this study investigates the possibilities and limitations of substitutive security governance across Latin America and the Caribbean. More specifically, this article looks at Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in Medellín, Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention (AVRP) efforts in Haiti and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Guatemala and Rio de Janeiro. It will be argued that communities are driven to support gangs against the oppressive state when they are indiscriminately targeted through muscular operations. Likewise, engaging gangs in dialogue grants them legitimacy and further weakens the position of the state. Therefore, the only sustainable solution lies in substitutive security governance, which aims to replace the functions gangs fulfill for their members, sponsors, and the community in which they are nested with a modern and accountable state that is bound by the rule of law. Still, substitutive strategies vis-à-vis gangs have their own limitations, which can only be overcome by way of an integrated and coordinated framework.
Many cities in contemporary Africa are characterised by hybrid modes of security governance that ... more Many cities in contemporary Africa are characterised by hybrid modes of security governance that are co-produced by a variety of state and non-state actors of violence. While the (il)legitimacy of informal non-state security providers on the local level has featured prominently in discussions on hybrid security governance, there is a paucity of empirical case studies of what actually contributes to their (de)legitimisation, notably in the urban context. In order to fill this gap in knowledge, this article investigates how the legitimacy of community-based armed groups – such as vigilantes, militias and gangs – that are operating in Kenyan cities is influenced by the shifting functions they fulfil on behalf of various stakeholders. Based on field research in the informal settlements of Nairobi and Mombasa, I found that their involvement in organised criminal activities often costs vigilantes the legitimacy they had gained by providing protection and crime control for their community. At the same time, their involvement in repeated cycles of post-election violence leads not only to increasing ethnic segregation of the slums in which they operate, but also to the bifurcation of their legitimacy along ethnic lines. Taken together, the article contributes to our understanding of urban violence and conflict in Eastern Africa by tracing the trajectory of the (de)legitimisation of hybrid security actors in the two main cities in Kenya.
Blame, Sway, and Vigilante Tactics: How Other Cultures Think Differently and Implications for Planning A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, 2018
In order to improve our understanding of different organizational cultures among interveners, thi... more In order to improve our understanding of different organizational cultures among interveners, this article aims to uncover the radically different worldviews within the organizational field of peacebuilding, which result in very different perceptions of the factors contributing to peace and conflict. More specifically, using peacebuilding interventions in post-earthquake Haiti as a case study, this article identifies coercive, cooperative, and substitutive worldviews, on the basis of which different types of interveners pursue strategies towards non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that are incompatible with one another. The central argument is that far from forming a homogenous organizational field, post-conflict peacebuilding can be grouped into three different subfields—stabilization, conflict resolution, and statebuilding—each guided by starkly contrasting institutional logics and contradicting worldviews.
A surge in the prevalence of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) in sub-Saharan Africa has led t... more A surge in the prevalence of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) in sub-Saharan Africa has led to concerns that they pose a growing challenge to governments and citizens across the region. This paper maps how different intervening actors—communities, governments, civil society organizations, humanitarian and development agencies, and security providers—have approached the challenges posed by CBAGs and how to best measure the success of these interventions. The mapping of approaches, analysis of lessons learned, and identification of success factors will contribute to a deeper empirical understanding of the strengths and shortcomings of current responses to CBAGs, which will inform the development of more effective and appropriate practices and policies.
My portion of this paper, Influence Inoculation: Why Some Target Audiences Are Immune to Our Effo... more My portion of this paper, Influence Inoculation: Why Some Target Audiences Are Immune to Our Efforts to Sway Them, describes a psychological phenomenon induced through peripheral or direct indoctrination through either cultural influences or the ubiquity of modern media.
International agencies responding to humanitarian crises in cities are increasingly faced with ur... more International agencies responding to humanitarian crises in cities are increasingly faced with urban armed groups controlling neighbourhoods where the most vulnerable sections of society are located. In such settings, it is not clear how to deliver aid to those who need it the most without further strengthening predatory armed actors. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Haiti, this article contributes to the emerging debate on the engagement of non-state armed groups in the context of disaster-stricken and conflict-affected cities, by presenting new empirical evidence on how humanitarian and development actors negotiate safe access in Port-au-Prince's gang-ruled neighbourhoods in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. While some major development agencies have struggled to minimize the unintended – yet potentially harmful – consequences of their activities for beneficiaries, the approach of the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio offers important lessons for more effective humanitarian response to urban crises in comparable contexts.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes form part of standard post-conflic... more Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes form part of standard post-conflict peacebuilding tools regularly applied in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, the limitations of such templates become evident when peacebuilders are confronted with unconventional settings, such as the urban environment. So far, there is a scarcity of research on UN-led DDR efforts in cities, even though the proliferation of urban armed groups is projected to pose an intractable challenge for decades to come. Based on six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince, this article presents new empirical evidence on innovative DDR programming in Haiti, the only country where a United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) tried to implement a traditional DDR programme for gang members. As this attempt proved to be a failure, the mission subsequently changed its approach to a more community-focused armed violence reduction and prevention programme which aims to disincentivize at-risk sections of the population from joining gangs. Even though the current community violence reduction approach is better adapted to the unconventional conflict environment in Haiti and is seen by many practitioners today as a role model, it shares a number of limitations with traditional DDR programmes and is not a panacea for urban peacebuilding.
With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-... more With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-gang efforts in Latin America has focused mainly on coercive mano dura policies and cooperative gang truces. Yet, there remains a paucity of studies going beyond such carrots-and-sticks approaches towards gangs. To fill this gap, this study investigates the possibilities and limitations of substitutive security governance across Latin America and the Caribbean. More specifically, this article looks at Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in Medellín, Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention (AVRP) efforts in Haiti and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Guatemala and Rio de Janeiro. It will be argued that communities are driven to support gangs against the oppressive state when they are indiscriminately targeted through muscular operations. Likewise, engaging gangs in dialogue grants them legitimacy and further weakens the position of the state. Therefore, the only sustainable solution lies in substitutive security govern-ance, which aims to replace the functions gangs fulfil for their members, sponsors, and the community in which they are nested with a modern and accountable state that is bound by the rule of law. Still, substitutive strategies vis-à-vis gangs have their own limitations, which can only be overcome by way of an integrated and coordinated framework.
The vast amount of literature emerging on the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has hitherto largely ... more The vast amount of literature emerging on the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has hitherto largely ignored one important dilemma donors may face when working with allegedly more locally accepted grassroots initiatives: while the latter are seen as indispensable actors that play important roles within their community, they might also reveal their (un)civil criminal dimension and start to prey on the supposed beneficiaries of peacebuilding and development programmes. This is exactly what I witnessed in Haiti during six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince in 2013. Based on semi-structured interviews and overt observation in Cité Soleil — often referred to as the most destitute slum in the Americas — my research investigates the different strategies that international actors take vis-à-vis community- based armed groups. While these groups are seen as legitimate civil society organisations by some donors, and as dangerous armed gangs by others, my research reveals that these two categorisations are not mutually exclusive.
The proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has caught public an... more The proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has caught public and academic attention alike, not least in the pages of this journal. To move the debate on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) forward, this article seeks to enhance our conceptual understanding of parochial armed groups which are not primarily driven by ideological or religious objectives. Thus, this article clarifies similarities as well as differences between subtypes of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) on the one hand, and between CBAGs and other NSAGs, on the other hand. By doing so, a typology is developed that classifies militias, gangs and vigilantes on the basis of their political, economic and security-related dimensions. The resulting ideal types are discussed through the lenses of different explanatory frameworks and policy debates in the field of contemporary security studies. A major typological issue is the tendency for CBAGs to ‘turn bad’ and become threats to the stability they were expected to transform, becoming a serious problem in countries where they operate. It is concluded that the challenge of CBAGs ultimately needs to be addressed by putting in place a functioning state that can tackle the underlying woes that led to their proliferation in the first place.
Conflict, Security & Development, 15 (2), May 7, 2015
In 2004, an unlikely combination of rural insurgent groups and urban gangs fought over the fate o... more In 2004, an unlikely combination of rural insurgent groups and urban gangs fought over the fate of President Aristide and brought Haiti to the brink of civil war. Ten years on, the country is still plagued by instances of armed violence. While most policy experts and practitioners seem to agree that over the last decade, violence transformed from a political into a criminal phenomenon, scholars remain divided over the question of whether Haiti's urban armed groups should be framed as a political movement or as hardened criminals. Drawing on semi-structured interviews and overt observation conducted during six months of fieldwork in Haiti in 2013, this article argues that it is crucial to refocus the analysis on the functions gangs fulfil on behalf of their politico-criminal sponsors. In contrast to the proclaimed internal shift from political to criminal motivation, this approach suggests that the constantly changing priorities of political entrepreneurs and organised crime groups shape the nature of the violent service offered by urban armed groups. The findings of this article mirror comparable dynamics in other countries in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa and have crucial implications for international agencies working in the urban environment and dealing with urban armed groups.
The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed grou... more The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-trafficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politicians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of the drug trade in Kenya.
Security Blurs: The Politics of Plural Security Provision, 2018
Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) are characterised by the proliferation of non-state a... more Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) are characterised by the proliferation of non-state armed groups that are not only causing insecurity, but have also taken over state security functions. Nevertheless, numerous academics and practitioners alike continue to frame security governance in FCAS through stringent analytical categories that are far removed from the blurriness of security actors in these settings. Based on empirical evidence from the informal settlements of Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince, this chapter challenges traditional understandings of security governance by focusing on security blurs, and specifically on the blurring between providers of security and providers of insecurity. More precisely, it is argued that whether a group is a source of security or a source of insecurity for the community in which they are nested depends primarily on the constantly shifting interests of their external sponsors.
Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding, 2020
Since 1927, the year Frederic Thrasher published his seminal work on gangs in Chicago, gang resea... more Since 1927, the year Frederic Thrasher published his seminal work on gangs in Chicago, gang research has produced numerous approaches across a variety of academic disciplines, highlighting different motivations behind a global phenomenon. Conventional criminological definitions of gangs tend to focus on their “involvement in illegal activity” (Klein, 1995; Covey, 2010, p. 4; Klein and Maxson, 2010). For instance, according to a classic definition offered by Criminal gangs as a global phenomenon have been the object of investigation in numerous studies in various parts of the world (Dowdney, 2005; Hagedorn, 2007b; Flynn and Brotherton, 2008). Yet, despite being increasingly recognized as a global and transnational challenge, most theoretical and conceptual approaches in gang research are still derived from specific case studies from the global North (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004; Klein and Maxson, 2010; Pitts, 2013). Based on an extensive literature review and field research on violent crime in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, this chapter provides empirical evidence on criminal gangs in the global South. Focusing on the case studies of Central America, Kenya and Haiti, this chapter discusses three aspects of contemporary global gangs: first, the motivation for members to join gangs; second, the transformation processes gangs typically undergo; and, third, the functions violence fulfils for various stakeholders of gangs, such as their politico-criminal sponsors and the community in which they are nested.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2022
Increasing the availability and reliability of community water sources is a primary pathway throu... more Increasing the availability and reliability of community water sources is a primary pathway through which many water supply interventions aim to achieve health gains in communities with limited access to water. While previous studies in rural settings have shown that greater access to water is associated both with increased overall consumption of water and use of water for hygiene related activities, there is limited evidence from urban environments. Using data collected from 1253 households during the evaluation of a community water supply governance and hygiene promotion intervention in the cities of Goma and Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo, we conducted a secondary analysis to determine the impact of these interventions on household water collection and use habits. Using multiple and logistic regression models we compared differences in outcomes of interest between households in quartiers with and without the intervention. Outcomes of interest included litres per capita day (lpcd) of water brought to the household, lpcd used at the household, and lpcd used for hygiene-related activities. Results demonstrated that intervention households were more likely to use community tapstands than households located in comparison quartiers and collected on average 16.3 lpcd of water, compared with 13.5 lpcd among comparison households (adj. coef: 3.2, 95 CI: 0.84 to 5.53, p = 0.008). However, reported usage of water in the household for domestic purposes was lower among intervention households (8.2 lpcd) when compared with comparison households (9.4 lpcd) (adj. coef: −1.11, 95 CI: −2.29 to 0.07), p = 0.066) and there was no difference between study groups in the amount of water allocated to hygiene activities. These results show that in this setting, implementation of a water supply governance and hygiene promotion intervention was associated with a modest increase in the amount of water being bought to the household, but that this did not translate into an increase in either overall per capita consumption of water or the per capita amount of water being allocated to hygiene related activities.
Humanitarian and development agencies intervening in Latin American cities increasingly face the ... more Humanitarian and development agencies intervening in Latin American cities increasingly face the challenge posed by criminal armed groups (CAGs). Yet, there is a need for evidencebased comparative studies on how international agencies deal with them. Drawing on data collected in Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Mexico, this paper presents a novel typology of humanitarian organisations' access strategies that distinguishes between different levels of interaction with CAGs. The paper shows how humanitarian agencies assess a variety of risks and balance the potential consequences of their engagement with CAGs with the need to maintain constructive and trustful relationships with the state and the community with which they work. It finds that indirect dialogue or negotiation with CAGs via community leaders who act as intermediaries might provide a low-risk alternative to direct negotiation with CAG leaders, provided that 'do no harm' and humanitarian protection considerations vis-à-vis communities and intermediaries play a central role.
Brazil’s role in UN peacekeeping operations has been subject to increasing attention from academi... more Brazil’s role in UN peacekeeping operations has been subject to increasing attention from academics and policy makers alike. While some authors praise Brazil’s engagement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a case of innovative South-South cooperation, others accuse Brazil of using Haiti as a ‘testing ground’ for repressive anti-gang tactics that have subsequently been introduced at home. This article challenges these two dominant views on Brazil’s role in Haiti. Based on a period of six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince and interviews with key Brazilian actors, the article draws a parallel between MINUSTAH’s military raids in gang-ruled neighbourhoods coupled with police reform in Haiti, on one hand, and the Pacifying Police Units (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora) plus the accompanying UPP Social in Rio de Janeiro, on the other hand. It is argued that Brazil’s peacekeeping strategy, at home and abroad, is a mix of coercive and cooperative measures reminiscent of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics already employed during the French colonial war in Algeria. Moreover, it is shown that policing techniques borrowed from the US are employed to ease the tension between carrots and sticks, notably so in the urban environment in which Brazilian peacekeeping is taking place.
With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-... more With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-gang efforts in Latin America has focused mainly on coercive mano dura policies and cooperative gang truces. Yet, there remains a paucity of studies going beyond such carrots-and-sticks approaches towards gangs. To fill this gap, this study investigates the possibilities and limitations of substitutive security governance across Latin America and the Caribbean. More specifically, this article looks at Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in Medellín, Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention (AVRP) efforts in Haiti and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Guatemala and Rio de Janeiro. It will be argued that communities are driven to support gangs against the oppressive state when they are indiscriminately targeted through muscular operations. Likewise, engaging gangs in dialogue grants them legitimacy and further weakens the position of the state. Therefore, the only sustainable solution lies in substitutive security governance, which aims to replace the functions gangs fulfill for their members, sponsors, and the community in which they are nested with a modern and accountable state that is bound by the rule of law. Still, substitutive strategies vis-à-vis gangs have their own limitations, which can only be overcome by way of an integrated and coordinated framework.
Many cities in contemporary Africa are characterised by hybrid modes of security governance that ... more Many cities in contemporary Africa are characterised by hybrid modes of security governance that are co-produced by a variety of state and non-state actors of violence. While the (il)legitimacy of informal non-state security providers on the local level has featured prominently in discussions on hybrid security governance, there is a paucity of empirical case studies of what actually contributes to their (de)legitimisation, notably in the urban context. In order to fill this gap in knowledge, this article investigates how the legitimacy of community-based armed groups – such as vigilantes, militias and gangs – that are operating in Kenyan cities is influenced by the shifting functions they fulfil on behalf of various stakeholders. Based on field research in the informal settlements of Nairobi and Mombasa, I found that their involvement in organised criminal activities often costs vigilantes the legitimacy they had gained by providing protection and crime control for their community. At the same time, their involvement in repeated cycles of post-election violence leads not only to increasing ethnic segregation of the slums in which they operate, but also to the bifurcation of their legitimacy along ethnic lines. Taken together, the article contributes to our understanding of urban violence and conflict in Eastern Africa by tracing the trajectory of the (de)legitimisation of hybrid security actors in the two main cities in Kenya.
Blame, Sway, and Vigilante Tactics: How Other Cultures Think Differently and Implications for Planning A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, 2018
In order to improve our understanding of different organizational cultures among interveners, thi... more In order to improve our understanding of different organizational cultures among interveners, this article aims to uncover the radically different worldviews within the organizational field of peacebuilding, which result in very different perceptions of the factors contributing to peace and conflict. More specifically, using peacebuilding interventions in post-earthquake Haiti as a case study, this article identifies coercive, cooperative, and substitutive worldviews, on the basis of which different types of interveners pursue strategies towards non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that are incompatible with one another. The central argument is that far from forming a homogenous organizational field, post-conflict peacebuilding can be grouped into three different subfields—stabilization, conflict resolution, and statebuilding—each guided by starkly contrasting institutional logics and contradicting worldviews.
A surge in the prevalence of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) in sub-Saharan Africa has led t... more A surge in the prevalence of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) in sub-Saharan Africa has led to concerns that they pose a growing challenge to governments and citizens across the region. This paper maps how different intervening actors—communities, governments, civil society organizations, humanitarian and development agencies, and security providers—have approached the challenges posed by CBAGs and how to best measure the success of these interventions. The mapping of approaches, analysis of lessons learned, and identification of success factors will contribute to a deeper empirical understanding of the strengths and shortcomings of current responses to CBAGs, which will inform the development of more effective and appropriate practices and policies.
My portion of this paper, Influence Inoculation: Why Some Target Audiences Are Immune to Our Effo... more My portion of this paper, Influence Inoculation: Why Some Target Audiences Are Immune to Our Efforts to Sway Them, describes a psychological phenomenon induced through peripheral or direct indoctrination through either cultural influences or the ubiquity of modern media.
International agencies responding to humanitarian crises in cities are increasingly faced with ur... more International agencies responding to humanitarian crises in cities are increasingly faced with urban armed groups controlling neighbourhoods where the most vulnerable sections of society are located. In such settings, it is not clear how to deliver aid to those who need it the most without further strengthening predatory armed actors. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Haiti, this article contributes to the emerging debate on the engagement of non-state armed groups in the context of disaster-stricken and conflict-affected cities, by presenting new empirical evidence on how humanitarian and development actors negotiate safe access in Port-au-Prince's gang-ruled neighbourhoods in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. While some major development agencies have struggled to minimize the unintended – yet potentially harmful – consequences of their activities for beneficiaries, the approach of the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio offers important lessons for more effective humanitarian response to urban crises in comparable contexts.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes form part of standard post-conflic... more Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes form part of standard post-conflict peacebuilding tools regularly applied in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, the limitations of such templates become evident when peacebuilders are confronted with unconventional settings, such as the urban environment. So far, there is a scarcity of research on UN-led DDR efforts in cities, even though the proliferation of urban armed groups is projected to pose an intractable challenge for decades to come. Based on six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince, this article presents new empirical evidence on innovative DDR programming in Haiti, the only country where a United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) tried to implement a traditional DDR programme for gang members. As this attempt proved to be a failure, the mission subsequently changed its approach to a more community-focused armed violence reduction and prevention programme which aims to disincentivize at-risk sections of the population from joining gangs. Even though the current community violence reduction approach is better adapted to the unconventional conflict environment in Haiti and is seen by many practitioners today as a role model, it shares a number of limitations with traditional DDR programmes and is not a panacea for urban peacebuilding.
With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-... more With responses to urban violence receiving increasing academic attention, the literature on anti-gang efforts in Latin America has focused mainly on coercive mano dura policies and cooperative gang truces. Yet, there remains a paucity of studies going beyond such carrots-and-sticks approaches towards gangs. To fill this gap, this study investigates the possibilities and limitations of substitutive security governance across Latin America and the Caribbean. More specifically, this article looks at Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in Medellín, Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention (AVRP) efforts in Haiti and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Guatemala and Rio de Janeiro. It will be argued that communities are driven to support gangs against the oppressive state when they are indiscriminately targeted through muscular operations. Likewise, engaging gangs in dialogue grants them legitimacy and further weakens the position of the state. Therefore, the only sustainable solution lies in substitutive security govern-ance, which aims to replace the functions gangs fulfil for their members, sponsors, and the community in which they are nested with a modern and accountable state that is bound by the rule of law. Still, substitutive strategies vis-à-vis gangs have their own limitations, which can only be overcome by way of an integrated and coordinated framework.
The vast amount of literature emerging on the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has hitherto largely ... more The vast amount of literature emerging on the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has hitherto largely ignored one important dilemma donors may face when working with allegedly more locally accepted grassroots initiatives: while the latter are seen as indispensable actors that play important roles within their community, they might also reveal their (un)civil criminal dimension and start to prey on the supposed beneficiaries of peacebuilding and development programmes. This is exactly what I witnessed in Haiti during six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince in 2013. Based on semi-structured interviews and overt observation in Cité Soleil — often referred to as the most destitute slum in the Americas — my research investigates the different strategies that international actors take vis-à-vis community- based armed groups. While these groups are seen as legitimate civil society organisations by some donors, and as dangerous armed gangs by others, my research reveals that these two categorisations are not mutually exclusive.
The proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has caught public an... more The proliferation of irregular armed actors which defy simplistic definition has caught public and academic attention alike, not least in the pages of this journal. To move the debate on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) forward, this article seeks to enhance our conceptual understanding of parochial armed groups which are not primarily driven by ideological or religious objectives. Thus, this article clarifies similarities as well as differences between subtypes of community-based armed groups (CBAGs) on the one hand, and between CBAGs and other NSAGs, on the other hand. By doing so, a typology is developed that classifies militias, gangs and vigilantes on the basis of their political, economic and security-related dimensions. The resulting ideal types are discussed through the lenses of different explanatory frameworks and policy debates in the field of contemporary security studies. A major typological issue is the tendency for CBAGs to ‘turn bad’ and become threats to the stability they were expected to transform, becoming a serious problem in countries where they operate. It is concluded that the challenge of CBAGs ultimately needs to be addressed by putting in place a functioning state that can tackle the underlying woes that led to their proliferation in the first place.
Conflict, Security & Development, 15 (2), May 7, 2015
In 2004, an unlikely combination of rural insurgent groups and urban gangs fought over the fate o... more In 2004, an unlikely combination of rural insurgent groups and urban gangs fought over the fate of President Aristide and brought Haiti to the brink of civil war. Ten years on, the country is still plagued by instances of armed violence. While most policy experts and practitioners seem to agree that over the last decade, violence transformed from a political into a criminal phenomenon, scholars remain divided over the question of whether Haiti's urban armed groups should be framed as a political movement or as hardened criminals. Drawing on semi-structured interviews and overt observation conducted during six months of fieldwork in Haiti in 2013, this article argues that it is crucial to refocus the analysis on the functions gangs fulfil on behalf of their politico-criminal sponsors. In contrast to the proclaimed internal shift from political to criminal motivation, this approach suggests that the constantly changing priorities of political entrepreneurs and organised crime groups shape the nature of the violent service offered by urban armed groups. The findings of this article mirror comparable dynamics in other countries in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa and have crucial implications for international agencies working in the urban environment and dealing with urban armed groups.
The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed grou... more The Kenyan state is currently under pressure from two sides: First, numerous non-state armed groups have taken over the provision of security in areas where the state is practically absent. Second, drug-trafficking organizations are gaining ground as the country is increasingly being used as a major transit hub for narcotics. This article investigates the relationship between drug trafficking and informal security provision in Kenya and draws analogies from comparable experiences in Latin America and West Africa. Field research in Kenya has demonstrated that profit-oriented, informal security actors in Mombasa work for drug lords, while their counterparts in Nairobi are more likely to be hired by politicians. Moreover, faith-based vigilante groups in both cities appear to be less susceptible to external manipulation by drug traffickers. The article concludes by considering the potential consequences of an expansion of the drug trade in Kenya.
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Papers by Moritz Schuberth