In 2016, Kennan Ferguson published “Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians?” Ferguson d... more In 2016, Kennan Ferguson published “Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians?” Ferguson described structural features of contemporary political science to explain the exclusion of Indigenous peoples and knowledges from the discipline. Today, there is a different context. In universities, Indigenous knowledges are no longer ignored or disqualified, rather there are aims to diversify and deparochialize the curriculum, while opening space for Indigenous scholarship. Despite good intentions, however, there are still structural obstacles to taking up Indigenous knowledges in the university generally and political science specifically. We evoke a stylized Reviewer 2 to describe dynamics within the peer review process that tend to limit or exclude interventions that engage with Indigenous knowledges: 1) the disciplining effects of disciplines; (2) the reproduction of eurocentrism; (3) the demand for essentialism or romanticization – or the challenge to both; and (4) the unfair politicization of the “good” argument. We identify a fifth (5) dynamic related to the continued underrepresentation of Indigenous scholars. We conclude by indicating ways that reviewers and editors committed to pluralism can rigorously carry out peer review while opening up political science to Indigenous knowledges.
En 2016, Kennan Ferguson a publié « Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians ? » (« Pourq... more En 2016, Kennan Ferguson a publié « Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians ? » (« Pourquoi la science politique déteste-t-elle les Amérindiens ? »). Ferguson y décrivait les caractéristiques structurelles de la science politique contemporaine pour expliquer l’exclusion des peuples et des savoirs autochtones de la discipline. Aujourd’hui, le contexte est différent. Dans les universités, les savoirs autochtones ne sont plus ignorés ou disqualifiés, mais on cherche plutôt à diversifier et à déparochialiser les programmes d’études, tout en ouvrant un espace à l’érudition autochtone. Cependant, malgré ces bonnes intentions, il existe toujours des obstacles structurels à la prise en compte des savoirs autochtones dans l’Université en général et dans les sciences politiques en particulier. Nous évoquons un évaluateur n°2 stylisé pour décrire les dynamiques au sein du processus d’évaluation par les pairs qui tendent à limiter ou à exclure les interventions qui s’engagent dans les savoirs autochtones : 1) les effets disciplinaires des disciplines ; 2) la reproduction de l’eurocentrisme ; 3) la demande d’essentialisme ou de romantisme - ou la remise en question des deux ; et 4) la politisation abusive du « bon » argument. Nous identifions une cinquième dynamique liée à (5) la sous-représentation persistante des chercheurs autochtones. Nous concluons en indiquant comment les évaluateurs et les rédacteurs en chef attachés au pluralisme peuvent procéder rigoureusement à l’évaluation par les pairs tout en ouvrant la science politique aux savoirs autochtones.
Indigenous Peoples and the Future of Federalism, 2024
This paper considers the UNDRIP and the project of implementation in light of the ideas of legal ... more This paper considers the UNDRIP and the project of implementation in light of the ideas of legal and political constitutionalism. Its aims are to link criticisms of the UNDRIP with these broader strands of theoretical reflection on constitutional politics so as to achieve a clearer understanding about what precisely these objections are reaching at; and to support the alternative offered by political constitutionalism for thinking about Indigenous self-determination. I argue that criticisms of the UNDRIP make the most sense when the UNDRIP and the project of implementation are associated with a legal constitutionalist discourse, which holds essential to promulgate certain legal rights that structure, limit and direct the conduct of political affairs. The central issue with this constitutional discourse is that it reduces political agency to its legal form, thus undermining Indigenous self-determination. In contrast, I argue that the political constitutionalist discourse allows us, as the name of the discourse suggests, to politicize our understanding of Indigenous self-determination and thus to keep in mind the centrality of political conduct to its enactment and safeguarding.
This article critically engages with the Canadian framing of settler colonial/decolonial politics... more This article critically engages with the Canadian framing of settler colonial/decolonial politics in terms of guilt and innocence. I argue that centring innocence, even as something to be snatched away from settlers, as with the theorization of settler moves to innocence, can corrupt the practice of moral responsibility. Furthermore, I argue that the desire for and expectation of innocence, in the face of structural injustices such as settler colonialism, are illusionary and that complicity is widespread. In contrast, I follow Iris Marion Young's focus on political responsibility, but I argue that public collective actions need not be as centred as she suggests. Given the nature of settler colonialism and of coloniality, I argue for the acknowledgment of the political significance of daily individual acts and for the cultivation of dispositions that disrupt unjust structures, such as a disposition to transgress.
This paper puts three discourses about resistance and violence in conversation, highlighting the ... more This paper puts three discourses about resistance and violence in conversation, highlighting the distinctive non-violent features of Indigenous movements, among other aims. Nelson Mandela holds the first discourse, offering a dialectical view of resistance, where the oppressor sets the terms of the confrontation and where violence is an allowable mode of resistance. James Tully holds the second, focussing on civic citizenship as the nonviolent engagement of political agents with the terms of their governance. The third is that of Indigenous theorists whose work focuses on resurgence, offering a disjunctive view of resistance, as transgressive and generative of a distinct Indigenous world. The last part of this paper braids these discourses to reveal overlaps, missed aspects, or disagreements about the relationship each affirms between resistance and violence.
This essay relies on the insight that settler colonialism is an ongoing structure geared toward t... more This essay relies on the insight that settler colonialism is an ongoing structure geared toward the elimination of Indigenous presence to argue that ideologies that legitimate and naturalize settler occupation are equally ongoing. More specifically, the ideologies that justify settler colonialism in major states like Australia, Canada, and the United States, are like Flying Heads that shape-shift and recur over time. We explore how two notorious ideological tropes—terra nullius and the myth of the Vanishing Race—recur in the work of contrasting contemporary theorists. Ultimately, Flying Head ideologies of settler colonialism cannot be defeated by reasoned argument alone, but by structural transformations beyond the settler-colonial relations that necessitate and sustain them. Following diverse Indigenous theorists and activists, we briefly explore prefigurative resurgent practices and how Indigenous political imaginaries, like the Dish with One Spoon, offer alternatives to transcend...
In what follows, I reflect on themes arising from my reading of Jacob Levy’s The Separation of Po... more In what follows, I reflect on themes arising from my reading of Jacob Levy’s The Separation of Powers and the Challenge to Constitutional Democracy. According to Levy, the separation of powers in contemporary constitutional democracies is failing, thus endangering the rule of law. Briefly, this is because political parties have bridged the gap between the legislature and the executive: by giving rise to partisan politics that cross the institutional divide, political parties have dampened, if not disabled, the institutional incentive and motivation of the legislature to keep the executive in check. Furthermore, when this is combined with the myth of the united and undifferentiated people, which the executive, populistically, can easily claim to embody, the simple act of opposing the executive may be framed as seditious. In the end, the power of the executive is set free by the partisan loyalty of fellow party members and by the framing of opposition as disloyal and deleterious to th...
This paper aims to contribute to the decolonization and Indigenization of democratic the-ory. Reg... more This paper aims to contribute to the decolonization and Indigenization of democratic the-ory. Regarding decolonization, I explain that democratic self-determination is typically as-sociated with sovereign autonomy and can serve to justify policies and discourses of settlercolonial control, erasure, and assimilation. Regarding Indigenization, I reconceptualize demo-cratic self-determination from an Indigenous starting point. I discuss the Two Row Wampumof the Haudenosaunee Confederacy and offer an account of the political principles it embodies.I interpret it as advancing a relational conception of democratic autonomy, which makes it pos-sible to embrace a plurality of political arrangements and political actors, to blur the distinctionbetween internal authority and external sovereignty, and to de-emphasize the enforcement ofdecisions in favor of the maintenance of commitments to a political relationship.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2019
Rationalism refers to a mode of theorizing that sees in universal reason the right tool to appreh... more Rationalism refers to a mode of theorizing that sees in universal reason the right tool to apprehend politics. It affirms that everything needs to be grounded in reason and it is optimistic that reason has the power to set all social and political institutions and practices on firm rational foundations. In this paper, I argue that this mode of theorizing is a source of epistemic violence in that it silences and distorts the voices of the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island. I firstly explain what this mode of theorizing is in greater detail. I secondly provide an account of the ways in which it is generally applied to the theorization of Indigenous peoples and to their political claims. Thirdly and fourthly, I explain how this rationalist mode of theorizing both silences and distorts the voices of Indigenous peoples. Finally, I explain what is entailed in opposing rationalism so as to hear Indigenous peoples in their own voices. I discuss two considerations about politics and political theory that should be kept in mind so as to avoid masking domination under the guise of reason and ignoring people’s agency in determining the right structure of society.
I contrast two perspectives adopted to theorize political authorities. The first is the modern pe... more I contrast two perspectives adopted to theorize political authorities. The first is the modern perspective. It conceives of political society as a civic union of free and equal citizens and regards the state as the political organization of this society. This perspective is primarily concerned with the principles that should govern the use of state power. The second is the political pluralist perspective. It recognizes a multiplicity of normative orders as equally legitimate. The focus is put on the civic processes by which a diverse citizenry should negotiate its interactions. I illustrate these perspectives by considering how they approach diversity, and more specifically the political claims of indigenous peoples. The pluralist perspective is argued to be normatively motivated by a consideration for the actual freedom of citizens to sustain diverse normative orders, to negotiate the structure of political society, and to jointly search for justice.
Citizenship is presented as a mode of governance, independently from substantive conceptions of p... more Citizenship is presented as a mode of governance, independently from substantive conceptions of political community, and differentiated citizenship and citizenship removal are assessed in light of this approach. In the first part, I present citizenship as a relationship where the governors are liable to the governed. In the second part, I argue that differentiation should be the norm rather than the exception. In the third part, I present three forms of differentiated citizenship and I discuss their compatibility with civic governance. I specifically make a case against the regularization of the power to remove citizenship.
This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civi... more This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civic trust. Three claims are defended: (1) there is nothing specific to democracy regarding the affirmation that trust is required for social cooperation; (2) democracy, when conceived discursively, depends on guarded epistemic trust and; (3) popular control may require, in some contexts, institutions that express and foster distrust towards a specific section of the population. The conclusion to be drawn is that the appropriateness of trust for the achievement of popular control over government depends on a contextual and realist assessment.
How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? On... more How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the default locus of political power is with the lowest competent political unit. This paper argues that subsidiarity is a structural principle of a conception of political legitimacy informed by epistemic considerations. Broadly, the argument is that political societies organised according to the principle of subsidiarity can more effectively achieve political decisions that can justifiably appear to be correct from the point of view of those subject to them. The paper presents two considerations in order to establish a pro tanto case for acting separately before presenting five additional epistemic considerations that establish a prima facie case for acting separately. The paper then shows that political legitimacy and the epistemic aim of decision-making can sometimes be served more effectively and efficiently by allowing higher-level political units to help lower-level political units.
This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and ... more This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and epistemic considerations. In the first part, I present the political conception of human rights. I then argue for four desiderata that such a conception should meet to be functionally applicable. In the rest of the first section and in the second section, I explain how abstract human right norms and the practice of specification prevent the political conception from meeting these four desiderata. In the last part of the paper, I argue that full-fledged tolerance in the international order – that is tolerance-as-non-intervention and tolerance-as-respect – should be attached to (1) compliance with jus cogens norms and to; (2a) a political community recognisably organised as a community of inquiry that is; (2b) committed to the specification and incorporation or expression of the idea of human rights within its local legal system.
This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first e... more This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first explain the view of corruption as a disease of the political body. Following this view, we have to consider the type of actions that debase a political entity of its constitutive principal in order to assess corruption. Accordingly, we need to consider what the constitutive principle of democracy is. This is the task I undertake in the second section where I explicate democratic legitimacy. I present democracy as a procedure of social inquiry about what ought to be done that includes epistemic and practical considerations. In the third section, I argue that the problem of corruption for a procedural conception of democracy is that the epistemic value of the procedure is diminished by corrupted agents’ lack of concern for truth. Corruption, according to this view, consists in two deformities of truth: lying and bullshit. These deformities corrupt since they conceal private interests under the guise of a concern for truth. In the fourth section, I discuss the difficulties a procedural account may face in formulating solutions to the problem of corruption.
This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistem... more This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts do not have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review.
Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the ach... more Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the achievement of correct decisions. The aims of this paper are to discuss the mechanisms which allow an open, free and inclusive forum of deliberation to achieve correct decisions and to discuss the impact of deliberation on disagreement. I concentrate on the constructive function of democracy which designates the capacity of deliberative democracy to identify and frame the problems of justice faced by a polity in epistemically positive ways. I first explain how democracy can pool information. This is then used to explain how deliberation can enable agreement to emerge. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of deliberation and how it is unable to resolve some disagreements. The final element of my discussion is an explanation of the role of deliberation in framing political disagreements. I argue that deliberation helps in avoiding unsustainable political disagreements which could bring about political decay.
Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la fonction constructive de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique.
I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting... more I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point.
In 2016, Kennan Ferguson published “Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians?” Ferguson d... more In 2016, Kennan Ferguson published “Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians?” Ferguson described structural features of contemporary political science to explain the exclusion of Indigenous peoples and knowledges from the discipline. Today, there is a different context. In universities, Indigenous knowledges are no longer ignored or disqualified, rather there are aims to diversify and deparochialize the curriculum, while opening space for Indigenous scholarship. Despite good intentions, however, there are still structural obstacles to taking up Indigenous knowledges in the university generally and political science specifically. We evoke a stylized Reviewer 2 to describe dynamics within the peer review process that tend to limit or exclude interventions that engage with Indigenous knowledges: 1) the disciplining effects of disciplines; (2) the reproduction of eurocentrism; (3) the demand for essentialism or romanticization – or the challenge to both; and (4) the unfair politicization of the “good” argument. We identify a fifth (5) dynamic related to the continued underrepresentation of Indigenous scholars. We conclude by indicating ways that reviewers and editors committed to pluralism can rigorously carry out peer review while opening up political science to Indigenous knowledges.
En 2016, Kennan Ferguson a publié « Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians ? » (« Pourq... more En 2016, Kennan Ferguson a publié « Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians ? » (« Pourquoi la science politique déteste-t-elle les Amérindiens ? »). Ferguson y décrivait les caractéristiques structurelles de la science politique contemporaine pour expliquer l’exclusion des peuples et des savoirs autochtones de la discipline. Aujourd’hui, le contexte est différent. Dans les universités, les savoirs autochtones ne sont plus ignorés ou disqualifiés, mais on cherche plutôt à diversifier et à déparochialiser les programmes d’études, tout en ouvrant un espace à l’érudition autochtone. Cependant, malgré ces bonnes intentions, il existe toujours des obstacles structurels à la prise en compte des savoirs autochtones dans l’Université en général et dans les sciences politiques en particulier. Nous évoquons un évaluateur n°2 stylisé pour décrire les dynamiques au sein du processus d’évaluation par les pairs qui tendent à limiter ou à exclure les interventions qui s’engagent dans les savoirs autochtones : 1) les effets disciplinaires des disciplines ; 2) la reproduction de l’eurocentrisme ; 3) la demande d’essentialisme ou de romantisme - ou la remise en question des deux ; et 4) la politisation abusive du « bon » argument. Nous identifions une cinquième dynamique liée à (5) la sous-représentation persistante des chercheurs autochtones. Nous concluons en indiquant comment les évaluateurs et les rédacteurs en chef attachés au pluralisme peuvent procéder rigoureusement à l’évaluation par les pairs tout en ouvrant la science politique aux savoirs autochtones.
Indigenous Peoples and the Future of Federalism, 2024
This paper considers the UNDRIP and the project of implementation in light of the ideas of legal ... more This paper considers the UNDRIP and the project of implementation in light of the ideas of legal and political constitutionalism. Its aims are to link criticisms of the UNDRIP with these broader strands of theoretical reflection on constitutional politics so as to achieve a clearer understanding about what precisely these objections are reaching at; and to support the alternative offered by political constitutionalism for thinking about Indigenous self-determination. I argue that criticisms of the UNDRIP make the most sense when the UNDRIP and the project of implementation are associated with a legal constitutionalist discourse, which holds essential to promulgate certain legal rights that structure, limit and direct the conduct of political affairs. The central issue with this constitutional discourse is that it reduces political agency to its legal form, thus undermining Indigenous self-determination. In contrast, I argue that the political constitutionalist discourse allows us, as the name of the discourse suggests, to politicize our understanding of Indigenous self-determination and thus to keep in mind the centrality of political conduct to its enactment and safeguarding.
This article critically engages with the Canadian framing of settler colonial/decolonial politics... more This article critically engages with the Canadian framing of settler colonial/decolonial politics in terms of guilt and innocence. I argue that centring innocence, even as something to be snatched away from settlers, as with the theorization of settler moves to innocence, can corrupt the practice of moral responsibility. Furthermore, I argue that the desire for and expectation of innocence, in the face of structural injustices such as settler colonialism, are illusionary and that complicity is widespread. In contrast, I follow Iris Marion Young's focus on political responsibility, but I argue that public collective actions need not be as centred as she suggests. Given the nature of settler colonialism and of coloniality, I argue for the acknowledgment of the political significance of daily individual acts and for the cultivation of dispositions that disrupt unjust structures, such as a disposition to transgress.
This paper puts three discourses about resistance and violence in conversation, highlighting the ... more This paper puts three discourses about resistance and violence in conversation, highlighting the distinctive non-violent features of Indigenous movements, among other aims. Nelson Mandela holds the first discourse, offering a dialectical view of resistance, where the oppressor sets the terms of the confrontation and where violence is an allowable mode of resistance. James Tully holds the second, focussing on civic citizenship as the nonviolent engagement of political agents with the terms of their governance. The third is that of Indigenous theorists whose work focuses on resurgence, offering a disjunctive view of resistance, as transgressive and generative of a distinct Indigenous world. The last part of this paper braids these discourses to reveal overlaps, missed aspects, or disagreements about the relationship each affirms between resistance and violence.
This essay relies on the insight that settler colonialism is an ongoing structure geared toward t... more This essay relies on the insight that settler colonialism is an ongoing structure geared toward the elimination of Indigenous presence to argue that ideologies that legitimate and naturalize settler occupation are equally ongoing. More specifically, the ideologies that justify settler colonialism in major states like Australia, Canada, and the United States, are like Flying Heads that shape-shift and recur over time. We explore how two notorious ideological tropes—terra nullius and the myth of the Vanishing Race—recur in the work of contrasting contemporary theorists. Ultimately, Flying Head ideologies of settler colonialism cannot be defeated by reasoned argument alone, but by structural transformations beyond the settler-colonial relations that necessitate and sustain them. Following diverse Indigenous theorists and activists, we briefly explore prefigurative resurgent practices and how Indigenous political imaginaries, like the Dish with One Spoon, offer alternatives to transcend...
In what follows, I reflect on themes arising from my reading of Jacob Levy’s The Separation of Po... more In what follows, I reflect on themes arising from my reading of Jacob Levy’s The Separation of Powers and the Challenge to Constitutional Democracy. According to Levy, the separation of powers in contemporary constitutional democracies is failing, thus endangering the rule of law. Briefly, this is because political parties have bridged the gap between the legislature and the executive: by giving rise to partisan politics that cross the institutional divide, political parties have dampened, if not disabled, the institutional incentive and motivation of the legislature to keep the executive in check. Furthermore, when this is combined with the myth of the united and undifferentiated people, which the executive, populistically, can easily claim to embody, the simple act of opposing the executive may be framed as seditious. In the end, the power of the executive is set free by the partisan loyalty of fellow party members and by the framing of opposition as disloyal and deleterious to th...
This paper aims to contribute to the decolonization and Indigenization of democratic the-ory. Reg... more This paper aims to contribute to the decolonization and Indigenization of democratic the-ory. Regarding decolonization, I explain that democratic self-determination is typically as-sociated with sovereign autonomy and can serve to justify policies and discourses of settlercolonial control, erasure, and assimilation. Regarding Indigenization, I reconceptualize demo-cratic self-determination from an Indigenous starting point. I discuss the Two Row Wampumof the Haudenosaunee Confederacy and offer an account of the political principles it embodies.I interpret it as advancing a relational conception of democratic autonomy, which makes it pos-sible to embrace a plurality of political arrangements and political actors, to blur the distinctionbetween internal authority and external sovereignty, and to de-emphasize the enforcement ofdecisions in favor of the maintenance of commitments to a political relationship.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2019
Rationalism refers to a mode of theorizing that sees in universal reason the right tool to appreh... more Rationalism refers to a mode of theorizing that sees in universal reason the right tool to apprehend politics. It affirms that everything needs to be grounded in reason and it is optimistic that reason has the power to set all social and political institutions and practices on firm rational foundations. In this paper, I argue that this mode of theorizing is a source of epistemic violence in that it silences and distorts the voices of the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island. I firstly explain what this mode of theorizing is in greater detail. I secondly provide an account of the ways in which it is generally applied to the theorization of Indigenous peoples and to their political claims. Thirdly and fourthly, I explain how this rationalist mode of theorizing both silences and distorts the voices of Indigenous peoples. Finally, I explain what is entailed in opposing rationalism so as to hear Indigenous peoples in their own voices. I discuss two considerations about politics and political theory that should be kept in mind so as to avoid masking domination under the guise of reason and ignoring people’s agency in determining the right structure of society.
I contrast two perspectives adopted to theorize political authorities. The first is the modern pe... more I contrast two perspectives adopted to theorize political authorities. The first is the modern perspective. It conceives of political society as a civic union of free and equal citizens and regards the state as the political organization of this society. This perspective is primarily concerned with the principles that should govern the use of state power. The second is the political pluralist perspective. It recognizes a multiplicity of normative orders as equally legitimate. The focus is put on the civic processes by which a diverse citizenry should negotiate its interactions. I illustrate these perspectives by considering how they approach diversity, and more specifically the political claims of indigenous peoples. The pluralist perspective is argued to be normatively motivated by a consideration for the actual freedom of citizens to sustain diverse normative orders, to negotiate the structure of political society, and to jointly search for justice.
Citizenship is presented as a mode of governance, independently from substantive conceptions of p... more Citizenship is presented as a mode of governance, independently from substantive conceptions of political community, and differentiated citizenship and citizenship removal are assessed in light of this approach. In the first part, I present citizenship as a relationship where the governors are liable to the governed. In the second part, I argue that differentiation should be the norm rather than the exception. In the third part, I present three forms of differentiated citizenship and I discuss their compatibility with civic governance. I specifically make a case against the regularization of the power to remove citizenship.
This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civi... more This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civic trust. Three claims are defended: (1) there is nothing specific to democracy regarding the affirmation that trust is required for social cooperation; (2) democracy, when conceived discursively, depends on guarded epistemic trust and; (3) popular control may require, in some contexts, institutions that express and foster distrust towards a specific section of the population. The conclusion to be drawn is that the appropriateness of trust for the achievement of popular control over government depends on a contextual and realist assessment.
How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? On... more How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the default locus of political power is with the lowest competent political unit. This paper argues that subsidiarity is a structural principle of a conception of political legitimacy informed by epistemic considerations. Broadly, the argument is that political societies organised according to the principle of subsidiarity can more effectively achieve political decisions that can justifiably appear to be correct from the point of view of those subject to them. The paper presents two considerations in order to establish a pro tanto case for acting separately before presenting five additional epistemic considerations that establish a prima facie case for acting separately. The paper then shows that political legitimacy and the epistemic aim of decision-making can sometimes be served more effectively and efficiently by allowing higher-level political units to help lower-level political units.
This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and ... more This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and epistemic considerations. In the first part, I present the political conception of human rights. I then argue for four desiderata that such a conception should meet to be functionally applicable. In the rest of the first section and in the second section, I explain how abstract human right norms and the practice of specification prevent the political conception from meeting these four desiderata. In the last part of the paper, I argue that full-fledged tolerance in the international order – that is tolerance-as-non-intervention and tolerance-as-respect – should be attached to (1) compliance with jus cogens norms and to; (2a) a political community recognisably organised as a community of inquiry that is; (2b) committed to the specification and incorporation or expression of the idea of human rights within its local legal system.
This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first e... more This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first explain the view of corruption as a disease of the political body. Following this view, we have to consider the type of actions that debase a political entity of its constitutive principal in order to assess corruption. Accordingly, we need to consider what the constitutive principle of democracy is. This is the task I undertake in the second section where I explicate democratic legitimacy. I present democracy as a procedure of social inquiry about what ought to be done that includes epistemic and practical considerations. In the third section, I argue that the problem of corruption for a procedural conception of democracy is that the epistemic value of the procedure is diminished by corrupted agents’ lack of concern for truth. Corruption, according to this view, consists in two deformities of truth: lying and bullshit. These deformities corrupt since they conceal private interests under the guise of a concern for truth. In the fourth section, I discuss the difficulties a procedural account may face in formulating solutions to the problem of corruption.
This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistem... more This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts do not have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review.
Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the ach... more Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the achievement of correct decisions. The aims of this paper are to discuss the mechanisms which allow an open, free and inclusive forum of deliberation to achieve correct decisions and to discuss the impact of deliberation on disagreement. I concentrate on the constructive function of democracy which designates the capacity of deliberative democracy to identify and frame the problems of justice faced by a polity in epistemically positive ways. I first explain how democracy can pool information. This is then used to explain how deliberation can enable agreement to emerge. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of deliberation and how it is unable to resolve some disagreements. The final element of my discussion is an explanation of the role of deliberation in framing political disagreements. I argue that deliberation helps in avoiding unsustainable political disagreements which could bring about political decay.
Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la fonction constructive de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique.
I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting... more I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point.
ID: International Dialogue, A Multidisciplinary Journal of World Affairs , 2015
Review of: Truth and Democracy
Jeremy Elkins and Andrew Norris (eds). Philadelphia: University of... more Review of: Truth and Democracy Jeremy Elkins and Andrew Norris (eds). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 346pp.
This paper engages with shared aspects of First Nation and Native American political
thought to ... more This paper engages with shared aspects of First Nation and Native American political
thought to delink populism and democracy. It first offers an account of populism as a form of politics that combines an anti-elitist discourse with an exclusionary view of the people. Three political ideas are then presented as offering fertile grounds for populism: (1) the idea of a polity as constituted by a unique and uniform people; (2) the idea that politics is primarily about exercising authority; (3) the idea that political relationships should be structured by justice. First Nation and Native American political theories are then discussed as offering decolonial options that center relationality and responsibility and that thus render populism unintelligible as allowable democratic conduct.
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Articles and chapters by Yann Allard-Tremblay
Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la fonction constructive de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique.
Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la fonction constructive de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique.
Jeremy Elkins and Andrew Norris (eds). Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 346pp.
thought to delink populism and democracy. It first offers an account of populism as a form of politics that combines an anti-elitist discourse with an exclusionary view of the people. Three political ideas are then presented as offering fertile grounds for populism: (1) the idea of a polity as constituted by a unique and uniform people; (2) the idea that politics is primarily about exercising authority; (3) the idea that political relationships should be structured by justice. First Nation and Native American political theories are then discussed as offering decolonial options that center relationality and responsibility and that thus render populism unintelligible as allowable democratic conduct.