Papers by Iselin Frydenlund
Journal of Contemproary Asia, 2024
The military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021 ended a period of semi-civilian rule (2011–2021)... more The military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021 ended a period of semi-civilian rule (2011–2021), bringing the country once again under direct military rule. Recent research into the religious responses to the coup in its early phases indicate that the mass protests were characterised by global internet culture, inter-religious solidarity, and new visions for a plural and democratic Myanmar. The Buddhist Sangha, it is often claimed, remained silent and mainly supportive of the military. Through a multi-method approach to textual analysis, qualitative interviews, and field work, this article seeks to analyse possible shifts in the ways that Buddhism has contributed to both justification of the military’s action and resistance to it. It is argued that Buddhist support for the coup must be understood not only within an instrumentalist framework, but also through what is referred to in this article as a Buddhist Ideology of Order. In opposition to this, a Buddhist revolutionary movement is identified. It envisions radical societal transformations, including of institutional Buddhism itself. Finally, the data show that pro-revolutionary activities go well beyond established monastic revolutionary networks, indicating broader Sangha engagements in the Myanmar Spring Revolution than has often been assumed.
Temenos - Nordic Journal for the Study of Religion, 2024
In this special issue of Temenos we wish to draw attention to and
provide a contextualization and... more In this special issue of Temenos we wish to draw attention to and
provide a contextualization and analysis of the burnings of the Qur’an
that have taken and continue to take place in the Nordic context in
recent years. Although many countries still have blasphemy laws or
laws against religious hatred that protect ‘religion’ (however defined)
or religious sensibilities from being desecrated or mocked, most
Western countries, including Sweden and Norway, have removed
blasphemy laws and made it possible to offer a critique of religion,
including the right to criticize religious texts. While several articles in
this special issue discuss the contemporary practice of public rituals
where a physical copy of the Qur’an is burnt, we argue that understanding
why this practice has become so widespread in the Nordic
region requires a historical awareness of how both blasphemy and
the freedoms of religion and expression have been understood and
practised in this very specific cultural and political environment in
the far corners of Europe.
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2024
This editorial introduces the Special Issue on Global Islamophobia. Discussing the seven articles... more This editorial introduces the Special Issue on Global Islamophobia. Discussing the seven articles in the Special Issue, we critically assess current theorizations that contend that US imperialism and racialization are fundamental to Islamophobia. The scholarship collected in this Special Issue demonstrates that these are only two of many important dimensions of global Islamophobia. This editorial introduces a matrix of global flows and modalities of Islamophobia as a framework to support global, comparative research on Islamophobia that goes beyond the “Western horizon” that characterizes current research in the field. Then, it describes these flows and modalities and how they provide a coherent basis for research on Islamophobia at a planetary scale. The articles, which focus on transnational articulations of Islamophobia and the role of Islamophobia in group-making across the world, demonstrate the plasticity and compatibility of Islamophobia with a wide range of political agendas, cultural contexts and identities.
The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 2021
The military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021 ended
semi-civilian rule (2011–2021), bringing t... more The military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021 ended
semi-civilian rule (2011–2021), bringing the country once again
under direct military rule. Through a multi-methodological
approach—analyzing written statements, digital data, and
qualitative interviews—this article explores how multiple religious
actors have responded to the coup. Our findings show that
compared to previous uprisings, the 2021 anti-coup protests were
characterized by global internet culture, interreligious solidarity,
and new visions for a plural and democratic Myanmar. Behind the
seemingly spontaneous street protests were also religious
institutions and networks, indicating long-term pro-democracy
education, activism, and networking within different religious
fields.
Religions, 2021
Buddhist protectionism in contemporary Myanmar revolves around fears of the decline of Buddhism a... more Buddhist protectionism in contemporary Myanmar revolves around fears of the decline of Buddhism and deracination of the amyo (group/“race”). Buddhist protectionists and Burmese nationalists have declared Islam and Muslims the greatest threat to race and religion, and Myanmar has witnessed widespread distribution of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim content, as well as massive violence against Muslim minority communities, the Rohingya in particular. The Indian neologism “Love Jihad” has scarce reference in contemporary Burmese Buddhist discourses, but, importantly, the tropes of aggressive male Muslim sexuality and (forced) conversion through marriage (“love jihad”) have been one of the core issues in Buddhist protectionism in Myanmar. The article shows that such tropes of the threatening foreign male have strong historical legacies in Myanmar, going back to colonial Burma when Burmese concerns over Indian male immigrant workers resulted in both anti-Indian violence and anti-miscegenation laws. Importantly, however, compared to colonial Indophobia and military era xenophobic nationalism, contemporary constructions are informed by new political realities and global forces, which have changed Buddhist protectionist imaginaries of gender and sexuality in important ways. Building on Sara R. Farris’ concept of “femonationalism”, and Rogers Brubaker’s concept of civilizationism, the article shows how Global Islamophobia, as well as global discourses on women’s rights and religious freedom, have informed Buddhist protectionism beyond ethnonationalism in the traditional sense.
Journal of Religion and Violence
Journal of Religion and Violence
Nordic Journal of Human Rights , 2017
Myanmar’s democratisation entailed political liberalisation and legal reform, but contrary to lib... more Myanmar’s democratisation entailed political liberalisation and legal reform, but contrary to liberal expectations, also further restrictions on the right to religious freedom. This article examines four laws that were passed by the President and the Parliament in 2015 in order ‘to protect race and religion’. The laws seek to regulate marriages between Buddhist women and non-Buddhist men, to prevent forced conversions, to abolish polygamy and extra-marital affairs, and to promote birth control and family planning in certain regions of the country. The laws were passed in great part due to
mobilisation of certain sections of the Buddhist monastic order.
This article investigates the rationale behind the laws and how
Buddhist activists succeeded in their legal agenda.
To cite this article: Iselin Frydenlund (2017) Religious Liberty for Whom? The Buddhist Politics of
Religious Freedom during Myanmar's Transition to Democracy, Nordic Journal of Human Rights,
35:1, 55-73.
Morgenbladet, 2019
Hvorfor lar vi oss forundre av at buddhismen har en tydelig politisk dimensjon?
Religion, Secularism, and the Pursuit of Peace in Myanmar, 2019
The final version of this text was published at Oxford Research Encyclopedias: http://oxfordre.co... more The final version of this text was published at Oxford Research Encyclopedias: http://oxfordre.com/, on 26 September 2018. This is the pre-published version.
From the late 1970s to its defeat by the Government of Sri Lanka in 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fought for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of what was often considered to be one of the world's most disciplined and efficient insurgency groups was to create an independent Tamil homeland (which they called Tamil Eelam) in the northern and eastern parts of the island. The LTTE based itself on a unique mix of Tamil nationalist, socialist, and feminist visions of a new future for the marginalized Tamil communities of Sri Lanka. The LTTE became feared for its extensive use of suicide missions, carried out by soldiers of both Hindu and Catholic backgrounds. Because of the marginalization of the Tamil-speaking Muslims from the Tamil nationalist project, none of the LTTE soldiers were Muslims. Generally speaking, religion played—and in the 21st century continues to play—a minor role in the ultimate nationalist goal of establishing Tamil Eelam. Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka centers around Tamil culture, language, literature, and regional identity, not religion. The LTTE's official ideology was strictly secularist, expressing a clear separation between religion, the state, and politics. The LTTE accepted individual religious practices in its ranks—for example, having a personal crucifix or a holy picture within military camps, but did not facilitate institutionalized religious practice. Yet religious formations, controversies, and practices have been important, if not crucial, to Tamil separatism and, ultimately, to the LTTE itself. In a short period of time, the LTTE developed a unique martial culture and martyr cult, drawing on numerous cultural and religious sources in Tamil society. This martyr cult encompassed references to the Christian tradition of martyrdom, Hindu bhakti (devotional) literature, and classic Tamil heroic poetry. Each martyr's self-sacrifice formed part of a symbolic universe that was fundamentally nationalistic, but Christian and Hindu references and ritual language were employed to help to legitimize the sacrificial act. The ideology of martyrdom transcended the martyrs' religious backgrounds, and instead of a place in paradise or release from the cycle of reincarnation, it promised eternal life in the memory of the nation. Within the cultural and political universe of the LTTE, the nation and its territory became sacralized, and the LTTE's meticulously articulated martial culture began to take on quasi-religious qualities. At the ideological level, the LTTE propaganda machinery managed to balance secularism, deep religious sentiment, and religious diversity, and religion functioned as a multilayered concept used for a variety of purposes by military and political leaders. Religion can also be identified as various ―fields‖ within the movement: ―civil religious,‖ ―Śaiva religious,‖ and ―Tamil Catholic religious,‖ allowing for overlapping yet distinct Hindu, Catholic, or nonreligious identities under the sacred canopy of Tamil nationalism.
This is an entry to the World Religions and Spirituality Project online data base, on the develop... more This is an entry to the World Religions and Spirituality Project online data base, on the development of Buddhist protectionist movements in Myanmar after the opening up of the country since 2011.
The link to the website is here:
https://wrldrels.org/2018/03/21/mabatha/
Given the long history of discrimination and violence against religious and ethnic minorities in ... more Given the long history of discrimination and violence against religious and ethnic minorities in Myanmar, international and transnational actors have engaged to address injustice and suffering. These ‘expert’ actors carry with them a particular understanding of religion and of religious freedom, often emphasizing the right to proselytize and to change one’s religion, or the right to freely associate in religious buildings. These actors engage in a Burmese landscape of domestic expert actors who might or might not share their concerns, creating a myriad of entanglements of ‘expert religion’ in the field of religious freedom, religious minority rights and interreligious relations. In the years 2013–2015 this diverse landscape came to be dominated by the Buddhist group MaBaTha and its campaign for four laws ‘to protect race and religion’ against the perceived ‘islamization’ of Myanmar. This article investigates ideas of religious freedom by looking at MaBaTha draft laws and the final 2015 legislation, considering how a ‘Buddhist politics of religious freedom’ became a tool to protect Buddhism from the perceived dangers posed by Islam.
This article addresses Buddhist militarism by exploring monastic-military ritual interactions dur... more This article addresses Buddhist militarism by exploring monastic-military ritual interactions during the Sri Lankan civil war, lasting from 1983 to 2009. Much has been written on the importance of Buddhism to Sinhala nationalism, the redefinition of the Buddhist monastic role in response to colonialism and the modernization process, as well as the development of a Buddhist just-war ideol-ogy. While these perspectives in various ways emphasize the importance of the Buddhist monastic order in pushing forward a Sinhala Buddhist nationalist agenda, little attention has been paid to the
performative
aspects of Buddhist militarism. Based on ethnographic data gathered during the Norwegian-facilitated peace talks (2000–2008), this article shows how rituals became crucial in conveying support to the state’s military efforts without compromising religious authority. By looking at Buddhist monastic ritual interaction in military institutions, this paper argues that the acceptance of the use of warfare is less anchored in systematized just-war thinking than the term “Buddhist just-war ideology” seems to suggest. Rather, through an anthropological approach to Buddhism and violence, this article shows that the term “Buddhist implicit militarism” better captures the rationale behind the broad monastic engagement with military institutions beyond minority positions of radical Buddhist militancy during a given “exception” in history. The essay concludes that monastic-military ritual interaction is a social field in which this “implicit militarism” is most clearly articulated.
Myanmar’s democratisation entailed political liberalisation and legal reform, but contrary to lib... more Myanmar’s democratisation entailed political liberalisation and legal reform, but contrary to liberal expectations, also further restrictions on the right to religious freedom. This article examines four laws that were passed by the President and the Parliament in 2015 in order ‘to protect race and religion’. The laws seek to regulate marriages between Buddhist women and non-Buddhist men, to prevent forced conversions, to abolish polygamy and extra-marital affairs, and to promote birth control and family planning in certain regions of the country. The laws were passed in great part due to mobilisation of certain sections of the Buddhist monastic order. This article investigates the rationale behind the laws and how Buddhist activists succeeded in their legal agenda.
This is an entry on the Bodu Bala Sena and "militant Buddhism" in Sri Lanka for the World Religio... more This is an entry on the Bodu Bala Sena and "militant Buddhism" in Sri Lanka for the World Religions & Spirituality Project, led by David Bromley, Professor of Religious Studies and Sociology of Religion, Virginia Commonwealth University, US, at http://wrldrels.org/index.html
Is the all-consuming focus on Islam leading us to ignore the fact that suicide attacks have also ... more Is the all-consuming focus on Islam leading us to ignore the fact that suicide attacks have also been carried out by Christian, Hindu and secular martyrs? Suicide attacks: The group responsible for most suicide attacks during the period 1980-2001 was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. None of the LTTE soldiers were Muslims. This photo, by Thomas Haugersveen, is part of a 2009 series on the Tamil Tigers. The photo was also part of PRIO's 2009 Anniversary photo competion/exhibition. There can be no doubt that violent actions conducted in the name of Islam constitute a threat to state and individual security not only in Europe, but most of all in the Muslim world itself. The question, however, is whether the all-consuming focus on Islam is leading us to ignore the fact that suicide attacks have also been carried out by Christian, Hindu and secular martyrs. Such actions are motivated by politics, strategy and individual self-realization. In recent years, we have learned a great deal about the relationships between Islam and suicide attacks and Islam and radicalization. This does not mean, however, that we have greatly increased our understanding of the relationship between religion and violence, or the specific relationship between religion and suicide attacks. In order to draw any general conclusions about suicide attacks, we need to compare the different cultural contexts in which they have occurred. Statistics for suicide attacks during the period 1980–2001 show that 60 per cent took place in Muslim areas of the world. One third of these attacks, however, were conducted by secularly oriented groups, such as the militant Kurdish organization PKK. The group responsible for the most suicide attacks during the period 1980–2001 was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), often referred to as the " Tamil Tigers ". The LTTE was responsible for 75 of the 186 suicide attacks carried out during this period. None of the LTTE soldiers were Muslims; all of them were Hindus or Catholics. Accordingly, during the 1980s and 1990s, slightly more than 40 per cent of all suicide attacks were carried out by non-Muslims. For more statistics on the development of suicide terrorism, see the Global Terrorism Database (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx? start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&sAttack=1&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties What does this statistic tell us? Firstly, let us look more closely at what the LTTE was. This extremely well organized insurgent army aimed to establish a Tamil state in Sri Lanka, and for long periods operated as a de facto state within a state. From 1987 onwards, the LTTE actively employed suicide attacks in its struggle against the Sri Lankan government. Attacks were carried out against both civilian and military targets. The LTTE's martyrs were Hindu or Catholic men and women who gave their lives to the struggle for Tamil liberation. Their objectives were not religious, however, but nationalistic. Tamil nationalism is founded on ideas about language, culture and a mother country. Although these should be viewed within the context of Hindu culture, the LTTE was also a strongly left-wing secular organization. Many people have commented on the LTTE's use of forced recruitment, including forced recruitment of child soldiers. There were demonstrable occurrences of coercion and various degrees of indoctrination, including in the case of the so-called " Black Tigers " , the LTTE's martyr brigade. Even so, if we are to understand why the Black Tigers strapped explosives to their bodies, we need to understand the cultural and ideological universe that influenced the thinking of these special-purpose soldiers. What is particularly interesting about the LTTE in this context is that they succeeded in developing very rapidly a completely unique ideology of martyrdom. Their cult of martyrdom encompassed references to both the Christian tradition of martyrdom and traditional Hindu Saiva heroic poetry. Above all, however, the LTTE developed a completely distinct tradition of nationalistic martyrdom. The LTTE's martyrs gave their lives not for the sake of their own eternal salvation, but for the future of the Tamil community. Regardless of their individual religious backgrounds, each martyr's self-sacrifice formed part of a symbolic universe that was fundamentally nationalistic, but where Christian and Hindu references and ritual language contributed to legitimizing the sacrificial act. This ideology of martyrdom was nonetheless secular in the sense that it transcended the martyrs' religious backgrounds and, instead of promising either a place in paradise or release from the cycle of reincarnation, promised eternal life in the memory of the nation. This was given symbolic emphasis through the description of the martyrs as the seeds of the nation: seeds that following martyrdom would be planted in the earth of the Tamil motherland. Symbolically, the martyrs would then grow as trees in the new, liberated nation. Accordingly the act of self-sacrifice was heavily laden with meaning both for the individuals involved and for the Tamil community, both in Sri Lanka and in the wider Tamil diaspora. What the LTTE's opponents saw as grotesque brainwashing , with fatal consequences for the security of Sri Lankan society, was interpreted by the LTTE's supporters as a necessary and legitimate sacrifice in order to secure their nation's survival. The life of the individual thus gained a meaning that went far beyond that of the individual concerned.
Iselin Frydenlund , 15 December 2015
Violence against Muslim minorities in Buddhist societies ha... more Iselin Frydenlund , 15 December 2015
Violence against Muslim minorities in Buddhist societies has increased in recent years. The Muslim Rohingyas in Myanmar are disenfranchised, and many of their candidates were rejected by the official Union Election Commission prior to the 2015 elections. Furthermore, laws about religious conversion, missionary activities, and interfaith marriage are being promoted to control relations between religions and prevent conflict. The danger, however, is that increased control will lead to more, not fewer, conflicts. Discrimination against religious minorities may lead to radicalisation. In addition minority-majority relations in a single state may have regional consequences because a minority in one state can be the majority in another, and there is an increasing trend for co-religionists in different countries to support each other. Thus protection of religious minorities is not only a question of freedom of religion and basic human rights; it also affects security and peacebuilding in the whole region. Anti-Muslim violence and political exclusion of Muslim minorities take place in the wake of increased Buddhist nationalism. This policy brief identifies local as well as global drivers for Muslim-Buddhist conflict and the rise of Buddhist nationalism. It then shows how Muslim-Buddhist conflict can be addressed, most importantly through the engagement of local religious leaders.
The upcoming general elections in Myanmar raise the question of religion’s role in democratisatio... more The upcoming general elections in Myanmar raise the question of religion’s role in democratisation processes. Previously Buddhism has been an important force in favour of democracy, but in the 2015 election campaign strong Buddhist forces are supporting the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). This is their democratic right, but it may hinder further political reforms and democratisation in Myanmar.
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Papers by Iselin Frydenlund
provide a contextualization and analysis of the burnings of the Qur’an
that have taken and continue to take place in the Nordic context in
recent years. Although many countries still have blasphemy laws or
laws against religious hatred that protect ‘religion’ (however defined)
or religious sensibilities from being desecrated or mocked, most
Western countries, including Sweden and Norway, have removed
blasphemy laws and made it possible to offer a critique of religion,
including the right to criticize religious texts. While several articles in
this special issue discuss the contemporary practice of public rituals
where a physical copy of the Qur’an is burnt, we argue that understanding
why this practice has become so widespread in the Nordic
region requires a historical awareness of how both blasphemy and
the freedoms of religion and expression have been understood and
practised in this very specific cultural and political environment in
the far corners of Europe.
semi-civilian rule (2011–2021), bringing the country once again
under direct military rule. Through a multi-methodological
approach—analyzing written statements, digital data, and
qualitative interviews—this article explores how multiple religious
actors have responded to the coup. Our findings show that
compared to previous uprisings, the 2021 anti-coup protests were
characterized by global internet culture, interreligious solidarity,
and new visions for a plural and democratic Myanmar. Behind the
seemingly spontaneous street protests were also religious
institutions and networks, indicating long-term pro-democracy
education, activism, and networking within different religious
fields.
http://crisea.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Del-7.10-CRISEA-Policy-Brief-EU-3.pdf
mobilisation of certain sections of the Buddhist monastic order.
This article investigates the rationale behind the laws and how
Buddhist activists succeeded in their legal agenda.
To cite this article: Iselin Frydenlund (2017) Religious Liberty for Whom? The Buddhist Politics of
Religious Freedom during Myanmar's Transition to Democracy, Nordic Journal of Human Rights,
35:1, 55-73.
From the late 1970s to its defeat by the Government of Sri Lanka in 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fought for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of what was often considered to be one of the world's most disciplined and efficient insurgency groups was to create an independent Tamil homeland (which they called Tamil Eelam) in the northern and eastern parts of the island. The LTTE based itself on a unique mix of Tamil nationalist, socialist, and feminist visions of a new future for the marginalized Tamil communities of Sri Lanka. The LTTE became feared for its extensive use of suicide missions, carried out by soldiers of both Hindu and Catholic backgrounds. Because of the marginalization of the Tamil-speaking Muslims from the Tamil nationalist project, none of the LTTE soldiers were Muslims. Generally speaking, religion played—and in the 21st century continues to play—a minor role in the ultimate nationalist goal of establishing Tamil Eelam. Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka centers around Tamil culture, language, literature, and regional identity, not religion. The LTTE's official ideology was strictly secularist, expressing a clear separation between religion, the state, and politics. The LTTE accepted individual religious practices in its ranks—for example, having a personal crucifix or a holy picture within military camps, but did not facilitate institutionalized religious practice. Yet religious formations, controversies, and practices have been important, if not crucial, to Tamil separatism and, ultimately, to the LTTE itself. In a short period of time, the LTTE developed a unique martial culture and martyr cult, drawing on numerous cultural and religious sources in Tamil society. This martyr cult encompassed references to the Christian tradition of martyrdom, Hindu bhakti (devotional) literature, and classic Tamil heroic poetry. Each martyr's self-sacrifice formed part of a symbolic universe that was fundamentally nationalistic, but Christian and Hindu references and ritual language were employed to help to legitimize the sacrificial act. The ideology of martyrdom transcended the martyrs' religious backgrounds, and instead of a place in paradise or release from the cycle of reincarnation, it promised eternal life in the memory of the nation. Within the cultural and political universe of the LTTE, the nation and its territory became sacralized, and the LTTE's meticulously articulated martial culture began to take on quasi-religious qualities. At the ideological level, the LTTE propaganda machinery managed to balance secularism, deep religious sentiment, and religious diversity, and religion functioned as a multilayered concept used for a variety of purposes by military and political leaders. Religion can also be identified as various ―fields‖ within the movement: ―civil religious,‖ ―Śaiva religious,‖ and ―Tamil Catholic religious,‖ allowing for overlapping yet distinct Hindu, Catholic, or nonreligious identities under the sacred canopy of Tamil nationalism.
The link to the website is here:
https://wrldrels.org/2018/03/21/mabatha/
performative
aspects of Buddhist militarism. Based on ethnographic data gathered during the Norwegian-facilitated peace talks (2000–2008), this article shows how rituals became crucial in conveying support to the state’s military efforts without compromising religious authority. By looking at Buddhist monastic ritual interaction in military institutions, this paper argues that the acceptance of the use of warfare is less anchored in systematized just-war thinking than the term “Buddhist just-war ideology” seems to suggest. Rather, through an anthropological approach to Buddhism and violence, this article shows that the term “Buddhist implicit militarism” better captures the rationale behind the broad monastic engagement with military institutions beyond minority positions of radical Buddhist militancy during a given “exception” in history. The essay concludes that monastic-military ritual interaction is a social field in which this “implicit militarism” is most clearly articulated.
Violence against Muslim minorities in Buddhist societies has increased in recent years. The Muslim Rohingyas in Myanmar are disenfranchised, and many of their candidates were rejected by the official Union Election Commission prior to the 2015 elections. Furthermore, laws about religious conversion, missionary activities, and interfaith marriage are being promoted to control relations between religions and prevent conflict. The danger, however, is that increased control will lead to more, not fewer, conflicts. Discrimination against religious minorities may lead to radicalisation. In addition minority-majority relations in a single state may have regional consequences because a minority in one state can be the majority in another, and there is an increasing trend for co-religionists in different countries to support each other. Thus protection of religious minorities is not only a question of freedom of religion and basic human rights; it also affects security and peacebuilding in the whole region. Anti-Muslim violence and political exclusion of Muslim minorities take place in the wake of increased Buddhist nationalism. This policy brief identifies local as well as global drivers for Muslim-Buddhist conflict and the rise of Buddhist nationalism. It then shows how Muslim-Buddhist conflict can be addressed, most importantly through the engagement of local religious leaders.
provide a contextualization and analysis of the burnings of the Qur’an
that have taken and continue to take place in the Nordic context in
recent years. Although many countries still have blasphemy laws or
laws against religious hatred that protect ‘religion’ (however defined)
or religious sensibilities from being desecrated or mocked, most
Western countries, including Sweden and Norway, have removed
blasphemy laws and made it possible to offer a critique of religion,
including the right to criticize religious texts. While several articles in
this special issue discuss the contemporary practice of public rituals
where a physical copy of the Qur’an is burnt, we argue that understanding
why this practice has become so widespread in the Nordic
region requires a historical awareness of how both blasphemy and
the freedoms of religion and expression have been understood and
practised in this very specific cultural and political environment in
the far corners of Europe.
semi-civilian rule (2011–2021), bringing the country once again
under direct military rule. Through a multi-methodological
approach—analyzing written statements, digital data, and
qualitative interviews—this article explores how multiple religious
actors have responded to the coup. Our findings show that
compared to previous uprisings, the 2021 anti-coup protests were
characterized by global internet culture, interreligious solidarity,
and new visions for a plural and democratic Myanmar. Behind the
seemingly spontaneous street protests were also religious
institutions and networks, indicating long-term pro-democracy
education, activism, and networking within different religious
fields.
http://crisea.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Del-7.10-CRISEA-Policy-Brief-EU-3.pdf
mobilisation of certain sections of the Buddhist monastic order.
This article investigates the rationale behind the laws and how
Buddhist activists succeeded in their legal agenda.
To cite this article: Iselin Frydenlund (2017) Religious Liberty for Whom? The Buddhist Politics of
Religious Freedom during Myanmar's Transition to Democracy, Nordic Journal of Human Rights,
35:1, 55-73.
From the late 1970s to its defeat by the Government of Sri Lanka in 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fought for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of what was often considered to be one of the world's most disciplined and efficient insurgency groups was to create an independent Tamil homeland (which they called Tamil Eelam) in the northern and eastern parts of the island. The LTTE based itself on a unique mix of Tamil nationalist, socialist, and feminist visions of a new future for the marginalized Tamil communities of Sri Lanka. The LTTE became feared for its extensive use of suicide missions, carried out by soldiers of both Hindu and Catholic backgrounds. Because of the marginalization of the Tamil-speaking Muslims from the Tamil nationalist project, none of the LTTE soldiers were Muslims. Generally speaking, religion played—and in the 21st century continues to play—a minor role in the ultimate nationalist goal of establishing Tamil Eelam. Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka centers around Tamil culture, language, literature, and regional identity, not religion. The LTTE's official ideology was strictly secularist, expressing a clear separation between religion, the state, and politics. The LTTE accepted individual religious practices in its ranks—for example, having a personal crucifix or a holy picture within military camps, but did not facilitate institutionalized religious practice. Yet religious formations, controversies, and practices have been important, if not crucial, to Tamil separatism and, ultimately, to the LTTE itself. In a short period of time, the LTTE developed a unique martial culture and martyr cult, drawing on numerous cultural and religious sources in Tamil society. This martyr cult encompassed references to the Christian tradition of martyrdom, Hindu bhakti (devotional) literature, and classic Tamil heroic poetry. Each martyr's self-sacrifice formed part of a symbolic universe that was fundamentally nationalistic, but Christian and Hindu references and ritual language were employed to help to legitimize the sacrificial act. The ideology of martyrdom transcended the martyrs' religious backgrounds, and instead of a place in paradise or release from the cycle of reincarnation, it promised eternal life in the memory of the nation. Within the cultural and political universe of the LTTE, the nation and its territory became sacralized, and the LTTE's meticulously articulated martial culture began to take on quasi-religious qualities. At the ideological level, the LTTE propaganda machinery managed to balance secularism, deep religious sentiment, and religious diversity, and religion functioned as a multilayered concept used for a variety of purposes by military and political leaders. Religion can also be identified as various ―fields‖ within the movement: ―civil religious,‖ ―Śaiva religious,‖ and ―Tamil Catholic religious,‖ allowing for overlapping yet distinct Hindu, Catholic, or nonreligious identities under the sacred canopy of Tamil nationalism.
The link to the website is here:
https://wrldrels.org/2018/03/21/mabatha/
performative
aspects of Buddhist militarism. Based on ethnographic data gathered during the Norwegian-facilitated peace talks (2000–2008), this article shows how rituals became crucial in conveying support to the state’s military efforts without compromising religious authority. By looking at Buddhist monastic ritual interaction in military institutions, this paper argues that the acceptance of the use of warfare is less anchored in systematized just-war thinking than the term “Buddhist just-war ideology” seems to suggest. Rather, through an anthropological approach to Buddhism and violence, this article shows that the term “Buddhist implicit militarism” better captures the rationale behind the broad monastic engagement with military institutions beyond minority positions of radical Buddhist militancy during a given “exception” in history. The essay concludes that monastic-military ritual interaction is a social field in which this “implicit militarism” is most clearly articulated.
Violence against Muslim minorities in Buddhist societies has increased in recent years. The Muslim Rohingyas in Myanmar are disenfranchised, and many of their candidates were rejected by the official Union Election Commission prior to the 2015 elections. Furthermore, laws about religious conversion, missionary activities, and interfaith marriage are being promoted to control relations between religions and prevent conflict. The danger, however, is that increased control will lead to more, not fewer, conflicts. Discrimination against religious minorities may lead to radicalisation. In addition minority-majority relations in a single state may have regional consequences because a minority in one state can be the majority in another, and there is an increasing trend for co-religionists in different countries to support each other. Thus protection of religious minorities is not only a question of freedom of religion and basic human rights; it also affects security and peacebuilding in the whole region. Anti-Muslim violence and political exclusion of Muslim minorities take place in the wake of increased Buddhist nationalism. This policy brief identifies local as well as global drivers for Muslim-Buddhist conflict and the rise of Buddhist nationalism. It then shows how Muslim-Buddhist conflict can be addressed, most importantly through the engagement of local religious leaders.
The book is divided into two sections. The first section provides historical background to the three countries with the largest Buddhist-Muslim relations. The second section has chapters that focus on specific encounters between Buddhists and Muslims, which includes anti-Buddhist sentiments in Bangladesh, the role of gender in Muslim-Buddhist relations and the rise of anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya sentiments in Myanmar.
By exploring historical fluctuations over time—paying particular attention to how state-formations condition Muslim-Buddhist entanglements—the book shows the processual and relational aspects of religious identity constructions and Buddhist-Muslim interactions in Theravada Buddhist majority states.
The evaluation committee consisted of Professor John C. Holt, Bowdoin College, USA; Professor Jonathan Spencer, University of Edinburgh, UK; and Professor Anne Stensvold, University of Oslo
Abstract:
In recent years, Muslim minority communities in Buddhist majority states have experienced an increasing number of attacks on their lives and properties. Violence against Muslim minorities has taken place in the wake of intense anti-Muslim campaigns, most vociferously articulated by certain groups of Buddhist monks, who in sermons and public speeches have warned against the dangers of Islam. Such aggressive and militant anti-Muslim campaigns are based upon the idea of a global Islamic conspiracy to eradicate Buddhism. This chapter analyses various aspects of Asian Buddhists’ fear of Islam: how do Buddhist conspiracy theories envision the Islamic take-over, and how are individual Muslims seen as local agents of such larger schemes? And why do Buddhist conspiracy theories about Islam flourish from 2012 onwards, and how are they related to domestic and regional politics?
Key words: islamophobia, Buddhist conspiracies about Islam, birth/rape/love jihad, ‘Green belt’ theories, Muslim minorities, Rohingya, Rakhine, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, global transmittence.
My aim is not to question the importance of no-harm (ahiṃsā) in Buddhism or the importance of this concept in defining Buddhism in relation to other religious traditions. Rather, this chapter seeks to explore why – and in what ways – Buddhist ethics and notions of nonviolence were privileged over other aspects of Buddhist teaching and practice during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. My argument is threefold: First, by tracing European notions of religion that shaped the way Buddhism was defined and conceptualized in the nineteenth century, I suggest that the notion of Buddhism-cum-pacifism is largely the result of European “positive orientalism” towards Buddhism. Second, I suggest that the notion of Buddhism-cum-pacifism is largely a modern reshaping of ideals of nonviolence, in a modernist attempt at reformulating a new Buddhism suitable for the modern world. Third and finally, using Sri Lanka as a case, it is argued that the principle of nonviolence was strategically used by anti-colonial forces and consequently that Buddhist pacifism is largely a modern, anti-colonial and Gandhian-inspired enterprise, with little historical precedence in Buddhist history.
The first half of this chapter will discuss Buddhist political paradigms, justifications of violence, and ritual protection. Thereafter, it will analyze Buddhism’s complex relations with states in contemporary Asia, indicating Buddhism’s potential for security, as well as insecurity.
The summer of 2013 the front page of TIME magazine featured the burmese munk U Wirathu under the headline "The Face of Buddhist Terror". The front page was the opposite of the impression many people have that Buddhism is a religion of peace. U Wirathu is the leader of the 969-movement who has caught much attention through inciting violence and persecution of Muslims in Burma. This has only been growing in strength after the reform process started in 2011. But this is not only about religion. Religion is often misused for non-religious purposes. What lies underneath is national identity and a battle for power and resources where religion is used as a marker of identity to devide the people into "us" and "them". How can we explain that religious leaders are using their faith to incite violence? And how do you get to the core of conflicts like these, in the attempt to create lasting solutions?
Panel:
Khin Thiri Kyaw, director of The Open Sky
Gunnar Stålsett, former bishop of Oslo, member of the Norwegian Nobel Committee
Egil Lothe, leader of the Buddhistforbundet
Iselin Frydenlund, Researcher at the Norwegian Centre of Human Rights (UiO)
Innleder og ordstyrer:
Audun Aagre, daily manager of the Norwegian Burma Committee
organized by The Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights and the University of Tromsø, Tromsø
ISBN: 9780190624385.
izations: A comparative perspective.” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 45, p. 301-301.
2006, vol. 43, p. 353-354
11. Journal of Peace Research vol. 41: 6