Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggeste... more Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggested to many that an experience's etiology can reduce its capacity to provide prima facie justification for believing its content below a baseline. This is epistemic downgrade due to etiology, and its possibility is incompatible with phenomenal conservatism. I develop a view that explains the epistemic deficiency in certain possible cases of cognitive penetration but on which there is no epistemic downgrading below a baseline and on which etiology plays no explanatory role. This view is not phenomenal conservatism exactly, but it does capture what’s right about phenomenal conservatism.
Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” is widely taken to be a paradigm example ... more Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” is widely taken to be a paradigm example of the sort of philosophical methodology that has been so hotly debated in the recent literature. Reflection on it motivates the following four theses about that methodology: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind. (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology. (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken as given inputs into generally accepted forms of reasoning. (D) Philosophical methodology is reasonable. Negative experimental philosophers have empirically challenged (D). Radical responses to their challenge include Williamson’s rejection of (A) and Cappelen and Deutsch’s rejection of (B). Here I follow traditionalists in maintaining (A), (B), and (D), but suggest questioning (C), which has largely been taken as a fixed point in the literature.
First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception genera... more First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular o... more This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the possibility of immediate justification, the dispute between representational and relational views of perception, the epistemic significance of cognitive penetration, the question of whether perceptual experiences are composed of more basic sensations and seemings, and questions about the existence and epistemic significance of highlevel content. In a concluding section we briefly consider how some of the topics pursued here might generalize beyond perception.
This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular o... more This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the possibility of immediate justification, the dispute between representational and relational views of perception, the epistemic significance of cognitive penetration, the question of whether perceptual experiences are composed of more basic sensations and seemings, and questions about the existence and epistemic significance of highlevel content. In a concluding section we briefly consider how some of the topics pursued here might generalize beyond perception. Keywords: evidenceinsensitivity; highlevel content; immediate justification; perceptual experience; presentational phenomenology; phenomenal conservatism; dogmatism; seemings; sensations; cognitive penetration Introduction You wonder whether it is raining. So you look out the window, see it raining, and thereby come to know that it is indeed raining. When you see it is raining, you have a perceptual experience. This is a conscious mental state with a distinctive phenomenology. When you come to know that it is indeed raining, you form a new belief about your immediate environment. This is a cognitive mental state for which you have adequate justification. If one is interested in the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, then a good starting point for inquiry is to consider the relationship between perceptual experiences and justified beliefs. That is what we will do here. We will organize this chapter around five questions: 1. Does having a perceptual experience make one have justification for any beliefs? 2. Does having a perceptual experience make one have justification for any beliefs about the external world? 3. Does having a perceptual experience make one have justification for any beliefs about the external world in virtue of its phenomenology?
Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seei... more Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn’t part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of their content. Epistemic elitists deny this and think that there is some further constraint the contents of experience must satisfy to be immediately justified. Here I defend epistemic elitism, propose a phenomenological account of what the further constraint is, and explore the resulting view’s consequences for our knowledge of other minds, and in particular for perceptual theories of this knowledge.
Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seei... more Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn’t part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of their content. Epistemic elitists deny this and think that there is some further constraint the contents of experience must satisfy to be immediately justified. Here I defend epistemic elitism, propose a phenomenological account of what the further constraint is, and explore the resulting view’s consequences for our knowledge of other minds, and in particular for perceptual theories of this knowledge.
It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it... more It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity.
According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought exper... more According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of “negative experimental philosophy” have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. (Cappelen 2012) and (Deutsch 2015) defend traditional philosophy against this critique by rejecting the picture of philosophical methodology it presupposes: philosophers do not really rely on intuitions. In this paper I defend methodological orthodoxy by arguing that philosophers must rely on intuitions somewhere and that they do in fact often rely on intuitions about thought experiments. I also argue in favor of a reply to the negative experimental critique that is similar to at least part of Deutsch’s own.
Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then y... more Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this paper we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were so composed, this underlying disunity in metaphysical or psychological structure would fall below the threshold of epistemic significance.
According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in p... more According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson’s Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel’s Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.
Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an ig... more Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an impression of moral properties. The fourth is an example of intuition. You intellectually grasp a general moral truth. Should moral perceptions be thought of as high-level perceptions or as intuitions? Most proponents of moral perception have thought of them as high-level perceptions. I give epistemological and methodological reasons for thinking that at least some are examples of what I call low-level intuitions—experiences in which we both apprehend abstract generalities and apply them to concrete particulars.
Some philosophers think that intuitions are a source of justification, and in particular a source... more Some philosophers think that intuitions are a source of justification, and in particular a source of justification for beliefs about abstract matters, such as numbers, shapes, freedom, truth, and beauty. Other philosophers are more skeptical. They doubt that intuitions are a source of justification for beliefs about abstract matters, though they might concede that intuitions are a source of justification for beliefs about what our own implicit theories about numbers, shapes, freedom, truth, and beauty are. The motivation to defend one or the other of these orientations, non-skeptical or skeptical, drives most discussions about intuition. As a consequence most of these discussions focus on issues that seem to bear immediately on the epistemological status of intuitions: Are intuitions reliable? How could they justify beliefs about abstract matters? Do recent experimental studies of intuition provide reason for skepticism about intuition? Is skepticism about intuition coherent? 2 Prior to all these questions, however, is the question: What are intuitions? Depending on what intuitions are, they might or might not be reliable, they might or might not possibly justify beliefs about abstract matters, they might or might not be embarrassed by recent experimental studies, and they might or might not be coherently foresworn.
You know what it is like to walk into a room and see how it is arranged. Now imagine a blindfolde... more You know what it is like to walk into a room and see how it is arranged. Now imagine a blindfolded clairvoyant. He walks into the same room and immediately knows the same things you do about how it is arranged. How does your experience di er phenomenally from the clairvoyant's experience? In The Nature of Perception, John Foster proposes that "in the clairvoyant cases, as envisaged, there is no provision for the presentational feel of phenomenal experience-for the subjective impression that an instance of the relevant type of environmental situation is directly presented." I agree with Foster. Visual experiences have what he calls a presentational feel and what I will call presentational phenomenology. This distinguishes visual experiences from episodes of immediately coming to know how things are on the basis of clairvoyance. In this paper I will address three di erent questions about presentational phenomenology.
The literature on mathematics suggests that intuition plays a role in it as a ground of belief. T... more The literature on mathematics suggests that intuition plays a role in it as a ground of belief. This article explores the nature of intuition as it occurs in mathematical thinking. Section 1 suggests that intuitions should be understood by analogy with perceptions. Section 2 explains what fleshing out such an analogy requires. Section 3 discusses Kantian ways of fleshing it out. Section 4 discusses Platonist ways of fleshing it out. Section 5 sketches a proposal for resolving the main problem facing Platonists-the problem of explaining how our experiences make contact with mathematical reality.
Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a... more Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action--guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through inference. According to inferential internalists, in order to gain justification for believing the conclusion of an argument by inferring it from the premises in that argument one must "see" that the premises support the conclusion.
Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theo... more Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl's framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch's Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call Phenomenal Holism, the view that all the parts of a total phenomenal state metaphysically depend on it. To illustrate how the ideas developed along the way can be used in advancing work on the phenomenology of particular kinds of experience, I draw on them in defending Husserl's view that we can be aware of abstract objects against a phenomenological objection.
Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggeste... more Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggested to many that an experience's etiology can reduce its capacity to provide prima facie justification for believing its content below a baseline. This is epistemic downgrade due to etiology, and its possibility is incompatible with phenomenal conservatism. I develop a view that explains the epistemic deficiency in certain possible cases of cognitive penetration but on which there is no epistemic downgrading below a baseline and on which etiology plays no explanatory role. This view is not phenomenal conservatism exactly, but it does capture what’s right about phenomenal conservatism.
Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” is widely taken to be a paradigm example ... more Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” is widely taken to be a paradigm example of the sort of philosophical methodology that has been so hotly debated in the recent literature. Reflection on it motivates the following four theses about that methodology: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind. (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology. (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken as given inputs into generally accepted forms of reasoning. (D) Philosophical methodology is reasonable. Negative experimental philosophers have empirically challenged (D). Radical responses to their challenge include Williamson’s rejection of (A) and Cappelen and Deutsch’s rejection of (B). Here I follow traditionalists in maintaining (A), (B), and (D), but suggest questioning (C), which has largely been taken as a fixed point in the literature.
First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception genera... more First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular o... more This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the possibility of immediate justification, the dispute between representational and relational views of perception, the epistemic significance of cognitive penetration, the question of whether perceptual experiences are composed of more basic sensations and seemings, and questions about the existence and epistemic significance of highlevel content. In a concluding section we briefly consider how some of the topics pursued here might generalize beyond perception.
This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular o... more This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the possibility of immediate justification, the dispute between representational and relational views of perception, the epistemic significance of cognitive penetration, the question of whether perceptual experiences are composed of more basic sensations and seemings, and questions about the existence and epistemic significance of highlevel content. In a concluding section we briefly consider how some of the topics pursued here might generalize beyond perception. Keywords: evidenceinsensitivity; highlevel content; immediate justification; perceptual experience; presentational phenomenology; phenomenal conservatism; dogmatism; seemings; sensations; cognitive penetration Introduction You wonder whether it is raining. So you look out the window, see it raining, and thereby come to know that it is indeed raining. When you see it is raining, you have a perceptual experience. This is a conscious mental state with a distinctive phenomenology. When you come to know that it is indeed raining, you form a new belief about your immediate environment. This is a cognitive mental state for which you have adequate justification. If one is interested in the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, then a good starting point for inquiry is to consider the relationship between perceptual experiences and justified beliefs. That is what we will do here. We will organize this chapter around five questions: 1. Does having a perceptual experience make one have justification for any beliefs? 2. Does having a perceptual experience make one have justification for any beliefs about the external world? 3. Does having a perceptual experience make one have justification for any beliefs about the external world in virtue of its phenomenology?
Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seei... more Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn’t part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of their content. Epistemic elitists deny this and think that there is some further constraint the contents of experience must satisfy to be immediately justified. Here I defend epistemic elitism, propose a phenomenological account of what the further constraint is, and explore the resulting view’s consequences for our knowledge of other minds, and in particular for perceptual theories of this knowledge.
Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seei... more Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn’t part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of their content. Epistemic elitists deny this and think that there is some further constraint the contents of experience must satisfy to be immediately justified. Here I defend epistemic elitism, propose a phenomenological account of what the further constraint is, and explore the resulting view’s consequences for our knowledge of other minds, and in particular for perceptual theories of this knowledge.
It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it... more It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity.
According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought exper... more According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of “negative experimental philosophy” have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. (Cappelen 2012) and (Deutsch 2015) defend traditional philosophy against this critique by rejecting the picture of philosophical methodology it presupposes: philosophers do not really rely on intuitions. In this paper I defend methodological orthodoxy by arguing that philosophers must rely on intuitions somewhere and that they do in fact often rely on intuitions about thought experiments. I also argue in favor of a reply to the negative experimental critique that is similar to at least part of Deutsch’s own.
Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then y... more Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this paper we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were so composed, this underlying disunity in metaphysical or psychological structure would fall below the threshold of epistemic significance.
According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in p... more According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson’s Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel’s Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.
Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an ig... more Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an impression of moral properties. The fourth is an example of intuition. You intellectually grasp a general moral truth. Should moral perceptions be thought of as high-level perceptions or as intuitions? Most proponents of moral perception have thought of them as high-level perceptions. I give epistemological and methodological reasons for thinking that at least some are examples of what I call low-level intuitions—experiences in which we both apprehend abstract generalities and apply them to concrete particulars.
Some philosophers think that intuitions are a source of justification, and in particular a source... more Some philosophers think that intuitions are a source of justification, and in particular a source of justification for beliefs about abstract matters, such as numbers, shapes, freedom, truth, and beauty. Other philosophers are more skeptical. They doubt that intuitions are a source of justification for beliefs about abstract matters, though they might concede that intuitions are a source of justification for beliefs about what our own implicit theories about numbers, shapes, freedom, truth, and beauty are. The motivation to defend one or the other of these orientations, non-skeptical or skeptical, drives most discussions about intuition. As a consequence most of these discussions focus on issues that seem to bear immediately on the epistemological status of intuitions: Are intuitions reliable? How could they justify beliefs about abstract matters? Do recent experimental studies of intuition provide reason for skepticism about intuition? Is skepticism about intuition coherent? 2 Prior to all these questions, however, is the question: What are intuitions? Depending on what intuitions are, they might or might not be reliable, they might or might not possibly justify beliefs about abstract matters, they might or might not be embarrassed by recent experimental studies, and they might or might not be coherently foresworn.
You know what it is like to walk into a room and see how it is arranged. Now imagine a blindfolde... more You know what it is like to walk into a room and see how it is arranged. Now imagine a blindfolded clairvoyant. He walks into the same room and immediately knows the same things you do about how it is arranged. How does your experience di er phenomenally from the clairvoyant's experience? In The Nature of Perception, John Foster proposes that "in the clairvoyant cases, as envisaged, there is no provision for the presentational feel of phenomenal experience-for the subjective impression that an instance of the relevant type of environmental situation is directly presented." I agree with Foster. Visual experiences have what he calls a presentational feel and what I will call presentational phenomenology. This distinguishes visual experiences from episodes of immediately coming to know how things are on the basis of clairvoyance. In this paper I will address three di erent questions about presentational phenomenology.
The literature on mathematics suggests that intuition plays a role in it as a ground of belief. T... more The literature on mathematics suggests that intuition plays a role in it as a ground of belief. This article explores the nature of intuition as it occurs in mathematical thinking. Section 1 suggests that intuitions should be understood by analogy with perceptions. Section 2 explains what fleshing out such an analogy requires. Section 3 discusses Kantian ways of fleshing it out. Section 4 discusses Platonist ways of fleshing it out. Section 5 sketches a proposal for resolving the main problem facing Platonists-the problem of explaining how our experiences make contact with mathematical reality.
Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a... more Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action--guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through inference. According to inferential internalists, in order to gain justification for believing the conclusion of an argument by inferring it from the premises in that argument one must "see" that the premises support the conclusion.
Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theo... more Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl's framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch's Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call Phenomenal Holism, the view that all the parts of a total phenomenal state metaphysically depend on it. To illustrate how the ideas developed along the way can be used in advancing work on the phenomenology of particular kinds of experience, I draw on them in defending Husserl's view that we can be aware of abstract objects against a phenomenological objection.
This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of ordinary multisensory experience that go beyond m... more This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of ordinary multisensory experience that go beyond mere co-consciousness of features (e.g., the experience that results from concurrently hearing a sound in the hallway and seeing the cup on the table). In one case, a sensory experience in one modality creates a perceptual demonstrative to whose referent qualities are attributed in another sensory modality. For example, when you hear someone speak, auditory experience attributes audible qualities to a seen event, a person’s speaking motions. The second kind of multisensory experience attributes features experienced in several sensory modalities to one and the same object via a process of amodal perceptual integration, i.e., integration that occurs separately from processing within the individual sensory modalities. Multisensory experiences arising from holding and seeing a tomato or from seeing the Indian curry boil and smelling it are examples of the second kind of multisensory experience. At the end of the chapter we look at synesthesia, a kind of atypical multisensory experience, and argue that one version of this phenomenon may be able to shed light on the neural mechanism underlying amodally integrated multisensory experience.
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