I am currently Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Neuroscience (10/2021-9/2022) at LMU Munich; I am also research group leader within an EU H2020-Consortium at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I am a philosopher of mind that works experimentally on aesthetic and embodied responses to cultural artifacts. Our group focuses on visual media -- especially film -- architecture, and art. Address: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin
Office: Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Luisenstraße 56, Haus 1, R. 317 10117 Berlin
Embodied cognition claims that how we move our body is central for experience. Exploring dimensio... more Embodied cognition claims that how we move our body is central for experience. Exploring dimensions of bodily engagement should, therefore, also be central for engaging art. However, little attention has been paid to the actual ways viewers move in front of art and how this impacts experiences. We aim to close this gap,
This article highlights ways to relate psychology, neuroscience, and fi lm theory that are underr... more This article highlights ways to relate psychology, neuroscience, and fi lm theory that are underrepresented in the current debate and that could contribute to a new cognitive media theory. First, we outline how neuroscientifi c approaches to moving images could be embedded in the embodied, enactive cognition framework and recent predictive processing theories of the brain. Within this framework, we understand fi lmic engagement as a specifi c way of worldmaking, which is co-constituted by formal elements such as framing, camerawork, and editing. Second, we address experimental progress. Here we weigh the promises and perils of neuroscientifi c studies by discussing the motor neuron account to camera movements as an example. Based on the limitations we identify, we advocate for a multi-method study of fi lm experience that brings cognitive science into dialogue with philosophical accounts and qualitative in-depth explorations of subjective experience.
One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has ... more One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has suggested lens and camera movements to be among the most effective stylistic devices involved in such engagement. In an EEG experiment we assessed the role of such movements in modulating specific spectators´neural and experiential responses, likely reflecting such engagement. We produced short video clips of an empty room with a still, a zooming and a moving camera (steadicam) that might simulate the movement of an observer in different ways. We found an event related desynchronization of the beta components of the rolandic mu rhythm that was stronger for the clips produced with steadicam than for those produced with a still or zooming camera. No equivalent modulation in the attention related occipital areas was found, thus confirming the sensorimotor nature of spectators´neural responses to the film clips. The present study provides the first empirical evidence that filmic means such as camera movements alone can modulate spectators' bodily engagement with film.
Frontiers in Psychology: Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2021
This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systemat... more This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media have on our mind. To grasp this impact, I propose an enactive account of media that is based on expansive habits as media-structured, embodied ways of bringing forth meaning and new domains of values. We apply such habits, for instance, when seeing a picture or perceiving a movie. They become established through a process of reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city) that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits—one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind.
Frontiers in Psychology. Cultural Psychology, 2021
To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this pap... more To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest an Aesthetic Self Effect supporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral changes, such as altering political partisanship or religious orientation, and significantly stronger than for other categories of taste, such as food preferences (Study 1). Using a multidimensional scaling technique to map perceived aesthetic similarities among musical genres, we determined that aesthetic distances between genres correlate highly with the perceived difference in identity (Study 2). Further studies generalize the Aesthetic Self Effect beyond the musical domain: general changes in visual art preferences, for example from more traditional to abstract art, also elicited a strong Self Effect (Study 3). Exploring the breadth of this effect we also found an Anaesthetic Self Effect. That is, hypothetical changes from aesthetic indifference to caring about music, art, or beauty are judged to have a significant impact on identity. This effect on identity is stronger for aesthetic fields compared to leisure activities, such as hiking or playing video games (Study 4). Across our studies, the Anaesthetic Self Effect turns out to be stronger than the Aesthetic Self Effect. Taken together, we found evidence for a link between aesthetics and identity: we are aesthetic selves. When our tastes in music and the arts or our aesthetic interests change we take these to be transformative changes.
When watching a film, we are seeing-in moving images. Film's visual experience is therefore twofo... more When watching a film, we are seeing-in moving images. Film's visual experience is therefore twofold, encompassing a recognitional (the scene presented, the story told, etc.) and a configurational fold (editing, camera movement, etc.). Although some researchers endorse twofoldness with respect to film, there is also significant resistance and misrepresentation of its very nature. This paper argues that the concept is central to an understanding of the basic apprehension and the aesthetic appreciation of film. It demonstrates how twofoldness could play a more substantial role in a new cognitive film theory and a naturalized aesthetics of film. By discussing recent theories of our motor engagement with cinema it shows how referencing to the interplay of two filmic folds could inform such a theory. Moving images are still a quite recent cultural artifact, and it is central to understand the specific brain-body-artifact assemblies that underlie our habits of perceiving them. This entails a focus on seeing-in as a central cognitive capacity. Seeing-in has been identified as the basic mode of the perception of pictures-such as paintings and drawings-and constitutes an experience of a scene that differs from perceiving the same scene in the flesh. The phenomenology of such an experience has been referred to as twofold, that is, encompassing features of the picture surface and of what is depicted (Hopkins 2003; Lopes 2005; Wollheim [1980] 2015). As such it has been argued that the concept extends to cinema and moving images more generally (see, e.g., Hopkins 2008, 2018; Terrone 2018): in most cases of film perception we simultaneously engage with scene-presenting features such as mise en cadre, camera movements, cuts, technologies of projections-and with the evolving content of a scene. Both jointly constitute the experience of moving images. P e n u l t I m a t e V e r s i o n
As we identify with characters on screen, we simulate their emotions and thoughts. This is accomp... more As we identify with characters on screen, we simulate their emotions and thoughts. This is accompanied by physiological changes such as galvanic skin response (GSR), an indicator for emotional arousal, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), referring to vagal activity. We investigated whether the presence of a cinema audience affects these psychophysiological processes. The study was conducted in a real cinema in Berlin. Participants came twice to watch previously rated emotional film scenes eliciting amusement, anger, tenderness or fear. Once they watched the scenes alone, once in a group. We tested whether the vagal modulation in response to the mere presence of others influences explicit (reported) and implicit markers (RSA, heart rate (HR) and GSR) of emotional processes in function of solitary or collective enjoyment of movie scenes. On the physiological level, we found a mediating effect of vagal flexibility to the mere presence of others. Individuals showing a high baseline difference (alone vs. social) prior to the presentation of film, maintained higher RSA in the alone compared to the social condition. The opposite pattern emerged for low baseline difference individuals. Emotional arousal as reflected in GSR was significantly more pronounced during scenes eliciting anger independent of the social condition. On the behavioural level, we found evidence for emotion-specific effects on reported empathy, emotional intensity and Theory of Mind. Furthermore, people who decrease their RSA in response to others' company are those who felt themselves more empathically engaged with the characters. Our data speaks in favour of a specific role of vagal regulation in response to the mere presence of others in terms of explicit empathic engagement with characters during shared filmic experience.
Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, 2020
How do cultural artifacts influence the ways we experience and act? In this paper I propose that ... more How do cultural artifacts influence the ways we experience and act? In this paper I propose that habits provide a central link between human organisms and the socio- cultural environment and that cognition is cultural tout court. I will defend an enactive account of habits that sees them as expansive in the temporal (they relate us to a history of socio-cultural interactions) and spatial sense (they are co-constituted by cultural artifacts and our enculturated bodies). This account is based on Dewey’s pragmatist- organicist concept of habits that rigorously anchors experience in culture. I will trace cultural factors in Dewey’s philosophy and 4E (embodied, embedded, enacted, extended) cognitive science with a focus on pervasive artifacts – such as architecture, pictures, and moving images – which have become part of our habits of perceiving. I finally situate such habits within recent predictive coding theories that claim to provide the corresponding neuroscientific theory to our cultural minds.
We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. The... more We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. They are separated from the wider class of art-elicited emotions. Aesthetic emotions historically have been characterized as calm, as lacking specific patterns of embodiment, and as being a sui generis kind of pleasure. We reject those views and ar- gue that there is a plurality of aesthetic emotions contributing to praise. After present- ing a general account of the nature of emotions, we analyze twelve positive aesthetic emotions in four different categories: emotions of pleasure, contemplation, amaze- ment, and respect. The emotions that we identify in each category, including feelings of fluency, intrigue, wonder, and adoration, have been widely neglected both within aesthetics and in emotion research more broadly.
One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has ... more One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has suggested lens and camera movements to be among the most effective stylistic devices involved in such engagement. In an EEG experiment we assessed the role of such movements in modulating specific spectators´neuralspectators´neural and experiential responses, likely reflecting such engagement. We produced short video clips of an empty room with a still, a zooming and a moving camera (steadicam) that might simulate the movement of an observer in different ways. We found an event related desynchronization of the beta components of the rolandic mu rhythm that was stronger for the clips produced with steadicam than for those produced with a still or zooming camera. No equivalent modulation in the attention related occipital areas was found, thus confirming the sensorimotor nature of spectators´neuralspectators´neural responses to the film clips. The present study provides the first empirical evidence that filmic means such as camera movements alone can modulate spectators' bodily engagement with film.
I argue that the ambition to provide a naturalized aesthetics of film in Smith' Film, Art, and th... more I argue that the ambition to provide a naturalized aesthetics of film in Smith' Film, Art, and the Third Culture (2017) is not fully matched by the actual explanatory work done. This is because it converges its focus too much on the emotional engagement with character on the dispense of other features of film. I will make three related points to back up my claim. (1) I will argue that Smith ignores important elements of the phenomenon of seeing-in that are necessary in order to grasp our complex engagement with moving images. (2) Because of this oversight he also misconstrues the role the mirror neuron system could play in explanation of our engagement with filmic scenes. (3) I propose an account of embodied seeing-in as a remedy and aim to show how it might contribute to the analysis of a central sequence in Hitchcock's Strangers on a Train that Smith also discusses.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2018
Evaluative concepts qualify as abstract because they seem to go beyond what is given in experienc... more Evaluative concepts qualify as abstract because they seem to go beyond what is given in experience. This is especially clear in the case of moral concepts. Justice, for example, has no fixed appearance. Less obviously, aesthetic concepts may also qualify as abstract. The very same sensory input can be regarded as beautiful by one person and ugly by another. Artistic success can also transcend sensory accessible features. Here we focus on moral badness and aesthetic goodness and argue that both can be grounded in emotional responses. Emotions, in turn, are grounded in bodily perceptions, which correspond to action tendencies. When we conceptualize something as good or bad (whether in the moral or aesthetic domain) we experience our bodily responses to that thing. The moral and aesthetic domain are distinguished by the emotions that they involve.
There has been much work on what people appreciate in art, but comparatively little on what feeli... more There has been much work on what people appreciate in art, but comparatively little on what feelings of appreciation consist in. What do people feel when they encounter artworks that they value? We propose that the value of art is registered by the emotion of wonder. Departing from some standard approaches in empirical aesthetics, we focus on the appreciation of art as art rather than mere aesthetic preference. Aesthetic preferences can have many different correlates outside the domain of art (as when we select graphically appealing consumer items or judge the attractiveness of people), and preference judgments with respect to art can reflect non-aesthetic considerations and tell us rather little about art appreciation. We argue that when it comes to the appreciation of art as such, wonder plays a special role. We introduce wonder and compare it to other candidates that are discussed in the recent empirical literature, such as beauty, interest, and being moved. We analyze wonder and emphasize three subemotional components: cognitive perplexity, perceptual engagement, and a sense of reverence.
In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enact... more In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enactivists (Hutto, 2015) claim that our engagement with art is extensive, in the sense that it is non-contentful and artifact-including. Gallagher (2011) defends an embodied-enactive account of the specific kind of affordances artworks provide. For Noë (2015) art is a reorganizational practice. Each of these accounts claims that empirical (neuro)aesthetics is incapable of capturing the art-related engagement they want to highlight. While I agree on the relational and enactive nature of the mind and see the presented theories as important contributions to our understanding of art and aesthetics, I will argue that their dismissal of empirical aesthetics is misguided on several counts. A more qualified look can reveal relevant empirical research for claims enactive theorists should be interested in. Their criticism is either too general regarding the empirical methods employed or based on philosophical claims that themselves should be subjected to empirical scrutiny.
This special issue of Art & Perception for the first time comprises the abstracts of talks and po... more This special issue of Art & Perception for the first time comprises the abstracts of talks and posters presented at a Visual Science of Art Conference (VSAC). This year’s, 5th installment of VSAC took place in Berlin, August 25th-27th, with 117 contributions selected for presentation and more than 250 participants. This issue includes an editorial by Claus-Christian Carbon and Joerg Fingerhut that introduces the contributions and discussions at the conference. The abstracts of the keynotes presented by Jesse Prinz and Irving Biederman are then followed by those of the peer-reviewed presentations: talks/symposia (in order of presentation) and posters (in alphabetical order). The talks are clustered around central topics in the sciences of the arts, such as aesthetic universals vs. cross-cultural differences, some works are focusing on physiological measures in the aesthetic sciences, or on visual statistics of art images, others address the important issue of ecological valid testing of aesthetic experiences. The contributions to this year’s VSAC demonstrated a clear broadening of topics at the intersection of the visual sciences and the arts. Many presentations went beyond the focus on immediate sensory responses to artworks and simple evaluative states in order to also discuss the typical richness and elaborative quality of art experience that psychologists, philosophers, art historians, sociologists, and others recognize as an intellectually engaged, historically situated, and culturally varied phenomenon. The reprint of these abstracts therefore also aims to represent a cross-section of current research and debates in the field.
MIT Press: Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture, 2017
In the first section of this chapter we will review different approaches to the ways that we cogn... more In the first section of this chapter we will review different approaches to the ways that we cognitively engage with film (e.g. by highlighting certain neural responses to different filmic means; means that include the use of cuts, and of different camera and lens movements to portray scenes) and provide a basic embodied interpretation of recent research in this area. In the second section we will address philosophical claims regarding our embodied engagement with film stemming from phenomenological film theory and will provide an initial taxonomy of the roles visual cultural artifacts play in 4EA approaches to the mind. In the third section, we will focus on a more positive claim, namely that familiarization with the filmic medium might change our experience of film as well as our extra filmic perceptual routines over time, a process that has led to the emergence of a filmic body. Cognitive film theory, as portrayed in the first section of this chapter, considers certain filmic techniques to be closer to our preexisting bodily habits than others, and it is because of this vicinity to our natural perceptual routines that such techniques succeed in creating seemingly more realistic situations (e.g. by engaging certain motor components of the brain), or so they argue. We will entertain a thought that stands in opposition to this, namely that we entertain a filmic body in the movie context that adheres to its own rules. When we therefore engage with the medium in bodily terms (in order to have an illusory experience and immerse ourselves in its narrative), this engagement is not simply premised on what could be called our natural body (i.e. a fixed set-up of perceptual mechanism), but on novel skills and habits of perceiving that we have developed through our exposure to the conditions and syntax of film.
City life and mental wellbeing are interdependent in many ways. However, this web of interdepende... more City life and mental wellbeing are interdependent in many ways. However, this web of interdependencies is far from being sufficiently understood. Urban planners and health providers have so far largely failed to develop strategies coordinating the bidirectional interaction between urban life and mental wellbeing. Before the backdrop of an accelerating global urbanisation, we have founded an interdisciplinary research forum on neurourbanism, spanning neuroscience and the urban disciplines including urban planning, architecture, and sociology, and we call for more cross-sectional approaches in different global regions (figure).
in: Bildakt at the Warburg Institute, Marienberg & Trabant (eds.), pp. 33-55, Oct 10, 2014
This paper introduces pictures more generally into the discussion of cognition and mind. I will a... more This paper introduces pictures more generally into the discussion of cognition and mind. I will argue that pictures play a decisive role in shaping our mental lives because they have changed (and constantly keep changing) the ways we access the world. Focusing on pictures will therefore also shed new light on various claims within the field of embodied cognition. In the first half of this paper I address the question of whether, and in what possible ways, pictures might be considered to be part of our extended mind. We will see however, that the explanatory means contingent upon the extended mind thesis – i.e. the claim that the vehicles of cognition are not confined to the boundaries of the individual organism – can only take us so far. Beyond such claims it will be pivotal to understand in what specific ways pictures might be regarded as being at the basis of certain perceptions of and interactions with the world. I will therefore address, in the second half of this paper, in what ways enactive and affective elements should inform our theory of the pictorial mind. In the course of this discussion it will become apparent that pictures are strange objects because they differ profoundly from other objects surrounding us. And it will also turn out that pictures – beyond the fact that they can be considered to be tools for our mind (in the sense that they facilitate our access to the world) – are rather strange or stubborn tools in that something in them resists full integration into our cognitive routines.
We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the pr... more We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the presence of things and others is gradual. I introduce this kind of presence as a ubiquitous feature of every phenomenally conscious experience, as well as a key ingredient of our ‘feeling of being alive’, and distinguish explanatory agendas that might be relevant with regard to this phenomenon (1-3). My focus will be the role of the body-brain nexus in realizing these experiences and its treatment in recent accounts of the bodily constitution of experience. Specifically, I compare a sensorimotor approach to perceptual presence that focuses on properties of the moving body (O’Regan 2011; Noë 2012) with a more general enactivism that focuses on properties of the living body (Thompson 2007).
First, I develop and discuss a theory of access derived from sensorimotor theory that might be suited to explain the phenomenon of gradual presence. This is a theory that sees the mastery of sensorimotor, bodily engagements with the world as key elements in setting up a phenomenal experience space. I object that in current versions of sensorimotor theory the correlation posited between presence and changes in the subject’s physical relation to the environment is too rigid. Nevertheless I defend the claim that gradual presence is constituted by our temporally extended engagement with the environment (4-7).
Second, I consider some objections stemming from enactivism with regard to self-regulatory properties of the living body and the phenomenological claim that the organism’s value-laden relations with its environment have to be included in the theory. I will show that the latter is a necessary amendment to sensorimotor theory and its concept of gradual presence (8-10).
Embodied cognition claims that how we move our body is central for experience. Exploring dimensio... more Embodied cognition claims that how we move our body is central for experience. Exploring dimensions of bodily engagement should, therefore, also be central for engaging art. However, little attention has been paid to the actual ways viewers move in front of art and how this impacts experiences. We aim to close this gap,
This article highlights ways to relate psychology, neuroscience, and fi lm theory that are underr... more This article highlights ways to relate psychology, neuroscience, and fi lm theory that are underrepresented in the current debate and that could contribute to a new cognitive media theory. First, we outline how neuroscientifi c approaches to moving images could be embedded in the embodied, enactive cognition framework and recent predictive processing theories of the brain. Within this framework, we understand fi lmic engagement as a specifi c way of worldmaking, which is co-constituted by formal elements such as framing, camerawork, and editing. Second, we address experimental progress. Here we weigh the promises and perils of neuroscientifi c studies by discussing the motor neuron account to camera movements as an example. Based on the limitations we identify, we advocate for a multi-method study of fi lm experience that brings cognitive science into dialogue with philosophical accounts and qualitative in-depth explorations of subjective experience.
One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has ... more One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has suggested lens and camera movements to be among the most effective stylistic devices involved in such engagement. In an EEG experiment we assessed the role of such movements in modulating specific spectators´neural and experiential responses, likely reflecting such engagement. We produced short video clips of an empty room with a still, a zooming and a moving camera (steadicam) that might simulate the movement of an observer in different ways. We found an event related desynchronization of the beta components of the rolandic mu rhythm that was stronger for the clips produced with steadicam than for those produced with a still or zooming camera. No equivalent modulation in the attention related occipital areas was found, thus confirming the sensorimotor nature of spectators´neural responses to the film clips. The present study provides the first empirical evidence that filmic means such as camera movements alone can modulate spectators' bodily engagement with film.
Frontiers in Psychology: Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2021
This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systemat... more This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media have on our mind. To grasp this impact, I propose an enactive account of media that is based on expansive habits as media-structured, embodied ways of bringing forth meaning and new domains of values. We apply such habits, for instance, when seeing a picture or perceiving a movie. They become established through a process of reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city) that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits—one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind.
Frontiers in Psychology. Cultural Psychology, 2021
To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this pap... more To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest an Aesthetic Self Effect supporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral changes, such as altering political partisanship or religious orientation, and significantly stronger than for other categories of taste, such as food preferences (Study 1). Using a multidimensional scaling technique to map perceived aesthetic similarities among musical genres, we determined that aesthetic distances between genres correlate highly with the perceived difference in identity (Study 2). Further studies generalize the Aesthetic Self Effect beyond the musical domain: general changes in visual art preferences, for example from more traditional to abstract art, also elicited a strong Self Effect (Study 3). Exploring the breadth of this effect we also found an Anaesthetic Self Effect. That is, hypothetical changes from aesthetic indifference to caring about music, art, or beauty are judged to have a significant impact on identity. This effect on identity is stronger for aesthetic fields compared to leisure activities, such as hiking or playing video games (Study 4). Across our studies, the Anaesthetic Self Effect turns out to be stronger than the Aesthetic Self Effect. Taken together, we found evidence for a link between aesthetics and identity: we are aesthetic selves. When our tastes in music and the arts or our aesthetic interests change we take these to be transformative changes.
When watching a film, we are seeing-in moving images. Film's visual experience is therefore twofo... more When watching a film, we are seeing-in moving images. Film's visual experience is therefore twofold, encompassing a recognitional (the scene presented, the story told, etc.) and a configurational fold (editing, camera movement, etc.). Although some researchers endorse twofoldness with respect to film, there is also significant resistance and misrepresentation of its very nature. This paper argues that the concept is central to an understanding of the basic apprehension and the aesthetic appreciation of film. It demonstrates how twofoldness could play a more substantial role in a new cognitive film theory and a naturalized aesthetics of film. By discussing recent theories of our motor engagement with cinema it shows how referencing to the interplay of two filmic folds could inform such a theory. Moving images are still a quite recent cultural artifact, and it is central to understand the specific brain-body-artifact assemblies that underlie our habits of perceiving them. This entails a focus on seeing-in as a central cognitive capacity. Seeing-in has been identified as the basic mode of the perception of pictures-such as paintings and drawings-and constitutes an experience of a scene that differs from perceiving the same scene in the flesh. The phenomenology of such an experience has been referred to as twofold, that is, encompassing features of the picture surface and of what is depicted (Hopkins 2003; Lopes 2005; Wollheim [1980] 2015). As such it has been argued that the concept extends to cinema and moving images more generally (see, e.g., Hopkins 2008, 2018; Terrone 2018): in most cases of film perception we simultaneously engage with scene-presenting features such as mise en cadre, camera movements, cuts, technologies of projections-and with the evolving content of a scene. Both jointly constitute the experience of moving images. P e n u l t I m a t e V e r s i o n
As we identify with characters on screen, we simulate their emotions and thoughts. This is accomp... more As we identify with characters on screen, we simulate their emotions and thoughts. This is accompanied by physiological changes such as galvanic skin response (GSR), an indicator for emotional arousal, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), referring to vagal activity. We investigated whether the presence of a cinema audience affects these psychophysiological processes. The study was conducted in a real cinema in Berlin. Participants came twice to watch previously rated emotional film scenes eliciting amusement, anger, tenderness or fear. Once they watched the scenes alone, once in a group. We tested whether the vagal modulation in response to the mere presence of others influences explicit (reported) and implicit markers (RSA, heart rate (HR) and GSR) of emotional processes in function of solitary or collective enjoyment of movie scenes. On the physiological level, we found a mediating effect of vagal flexibility to the mere presence of others. Individuals showing a high baseline difference (alone vs. social) prior to the presentation of film, maintained higher RSA in the alone compared to the social condition. The opposite pattern emerged for low baseline difference individuals. Emotional arousal as reflected in GSR was significantly more pronounced during scenes eliciting anger independent of the social condition. On the behavioural level, we found evidence for emotion-specific effects on reported empathy, emotional intensity and Theory of Mind. Furthermore, people who decrease their RSA in response to others' company are those who felt themselves more empathically engaged with the characters. Our data speaks in favour of a specific role of vagal regulation in response to the mere presence of others in terms of explicit empathic engagement with characters during shared filmic experience.
Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, 2020
How do cultural artifacts influence the ways we experience and act? In this paper I propose that ... more How do cultural artifacts influence the ways we experience and act? In this paper I propose that habits provide a central link between human organisms and the socio- cultural environment and that cognition is cultural tout court. I will defend an enactive account of habits that sees them as expansive in the temporal (they relate us to a history of socio-cultural interactions) and spatial sense (they are co-constituted by cultural artifacts and our enculturated bodies). This account is based on Dewey’s pragmatist- organicist concept of habits that rigorously anchors experience in culture. I will trace cultural factors in Dewey’s philosophy and 4E (embodied, embedded, enacted, extended) cognitive science with a focus on pervasive artifacts – such as architecture, pictures, and moving images – which have become part of our habits of perceiving. I finally situate such habits within recent predictive coding theories that claim to provide the corresponding neuroscientific theory to our cultural minds.
We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. The... more We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. They are separated from the wider class of art-elicited emotions. Aesthetic emotions historically have been characterized as calm, as lacking specific patterns of embodiment, and as being a sui generis kind of pleasure. We reject those views and ar- gue that there is a plurality of aesthetic emotions contributing to praise. After present- ing a general account of the nature of emotions, we analyze twelve positive aesthetic emotions in four different categories: emotions of pleasure, contemplation, amaze- ment, and respect. The emotions that we identify in each category, including feelings of fluency, intrigue, wonder, and adoration, have been widely neglected both within aesthetics and in emotion research more broadly.
One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has ... more One key feature of film consists in its power to bodily engage the viewer. Previous research has suggested lens and camera movements to be among the most effective stylistic devices involved in such engagement. In an EEG experiment we assessed the role of such movements in modulating specific spectators´neuralspectators´neural and experiential responses, likely reflecting such engagement. We produced short video clips of an empty room with a still, a zooming and a moving camera (steadicam) that might simulate the movement of an observer in different ways. We found an event related desynchronization of the beta components of the rolandic mu rhythm that was stronger for the clips produced with steadicam than for those produced with a still or zooming camera. No equivalent modulation in the attention related occipital areas was found, thus confirming the sensorimotor nature of spectators´neuralspectators´neural responses to the film clips. The present study provides the first empirical evidence that filmic means such as camera movements alone can modulate spectators' bodily engagement with film.
I argue that the ambition to provide a naturalized aesthetics of film in Smith' Film, Art, and th... more I argue that the ambition to provide a naturalized aesthetics of film in Smith' Film, Art, and the Third Culture (2017) is not fully matched by the actual explanatory work done. This is because it converges its focus too much on the emotional engagement with character on the dispense of other features of film. I will make three related points to back up my claim. (1) I will argue that Smith ignores important elements of the phenomenon of seeing-in that are necessary in order to grasp our complex engagement with moving images. (2) Because of this oversight he also misconstrues the role the mirror neuron system could play in explanation of our engagement with filmic scenes. (3) I propose an account of embodied seeing-in as a remedy and aim to show how it might contribute to the analysis of a central sequence in Hitchcock's Strangers on a Train that Smith also discusses.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2018
Evaluative concepts qualify as abstract because they seem to go beyond what is given in experienc... more Evaluative concepts qualify as abstract because they seem to go beyond what is given in experience. This is especially clear in the case of moral concepts. Justice, for example, has no fixed appearance. Less obviously, aesthetic concepts may also qualify as abstract. The very same sensory input can be regarded as beautiful by one person and ugly by another. Artistic success can also transcend sensory accessible features. Here we focus on moral badness and aesthetic goodness and argue that both can be grounded in emotional responses. Emotions, in turn, are grounded in bodily perceptions, which correspond to action tendencies. When we conceptualize something as good or bad (whether in the moral or aesthetic domain) we experience our bodily responses to that thing. The moral and aesthetic domain are distinguished by the emotions that they involve.
There has been much work on what people appreciate in art, but comparatively little on what feeli... more There has been much work on what people appreciate in art, but comparatively little on what feelings of appreciation consist in. What do people feel when they encounter artworks that they value? We propose that the value of art is registered by the emotion of wonder. Departing from some standard approaches in empirical aesthetics, we focus on the appreciation of art as art rather than mere aesthetic preference. Aesthetic preferences can have many different correlates outside the domain of art (as when we select graphically appealing consumer items or judge the attractiveness of people), and preference judgments with respect to art can reflect non-aesthetic considerations and tell us rather little about art appreciation. We argue that when it comes to the appreciation of art as such, wonder plays a special role. We introduce wonder and compare it to other candidates that are discussed in the recent empirical literature, such as beauty, interest, and being moved. We analyze wonder and emphasize three subemotional components: cognitive perplexity, perceptual engagement, and a sense of reverence.
In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enact... more In this paper, I review recent enactive approaches to art and aesthetic experience. Radical enactivists (Hutto, 2015) claim that our engagement with art is extensive, in the sense that it is non-contentful and artifact-including. Gallagher (2011) defends an embodied-enactive account of the specific kind of affordances artworks provide. For Noë (2015) art is a reorganizational practice. Each of these accounts claims that empirical (neuro)aesthetics is incapable of capturing the art-related engagement they want to highlight. While I agree on the relational and enactive nature of the mind and see the presented theories as important contributions to our understanding of art and aesthetics, I will argue that their dismissal of empirical aesthetics is misguided on several counts. A more qualified look can reveal relevant empirical research for claims enactive theorists should be interested in. Their criticism is either too general regarding the empirical methods employed or based on philosophical claims that themselves should be subjected to empirical scrutiny.
This special issue of Art & Perception for the first time comprises the abstracts of talks and po... more This special issue of Art & Perception for the first time comprises the abstracts of talks and posters presented at a Visual Science of Art Conference (VSAC). This year’s, 5th installment of VSAC took place in Berlin, August 25th-27th, with 117 contributions selected for presentation and more than 250 participants. This issue includes an editorial by Claus-Christian Carbon and Joerg Fingerhut that introduces the contributions and discussions at the conference. The abstracts of the keynotes presented by Jesse Prinz and Irving Biederman are then followed by those of the peer-reviewed presentations: talks/symposia (in order of presentation) and posters (in alphabetical order). The talks are clustered around central topics in the sciences of the arts, such as aesthetic universals vs. cross-cultural differences, some works are focusing on physiological measures in the aesthetic sciences, or on visual statistics of art images, others address the important issue of ecological valid testing of aesthetic experiences. The contributions to this year’s VSAC demonstrated a clear broadening of topics at the intersection of the visual sciences and the arts. Many presentations went beyond the focus on immediate sensory responses to artworks and simple evaluative states in order to also discuss the typical richness and elaborative quality of art experience that psychologists, philosophers, art historians, sociologists, and others recognize as an intellectually engaged, historically situated, and culturally varied phenomenon. The reprint of these abstracts therefore also aims to represent a cross-section of current research and debates in the field.
MIT Press: Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture, 2017
In the first section of this chapter we will review different approaches to the ways that we cogn... more In the first section of this chapter we will review different approaches to the ways that we cognitively engage with film (e.g. by highlighting certain neural responses to different filmic means; means that include the use of cuts, and of different camera and lens movements to portray scenes) and provide a basic embodied interpretation of recent research in this area. In the second section we will address philosophical claims regarding our embodied engagement with film stemming from phenomenological film theory and will provide an initial taxonomy of the roles visual cultural artifacts play in 4EA approaches to the mind. In the third section, we will focus on a more positive claim, namely that familiarization with the filmic medium might change our experience of film as well as our extra filmic perceptual routines over time, a process that has led to the emergence of a filmic body. Cognitive film theory, as portrayed in the first section of this chapter, considers certain filmic techniques to be closer to our preexisting bodily habits than others, and it is because of this vicinity to our natural perceptual routines that such techniques succeed in creating seemingly more realistic situations (e.g. by engaging certain motor components of the brain), or so they argue. We will entertain a thought that stands in opposition to this, namely that we entertain a filmic body in the movie context that adheres to its own rules. When we therefore engage with the medium in bodily terms (in order to have an illusory experience and immerse ourselves in its narrative), this engagement is not simply premised on what could be called our natural body (i.e. a fixed set-up of perceptual mechanism), but on novel skills and habits of perceiving that we have developed through our exposure to the conditions and syntax of film.
City life and mental wellbeing are interdependent in many ways. However, this web of interdepende... more City life and mental wellbeing are interdependent in many ways. However, this web of interdependencies is far from being sufficiently understood. Urban planners and health providers have so far largely failed to develop strategies coordinating the bidirectional interaction between urban life and mental wellbeing. Before the backdrop of an accelerating global urbanisation, we have founded an interdisciplinary research forum on neurourbanism, spanning neuroscience and the urban disciplines including urban planning, architecture, and sociology, and we call for more cross-sectional approaches in different global regions (figure).
in: Bildakt at the Warburg Institute, Marienberg & Trabant (eds.), pp. 33-55, Oct 10, 2014
This paper introduces pictures more generally into the discussion of cognition and mind. I will a... more This paper introduces pictures more generally into the discussion of cognition and mind. I will argue that pictures play a decisive role in shaping our mental lives because they have changed (and constantly keep changing) the ways we access the world. Focusing on pictures will therefore also shed new light on various claims within the field of embodied cognition. In the first half of this paper I address the question of whether, and in what possible ways, pictures might be considered to be part of our extended mind. We will see however, that the explanatory means contingent upon the extended mind thesis – i.e. the claim that the vehicles of cognition are not confined to the boundaries of the individual organism – can only take us so far. Beyond such claims it will be pivotal to understand in what specific ways pictures might be regarded as being at the basis of certain perceptions of and interactions with the world. I will therefore address, in the second half of this paper, in what ways enactive and affective elements should inform our theory of the pictorial mind. In the course of this discussion it will become apparent that pictures are strange objects because they differ profoundly from other objects surrounding us. And it will also turn out that pictures – beyond the fact that they can be considered to be tools for our mind (in the sense that they facilitate our access to the world) – are rather strange or stubborn tools in that something in them resists full integration into our cognitive routines.
We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the pr... more We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the presence of things and others is gradual. I introduce this kind of presence as a ubiquitous feature of every phenomenally conscious experience, as well as a key ingredient of our ‘feeling of being alive’, and distinguish explanatory agendas that might be relevant with regard to this phenomenon (1-3). My focus will be the role of the body-brain nexus in realizing these experiences and its treatment in recent accounts of the bodily constitution of experience. Specifically, I compare a sensorimotor approach to perceptual presence that focuses on properties of the moving body (O’Regan 2011; Noë 2012) with a more general enactivism that focuses on properties of the living body (Thompson 2007).
First, I develop and discuss a theory of access derived from sensorimotor theory that might be suited to explain the phenomenon of gradual presence. This is a theory that sees the mastery of sensorimotor, bodily engagements with the world as key elements in setting up a phenomenal experience space. I object that in current versions of sensorimotor theory the correlation posited between presence and changes in the subject’s physical relation to the environment is too rigid. Nevertheless I defend the claim that gradual presence is constituted by our temporally extended engagement with the environment (4-7).
Second, I consider some objections stemming from enactivism with regard to self-regulatory properties of the living body and the phenomenological claim that the organism’s value-laden relations with its environment have to be included in the theory. I will show that the latter is a necessary amendment to sensorimotor theory and its concept of gradual presence (8-10).
Band 12 der »Nachgelassenen Manuskripte und Texte« umfasst vor allem das gründlich ausgearbeitete... more Band 12 der »Nachgelassenen Manuskripte und Texte« umfasst vor allem das gründlich ausgearbeitete Vorlesungsmanuskript der 1920/21 in Hamburg gehaltenen Vorlesung »Schillers philosophische Weltansicht«. Cassirer argumentiert darin in fünf Kapiteln für die innere Bedingtheit von philosophischem System und dichterischem Schaffen bei Schiller. In Schillers Werk sieht er einen neuen Stil in der Philosophie entstehen, der sich dadurch auszeichnet, dass der philosophische, abstrakte Gedanke je immer schon eine gestaltete Form hat und philosophische und künstlerische Momente in einem inneren Abhängigkeitsverhältnis stehen. Philosophische Weltansicht ist zugleich auch die Weltansicht des Künstlers, und Kunst erhält damit eine herausragende Stellung im System der geistigen Kultur.
Das Manuskript der Schiller-Vorlesung stellt neben dem Kapitel »Freiheitsproblem und Formproblem in der klassischen Ästhetik« in »Freiheit und Form« von 1916 die intensivste direkte Auseinandersetzung Cassirers mit Schiller dar. Der zeitgleich mit der Vorlesung erschienene Text aus »Idee und Gestalt«, »Die Methodik des Idealismus in Schillers philosophischen Schriften« (1921), erscheint vor dem Hintergrund des ausführlicheren Manuskripts als die Behandlung eines Spezialproblems – des Methodengedankens – innerhalb der größeren Fragen nach der Symbolfunktion der Kunst und der Rolle der ästhetischen Anschauung. Mit der Veröffentlichung des in diesem Band erschlossenen Manuskriptes wird auch deutlich, wie viel Cassirers eigene Antworten auf diese Fragen sich seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Schiller verdanken.
Beim Stichwort »Kognition« denken die meisten an das Gehirn, Computermodelle oder Informationsver... more Beim Stichwort »Kognition« denken die meisten an das Gehirn, Computermodelle oder Informationsverarbeitung. In der realen Welt treffen wir aber immer nur auf Wesen mit Körpern, die in eine Umwelt eingebunden und in ihr aktiv sind. Kognition findet nicht im Kopf statt, sondern in der Welt. So lautet der Grundgedanke der Philosophie der Verkörperung. Die Hinwendung zu Körper und Umwelt stellt eine der vielleicht weitreichendsten Neuorientierungen der modernen Kognitionswissenschaft und Philosophie dar, die auch unser Verständnis von Wissenschaft und Kultur prägen wird. Der Band versammelt die Grundlagentexte zu diesem Thema zum ersten Mal in deutscher Sprache und bietet somit einen vorzüglichen Überblick über dieses neue Forschungsgebiet.
Contributions by Matthew Ratcliffe, Jan Slaby, Achim Stephan, Riccardo Manzotti, Alice Holzhey-Ku... more Contributions by Matthew Ratcliffe, Jan Slaby, Achim Stephan, Riccardo Manzotti, Alice Holzhey-Kunz, Thomas Fuchs, Joerg Fingerhut, Fiorella Battaglia, Arbogast Schmitt, Eva-Maria Engelen, Tanja Klemm, Matthias Jung, Sabine Marienberg.
The question of what characterizes feelings of being alive is a puzzling and controversial one. Are we dealing with a unique affective phenomenon or can it be integrated into existing classifications of emotions and moods? What might be the natural basis for such feelings? What could be considered their specifically human dimension? These issues are addressed by researchers from various disciplines, including philosophy of mind and emotions, psychology, and history of art.
""A myriad of sensations inform and direct us when we engage with the environment. To understand ... more ""A myriad of sensations inform and direct us when we engage with the environment. To understand their influence on the development of our habitus it is important to focus on unifying processes in sensing. This approach allows us to include phenomena that elude a rather narrow view that focuses on each of the five discrete senses in isolation. One of the central questions addressed in this volume is whether there is something like a sensual habitus, and if there is, how it can be defined. This is especially done by exploring the formation and habituation of the senses in and by a culturally shaped habitat. Two key concepts, Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics, are addressed as essential components for an understanding of the interface of habitat and the rich and multisensory experience of a perceiving subject.
At a Berlin-based conference Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics, scholars from various disciplines gathered to discuss these issues. In bringing together the outcome of these discussions, this book gives new insights into the key phenomena of sensory integration and synaesthetic experiences, it enriches the perspectives on sensually embedded interaction and its habituation, and it expands this interdisciplinary inquiry to questions about the cultures of sensory habitus.""
"Ernst Cassirer hat sich in den Jahren 1907 bis 1945 in Vorlesungen und Vorträgen immer wieder mi... more "Ernst Cassirer hat sich in den Jahren 1907 bis 1945 in Vorlesungen und Vorträgen immer wieder mit der Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Philosophie zu den Naturwissenschaften beschäftigt. Trotz der großen zeitlichen Spanne, die die Texte des Bandes umfaßt, wird deutlich, daß es Cassirer von Anfang an darum geht, die von den Wissenschaften selbst aufgeworfenen philosophischen Probleme aufzugreifen und zu erörtern - und keinesfalls nur darum, Probleme der Philosophie an die Wissenschaften heranzutragen. In diesem Sinne ist der Titel "Vorlesungen und Vorträge zu philosophischen Problemen der Wissenschaften" zu verstehen.
Band 8 der Edition "Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte" enthält neben dem frühen Vortrag aus Cassirers Berliner Zeit "Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff" (1907) die Antrittsvorlesung in Hamburg "Die Beziehung zwischen Philosophie und exakter Wissenschaft" (1919) und den Hamburger Vorlesungszyklus "Die philosophischen Probleme der Relativitätstheorie" (1920/21). Außerdem enthalten sind zwei Radio-Vorträge zum Thema "Die Einheit der Wissenschaft" (21. und 28. Oktober 1931) und eine deutschsprachige sowie eine englischsprachige Studie zu "Gruppenbegriff und Wahrnehmungstheorie" (1937) und "The Concept of Group" (1945)."
Das Konzept der ‚Eignung’ oder ‚Affordanz’ ist das zentrale theoretische Konstrukt der ökologisch... more Das Konzept der ‚Eignung’ oder ‚Affordanz’ ist das zentrale theoretische Konstrukt der ökologischen Wahrnehmungspsychologie, die sich der Interaktion von Organismus und Umwelt widmet. Es ist von Philosophen und Psychologen eingeführt worden, um eine grundlegende Theorie der direkten Wahrnehmung vertreten zu können, die keine komplexen inneren Repräsentationen und vermittelnde Schlüsse voraussetzt. Eignungen sind in der Umwelt und enthalten genügend Informationen um handlungsleitend zu sein, ohne dass über sie in mentalen Operationen geurteilt werden müsste. Mit der Einführung des Begriffes der ‚affordance’ behauptet Gibson (1979, 127) eine zentrale Leerstelle in der Psychologie seiner Zeit zu füllen, indem er Eignungen der Umwelt für Handlung benennt (das ’Besteigbare’, ’Greifbare’, ’Sitzbare’) und dabei Angebote und Bedrohungen unterscheidet, ihnen also Werte zuordnet. Die grundlegende empirische Hypothese ist, dass Affordanzen direkt wahrgenommen werden und die Wahrnehmung von Objekten mit Eigenschaften demgegenüber derivativ ist. Die Affordanzen selbst sind nicht rein physikalisch beschreibbar und Gibson entwickelt aus diesem Grunde eine erweiterte ontologische Theorie, die solche Entitäten mit einschließt. Heidegger verpflichtet sich in Sein und Zeit zu einer vergleichbaren Ontologie, indem er behauptet, dass wir primär Seiendes von der Seinsart des Zuhandenen wahrnehmen und erst abgeleitet davon Vorhandenes.
Gibsons erklärtes Ziel ist es, die Subjekt-Objekt-Dichotomie zu durchbrechen, indem er einen Fakt aufzeigt, der weder der Umwelt noch dem Organismus zugeschrieben werden kann, der „objektiv wie subjektiv sei, […] sowohl physikalisch als auch psychisch, und dennoch keines von beidem.“ (129) Dies galt als notorisch unklar und verwirrend. In der Nachfolge Gibsons wurden deshalb – auf andere Stellen Bezug nehmend (127) – Affordanzen als Eigenschaften der Umwelt definiert. Sie wurden dem folgend als Dispositionen aufgefasst und korrespondierenden ‚Effektivitäten’ im Organismus entgegengestellt (Turvey et al.). Dieser Ansatz ist jedoch unbefriedigend. Unter der Standardinterpretation werden Dispositionen (ein Glas hat z.B. die dispositionale Eigenschaft zerbrechlich zu sein) manifest, wenn sich die aktualisierenden Umstände einstellen (wenn der nötige Druck auf ein Glas ausgeübt wird, zerbricht es), während z.B. die ‚Sitzbarkeit’ eines Stuhls sich nicht manifestieren muss, wenn man sie wahrnimmt.
Ausgangspunkt für eine Theorie der Affordanzen sollte deshalb die Aufassung sein, dass mit den Affordanzen eine Relation von Umweltmerkmal und Fähigkeit des Organismus wahrgenommen wird. Diese Relationen sind real. Sie ändern sich allerdings in der Interaktion von Organismus und kognitiver Nische ständig, d.h. nicht nur phylogenetisch sondern auch ontogenetisch. Eine solche Fassung von Affordanzen erlaubt es, sie als Teil der Handlungs-Wahrnehmungsschleifen zu sehen, die im Enaktivismus beschrieben werden. Sie sind damit ein Baustein für eine theoretisch anspruchsvolle enaktive Wahrnehmungstheorie, die direkte Wahrnehmungen verteidigen will. In solcher Funktion (als Bausteine eine Theorie direkter Wahrnehmung) kommen sie bereits in Theorien der Wahrnehmung emotionaler Ausdrücke, sozialer Situationen und der Welt durch Sprache zur Anwendung – während sie für Bildtheorien und ästhetische Wahrnehmung noch nicht systematisch in Anschlag gebracht worden sind.
Literatur (chronologisch)
– Gibson, James Jerome. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979.
Der Klassiker zum Thema. Der Begriff der ‚Affordance’ wird in diesem Werk als terminus technicus einer Wahrnehmungspsychologie eingeführt, die auf der Interaktion zwischen Nische und Organismus beruht. Für die Herleitung des Begriffes aus der Gestaltpsychologie (insbes. Koffka) mit dem Ziel, nicht in deren Dualismus zwischen phänomenologischem und behavioralem Objekt zu verfallen, vgl. das Kapitel zu „The Origin of the Concept of Affordances: A Recent History“, 138-140. Die Wahrnehmung einer ‚Affordance’ ist für Gibson immer von einer Körperwahrnehmung (Propriozeption) begleitet.
– Turvey, Michael T., Robert E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed and William M. Mace. „Ecological Laws of Perceiving and Acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981).“ Cognition 9, no. 3 (1981): 237-304.
Dieser Text verteidigt die ökologischen Psychologie und das Konzept der Affordanz gegen das vernichtende Urteil der einflussreichen zeitgenössischen Kognitionspsychologie. Ohne die theoretische Arbeit der Autoren, die einige philosophischen Probleme Gibsons offenlegten und korrigierten und auch empirisch überprüfbare Hypothesen der Theorie formulierten, wäre die grundlegende Theorie vermutlich zu der Zeit nicht in ein Forschungsprogramm übergeleitet worden.
– Reed, Edward S. Encountering the World: Toward An Ecological Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Evolutionsbiologische Theorie der Affordanzen und generell der Psychologie, die nicht in die vereinfachenden Erklärung einer adaptiven (selektionistischen) Psychologie verfällt. Die Realität der Affordanzen wird hier begründet, indem sie als Quelle des Selektionsdruckes auf Organismen identifiziert werden.
– Scarantino, Andrea M. „Affordances Explained.“ Philosophy of Science 70, no. 5 (2003): 949-961.
Knappe und gute Einführung in das Konzept der Affordanzen. Argumentiert für ein Verständnis der Affordanzen als Dispositionen.
Führt ’Affordances 2.0’ ein, die die Veränderungen der kognitiven (oder kulturellen) Nische durch die Handlungen des Organismus und die Rückkoppelung dieser Veränderungen auf die Handlungen innerhalb einer dynamischen Theorie des Geistes erklärt. Gute Übersicht über die Nach-Gibsonianischen Versuche dessen verwirrte Ontologie zu systematisieren mit einem Argument dafür, Affordanzen als Relationen zu beschreiben (Kapitel 7).
Wie hängt der Paradigmenwechsel in der Erforschung des Geistes, weg vom Zerebral-zentrismus und d... more Wie hängt der Paradigmenwechsel in der Erforschung des Geistes, weg vom Zerebral-zentrismus und der Computermetapher des Geistes und hin zu einer Erforschung der Rolle von körperlicher Aktivität und der Situiertheit in einer bestimmten Umwelt mit Fragen zu Kultur und Bild zusammen
Die Grundthese der Philosophie der Verkorperung lautet, dass Kognition vielfältige Fähigkeiten vo... more Die Grundthese der Philosophie der Verkorperung lautet, dass Kognition vielfältige Fähigkeiten vom Wahrnehmen, über geschickte Verhaltensweisen, bis hin zu abstrakten Überlegungen umfasst, und dass diese Fähigkeiten nicht nur im Kopf, sondern auch im Körper und in der Welt verortet werden müssen. Mit dieser theoretischen Grundannahme ist eine der vielleicht weitreichendsten Neuorientierungen in den Geistes- und Kognitionswissenschaften der letzten 30 Jahre benannt. Die Philosophie der Verkörperung stellt in Frage, was Kognition überhaupt ist und wo und wie sie stattfindet. Die Debatte wird durch begriffliche Überlegungen, genauso wie durch phänomenologische Beschreibungen und empirische Arbeiten aus den verschiedenen Disziplinen der Kognitionswissenschaften geprägt. In diesem Forschungsbericht geben wir einen Überblick über jüngste Entwicklungen in der Forschung.
In den vergangenen Jahren wurde insbesondere in der Philosophie erbittert darüber gestritten, welche Rollen die Psychologie und Neurowissenschaft für unser Verständnis von Kunstwerken haben könnten. Der Vortrag wird erkunden, welche Elemente romantischer Bilderfahrung in der empirischen Ästhetik abgebildet sind und welche noch abgebildet werden könnten. Einige von Caspar David Friedrichs „Experimenten“ zur Erschließung des Bildmediums werden dazu dienen, die Grenzen und Möglichkeiten einer psychologischen Erforschung der Bilderfahrung zu beleuchten.
20. September 2018 – 21. September 2018: "Verkörpertes Wissen – revisited" //
Eine Veransta... more 20. September 2018 – 21. September 2018: "Verkörpertes Wissen – revisited" //
Eine Veranstaltung des Ludwik Fleck Zentrums in Kooperation mit dem Zentrum «Geschichte des Wissens» und dessen AG Medical Humanities //
Organisiert von: Dr. Sophie Witt und PD. Dr. Hartmut v. Sass //
Mit: Dr. Gerko Egert, Dr. Joerg Fingerhut, Prof. Dr. Céline Kaiser, Dr. Michael Penkler, Dr. Mai Wegener, Prof. Dr. Markus Wild, PD Dr. Bettina Bock von Wülfingen, Prof. Dr. Bettina Wuttig //
Die Rede von Embodied Knowledge – von einem Wissen, das an einen Körper gebunden ist – hat seit den 1980er Jahren eine Reihe von wissenstheoretischen Zugriffen und wissenschaftshistorischen Forschungsfeldern geprägt: Von der (Technik-)Philosophie über die Robotik bis hin zu den Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaften und die daran anschliessende Psychologie und Soziologie. Im Anschluss an Michael Polanyi wurde von der Implizitheit des Wissens ausgegangen, also von einem Wissen, das zu Teilen unbewusst und als solches sozial und kulturell vorstrukturiert ist. Während also embodiment tendenziell einen Körper voraussetzt, der – durch Macht, Gesellschaft oder Wirklichkeit – nachträglich geprägt wird, stellen jüngeren Ansätze – z.B. unter dem Schlagwort des «Körperwissens» oder der «Somatisierung» – den Vorgang der Verkörperung in den Fokus, d. h. sie fragen, wie «Körper» allererst generiert werden und welche diskursiven, vor allem aber auch performativen und materiellen Praktiken und Eigenlogiken damit im Zusammenhang stehen.
«Verkörpertes Wissen – revisited» will eine kritische Sondierung grundlegender Positionen und aktueller Debatten vornehmen und die Frage nach Verkörperung an gegenwärtige Forschungsfelder der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften anbinden. //
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As we identify with characters on screen, we simulate their emotions and thoughts. This is accomp... more As we identify with characters on screen, we simulate their emotions and thoughts. This is accompanied by physiological changes such as galvanic skin response (GSR), an indicator for emotional arousal, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), referring to vagal activity. We investigated whether the presence of a cinema audience affects these psychophysiological processes. The study was conducted in a real cinema in Berlin. Participants came twice to watch previously rated emotional film scenes eliciting amusement, anger, tenderness or fear. Once they watched the scenes alone, once in a group. We tested whether the vagal modulation in response to the mere presence of others influences explicit (reported) and implicit markers (RSA, heart rate (HR) and GSR) of emotional processes in function of solitary or collective enjoyment of movie scenes. On the physiological level, we found a mediating effect of vagal flexibility to the mere presence of others. Individuals showing a high baseline difference (alone vs. social) prior to the presentation of film, maintained higher RSA in the alone compared to the social condition. The opposite pattern emerged for low baseline difference individuals. Emotional arousal as reflected in GSR was significantly more pronounced during scenes eliciting anger independent of the social condition. On the behavioural level, we found evidence for emotion-specific effects on reported empathy, emotional intensity and Theory of Mind. Furthermore, people who decrease their RSA in response to others' company are those who felt themselves more empathically engaged with the characters. Our data speaks in favour of a specific role of vagal regulation in response to the mere presence of others in terms of explicit empathic engagement with characters during shared filmic experience.
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reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of
viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city) that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits—one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind.
P e n u l t I m a t e V e r s i o n
First, I develop and discuss a theory of access derived from sensorimotor theory that might be suited to explain the phenomenon of gradual presence. This is a theory that sees the mastery of sensorimotor, bodily engagements with the world as key elements in setting up a phenomenal experience space. I object that in current versions of sensorimotor theory the correlation posited between presence and changes in the subject’s physical relation to the environment is too rigid. Nevertheless I defend the claim that gradual presence is constituted by our temporally extended engagement with the environment (4-7).
Second, I consider some objections stemming from enactivism with regard to self-regulatory properties of the living body and the phenomenological claim that the organism’s value-laden relations with its environment have to be included in the theory. I will show that the latter is a necessary amendment to sensorimotor theory and its concept of gradual presence (8-10).
reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of
viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city) that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits—one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind.
P e n u l t I m a t e V e r s i o n
First, I develop and discuss a theory of access derived from sensorimotor theory that might be suited to explain the phenomenon of gradual presence. This is a theory that sees the mastery of sensorimotor, bodily engagements with the world as key elements in setting up a phenomenal experience space. I object that in current versions of sensorimotor theory the correlation posited between presence and changes in the subject’s physical relation to the environment is too rigid. Nevertheless I defend the claim that gradual presence is constituted by our temporally extended engagement with the environment (4-7).
Second, I consider some objections stemming from enactivism with regard to self-regulatory properties of the living body and the phenomenological claim that the organism’s value-laden relations with its environment have to be included in the theory. I will show that the latter is a necessary amendment to sensorimotor theory and its concept of gradual presence (8-10).
Das Manuskript der Schiller-Vorlesung stellt neben dem Kapitel »Freiheitsproblem und Formproblem in der klassischen Ästhetik« in »Freiheit und Form« von 1916 die intensivste direkte Auseinandersetzung Cassirers mit Schiller dar. Der zeitgleich mit der Vorlesung erschienene Text aus »Idee und Gestalt«, »Die Methodik des Idealismus in Schillers philosophischen Schriften« (1921), erscheint vor dem Hintergrund des ausführlicheren Manuskripts als die Behandlung eines Spezialproblems – des Methodengedankens – innerhalb der größeren Fragen nach der Symbolfunktion der Kunst und der Rolle der ästhetischen Anschauung. Mit der Veröffentlichung des in diesem Band erschlossenen Manuskriptes wird auch deutlich, wie viel Cassirers eigene Antworten auf diese Fragen sich seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Schiller verdanken.
The question of what characterizes feelings of being alive is a puzzling and controversial one. Are we dealing with a unique affective phenomenon or can it be integrated into existing classifications of emotions and moods? What might be the natural basis for such feelings? What could be considered their specifically human dimension? These issues are addressed by researchers from various disciplines, including philosophy of mind and emotions, psychology, and history of art.
At a Berlin-based conference Synaesthesia and Kinaesthetics, scholars from various disciplines gathered to discuss these issues. In bringing together the outcome of these discussions, this book gives new insights into the key phenomena of sensory integration and synaesthetic experiences, it enriches the perspectives on sensually embedded interaction and its habituation, and it expands this interdisciplinary inquiry to questions about the cultures of sensory habitus.""
Band 8 der Edition "Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte" enthält neben dem frühen Vortrag aus Cassirers Berliner Zeit "Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff" (1907) die Antrittsvorlesung in Hamburg "Die Beziehung zwischen Philosophie und exakter Wissenschaft" (1919) und den Hamburger Vorlesungszyklus "Die philosophischen Probleme der Relativitätstheorie" (1920/21). Außerdem enthalten sind zwei Radio-Vorträge zum Thema "Die Einheit der Wissenschaft" (21. und 28. Oktober 1931) und eine deutschsprachige sowie eine englischsprachige Studie zu "Gruppenbegriff und Wahrnehmungstheorie" (1937) und "The Concept of Group" (1945)."
Mit der Einführung des Begriffes der ‚affordance’ behauptet Gibson (1979, 127) eine zentrale Leerstelle in der Psychologie seiner Zeit zu füllen, indem er Eignungen der Umwelt für Handlung benennt (das ’Besteigbare’, ’Greifbare’, ’Sitzbare’) und dabei Angebote und Bedrohungen unterscheidet, ihnen also Werte zuordnet. Die grundlegende empirische Hypothese ist, dass Affordanzen direkt wahrgenommen werden und die Wahrnehmung von Objekten mit Eigenschaften demgegenüber derivativ ist. Die Affordanzen selbst sind nicht rein physikalisch beschreibbar und Gibson entwickelt aus diesem Grunde eine erweiterte ontologische Theorie, die solche Entitäten mit einschließt. Heidegger verpflichtet sich in Sein und Zeit zu einer vergleichbaren Ontologie, indem er behauptet, dass wir primär Seiendes von der Seinsart des Zuhandenen wahrnehmen und erst abgeleitet davon Vorhandenes.
Gibsons erklärtes Ziel ist es, die Subjekt-Objekt-Dichotomie zu durchbrechen, indem er einen Fakt aufzeigt, der weder der Umwelt noch dem Organismus zugeschrieben werden kann, der „objektiv wie subjektiv sei, […] sowohl physikalisch als auch psychisch, und dennoch keines von beidem.“ (129) Dies galt als notorisch unklar und verwirrend. In der Nachfolge Gibsons wurden deshalb – auf andere Stellen Bezug nehmend (127) – Affordanzen als Eigenschaften der Umwelt definiert. Sie wurden dem folgend als Dispositionen aufgefasst und korrespondierenden ‚Effektivitäten’ im Organismus entgegengestellt (Turvey et al.). Dieser Ansatz ist jedoch unbefriedigend. Unter der Standardinterpretation werden Dispositionen (ein Glas hat z.B. die dispositionale Eigenschaft zerbrechlich zu sein) manifest, wenn sich die aktualisierenden Umstände einstellen (wenn der nötige Druck auf ein Glas ausgeübt wird, zerbricht es), während z.B. die ‚Sitzbarkeit’ eines Stuhls sich nicht manifestieren muss, wenn man sie wahrnimmt.
Ausgangspunkt für eine Theorie der Affordanzen sollte deshalb die Aufassung sein, dass mit den Affordanzen eine Relation von Umweltmerkmal und Fähigkeit des Organismus wahrgenommen wird. Diese Relationen sind real. Sie ändern sich allerdings in der Interaktion von Organismus und kognitiver Nische ständig, d.h. nicht nur phylogenetisch sondern auch ontogenetisch. Eine solche Fassung von Affordanzen erlaubt es, sie als Teil der Handlungs-Wahrnehmungsschleifen zu sehen, die im Enaktivismus beschrieben werden. Sie sind damit ein Baustein für eine theoretisch anspruchsvolle enaktive Wahrnehmungstheorie, die direkte Wahrnehmungen verteidigen will. In solcher Funktion (als Bausteine eine Theorie direkter Wahrnehmung) kommen sie bereits in Theorien der Wahrnehmung emotionaler Ausdrücke, sozialer Situationen und der Welt durch Sprache zur Anwendung – während sie für Bildtheorien und ästhetische Wahrnehmung noch nicht systematisch in Anschlag gebracht worden sind.
Literatur (chronologisch)
– Gibson, James Jerome. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979.
Der Klassiker zum Thema. Der Begriff der ‚Affordance’ wird in diesem Werk als terminus technicus einer Wahrnehmungspsychologie eingeführt, die auf der Interaktion zwischen Nische und Organismus beruht. Für die Herleitung des Begriffes aus der Gestaltpsychologie (insbes. Koffka) mit dem Ziel, nicht in deren Dualismus zwischen phänomenologischem und behavioralem Objekt zu verfallen, vgl. das Kapitel zu „The Origin of the Concept of Affordances: A Recent History“, 138-140. Die Wahrnehmung einer ‚Affordance’ ist für Gibson immer von einer Körperwahrnehmung (Propriozeption) begleitet.
– Turvey, Michael T., Robert E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed and William M. Mace. „Ecological Laws of Perceiving and Acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981).“ Cognition 9, no. 3 (1981): 237-304.
Dieser Text verteidigt die ökologischen Psychologie und das Konzept der Affordanz gegen das vernichtende Urteil der einflussreichen zeitgenössischen Kognitionspsychologie. Ohne die theoretische Arbeit der Autoren, die einige philosophischen Probleme Gibsons offenlegten und korrigierten und auch empirisch überprüfbare Hypothesen der Theorie formulierten, wäre die grundlegende Theorie vermutlich zu der Zeit nicht in ein Forschungsprogramm übergeleitet worden.
– Reed, Edward S. Encountering the World: Toward An Ecological Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Evolutionsbiologische Theorie der Affordanzen und generell der Psychologie, die nicht in die vereinfachenden Erklärung einer adaptiven (selektionistischen) Psychologie verfällt. Die Realität der Affordanzen wird hier begründet, indem sie als Quelle des Selektionsdruckes auf Organismen identifiziert werden.
– Scarantino, Andrea M. „Affordances Explained.“ Philosophy of Science 70, no. 5 (2003): 949-961.
Knappe und gute Einführung in das Konzept der Affordanzen. Argumentiert für ein Verständnis der Affordanzen als Dispositionen.
– Chemero, Anthony. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009.
Führt ’Affordances 2.0’ ein, die die Veränderungen der kognitiven (oder kulturellen) Nische durch die Handlungen des Organismus und die Rückkoppelung dieser Veränderungen auf die Handlungen innerhalb einer dynamischen Theorie des Geistes erklärt. Gute Übersicht über die Nach-Gibsonianischen Versuche dessen verwirrte Ontologie zu systematisieren mit einem Argument dafür, Affordanzen als Relationen zu beschreiben (Kapitel 7).
In diesem Forschungsbericht geben wir einen Überblick über jüngste Entwicklungen in der Forschung.
In den vergangenen Jahren wurde insbesondere in der Philosophie erbittert darüber gestritten, welche Rollen die Psychologie und Neurowissenschaft für unser Verständnis von Kunstwerken haben könnten. Der Vortrag wird erkunden, welche Elemente romantischer Bilderfahrung in der empirischen Ästhetik abgebildet sind und welche noch abgebildet werden könnten. Einige von Caspar David Friedrichs „Experimenten“ zur Erschließung des Bildmediums werden dazu dienen, die Grenzen und Möglichkeiten einer psychologischen Erforschung der Bilderfahrung zu beleuchten.
Eine Veranstaltung des Ludwik Fleck Zentrums in Kooperation mit dem Zentrum «Geschichte des Wissens» und dessen AG Medical Humanities //
Organisiert von: Dr. Sophie Witt und PD. Dr. Hartmut v. Sass //
Mit: Dr. Gerko Egert, Dr. Joerg Fingerhut, Prof. Dr. Céline Kaiser, Dr. Michael Penkler, Dr. Mai Wegener, Prof. Dr. Markus Wild, PD Dr. Bettina Bock von Wülfingen, Prof. Dr. Bettina Wuttig //
Die Rede von Embodied Knowledge – von einem Wissen, das an einen Körper gebunden ist – hat seit den 1980er Jahren eine Reihe von wissenstheoretischen Zugriffen und wissenschaftshistorischen Forschungsfeldern geprägt: Von der (Technik-)Philosophie über die Robotik bis hin zu den Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaften und die daran anschliessende Psychologie und Soziologie. Im Anschluss an Michael Polanyi wurde von der Implizitheit des Wissens ausgegangen, also von einem Wissen, das zu Teilen unbewusst und als solches sozial und kulturell vorstrukturiert ist. Während also embodiment tendenziell einen Körper voraussetzt, der – durch Macht, Gesellschaft oder Wirklichkeit – nachträglich geprägt wird, stellen jüngeren Ansätze – z.B. unter dem Schlagwort des «Körperwissens» oder der «Somatisierung» – den Vorgang der Verkörperung in den Fokus, d. h. sie fragen, wie «Körper» allererst generiert werden und welche diskursiven, vor allem aber auch performativen und materiellen Praktiken und Eigenlogiken damit im Zusammenhang stehen.
«Verkörpertes Wissen – revisited» will eine kritische Sondierung grundlegender Positionen und aktueller Debatten vornehmen und die Frage nach Verkörperung an gegenwärtige Forschungsfelder der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften anbinden. //
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