Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides' legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides e... more Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides' legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one's knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge, and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in Maimonides' contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides's imagery, allows limited knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt. Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected or demoted in Maimonides' discussion.
The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type o... more The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature – while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances.
The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sag... more The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sages, the Rabbis posit a transcendent, celestial yeshiva. This dual system seems central to the rabbinic doctrine of retribution in a sequential afterlife. In contrast to the standard dualist reading and accepted dogma, I propose a monist’s reading of these aggadic texts, which sees a single arena of human action and endeavor, with multivalent significance. My starting point is the dramatic narrative of the persecution, flight, and ultimate death of one of the leading Talmudic sages, Rabba bar Naḥmani. These esoteric stories go beyond familiar taxonomies as modes of concealment. Not cyphers to be cracked, they offer a nuanced way of thinking about the world, accessible through narrative as an adaptive mode of transmission.
The Review of Rabbinic Judaism 24(2021) 56-72, 2021
The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type o... more The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature—while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt, and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances.
Keywords: (primary and secondary) decision rules, ḥazakah, legal fictions, narrative, factual uncertainty, Jewish law and jurisprudence, Talmudic law
The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sag... more The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sages, the Rabbis posit a transcendent, celestial yeshiva. This dual system seems central to the rabbinic doctrine of retribution in a sequential afterlife. In contrast to the standard dualist reading and accepted dogma, I propose a monist's reading of these ag-gadic texts, which sees a single arena of human action and endeavor, with multivalent significance. My starting point is the dramatic narrative of the persecution, flight, and ultimate death of one of the leading Talmudic sages, Rabba bar Naḥmani. These eso-teric stories go beyond familiar taxonomies as modes of concealment. Not cyphers to be cracked, they offer a nuanced way of thinking about the world, accessible through narrative as an adaptive mode of transmission.
In terms of moral theory, Proverbs 1-9 seems disappointing. CHeavily emphasizing the eudemonistic... more In terms of moral theory, Proverbs 1-9 seems disappointing. CHeavily emphasizing the eudemonistic consequences of folly, ots adages appear self-centered and therefore highly inappropriate in the context of religious ethics. In the present article, I contend that Wisdom's central position as God's world order in this text is comparable to Stoic thought that faces similar problems. At the same time, while the Stoics were concerned with conformity to the universal logos per se, Proverbs 1-9 focuses on the moral structure of the human psyche, highlighting the self-destructive consequences of immoral behavior as internal phenomena. The cause and effect nexus central to the chapters in questions stems from the individual as a moral agent, transforming the external incentives of "common sense" admonitions to reflections on the inner impetus for moral behavior.
In similar fashion to the limits of knowledge, doubts too have there limits. This paper explores ... more In similar fashion to the limits of knowledge, doubts too have there limits. This paper explores these limits in the Halachic writings of Mamonides, reinterpreting passages that acccept the limiations of doubt.
The classic case of the “chained wife” – the Agunah – actually refers to instances of husbands lo... more The classic case of the “chained wife” – the Agunah – actually refers to instances of husbands lost and presumed dead, without proper testimony to permit their wives to remarry. My paper focuses on the classic Agunah, proposing a fresh look at Maimonides’ conceptualization of its seemingly unique evidentiary rule and the implications of this reading to the Halachic episteme.
הגט – ספר הכריתות המקראי – הוא המכשיר של לניתוק קשר הנישואין בין בני זוג על פי ההלכה. ביסודו, הגט... more הגט – ספר הכריתות המקראי – הוא המכשיר של לניתוק קשר הנישואין בין בני זוג על פי ההלכה. ביסודו, הגט הוא שטר המופקד בידי האשה הוכיח שפקעה מחויבותה לייחד את קשרי האישות שלה לבעלה. בכך הגט מכונן את מעמדה החדש כפנויה, והיא מותרת להינשא לכל אדם. המאמר בוחן שינויים בחלו בפרמטרים מרכזיים עיצוב הגט – צורת אותיותיו, עיצוב חתימות העדים, ואיות השמות שבו – תוך חתירה תחת יסודו המשפטי. תמורות אלו מציבות את הגט כמסמך בעל תכונות מטפיזיות, מעין דבר שבקדושה, ככל הנראה כדי להתמודד עם ניתוק קשר הנישואין הנתפס על ידי הקהילייה ההלכתית כברית מטפיזית אף היא.
Of scriptural origin, the Get--the Jewish bill of divorce--is prescribed by Jewish law as the unique and sole method for dissolving marriage between living man and wife. The paper explores the Get’s metamorphosis from legal instrument to metaphysical sacrament, tracking developments in key procedural issues of style and lettering. Halacha has reinterpreted stylistic demands to conform to sacred scribal writing, thus undermining their original legal purport. By the same token, the adoption of a unique phonetic spelling system, replaces the communicative value of the Get as a legal deed with rigid designation of the divorcing couple, at the expense of legibility. The perception of the Get as a metaphysical device suggests a grass-roots conception of marriage as a spiritual, metaphysical bond—to be undone only by sacrament, and not by legal convention alone.
Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical
writings. Maimonides equat... more Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge, and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt. Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.
Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical
writings. Maimonides equat... more Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge, and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt. Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.
Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides' legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides e... more Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides' legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one's knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge, and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in Maimonides' contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides's imagery, allows limited knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt. Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected or demoted in Maimonides' discussion.
The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type o... more The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature – while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances.
The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sag... more The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sages, the Rabbis posit a transcendent, celestial yeshiva. This dual system seems central to the rabbinic doctrine of retribution in a sequential afterlife. In contrast to the standard dualist reading and accepted dogma, I propose a monist’s reading of these aggadic texts, which sees a single arena of human action and endeavor, with multivalent significance. My starting point is the dramatic narrative of the persecution, flight, and ultimate death of one of the leading Talmudic sages, Rabba bar Naḥmani. These esoteric stories go beyond familiar taxonomies as modes of concealment. Not cyphers to be cracked, they offer a nuanced way of thinking about the world, accessible through narrative as an adaptive mode of transmission.
The Review of Rabbinic Judaism 24(2021) 56-72, 2021
The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type o... more The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature—while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt, and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances.
Keywords: (primary and secondary) decision rules, ḥazakah, legal fictions, narrative, factual uncertainty, Jewish law and jurisprudence, Talmudic law
The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sag... more The rabbis portray two arenas in which Torah is studied. Above the terrestrial academy of the sages, the Rabbis posit a transcendent, celestial yeshiva. This dual system seems central to the rabbinic doctrine of retribution in a sequential afterlife. In contrast to the standard dualist reading and accepted dogma, I propose a monist's reading of these ag-gadic texts, which sees a single arena of human action and endeavor, with multivalent significance. My starting point is the dramatic narrative of the persecution, flight, and ultimate death of one of the leading Talmudic sages, Rabba bar Naḥmani. These eso-teric stories go beyond familiar taxonomies as modes of concealment. Not cyphers to be cracked, they offer a nuanced way of thinking about the world, accessible through narrative as an adaptive mode of transmission.
In terms of moral theory, Proverbs 1-9 seems disappointing. CHeavily emphasizing the eudemonistic... more In terms of moral theory, Proverbs 1-9 seems disappointing. CHeavily emphasizing the eudemonistic consequences of folly, ots adages appear self-centered and therefore highly inappropriate in the context of religious ethics. In the present article, I contend that Wisdom's central position as God's world order in this text is comparable to Stoic thought that faces similar problems. At the same time, while the Stoics were concerned with conformity to the universal logos per se, Proverbs 1-9 focuses on the moral structure of the human psyche, highlighting the self-destructive consequences of immoral behavior as internal phenomena. The cause and effect nexus central to the chapters in questions stems from the individual as a moral agent, transforming the external incentives of "common sense" admonitions to reflections on the inner impetus for moral behavior.
In similar fashion to the limits of knowledge, doubts too have there limits. This paper explores ... more In similar fashion to the limits of knowledge, doubts too have there limits. This paper explores these limits in the Halachic writings of Mamonides, reinterpreting passages that acccept the limiations of doubt.
The classic case of the “chained wife” – the Agunah – actually refers to instances of husbands lo... more The classic case of the “chained wife” – the Agunah – actually refers to instances of husbands lost and presumed dead, without proper testimony to permit their wives to remarry. My paper focuses on the classic Agunah, proposing a fresh look at Maimonides’ conceptualization of its seemingly unique evidentiary rule and the implications of this reading to the Halachic episteme.
הגט – ספר הכריתות המקראי – הוא המכשיר של לניתוק קשר הנישואין בין בני זוג על פי ההלכה. ביסודו, הגט... more הגט – ספר הכריתות המקראי – הוא המכשיר של לניתוק קשר הנישואין בין בני זוג על פי ההלכה. ביסודו, הגט הוא שטר המופקד בידי האשה הוכיח שפקעה מחויבותה לייחד את קשרי האישות שלה לבעלה. בכך הגט מכונן את מעמדה החדש כפנויה, והיא מותרת להינשא לכל אדם. המאמר בוחן שינויים בחלו בפרמטרים מרכזיים עיצוב הגט – צורת אותיותיו, עיצוב חתימות העדים, ואיות השמות שבו – תוך חתירה תחת יסודו המשפטי. תמורות אלו מציבות את הגט כמסמך בעל תכונות מטפיזיות, מעין דבר שבקדושה, ככל הנראה כדי להתמודד עם ניתוק קשר הנישואין הנתפס על ידי הקהילייה ההלכתית כברית מטפיזית אף היא.
Of scriptural origin, the Get--the Jewish bill of divorce--is prescribed by Jewish law as the unique and sole method for dissolving marriage between living man and wife. The paper explores the Get’s metamorphosis from legal instrument to metaphysical sacrament, tracking developments in key procedural issues of style and lettering. Halacha has reinterpreted stylistic demands to conform to sacred scribal writing, thus undermining their original legal purport. By the same token, the adoption of a unique phonetic spelling system, replaces the communicative value of the Get as a legal deed with rigid designation of the divorcing couple, at the expense of legibility. The perception of the Get as a metaphysical device suggests a grass-roots conception of marriage as a spiritual, metaphysical bond—to be undone only by sacrament, and not by legal convention alone.
Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical
writings. Maimonides equat... more Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge, and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt. Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.
Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical
writings. Maimonides equat... more Love of God is all encompassing in Maimonides’ legal and philosophical writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge, and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt. Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.
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Keywords: (primary and secondary) decision rules, ḥazakah, legal fictions, narrative, factual uncertainty, Jewish law and jurisprudence, Talmudic law
Of scriptural origin, the Get--the Jewish bill of divorce--is prescribed by Jewish law as the unique and sole method for dissolving marriage between living man and wife. The paper explores the Get’s metamorphosis from legal instrument to metaphysical sacrament, tracking developments in key procedural issues of style and lettering. Halacha has reinterpreted stylistic demands to conform to sacred scribal writing, thus undermining their original legal purport. By the same token, the adoption of a unique phonetic spelling system, replaces the communicative value of the Get as a legal deed with rigid designation of the divorcing couple, at the expense of legibility. The perception of the Get as a metaphysical device suggests a grass-roots conception of marriage as a spiritual, metaphysical bond—to be undone only by sacrament, and not by legal convention alone.
writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s
knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge,
and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in
Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according
to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual
subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the
boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited
knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt.
Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of
awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected
or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.
writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s
knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge,
and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in
Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according
to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual
subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the
boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited
knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt.
Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of
awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected
or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.
Keywords: (primary and secondary) decision rules, ḥazakah, legal fictions, narrative, factual uncertainty, Jewish law and jurisprudence, Talmudic law
Of scriptural origin, the Get--the Jewish bill of divorce--is prescribed by Jewish law as the unique and sole method for dissolving marriage between living man and wife. The paper explores the Get’s metamorphosis from legal instrument to metaphysical sacrament, tracking developments in key procedural issues of style and lettering. Halacha has reinterpreted stylistic demands to conform to sacred scribal writing, thus undermining their original legal purport. By the same token, the adoption of a unique phonetic spelling system, replaces the communicative value of the Get as a legal deed with rigid designation of the divorcing couple, at the expense of legibility. The perception of the Get as a metaphysical device suggests a grass-roots conception of marriage as a spiritual, metaphysical bond—to be undone only by sacrament, and not by legal convention alone.
writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s
knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge,
and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in
Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according
to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual
subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the
boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited
knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt.
Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of
awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected
or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.
writings. Maimonides equates the measure of love with the level of one’s
knowledge of God. Yet, paradoxically, Maimonides limits human knowledge,
and so prevents full attainment of loving God. The key to the paradox lies in
Maimonides’ contextual epistemology, allowing for limited knowledge according
to the capabilities of the individual, and thus for love tailored to individual
subjectivity. Knowledge is also normative in the sense that knowing the
boundaries of knowledge, vivid in Maimonides’s imagery, allows limited
knowledge, whereas crossing the boundaries leads to an abyss of error and doubt.
Self-awareness of epistemological limitation translates itself into the emotion of
awe. As such, awe is not a stand-alone emotion, and is therefore often neglected
or demoted in Maimonides’ discussion.