Books by Gualtiero Piccinini
Oxford University Press, 2024
We argue that mapping accounts of computational implementation can be made adequate by incorporat... more We argue that mapping accounts of computational implementation can be made adequate by incorporating appropriate physical constraints. Specifically, according to the robust mapping account we propose, a mapping from physical to computational states is a legitimate basis for implementation only if it includes only physical states relevant to the computation, the physical states have enough spatiotemporal structure to map onto the structure of the computational states, and the evolving physical states bear neither more nor less information about the evolving computation than do the computational states they map onto. When these conditions are in place, a physical system can be said to implement a computation in a robust sense, which does not trivialize the notion of implementation. We apply this robust mapping account to important questions in the physical foundations of computation and cognitive science.
Cambridge Elements, 2023
The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history ... more The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history going back to the idea that thought is a kind of computation. Its modern incarnation relies on analogies with contemporary computing technology and the use of computational models. It comes in many versions, some more plausible than others. This Element supports the theory primarily by its contribution to solving the mind-body problem, its ability to explain mental phenomena, and the success of computational modelling and artificial intelligence. To be turned into an adequate theory, it needs to be made compatible with the tractability of cognition, the situatedness and dynamical aspects of the mind, the way the brain works, intentionality, and consciousness.
Oxford University Press, 2020
In Neurocognitive Mechanisms Gualtiero Piccinini presents the most systematic, rigorous, and comp... more In Neurocognitive Mechanisms Gualtiero Piccinini presents the most systematic, rigorous, and comprehensive philosophical defence to date of the computational theory of cognition. His view posits that cognition involves neural computation within multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms, and includes novel ideas about ontology, functions, neural representation, neural computation, and consciousness. He begins by defending an ontologically egalitarian account of composition and realization, according to which all levels are equally real. He then explicates multiple realizability and mechanisms within this ontologically egalitarian framework, defends a goal-contribution account of teleological functions, and defends a mechanistic version of functionalism. This provides the foundation for a mechanistic account of computation, which in turn clarifies the ways in which the computational theory of cognition is a multilevel mechanistic theory supported by contemporary cognitive neuroscience.
Piccinini argues that cognition is computational at least in a generic sense. He defends the computational theory of cognition from standard objections, yet also rebuts putative a priori arguments. He contends that the typical vehicles of neural computations are representations, and that, contrary to the received view, the representations posited by the computational theory of cognition are observable and manipulatable in the laboratory. He also contends that neural computations are neither digital nor analog; instead, neural computations are sui generis. He concludes by investigating the relation between computation and consciousness, suggesting that consciousness may be a functional phenomenon without being computational in nature. This book will be of interest to philosophers of cognitive science as well as neuroscientists.
Oxford University Press, 2015
Gualtiero Piccinini articulates and defends a mechanistic account of concrete, or physical, compu... more Gualtiero Piccinini articulates and defends a mechanistic account of concrete, or physical, computation. A physical system is a computing system just in case it is a mechanism one of whose functions is to manipulate vehicles based solely on differences between different portions of the vehicles according to a rule defined over the vehicles. Physical Computation discusses previous accounts of computation and argues that the mechanistic account is better. Many kinds of computation are explicated, such as digital vs. analog, serial vs. parallel, neural network computation, program-controlled computation, and more. Piccinini argues that computation does not entail representation or information processing although information processing entails computation. Pancomputationalism, according to which every physical system is computational, is rejected. A modest version of the physical Church-Turing thesis, according to which any function that is physically computable is computable by Turing machines, is defended.
Drafts by Gualtiero Piccinini
We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its par... more We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a portion of reality at different scales in the precise sense employed by measurement theory. The purpose of these scales is the numerical representation of primitive relations between quantities of objects. To show this, we prove representation and uniqueness theorems for composition. Thus, mereologically invariant composition is trans-scalar identity.
This chapter provides an account of realization within a mechanistic framework and introduces the... more This chapter provides an account of realization within a mechanistic framework and introduces the notions of variable realizability, multiple realizability, and medium independence. I argue that realization is the relation between a higher-level property and the lower-level properties of which it is a part. Variable realizability occurs when the same higher-level property can be realized in different lower-level properties—the same property part embedded in different property wholes. Variable realizability is ubiquitous yet insufficient for multiple realizability proper. Multiple realizability occurs when the same higher-level property can be realized in different lower-level properties that constitute different mechanisms for that property at the immediately lower mechanistic level. Medium independence is an even stronger condition than multiple realizability: it occurs when not only is a higher-level property multiply realizable; in addition, the inputs and outputs that define the higher-level property are also multiply realizable. Thus, all that matters to defining a medium-independent higher-level property is the manipulation of certain degrees of freedom. In sum, medium independence entails multiple realizability, which in turn entails variable realizability, but variable realizability does not entail multiple realizability, which in turn does not entail medium independence.
This chapter articulates an egalitarian ontology of levels of objects and properties. Neither who... more This chapter articulates an egalitarian ontology of levels of objects and properties. Neither wholes nor their proper parts are more fundamental. Neither higher-level properties nor lower-level properties are more fundamental. Instead, whole objects are invariants over some part additions, subtractions, and rearrangements; higher-level properties are part of their lower-level realizers. This egalitarian ontology solves the causal exclusion problem and does justice to the special sciences—including cognitive neuroscience.
According to pancomputationalism, all physical systems – atoms, rocks, hurricanes, and toasters –... more According to pancomputationalism, all physical systems – atoms, rocks, hurricanes, and toasters – perform computations. Pancomputationalism seems to be increasingly popular among some philosophers and physicists. In this paper, we interpret pancomputationalism in terms of computational descriptions of varying strength—computational interpretations of physical microstates and dynamics that vary in their restrictiveness. We distinguish several types of pancomputationalism and identify essential features of the computational descriptions required to support them. By tying various pancomputationalist theses directly to notions of what counts as computation in a physical system, we clarify the meaning, strength, and plausibility of pancomputationalist claims. We show that the force of these claims is diminished when weaknesses in their supporting computational descriptions are laid bare. Specifically, once computation is meaningfully distinguished from ordinary dynamics, the most sensational pancomputationalist claims are unwarranted, whereas the more modest claims offer little more than recognition of causal similarities between physical processes and the most primitive computing processes.
Papers by Gualtiero Piccinini
Computational neuroscience consists of building computational models of neural systems at various... more Computational neuroscience consists of building computational models of neural systems at various levels of organization. Most computational neuroscientists assume that nervous systems compute and process information. We explain how computational modelling in neuroscience works by using a recent model of object recognition as a case study and discuss what computational neuroscientists mean by 'computation' and 'information processing' in nervous systems; whether computation and information processing are matters of objective fact or of conventional, observer-dependent description; and how computational descriptions and explanations are related to other levels of analysis and organization.
Cognitive Neuroscience
I argue that ideas and models about the mechanisms of neural computation and representation-inclu... more I argue that ideas and models about the mechanisms of neural computation and representation-including computational architecture, representational format, encoding schemes, learning methods, computation-representation coordination, and substrate-dependent aspects-must be tested by studying embodied neural systems. Thus, cognitive computational neuroscience-the study of neural computations over neural representations-must be an embodied research program.
Social Science Research Network, 2009
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep 1, 2004
Philosophy of Science, Dec 1, 2010
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020
McCulloch and Pitts were the first to use and Alan Turing’s notion of computation to understand n... more McCulloch and Pitts were the first to use and Alan Turing’s notion of computation to understand neural, and thus cognitive, activity. McCulloch and Pitts’s contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata, which is an important formalism in computability theory, (ii) a technique that inspired the notion of logic design, which is a fundamental part of modern computer design, (iii) the first use of computation to address the mind–body problem, and (iv) the first modern computational theory of cognition, which posits that neurons are equivalent to logic gates and neural networks are digital circuits.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Jun 4, 2013
Philosophy Compass, May 1, 2009
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020
This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are som... more This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020
Neural representations are models of the organism and environment built by the nervous system. Th... more Neural representations are models of the organism and environment built by the nervous system. This chapter provides an account of representational role and content for both indicative and imperative representations. It also argues that, contrary to a mainstream assumption, representations are not merely theoretical posits. Instead, neural representations are observable and are routinely observed and manipulated by experimental neuroscientists in their laboratories. If a type of entity is observable or manipulable, then it exists. Therefore, neural representations are as real as neurons, action potentials, or any other experimentally established entities in our ontology.
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Books by Gualtiero Piccinini
Piccinini argues that cognition is computational at least in a generic sense. He defends the computational theory of cognition from standard objections, yet also rebuts putative a priori arguments. He contends that the typical vehicles of neural computations are representations, and that, contrary to the received view, the representations posited by the computational theory of cognition are observable and manipulatable in the laboratory. He also contends that neural computations are neither digital nor analog; instead, neural computations are sui generis. He concludes by investigating the relation between computation and consciousness, suggesting that consciousness may be a functional phenomenon without being computational in nature. This book will be of interest to philosophers of cognitive science as well as neuroscientists.
Drafts by Gualtiero Piccinini
Papers by Gualtiero Piccinini
Piccinini argues that cognition is computational at least in a generic sense. He defends the computational theory of cognition from standard objections, yet also rebuts putative a priori arguments. He contends that the typical vehicles of neural computations are representations, and that, contrary to the received view, the representations posited by the computational theory of cognition are observable and manipulatable in the laboratory. He also contends that neural computations are neither digital nor analog; instead, neural computations are sui generis. He concludes by investigating the relation between computation and consciousness, suggesting that consciousness may be a functional phenomenon without being computational in nature. This book will be of interest to philosophers of cognitive science as well as neuroscientists.