I am a philosopher of mind and cognitive science at Monash University in Melbourne Australia. Address: Philosophy
Room 4.027 Arthur Lewis Building
School of Social Science
University of Manchester
M13 9PL
This book draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciou... more This book draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. In the first part I develop an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified. Part II applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. I argue that the unity of consciousness remains intact in each of these cases. Part III explores the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self.
* Complete coverage of over 250 concepts, helping the reader to get a sense of the whole fiel... more * Complete coverage of over 250 concepts, helping the reader to get a sense of the whole field * Concise, to-the-point entries organized as a dictionary, enabling the reader in to find answers quickly and easily * Extensively cross-referenced throughout, so that the reader can explore related concepts or findings * Truly interdisciplinary, helping the reader to understand how the different fields interact
This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As patho... more This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and conceptual perspectives: some contributors focus on the general question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our taxonomy of psychological states; some contributors ask whether particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and affective factors; and some contributors provide general models of motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological belief-formation might be measured.
It has often been suggested in the popular and academic literature that the psychedelic state qua... more It has often been suggested in the popular and academic literature that the psychedelic state qualifies as a higher state of consciousness relative to the state of normal waking awareness. This article subjects this proposal to critical scrutiny, focusing on the question of what it would mean for a state of consciousness to be 'higher'. We begin by considering the contrast between conscious contents and conscious global states. We then review the changes in conscious global state associated with psychedelic drug use, focusing on the effects of two serotonergic hallucinogens: psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide. Limiting our review to findings obtained from lab-based experiments and reported in peer-reviewed journals, we prioritize the more common and reliably induced effects obtained through subjective questionnaires and psychophysical measures. The findings are grouped into three broad categories (sensory perception, cognitive function, and experiences of unity) and demonstrate that although certain aspects of consciousness are improved or enhanced in the psychedelic state, many of the functional capacities that are associated with consciousness are seriously compromised. Psychedelic-induced states of consciousness are indeed remarkable in many ways, but it is inappropriate to regard them as 'higher' states of consciousness. The fact that psychedelics affect different aspects of consciousness in fundamentally different ways provides evidence against the unidimensional (or 'level-based') view of consciousness, and instead provides strong support for a multidimensional conception of conscious states. The final section of the article considers the implications of this analysis for two prominent theories of consciousness: the Global Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory.
At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlate... more At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (the NCCs). One of the alleged advantages of the NCCs framework is its metaphysical neutrality—the fact that it begs no contested questions with respect to debates about the fundamental nature of consciousness. Here, we argue that even if the NCC framework is metaphysically neutral, it is structurally committed, for it presupposes a certain model—what we call the Lite-Brite model—of consciousness. This, we argue, represents a serious liability for the NCC framework for the plausibility of the Lite-Brite model is very much an open question, and the science of consciousness would be better served by a framework that does not presuppose it. Drawing on interventionist ideas in the philosophy of science, we suggest that the Difference-Maker framework can provide just such an alternative. Instead of searching for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), we ought to be ...
The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of con... more The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. It functions as a guiding framework for a great deal of research into the neural basis of consciousness and for attempts to develop a consciousness meter. In light of these developments, it is important to examine whether its foundations are secure. This article does just that by examining the axiomatic method that the architects of IIT appeal to. I begin by asking what exactly the axiomatic method involves, arguing that it is open to multiple interpretations. I then examine the five axioms of IIT, asking: what each axiom means, whether it is indeed axiomatic and whether it could constrain a theory of consciousness. I argue that none of the five alleged axioms is able to play the role that is required of it, either because it fails to qualify as axiomatic or because it fails to impose a substantive constraint on a theory of consciousness. The article concludes by briefly sketching an alternative methodology for the science of consciousness: the natural kind approach.
The on-going debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual experience' concerns the range of... more The on-going debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual experience' concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that 'ensemble properties' should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. Ensemble properties are features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. They include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent work in vision science has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. We argue that epistemological considerations provide strong reasons to think that these properties figure in visual experience. Judgements about ensemble properties are immediately warranted by our perceptual experience, and the only plausible way that a perceptual experience could confer this warrant is if it confers awareness of ensemble properties.
This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcoma... more This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcomatose disorders of consciousness (DoC), and it provides guidelines for how an improved DoC taxonomy might be developed. In particular , it is argued that behavioral criteria for the application of DoC categories should be supplemented with brain-based criteria (eg, information derived from electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging), and that the categorical framework that currently characterizes DoC should be replaced by a multidimensional framework that better captures the performance of patients across a range of cognitive and behavioural tasks.
Consciousness is often taken to be an impediment to materialism and to provide a motivation for s... more Consciousness is often taken to be an impediment to materialism and to provide a motivation for some form of dualism. Although contemporary arguments for dualism typically focus on the qualitative character of consciousness, traditional arguments for dualism often appealed to the unity of consciousness. In the early modern period one can find unity of consciousness arguments in the writings of Descartes and Leibniz, and in the recent literature they have been defended by David Barnett, William Hasker, and Richard Swinburne (among others). The idea that the unity of consciousness is an impediment to materialism—and by the same token supports dualism—clearly has a deep and abiding appeal. This paper argue that that appeal is not warranted.
This paper provides an overview of the philosophical issues arising out of recent research on dis... more This paper provides an overview of the philosophical issues arising out of recent research on disorders of consciousness, in particular the Vegetative State (VS) and the Minimally Conscious State (MCS).
A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be rep... more A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. Are the contents of perceptual experience restricted to 'low-level' properties such as location, shape and texture, or can 'high-level' properties such as being a tomato, being a pine tree or being a watch also be represented in perceptual experience? This paper explores the bearing of gist perception on the admissible contents debate, arguing that it provides qualified support for the claim that certain kinds of high-level properties--such as being a natural scene--can be perceptually represented.
The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not on... more The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global states. Two Aspects of Consciousness Consciousness is typically taken to have two aspects: local states (see Glossary) and global states. Local states of consciousness include perceptual experiences of various kinds, imagery experiences, bodily sensations, affective experiences, and occurrent thoughts. In the science of consciousness local states are usually referred to as 'conscious contents', for they are typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects and features that they represent. By contrast, global states of consciousness are not typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects or features that are represented in experience. Instead, they are typically distinguished from each other on cognitive, behavioural, and physiological grounds. For example, the global state associated with alert wakefulness is distinguished from the global states that are associated with post-comatose conditions such as the vegetative state (VS) and the minimally conscious state (MCS), and these states are themselves distinguished from the states that are associated with light-to-moderate degrees of sedation, dreaming, hypnosis, and epileptic absence seizures. Compared with the amount of attention that has been devoted to the contents of consciousness , global states of consciousness have been relatively neglected (although see [1–6]). This neglect might be justified if the notion played only a marginal role in the science of consciousness , but it is puzzling given the increasing prominence of global states in consciousness studies. The neglect of global states might also be justified if their nature was self-evident, but that is not the case either. Indeed, the standard conception of global states equates them with 'levels of consciousness', but it is far from clear what a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based conceptions of global states of consciousness is untenable, and offers in its place a multidimensional analysis of global states.
This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By 'the phe... more This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By 'the phenomenology of agency' I mean those phenomenal states that are associated with first-person agency. I call such states 'agentive experiences'. After briefly defending the claim that there is a phenomenology distinctive of first-person agency, I focus on two questions: (i) What is the structure of agentive experience? (ii) What is the representational content of agentive experience? I conclude with a brief examination of how agentive experiences might be generated and what role they might play in the subject's cognitive economy.
In this paper we develop a participatory model of the Christian doctrine of the atonement, accord... more In this paper we develop a participatory model of the Christian doctrine of the atonement, according to which the atonement involves participating in the death and resurrection of Christ. In part one we argue that current models of the atonement—exemplary, penal, substitutionary and merit models—are unsatisfactory. The central problem with these models is that they assume a purely deontic conception
This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a highlevel, narrative-based acco... more This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a highlevel, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
This book draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciou... more This book draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. In the first part I develop an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified. Part II applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. I argue that the unity of consciousness remains intact in each of these cases. Part III explores the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self.
* Complete coverage of over 250 concepts, helping the reader to get a sense of the whole fiel... more * Complete coverage of over 250 concepts, helping the reader to get a sense of the whole field * Concise, to-the-point entries organized as a dictionary, enabling the reader in to find answers quickly and easily * Extensively cross-referenced throughout, so that the reader can explore related concepts or findings * Truly interdisciplinary, helping the reader to understand how the different fields interact
This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As patho... more This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and conceptual perspectives: some contributors focus on the general question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our taxonomy of psychological states; some contributors ask whether particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and affective factors; and some contributors provide general models of motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological belief-formation might be measured.
It has often been suggested in the popular and academic literature that the psychedelic state qua... more It has often been suggested in the popular and academic literature that the psychedelic state qualifies as a higher state of consciousness relative to the state of normal waking awareness. This article subjects this proposal to critical scrutiny, focusing on the question of what it would mean for a state of consciousness to be 'higher'. We begin by considering the contrast between conscious contents and conscious global states. We then review the changes in conscious global state associated with psychedelic drug use, focusing on the effects of two serotonergic hallucinogens: psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide. Limiting our review to findings obtained from lab-based experiments and reported in peer-reviewed journals, we prioritize the more common and reliably induced effects obtained through subjective questionnaires and psychophysical measures. The findings are grouped into three broad categories (sensory perception, cognitive function, and experiences of unity) and demonstrate that although certain aspects of consciousness are improved or enhanced in the psychedelic state, many of the functional capacities that are associated with consciousness are seriously compromised. Psychedelic-induced states of consciousness are indeed remarkable in many ways, but it is inappropriate to regard them as 'higher' states of consciousness. The fact that psychedelics affect different aspects of consciousness in fundamentally different ways provides evidence against the unidimensional (or 'level-based') view of consciousness, and instead provides strong support for a multidimensional conception of conscious states. The final section of the article considers the implications of this analysis for two prominent theories of consciousness: the Global Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory.
At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlate... more At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (the NCCs). One of the alleged advantages of the NCCs framework is its metaphysical neutrality—the fact that it begs no contested questions with respect to debates about the fundamental nature of consciousness. Here, we argue that even if the NCC framework is metaphysically neutral, it is structurally committed, for it presupposes a certain model—what we call the Lite-Brite model—of consciousness. This, we argue, represents a serious liability for the NCC framework for the plausibility of the Lite-Brite model is very much an open question, and the science of consciousness would be better served by a framework that does not presuppose it. Drawing on interventionist ideas in the philosophy of science, we suggest that the Difference-Maker framework can provide just such an alternative. Instead of searching for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), we ought to be ...
The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of con... more The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. It functions as a guiding framework for a great deal of research into the neural basis of consciousness and for attempts to develop a consciousness meter. In light of these developments, it is important to examine whether its foundations are secure. This article does just that by examining the axiomatic method that the architects of IIT appeal to. I begin by asking what exactly the axiomatic method involves, arguing that it is open to multiple interpretations. I then examine the five axioms of IIT, asking: what each axiom means, whether it is indeed axiomatic and whether it could constrain a theory of consciousness. I argue that none of the five alleged axioms is able to play the role that is required of it, either because it fails to qualify as axiomatic or because it fails to impose a substantive constraint on a theory of consciousness. The article concludes by briefly sketching an alternative methodology for the science of consciousness: the natural kind approach.
The on-going debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual experience' concerns the range of... more The on-going debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual experience' concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that 'ensemble properties' should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. Ensemble properties are features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. They include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent work in vision science has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. We argue that epistemological considerations provide strong reasons to think that these properties figure in visual experience. Judgements about ensemble properties are immediately warranted by our perceptual experience, and the only plausible way that a perceptual experience could confer this warrant is if it confers awareness of ensemble properties.
This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcoma... more This article examines the serious shortcomings that characterize the current taxonomy of postcomatose disorders of consciousness (DoC), and it provides guidelines for how an improved DoC taxonomy might be developed. In particular , it is argued that behavioral criteria for the application of DoC categories should be supplemented with brain-based criteria (eg, information derived from electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance imaging), and that the categorical framework that currently characterizes DoC should be replaced by a multidimensional framework that better captures the performance of patients across a range of cognitive and behavioural tasks.
Consciousness is often taken to be an impediment to materialism and to provide a motivation for s... more Consciousness is often taken to be an impediment to materialism and to provide a motivation for some form of dualism. Although contemporary arguments for dualism typically focus on the qualitative character of consciousness, traditional arguments for dualism often appealed to the unity of consciousness. In the early modern period one can find unity of consciousness arguments in the writings of Descartes and Leibniz, and in the recent literature they have been defended by David Barnett, William Hasker, and Richard Swinburne (among others). The idea that the unity of consciousness is an impediment to materialism—and by the same token supports dualism—clearly has a deep and abiding appeal. This paper argue that that appeal is not warranted.
This paper provides an overview of the philosophical issues arising out of recent research on dis... more This paper provides an overview of the philosophical issues arising out of recent research on disorders of consciousness, in particular the Vegetative State (VS) and the Minimally Conscious State (MCS).
A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be rep... more A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. Are the contents of perceptual experience restricted to 'low-level' properties such as location, shape and texture, or can 'high-level' properties such as being a tomato, being a pine tree or being a watch also be represented in perceptual experience? This paper explores the bearing of gist perception on the admissible contents debate, arguing that it provides qualified support for the claim that certain kinds of high-level properties--such as being a natural scene--can be perceptually represented.
The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not on... more The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global states. Two Aspects of Consciousness Consciousness is typically taken to have two aspects: local states (see Glossary) and global states. Local states of consciousness include perceptual experiences of various kinds, imagery experiences, bodily sensations, affective experiences, and occurrent thoughts. In the science of consciousness local states are usually referred to as 'conscious contents', for they are typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects and features that they represent. By contrast, global states of consciousness are not typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects or features that are represented in experience. Instead, they are typically distinguished from each other on cognitive, behavioural, and physiological grounds. For example, the global state associated with alert wakefulness is distinguished from the global states that are associated with post-comatose conditions such as the vegetative state (VS) and the minimally conscious state (MCS), and these states are themselves distinguished from the states that are associated with light-to-moderate degrees of sedation, dreaming, hypnosis, and epileptic absence seizures. Compared with the amount of attention that has been devoted to the contents of consciousness , global states of consciousness have been relatively neglected (although see [1–6]). This neglect might be justified if the notion played only a marginal role in the science of consciousness , but it is puzzling given the increasing prominence of global states in consciousness studies. The neglect of global states might also be justified if their nature was self-evident, but that is not the case either. Indeed, the standard conception of global states equates them with 'levels of consciousness', but it is far from clear what a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based conceptions of global states of consciousness is untenable, and offers in its place a multidimensional analysis of global states.
This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By 'the phe... more This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By 'the phenomenology of agency' I mean those phenomenal states that are associated with first-person agency. I call such states 'agentive experiences'. After briefly defending the claim that there is a phenomenology distinctive of first-person agency, I focus on two questions: (i) What is the structure of agentive experience? (ii) What is the representational content of agentive experience? I conclude with a brief examination of how agentive experiences might be generated and what role they might play in the subject's cognitive economy.
In this paper we develop a participatory model of the Christian doctrine of the atonement, accord... more In this paper we develop a participatory model of the Christian doctrine of the atonement, according to which the atonement involves participating in the death and resurrection of Christ. In part one we argue that current models of the atonement—exemplary, penal, substitutionary and merit models—are unsatisfactory. The central problem with these models is that they assume a purely deontic conception
This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a highlevel, narrative-based acco... more This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a highlevel, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that mono... more A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism, Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
This paper is a response to Maximilian H. Engel's commentary on my target paper, in which I provi... more This paper is a response to Maximilian H. Engel's commentary on my target paper, in which I provided a critical examination of pessimism accounts of the trustworthiness of introspection. Engel's focuses on the distinction that I drew between two kinds of introspective judgments, scaffolded judgments and freestanding judgments, and suggests that this distinction might fruitfully illuminate the epistemology of intuitive judgments. I present some doubts about whether the distinction can be transferred to intuition in this way, and also sketch a more fundamental contrast between introspective judgments and intuitive judgments.
A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be rep... more A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. Is perceptual restricted to low-level properties, or can high-level properties such as being a tomato, being a pine tree or being a watch also be represented in perceptual experience? This paper explores the bearing of gist perception on the admissible contents debate, arguing that it provides qualified support for the claim that certain kinds of high-level properties—such as being a natural scene—can be perceptually represented.
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Books by Tim Bayne
* Concise, to-the-point entries organized as a dictionary, enabling the reader in to find answers quickly and easily
* Extensively cross-referenced throughout, so that the reader can explore related concepts or findings
* Truly interdisciplinary, helping the reader to understand how the different fields interact
Papers by Tim Bayne
* Concise, to-the-point entries organized as a dictionary, enabling the reader in to find answers quickly and easily
* Extensively cross-referenced throughout, so that the reader can explore related concepts or findings
* Truly interdisciplinary, helping the reader to understand how the different fields interact