Mature-age arts graduate recently majored in philosophy, minored in history. Obtained B.Sc from same university many years ago. Working part-time as a regulatory consultant specialising in animal welfare.
The ‘Norman Conquest’ is generally regarded as an epic event in English history – it was more tha... more The ‘Norman Conquest’ is generally regarded as an epic event in English history – it was more than just a change of royal dynasty. There is no doubt that William I built castles and drastically changed the composition of the nobility and clergy, dispossessing many of their estates. However, the extent of legal and administrative changes he made is contested by different historians. I intend to show that William initially minimised these changes to help legitimise his claim to the English throne. He emphasised continuity in English law and customs, to avoid the appearance of a Norman French takeover of England. But he later abandoned this strategy, and made some major and lasting changes to English law and administration.
In this paper I would like to analyse the derogatory nature of racial slurs. In particular, I sh... more In this paper I would like to analyse the derogatory nature of racial slurs. In particular, I shall try to answer the following questions: ‘What harm do racial slurs do?’ and ‘Do racial slurs deserve protection under the principle of free speech?’. In answering these questions, I enlist the methodology of speech act theory. I argue that racial slurs are perlocutionary speech acts that result in harmful consequences to target groups and individuals. They are not just offensive insults or taboo words. There are widely-accepted exceptions to the right of free speech for words that cause harm, and I argue that racial slurs should be included amongst these exceptions.
In her paper ‘Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission’ Jennifer Lackey (2008: 855-867) argues agai... more In her paper ‘Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission’ Jennifer Lackey (2008: 855-867) argues against the following two theses regarding the justification of testimonial knowledge: 2. For every speaker S and hearer H, if H comes to know that p via S’s testifying that p, then S must know that p. 2*. For every testimonial chain of knowledge C, in order for a hearer H in C to come to know that p via the testimony of a speaker S in C, at least the first speaker S in C must know that p (in some non-testimonial way).
This essay examines Lackey’s critique of thesis 2*, where I argue that Lackey does make out a satisfactory case for her position against it; but that her case is an ‘exception to the rule’ in a similar way that ‘Gettier cases’ are an exception to the rule that knowledge is justified true belief.
There are several objections to consequentialism as a basis for morality. Some of these objectio... more There are several objections to consequentialism as a basis for morality. Some of these objections are of considerable scholarly interest to philosophers; but I think the most powerful objection is that adherence to consequentialism can in some cases result in injustice. My thesis is that justice is an important factor that needs to be taken into account in ethical theories. I also intend to argue that the best response to this objection, which is to attempt to treat justice as an intrinsically valuable consequence of actions, is currently unworkable.
Representative democracy is a form of democracy in which citizens elect representatives who then ... more Representative democracy is a form of democracy in which citizens elect representatives who then vote on legislation or policy issues, as opposed to a direct democracy where citizens vote on issues themselves. Two of the main theories of representative democracy are the ‘trustee model’ and the or ‘delegate model’. In this essay, I argue that the trustee model makes more sense than the delegate model. I also consider some refinements of the trustee model, such as those identified by Mansbridge and Rehfeld. I propose what I call the ‘professional model’, where a politician should act in the long-term best interests of his or her constituents, in a similar obligation to the clients of a lawyer or medical doctor, even if this might be contrary to the preferences of those constituents.
In 27BCE Gaius Octavius (‘Octavian’) in effect became the first Emperor of Rome, although this wa... more In 27BCE Gaius Octavius (‘Octavian’) in effect became the first Emperor of Rome, although this was not of one his official titles. As part of this process, his name was changed by Senate decree to Augustus. For all practical purposes, the Roman Emperor became a monarch, yet throughout Rome’s republican period, the Senate had resolutely opposed any return to the previous monarchy. Indeed, this opposition has been given as one of the main reasons for the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44BCE (Cicero, III 82-83). The purpose of this essay is to explore the reasons for this apparent paradox, and to suggestion an explanation as to how Augustus was able overcome the Senate’s opposition to monarchy and become a king-like Emperor.
The divides between sacred and secular music have been relatively clear since the Middle Ages, wi... more The divides between sacred and secular music have been relatively clear since the Middle Ages, with the possible exception of African-American gospel music in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. On the other hand, the divides between art and popular music have not been as clear; and have become increasingly difficult to sharply define in terms of musical content and form in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Some examples of ‘crossovers’ between art music and popular music (in both directions) are given in this essay, together with an alternative method of distinguishing between art music and popular music (and also folk music), based on function rather than form.
The philosophical problem of universals has endured since ancient times, and can have metaphysica... more The philosophical problem of universals has endured since ancient times, and can have metaphysical or epistemic connotations, depending upon the philosopher in question. I intend to show in this essay that both Plato’s and the Stoics’ theories of universals were not only derived from, but were ‘in the grip’ of their epistemological and metaphysical philosophies respectively; and were thus vulnerable to methodological criticism. I propose to first outline the three alternative theories of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics; and then to suggest that Aristotle’s theory, whilst developed as a criticism of Plato’s theory, stands more robustly on its own merits.
At first sight, the concepts of economic efficiency and social justice might seem unrelated or ev... more At first sight, the concepts of economic efficiency and social justice might seem unrelated or even counterposed. Some people intuitively feel that in the economic sense, efficiency works against fairness and therefore equality. In this essay, I propose to argue the opposite – that the concept of economic efficiency can be used as part of a case against the notion that social justice entails economic equality. My case is primarily based on the works of Frankfurt; but Rawls’ Difference Principle is also of assistance. I also intend to consider some objections to this case, and to either provide counter-arguments against them, or to suggest that the objections are not sufficiently important to outweigh the case I am putting forward.
After the final defeat of the Persians in the mid-fifth century BCE, the Delian League was gradua... more After the final defeat of the Persians in the mid-fifth century BCE, the Delian League was gradually transformed into an Athenian empire. The transformation was accompanied by an accumulation of power over other city states by Athens; associated with certain claims of political corruption. This essay describes the transformation process, how Athenians justified it, and how they responded to the claims of corruption. It also examines the claims in terms of the different ancient and modern perspectives of corruption.
Within the context of ancient Athenian democracy, the term ‘radical democracy’ refers to a set of... more Within the context of ancient Athenian democracy, the term ‘radical democracy’ refers to a set of constitutional reforms introduced by Ephialtes and Perikles, beginning in 462 BCE. The main elements of these radical reforms were that (1) all major matters of public policy were determined at meetings of the Ekklesia (Assembly); at which all adult citizens[1] of good standing were entitled to vote (Roberts 1998, 41); and (2) public officials were randomly chosen by lot, known as sortition (Scarre and Fagan 2008, 291). In this essay, I propose to argue that these radical democratic reforms went too far – that is, that their advantages were outweighed by their disadvantages.
Towards the end of his book ‘The Construction of Social Reality’, John Searle [1] makes a case fo... more Towards the end of his book ‘The Construction of Social Reality’, John Searle [1] makes a case for realism, which he defines as ‘the view that world exists independently of our representations of it’ (Searle 1995: 153). He first responds to what he sees as the main objections to this view (Searle 1995: 149-176); and then provides some arguments in favour of it (Searle 1995: 177-197). Searle also discusses the correspondence theory of truth which he sees as related to realism (Searle 1995: 199-226). In this essay, I shall present Searle’s arguments and responses in the reverse order to his, and then I shall discuss what I see as the strengths and weaknesses of his case. My thesis is essentially that an external reality is consistent with both Searle’s construction of social reality and the correspondence theory of truth.
Rationality is the state or quality of being rational, which means as being consistent with or ba... more Rationality is the state or quality of being rational, which means as being consistent with or based on or using reason. Reason is thought by rationalists to be more reliable in determining what is true; in contrast to reliance on factors such as authority, tradition, instinct, intuition, emotion, mysticism, superstition faith or arbitrary choice.
The word rational can be used in several different contexts; but the context most relevant to skepticism is that of rational belief, because we use it as a filter to determine what we should be sceptical about. We skeptics are not skeptical of everything. We believe what it is rational to believe, and we are skeptical of irrational beliefs. Two criteria have been proposed by Nozick for a rational belief: 1. support by reasons that make the belief credible; and 2. generation by a process that reliably produces true beliefs. A rational belief is not necessarily true, and an irrational belief is not necessarily false. On the other hand, a rational belief needs to be reasonable or credible in the circumstances; that is, a rational belief is one that is justified by reason. It needs to pass objective tests of irrationality. Objective tests of irrational belief include logical fallacies, emotional or faith-based rather than evidence-based beliefs, beliefs based on insufficient supporting evidence, beliefs derived from confirmation bias, beliefs incompatible with science, internally incoherent beliefs and possibly other tests.
Although an irrational belief is not necessarily false, we can say that because an irrational belief is unreliable and more likely to be false than a rational belief, we should therefore be more skeptical about beliefs that are known to be or appear to be irrational than about rational beliefs.
t is a common misconception that Descartes held the view that because animals cannot think, they ... more t is a common misconception that Descartes held the view that because animals cannot think, they have no feelings and do not suffer pain. In 1952, this view was described by the Scottish philosopher and psychologist Norman Kemp Smith as a ‘monstrous thesis’ (Cottingham 1978: 554-556). In this essay, I intend to examine two questions – firstly, whether Descartes actually held this view and secondly, whether this view is entailed by his other views about animal minds. My answer is essentially that whilst the text references are somewhat unclear on this specific point, it is unlikely that Descartes held this view or that it was entailed by his other related views.
In his book 'The Construction of Social Reality' (Searle 1995:1) and later works, John Searle [1]... more In his book 'The Construction of Social Reality' (Searle 1995:1) and later works, John Searle [1] discusses the problem that 'there are portions of the real world, objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human agreement'. He describes these objective facts as observer relative features of reality, or components of 'social reality', as opposed to the intrinsic features of physical reality or 'brute facts', such as rocks, water and trees. He then asks the question 'how is a socially constructed reality possible?' and then devotes much of this book to providing some answers. In this essay, I propose to go further and suggest that because these observer relative features are more relevant and important to our daily lives than intrinsic features, for many people social reality seems more 'real' than physical reality. In other words, rather than being hard to account for, observer relative features 'have a grip on us'.
Sedley and Baltzly provide a plausible explanation of the connection between Epicurus’ atomic swe... more Sedley and Baltzly provide a plausible explanation of the connection between Epicurus’ atomic swerve and free will. It is possible that consciousness is an emergent psychological property of the material mind. Free will could be seen as a manifestation of consciousness. Whilst we cannot yet fully explain what consciousness is and how is works, there is little doubt that consciousness exists. If consciousness can exist, then so can free will. However, where I part company with Sedley is that I find Epicurus’ theory of the atomic swerve unconvincing.
The idea that the future is already determined is known in philosophy as determinism. There are v... more The idea that the future is already determined is known in philosophy as determinism. There are various definitions of determinism available; but in this paper, I shall use the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition, which is 'the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future' (McKenna, 2009:1.3). This idea presents a difficult problem for the concept of free will: how can we make free choices if all our actions are determined by the facts of the past and the laws of nature? A related but distinct question is: how can we be held morally responsible for our actions if we have no free will? Undesirable consequences like these are not sufficient reasons for declaring determinism to be false; but they can act (and have influenced many philosophers) as a powerful motivator towards resolving the apparent conflict between determinism and free will.
It has been claimed by some writers that alchemy was a precursor to chemistry, or that chemistry ... more It has been claimed by some writers that alchemy was a precursor to chemistry, or that chemistry ‘evolved’ from alchemy. I think this is wrong. Chemistry no more evolved from alchemy than astronomy evolved from astrology. Alchemy was a mystical pseudoscience like astrology, rather than being a protoscience of chemistry. The eventual mainstream switch from alchemy to chemistry in the 17th century was quite rapid – more like a revolution than evolution. It has been suggested that this was due to the development of scientific methods. I think this is also wrong, for reasons I shall later explain.
In these challenging times of 'alternative facts' and anti-science attitudes, it may sound strang... more In these challenging times of 'alternative facts' and anti-science attitudes, it may sound strange to be warning against excessive scientific exuberance. Yet to help defend science from these attacks, I think we need to encourage science to maintain its credibility amongst non-scientists. Despite the recent growth of various anti-science movements, science is still widely regarded as the 'gold standard' for the discovery of empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge derived from observations and experiments. Even theoretical physics is supposed to be empirically verifiable in principle when the necessary technology becomes available, as in the case of the Higgs boson and Einstein's gravitational waves. But empirical observations are not our only source of knowledge – we also use reasoning to make sense of our observations and to draw valid conclusions from them. We can even generate new knowledge through the application of reasoning to what we already know, as I shall discuss later. Most skeptics (with a 'k') see science as a kind of rational antidote to the irrationality of pseudoscience, quackery and other varieties of woo. So we naturally tend to support and promote science for this purpose. But sometimes we can go too far in our enthusiasm for science. We can mistakenly attempt to extend the scope of science beyond its empirical capabilities, into other fields of inquiry such as philosophy and politics – even ethics. If only a small number of celebrity scientists lessen their credibility by making pronouncements beyond their individual fields of expertise, they render themselves vulnerable to attack by our opponents who are looking for any weaknesses in their arguments. In doing so, they can unintentionally undermine public confidence in science, and by extension, scientific skepticism.
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) is best known for his major contributions to evolutionary theory. In 1... more Charles Darwin (1809-1882) is best known for his major contributions to evolutionary theory. In 1859, Darwin published his theory of natural selection as the mechanism of evolution in his revolutionary book On the Origin of Species. This book provided compelling evidence overcoming the scientific rejection of earlier concepts of transmutation of species. The basic principles of his theory have been shown to be correct and are now widely accepted as the basis of mainstream zoology, botany and ecology. On the other hand, in a later book Darwin got it wrong with the mechanisms of inheritance. The empirical rules of genetics, based solely on observational results, were largely understood since Gregor Mendel’s ‘wrinkled pea’ experiments in the 1860s. The postulated units of inheritance were called genes, but in Charles Darwin’s time it was not understood where genes were located in the body or what they physically consisted of. Darwin knew that there must have been a physical mechanism for inheritance, but his speculations about it – called pangenesis – were incorrect. Fortunately for the credibility of his theory of evolution by natural selection, he published these speculations later in a separate 1868 book titled Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication.
The ‘Norman Conquest’ is generally regarded as an epic event in English history – it was more tha... more The ‘Norman Conquest’ is generally regarded as an epic event in English history – it was more than just a change of royal dynasty. There is no doubt that William I built castles and drastically changed the composition of the nobility and clergy, dispossessing many of their estates. However, the extent of legal and administrative changes he made is contested by different historians. I intend to show that William initially minimised these changes to help legitimise his claim to the English throne. He emphasised continuity in English law and customs, to avoid the appearance of a Norman French takeover of England. But he later abandoned this strategy, and made some major and lasting changes to English law and administration.
In this paper I would like to analyse the derogatory nature of racial slurs. In particular, I sh... more In this paper I would like to analyse the derogatory nature of racial slurs. In particular, I shall try to answer the following questions: ‘What harm do racial slurs do?’ and ‘Do racial slurs deserve protection under the principle of free speech?’. In answering these questions, I enlist the methodology of speech act theory. I argue that racial slurs are perlocutionary speech acts that result in harmful consequences to target groups and individuals. They are not just offensive insults or taboo words. There are widely-accepted exceptions to the right of free speech for words that cause harm, and I argue that racial slurs should be included amongst these exceptions.
In her paper ‘Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission’ Jennifer Lackey (2008: 855-867) argues agai... more In her paper ‘Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission’ Jennifer Lackey (2008: 855-867) argues against the following two theses regarding the justification of testimonial knowledge: 2. For every speaker S and hearer H, if H comes to know that p via S’s testifying that p, then S must know that p. 2*. For every testimonial chain of knowledge C, in order for a hearer H in C to come to know that p via the testimony of a speaker S in C, at least the first speaker S in C must know that p (in some non-testimonial way).
This essay examines Lackey’s critique of thesis 2*, where I argue that Lackey does make out a satisfactory case for her position against it; but that her case is an ‘exception to the rule’ in a similar way that ‘Gettier cases’ are an exception to the rule that knowledge is justified true belief.
There are several objections to consequentialism as a basis for morality. Some of these objectio... more There are several objections to consequentialism as a basis for morality. Some of these objections are of considerable scholarly interest to philosophers; but I think the most powerful objection is that adherence to consequentialism can in some cases result in injustice. My thesis is that justice is an important factor that needs to be taken into account in ethical theories. I also intend to argue that the best response to this objection, which is to attempt to treat justice as an intrinsically valuable consequence of actions, is currently unworkable.
Representative democracy is a form of democracy in which citizens elect representatives who then ... more Representative democracy is a form of democracy in which citizens elect representatives who then vote on legislation or policy issues, as opposed to a direct democracy where citizens vote on issues themselves. Two of the main theories of representative democracy are the ‘trustee model’ and the or ‘delegate model’. In this essay, I argue that the trustee model makes more sense than the delegate model. I also consider some refinements of the trustee model, such as those identified by Mansbridge and Rehfeld. I propose what I call the ‘professional model’, where a politician should act in the long-term best interests of his or her constituents, in a similar obligation to the clients of a lawyer or medical doctor, even if this might be contrary to the preferences of those constituents.
In 27BCE Gaius Octavius (‘Octavian’) in effect became the first Emperor of Rome, although this wa... more In 27BCE Gaius Octavius (‘Octavian’) in effect became the first Emperor of Rome, although this was not of one his official titles. As part of this process, his name was changed by Senate decree to Augustus. For all practical purposes, the Roman Emperor became a monarch, yet throughout Rome’s republican period, the Senate had resolutely opposed any return to the previous monarchy. Indeed, this opposition has been given as one of the main reasons for the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44BCE (Cicero, III 82-83). The purpose of this essay is to explore the reasons for this apparent paradox, and to suggestion an explanation as to how Augustus was able overcome the Senate’s opposition to monarchy and become a king-like Emperor.
The divides between sacred and secular music have been relatively clear since the Middle Ages, wi... more The divides between sacred and secular music have been relatively clear since the Middle Ages, with the possible exception of African-American gospel music in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. On the other hand, the divides between art and popular music have not been as clear; and have become increasingly difficult to sharply define in terms of musical content and form in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Some examples of ‘crossovers’ between art music and popular music (in both directions) are given in this essay, together with an alternative method of distinguishing between art music and popular music (and also folk music), based on function rather than form.
The philosophical problem of universals has endured since ancient times, and can have metaphysica... more The philosophical problem of universals has endured since ancient times, and can have metaphysical or epistemic connotations, depending upon the philosopher in question. I intend to show in this essay that both Plato’s and the Stoics’ theories of universals were not only derived from, but were ‘in the grip’ of their epistemological and metaphysical philosophies respectively; and were thus vulnerable to methodological criticism. I propose to first outline the three alternative theories of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics; and then to suggest that Aristotle’s theory, whilst developed as a criticism of Plato’s theory, stands more robustly on its own merits.
At first sight, the concepts of economic efficiency and social justice might seem unrelated or ev... more At first sight, the concepts of economic efficiency and social justice might seem unrelated or even counterposed. Some people intuitively feel that in the economic sense, efficiency works against fairness and therefore equality. In this essay, I propose to argue the opposite – that the concept of economic efficiency can be used as part of a case against the notion that social justice entails economic equality. My case is primarily based on the works of Frankfurt; but Rawls’ Difference Principle is also of assistance. I also intend to consider some objections to this case, and to either provide counter-arguments against them, or to suggest that the objections are not sufficiently important to outweigh the case I am putting forward.
After the final defeat of the Persians in the mid-fifth century BCE, the Delian League was gradua... more After the final defeat of the Persians in the mid-fifth century BCE, the Delian League was gradually transformed into an Athenian empire. The transformation was accompanied by an accumulation of power over other city states by Athens; associated with certain claims of political corruption. This essay describes the transformation process, how Athenians justified it, and how they responded to the claims of corruption. It also examines the claims in terms of the different ancient and modern perspectives of corruption.
Within the context of ancient Athenian democracy, the term ‘radical democracy’ refers to a set of... more Within the context of ancient Athenian democracy, the term ‘radical democracy’ refers to a set of constitutional reforms introduced by Ephialtes and Perikles, beginning in 462 BCE. The main elements of these radical reforms were that (1) all major matters of public policy were determined at meetings of the Ekklesia (Assembly); at which all adult citizens[1] of good standing were entitled to vote (Roberts 1998, 41); and (2) public officials were randomly chosen by lot, known as sortition (Scarre and Fagan 2008, 291). In this essay, I propose to argue that these radical democratic reforms went too far – that is, that their advantages were outweighed by their disadvantages.
Towards the end of his book ‘The Construction of Social Reality’, John Searle [1] makes a case fo... more Towards the end of his book ‘The Construction of Social Reality’, John Searle [1] makes a case for realism, which he defines as ‘the view that world exists independently of our representations of it’ (Searle 1995: 153). He first responds to what he sees as the main objections to this view (Searle 1995: 149-176); and then provides some arguments in favour of it (Searle 1995: 177-197). Searle also discusses the correspondence theory of truth which he sees as related to realism (Searle 1995: 199-226). In this essay, I shall present Searle’s arguments and responses in the reverse order to his, and then I shall discuss what I see as the strengths and weaknesses of his case. My thesis is essentially that an external reality is consistent with both Searle’s construction of social reality and the correspondence theory of truth.
Rationality is the state or quality of being rational, which means as being consistent with or ba... more Rationality is the state or quality of being rational, which means as being consistent with or based on or using reason. Reason is thought by rationalists to be more reliable in determining what is true; in contrast to reliance on factors such as authority, tradition, instinct, intuition, emotion, mysticism, superstition faith or arbitrary choice.
The word rational can be used in several different contexts; but the context most relevant to skepticism is that of rational belief, because we use it as a filter to determine what we should be sceptical about. We skeptics are not skeptical of everything. We believe what it is rational to believe, and we are skeptical of irrational beliefs. Two criteria have been proposed by Nozick for a rational belief: 1. support by reasons that make the belief credible; and 2. generation by a process that reliably produces true beliefs. A rational belief is not necessarily true, and an irrational belief is not necessarily false. On the other hand, a rational belief needs to be reasonable or credible in the circumstances; that is, a rational belief is one that is justified by reason. It needs to pass objective tests of irrationality. Objective tests of irrational belief include logical fallacies, emotional or faith-based rather than evidence-based beliefs, beliefs based on insufficient supporting evidence, beliefs derived from confirmation bias, beliefs incompatible with science, internally incoherent beliefs and possibly other tests.
Although an irrational belief is not necessarily false, we can say that because an irrational belief is unreliable and more likely to be false than a rational belief, we should therefore be more skeptical about beliefs that are known to be or appear to be irrational than about rational beliefs.
t is a common misconception that Descartes held the view that because animals cannot think, they ... more t is a common misconception that Descartes held the view that because animals cannot think, they have no feelings and do not suffer pain. In 1952, this view was described by the Scottish philosopher and psychologist Norman Kemp Smith as a ‘monstrous thesis’ (Cottingham 1978: 554-556). In this essay, I intend to examine two questions – firstly, whether Descartes actually held this view and secondly, whether this view is entailed by his other views about animal minds. My answer is essentially that whilst the text references are somewhat unclear on this specific point, it is unlikely that Descartes held this view or that it was entailed by his other related views.
In his book 'The Construction of Social Reality' (Searle 1995:1) and later works, John Searle [1]... more In his book 'The Construction of Social Reality' (Searle 1995:1) and later works, John Searle [1] discusses the problem that 'there are portions of the real world, objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human agreement'. He describes these objective facts as observer relative features of reality, or components of 'social reality', as opposed to the intrinsic features of physical reality or 'brute facts', such as rocks, water and trees. He then asks the question 'how is a socially constructed reality possible?' and then devotes much of this book to providing some answers. In this essay, I propose to go further and suggest that because these observer relative features are more relevant and important to our daily lives than intrinsic features, for many people social reality seems more 'real' than physical reality. In other words, rather than being hard to account for, observer relative features 'have a grip on us'.
Sedley and Baltzly provide a plausible explanation of the connection between Epicurus’ atomic swe... more Sedley and Baltzly provide a plausible explanation of the connection between Epicurus’ atomic swerve and free will. It is possible that consciousness is an emergent psychological property of the material mind. Free will could be seen as a manifestation of consciousness. Whilst we cannot yet fully explain what consciousness is and how is works, there is little doubt that consciousness exists. If consciousness can exist, then so can free will. However, where I part company with Sedley is that I find Epicurus’ theory of the atomic swerve unconvincing.
The idea that the future is already determined is known in philosophy as determinism. There are v... more The idea that the future is already determined is known in philosophy as determinism. There are various definitions of determinism available; but in this paper, I shall use the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition, which is 'the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future' (McKenna, 2009:1.3). This idea presents a difficult problem for the concept of free will: how can we make free choices if all our actions are determined by the facts of the past and the laws of nature? A related but distinct question is: how can we be held morally responsible for our actions if we have no free will? Undesirable consequences like these are not sufficient reasons for declaring determinism to be false; but they can act (and have influenced many philosophers) as a powerful motivator towards resolving the apparent conflict between determinism and free will.
It has been claimed by some writers that alchemy was a precursor to chemistry, or that chemistry ... more It has been claimed by some writers that alchemy was a precursor to chemistry, or that chemistry ‘evolved’ from alchemy. I think this is wrong. Chemistry no more evolved from alchemy than astronomy evolved from astrology. Alchemy was a mystical pseudoscience like astrology, rather than being a protoscience of chemistry. The eventual mainstream switch from alchemy to chemistry in the 17th century was quite rapid – more like a revolution than evolution. It has been suggested that this was due to the development of scientific methods. I think this is also wrong, for reasons I shall later explain.
In these challenging times of 'alternative facts' and anti-science attitudes, it may sound strang... more In these challenging times of 'alternative facts' and anti-science attitudes, it may sound strange to be warning against excessive scientific exuberance. Yet to help defend science from these attacks, I think we need to encourage science to maintain its credibility amongst non-scientists. Despite the recent growth of various anti-science movements, science is still widely regarded as the 'gold standard' for the discovery of empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge derived from observations and experiments. Even theoretical physics is supposed to be empirically verifiable in principle when the necessary technology becomes available, as in the case of the Higgs boson and Einstein's gravitational waves. But empirical observations are not our only source of knowledge – we also use reasoning to make sense of our observations and to draw valid conclusions from them. We can even generate new knowledge through the application of reasoning to what we already know, as I shall discuss later. Most skeptics (with a 'k') see science as a kind of rational antidote to the irrationality of pseudoscience, quackery and other varieties of woo. So we naturally tend to support and promote science for this purpose. But sometimes we can go too far in our enthusiasm for science. We can mistakenly attempt to extend the scope of science beyond its empirical capabilities, into other fields of inquiry such as philosophy and politics – even ethics. If only a small number of celebrity scientists lessen their credibility by making pronouncements beyond their individual fields of expertise, they render themselves vulnerable to attack by our opponents who are looking for any weaknesses in their arguments. In doing so, they can unintentionally undermine public confidence in science, and by extension, scientific skepticism.
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) is best known for his major contributions to evolutionary theory. In 1... more Charles Darwin (1809-1882) is best known for his major contributions to evolutionary theory. In 1859, Darwin published his theory of natural selection as the mechanism of evolution in his revolutionary book On the Origin of Species. This book provided compelling evidence overcoming the scientific rejection of earlier concepts of transmutation of species. The basic principles of his theory have been shown to be correct and are now widely accepted as the basis of mainstream zoology, botany and ecology. On the other hand, in a later book Darwin got it wrong with the mechanisms of inheritance. The empirical rules of genetics, based solely on observational results, were largely understood since Gregor Mendel’s ‘wrinkled pea’ experiments in the 1860s. The postulated units of inheritance were called genes, but in Charles Darwin’s time it was not understood where genes were located in the body or what they physically consisted of. Darwin knew that there must have been a physical mechanism for inheritance, but his speculations about it – called pangenesis – were incorrect. Fortunately for the credibility of his theory of evolution by natural selection, he published these speculations later in a separate 1868 book titled Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication.
To the ancient Greeks, science was simply the knowledge of nature. The acquisition of such knowl... more To the ancient Greeks, science was simply the knowledge of nature. The acquisition of such knowledge was theoretical rather than experimental. Logic and reason were applied to observations of nature in attempts to discover the underlying principles influencing phenomena.
After the Dark Ages, the revival of classical logic and reason in Western Europe was highly significant to the development of universities and subsequent intellectual progress. It was also a precursor to the development of empirical scientific methods in the thirteenth century, which I think were even more important because of the later practical benefits of science to humanity. The two most influential thinkers in development of scientific methods at this time were the English philosophers Robert Grosseteste (1175-1253) and Roger Bacon (c.1219/20-c.1292). (Note: Roger Bacon is not to be confused with Francis Bacon).
Professor Tom Nichols, a US national security expert wrote last year about the ‘death of expertis... more Professor Tom Nichols, a US national security expert wrote last year about the ‘death of expertise’; a Google-fueled, Wikipedia-based, blog-sodden collapse of divisions between professionals and amateurs, teachers and students, knowers and wonderers – between those with any expertise in an area and those with none at all. He sees this situation as not only a rejection of knowledge, but also the processes of knowledge acquisition – a rejection of science and other pursuits of rationality.
So how did it all come to this sorry state of affairs? I think that there are basically four contributing factors: the blurring of facts and opinions; a misunderstanding of democracy; a misunderstanding of the Argument from Authority; and the dissipation of media accountability.
Jazz musical lineages are normally tracked by instrument. Leading musicians are often described ... more Jazz musical lineages are normally tracked by instrument. Leading musicians are often described in the literature as having been primarily influenced by their predecessors on the same instrument – trumpeters are influenced by trumpeters, saxophonists by saxophonists, and so on. This paper argues that in the 1920s, trumpeter Louis Armstrong was the major jazz influence on tenor saxophonist Coleman Hawkins as a soloist; and that Hawkins also influenced musicians on other instruments, such as Roy Eldridge on trumpet. This influence of Armstrong on Hawkins was mediated by bandleader Fletcher Henderson, in whose orchestra both were members from October 1924 to November 1925.
Uploads
Drafts by Tim Harding
2. For every speaker S and hearer H, if H comes to know that p via S’s testifying that p, then S must know that p.
2*. For every testimonial chain of knowledge C, in order for a hearer H in C to come to know that p via the testimony of a speaker S in C, at least the first speaker S in C must know that p (in some non-testimonial way).
This essay examines Lackey’s critique of thesis 2*, where I argue that Lackey does make out a satisfactory case for her position against it; but that her case is an ‘exception to the rule’ in a similar way that ‘Gettier cases’ are an exception to the rule that knowledge is justified true belief.
The word rational can be used in several different contexts; but the context most relevant to skepticism is that of rational belief, because we use it as a filter to determine what we should be sceptical about. We skeptics are not skeptical of everything. We believe what it is rational to believe, and we are skeptical of irrational beliefs.
Two criteria have been proposed by Nozick for a rational belief:
1. support by reasons that make the belief credible; and
2. generation by a process that reliably produces true beliefs.
A rational belief is not necessarily true, and an irrational belief is not necessarily false. On the other hand, a rational belief needs to be reasonable or credible in the circumstances; that is, a rational belief is one that is justified by reason. It needs to pass objective tests of irrationality.
Objective tests of irrational belief include logical fallacies, emotional or faith-based rather than evidence-based beliefs, beliefs based on insufficient supporting evidence, beliefs derived from confirmation bias, beliefs incompatible with science, internally incoherent beliefs and possibly other tests.
Although an irrational belief is not necessarily false, we can say that because an irrational belief is unreliable and more likely to be false than a rational belief, we should therefore be more skeptical about beliefs that are known to be or appear to be irrational than about rational beliefs.
Papers by Tim Harding
On the other hand, in a later book Darwin got it wrong with the mechanisms of inheritance. The empirical rules of genetics, based solely on observational results, were largely understood since Gregor Mendel’s ‘wrinkled pea’ experiments in the 1860s. The postulated units of inheritance were called genes, but in Charles Darwin’s time it was not understood where genes were located in the body or what they physically consisted of. Darwin knew that there must have been a physical mechanism for inheritance, but his speculations about it – called pangenesis – were incorrect. Fortunately for the credibility of his theory of evolution by natural selection, he published these speculations later in a separate 1868 book titled Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication.
2. For every speaker S and hearer H, if H comes to know that p via S’s testifying that p, then S must know that p.
2*. For every testimonial chain of knowledge C, in order for a hearer H in C to come to know that p via the testimony of a speaker S in C, at least the first speaker S in C must know that p (in some non-testimonial way).
This essay examines Lackey’s critique of thesis 2*, where I argue that Lackey does make out a satisfactory case for her position against it; but that her case is an ‘exception to the rule’ in a similar way that ‘Gettier cases’ are an exception to the rule that knowledge is justified true belief.
The word rational can be used in several different contexts; but the context most relevant to skepticism is that of rational belief, because we use it as a filter to determine what we should be sceptical about. We skeptics are not skeptical of everything. We believe what it is rational to believe, and we are skeptical of irrational beliefs.
Two criteria have been proposed by Nozick for a rational belief:
1. support by reasons that make the belief credible; and
2. generation by a process that reliably produces true beliefs.
A rational belief is not necessarily true, and an irrational belief is not necessarily false. On the other hand, a rational belief needs to be reasonable or credible in the circumstances; that is, a rational belief is one that is justified by reason. It needs to pass objective tests of irrationality.
Objective tests of irrational belief include logical fallacies, emotional or faith-based rather than evidence-based beliefs, beliefs based on insufficient supporting evidence, beliefs derived from confirmation bias, beliefs incompatible with science, internally incoherent beliefs and possibly other tests.
Although an irrational belief is not necessarily false, we can say that because an irrational belief is unreliable and more likely to be false than a rational belief, we should therefore be more skeptical about beliefs that are known to be or appear to be irrational than about rational beliefs.
On the other hand, in a later book Darwin got it wrong with the mechanisms of inheritance. The empirical rules of genetics, based solely on observational results, were largely understood since Gregor Mendel’s ‘wrinkled pea’ experiments in the 1860s. The postulated units of inheritance were called genes, but in Charles Darwin’s time it was not understood where genes were located in the body or what they physically consisted of. Darwin knew that there must have been a physical mechanism for inheritance, but his speculations about it – called pangenesis – were incorrect. Fortunately for the credibility of his theory of evolution by natural selection, he published these speculations later in a separate 1868 book titled Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication.
After the Dark Ages, the revival of classical logic and reason in Western Europe was highly significant to the development of universities and subsequent intellectual progress. It was also a precursor to the development of empirical scientific methods in the thirteenth century, which I think were even more important because of the later practical benefits of science to humanity. The two most influential thinkers in development of scientific methods at this time were the English philosophers Robert Grosseteste (1175-1253) and Roger Bacon (c.1219/20-c.1292). (Note: Roger Bacon is not to be confused with Francis Bacon).
So how did it all come to this sorry state of affairs? I think that there are basically four contributing factors: the blurring of facts and opinions; a misunderstanding of democracy; a misunderstanding of the Argument from Authority; and the dissipation of media accountability.