claudio corradetti
Claudio Corradetti is Associate Professor in Political Philosophy. He has been undergraduate at Oxford University (Trinity College). After a degree in Philosophy cum laude from the University of Rome "La Sapienza" he has obtained a MA Philosophy (London) and a PhD in Political Theory at LUISS Guido Carli, Rome.
Claudio has been trained also in law. He has received a Diploma in European Public Law by the European Group of Public Law, University of Athens and has qualified to the Directed Studies advanced seminars and to the prestigious Diploma Exam of the Hague Academy of International Law.
Before returning to Italy, Claudio has taught and conducted research at the University of Graz and at the University of Oslo, PluriCourts, Centre of Excellence. In 2020 he was awarded a Fulbright Research Scholarship at Columbia University NY. In 2023 he was visiting professor at the Philosophy Department of Indiana University, Bloomigton.
Claudio serves as a peer-reviewer for some among the major publishers as Cambridge University Press, Sage, Springer, Oxford University Press, Ashgate, Routledge etc.
Claudio has been trained also in law. He has received a Diploma in European Public Law by the European Group of Public Law, University of Athens and has qualified to the Directed Studies advanced seminars and to the prestigious Diploma Exam of the Hague Academy of International Law.
Before returning to Italy, Claudio has taught and conducted research at the University of Graz and at the University of Oslo, PluriCourts, Centre of Excellence. In 2020 he was awarded a Fulbright Research Scholarship at Columbia University NY. In 2023 he was visiting professor at the Philosophy Department of Indiana University, Bloomigton.
Claudio serves as a peer-reviewer for some among the major publishers as Cambridge University Press, Sage, Springer, Oxford University Press, Ashgate, Routledge etc.
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conceived for my doctoral thesis, to read back the original version provoked a sense
of surprise but also of distance. Along with the pleasure of unexpected connections
comes a feeling of estrangement for some of its elaborations. I have therefore
intended to remedy to this difficulty with an overall revision of this text belonging
to an early phase of my formation. After all this time, previous interests have found
new syntheses in current methodological transformations and ideas. I have therefore
written new chapters and reorganized again several chapters and some of the fundamental
theses of the original version.
The result has been a new book, a rethinking of the philosophical core of a theory
of human rights. An important addition has considered the duplicity of the point of
observation in which human rights have been justified. On the one hand, human
rights have been argued in terms of formal liberties, that is, as necessary presuppositions
to justify rational action through discursive practice; on the other hand, the
idea of human rights has been argued in terms of applicative standards of judgment.
The mediation between these two levels, then, has required a rethinking of the theory
through the consideration of the concept of human dignity as a general principle
of the system of human rights (therefore not as a right among the others).
Human dignity, indeed, provides an orientation to the use of reflective judgment
in human rights. If something resilient to time is therefore in these pages, this is
undoubtedly in an attempt to reconsider some of the points left suspended in the first
edition. There is no doubt that a philosophical discourse on human rights cannot
avoid considering what is truth (what I define as “experiential truth”), or what are
the conditions of normative validity for individual agency.
Human rights represent, in fact, a self-fulfilled philosophical discourse, and even
more, a discourse requiring the contribution of a multiplicity of levels of analysis.
In the following pages I will consider the idea that human rights express an
epochal and revolutionary character of modernity. They represent, that is, elements
of self-reflection of the modern man in the process of defining himself as a worthy
subject of equal respect.
relazioni internazionali e delle politiche di
cooperazione tra gli Stati. Essi restano, tuttavia,
strumenti fragili, a volte manipolati per l’avanzamento
d’interessi nazionali. Come possiamo restare fedeli
ai principi universalistici dei diritti umani? Come
si giustificano le prassi legittime derivate da questi?
Quali sono i presupposti concettuali che dobbiamo
considerare per una concezione che intenda porsi
come valida rispetto a una molteplicità di culture e
visioni del mondo? Questo libro intende esaminare
questioni di natura filosofica e giuridica con lo scopo
d’indicare le traiettorie politico-costituzionali che
informano l’ideale di giustizia tra i popoli. Al centro
del dibattito è la riflessione più recente di J.Habermas,
massimo esponente della Teoria Critica oggi, e uno
dei più importanti filosofi del novecento. L’autore si
confronta con tale tradizione di pensiero, suggerendo
che i diritti umani dischiudono una nuova dimensione
di universalismo, un livello qui definito in termini di
‘universalismo pluralista’.
Greece. Some of its most central problems were already addressed in Aeschylus’s trilogy of The
Oresteia where Athena played the transitional role of casting the decisive vote for pardoning
Orestes and saving him from the Furies (the Erinnyes).1 Yet, the linguistic expression “transitional
justice” has been adopted for the first time in its technical sense by R. Teitel during late 1980s who
then formulated the basic principles of this emerging discipline in her path-breaking work on the
subject.2
Since its appearance, the term was immediately discussed and criticized due to its combination
of two apparently irreconcilable elements: the idea of justice and the idea of change through time
— transition. The skepticism accompanying the birth of transitional justice as a field of study was
thus characterized since the beginning by a continuous attempt of defining the field, an attempt
which is even now far from having been completed.3 Some views have challenged the notion of
transitional justice as a form of compromise among contracting parties whereas others have instead
considered it as a specific context of application of general normative principles independently
justified (hence the proper interpretation of “transitional”).4
The specific task for a normatively framed programme of justice in transition is the focus
of some of the most influential literature in the field as, for instance, in R. Teitel (2003), where
the author considers how twentieth-century institutional and legal developments of transitional
justice revolved around three major historical events/phases: I) the post-Second World phase of the
Nuremberg Trials prosecuting Nazis’ generals, II) the post-Cold War phase which has modified the
bipolar equilibrium and opened democratization processes, and finally, III) the steady-state phase
of transitional justice
Papers by claudio corradetti
shrinking. Is the end of globalization also the end of liberal cosmopolitan
values? Will the new millennium see an unreserved struggle between nationalist
autocracies and cosmopolitan states? Can we reconcile cosmopolitanism with selective
citizenship?
Cosmopolitanism and globalization are not — in principle — coextensive terms.
This has never been so since the first modern theorizations of liberal cosmopolitanism.
Kantian cosmopolitanism, for instance, never required but simply permitted
a globalized world. Kant’s notion of “the right to visit” ultimately understood as
non-refoulement is the quintessential, non-derogable, protection that cosmopolitanism
requires, but one which excludes the possibility that commercial visits are also
mandatory rights. Kant’s cosmopolitanism can afford itself to survive in a minimalist
way even if it incorporates a constructivist — maximalist — dynamic. In times
of hardships, as they are today, cosmopolitanism should be seen in terms of militant
cosmopolitanism.
In the following sections I will address this intellectual turn and consider how the
notion of jus cogens has progressively replaced concept of cosmopolitan law as nonderogable
law.
It is not by chance, therefore, that Marko asks the following fundamental questions: “Why should we protect minorities at all?”,2 “And, if we should, is it possible to effectively protect them?”.3 These are only apparently rhetorical questions. In fact they formulate deep intellectual demands questioning why liberal approaches have developed concepts of toleration of minorities as well as compensatory measures for past injustices.4
fascism to the democracy out of which the political recognition of autonomy for
minority groups within the nation state represents a specific section.1 Luckily, South
Tyrol has not experienced genocide at the hands of dominant surrounding states,
yet, within the local German-speaking population there is still the vivid perception
of the humiliation perpetrated by the fascists through their program of territorial
Italianization based on ‘the options’ [in German: Die Optionen]’. This set of measures
issued between 1939 and 1943 obliged both the German-speaking South Tyroleans
and the Ladin-speaking language group to either move to the III Reich or to become
assimilated Italians.
In the following epistolary, Allen Wood and Claudio Corradetti offer two different standpoints on what can be still defined as textual interpretation. Whereas for Wood there must be kept a clear-cut separation between what a text shows and what an interpreter argues starting from the text, for Claudio Corradetti such distinction remains internal to textual exegesis in so far as interpreter’s conclusions follow a logical pattern of justification starting from textual hints.
All in all, the exchange revolves mainly around two points: 1) a substantive divergence on what was the final understanding and rationale of Kant’s international relations and 2) the meta-questions concerning: what is textual interpretation? What are its limits and possibilities? The letters below reproduced in full the exchange that occurred between 8-15 February 2020 in occasion of Corradetti’s presentation at the Political Theory Symposium (Political Science co-sponsor with German Studies and International Studies), organized by William Scheuerman at Indiana University at Bloomigton. Allen Wood replies to Bill Scheuerman on Claudio Corradetti’s “Part 3 – Theory and Practice. The World (State) Republic as a Regulative Idea of Reason”, in Kant, Global Politics and Cosmopolitan Law. The World (State) Republic as a Regulative Idea of Reason, Routledge, London-New York, 2020.
conceived for my doctoral thesis, to read back the original version provoked a sense
of surprise but also of distance. Along with the pleasure of unexpected connections
comes a feeling of estrangement for some of its elaborations. I have therefore
intended to remedy to this difficulty with an overall revision of this text belonging
to an early phase of my formation. After all this time, previous interests have found
new syntheses in current methodological transformations and ideas. I have therefore
written new chapters and reorganized again several chapters and some of the fundamental
theses of the original version.
The result has been a new book, a rethinking of the philosophical core of a theory
of human rights. An important addition has considered the duplicity of the point of
observation in which human rights have been justified. On the one hand, human
rights have been argued in terms of formal liberties, that is, as necessary presuppositions
to justify rational action through discursive practice; on the other hand, the
idea of human rights has been argued in terms of applicative standards of judgment.
The mediation between these two levels, then, has required a rethinking of the theory
through the consideration of the concept of human dignity as a general principle
of the system of human rights (therefore not as a right among the others).
Human dignity, indeed, provides an orientation to the use of reflective judgment
in human rights. If something resilient to time is therefore in these pages, this is
undoubtedly in an attempt to reconsider some of the points left suspended in the first
edition. There is no doubt that a philosophical discourse on human rights cannot
avoid considering what is truth (what I define as “experiential truth”), or what are
the conditions of normative validity for individual agency.
Human rights represent, in fact, a self-fulfilled philosophical discourse, and even
more, a discourse requiring the contribution of a multiplicity of levels of analysis.
In the following pages I will consider the idea that human rights express an
epochal and revolutionary character of modernity. They represent, that is, elements
of self-reflection of the modern man in the process of defining himself as a worthy
subject of equal respect.
relazioni internazionali e delle politiche di
cooperazione tra gli Stati. Essi restano, tuttavia,
strumenti fragili, a volte manipolati per l’avanzamento
d’interessi nazionali. Come possiamo restare fedeli
ai principi universalistici dei diritti umani? Come
si giustificano le prassi legittime derivate da questi?
Quali sono i presupposti concettuali che dobbiamo
considerare per una concezione che intenda porsi
come valida rispetto a una molteplicità di culture e
visioni del mondo? Questo libro intende esaminare
questioni di natura filosofica e giuridica con lo scopo
d’indicare le traiettorie politico-costituzionali che
informano l’ideale di giustizia tra i popoli. Al centro
del dibattito è la riflessione più recente di J.Habermas,
massimo esponente della Teoria Critica oggi, e uno
dei più importanti filosofi del novecento. L’autore si
confronta con tale tradizione di pensiero, suggerendo
che i diritti umani dischiudono una nuova dimensione
di universalismo, un livello qui definito in termini di
‘universalismo pluralista’.
Greece. Some of its most central problems were already addressed in Aeschylus’s trilogy of The
Oresteia where Athena played the transitional role of casting the decisive vote for pardoning
Orestes and saving him from the Furies (the Erinnyes).1 Yet, the linguistic expression “transitional
justice” has been adopted for the first time in its technical sense by R. Teitel during late 1980s who
then formulated the basic principles of this emerging discipline in her path-breaking work on the
subject.2
Since its appearance, the term was immediately discussed and criticized due to its combination
of two apparently irreconcilable elements: the idea of justice and the idea of change through time
— transition. The skepticism accompanying the birth of transitional justice as a field of study was
thus characterized since the beginning by a continuous attempt of defining the field, an attempt
which is even now far from having been completed.3 Some views have challenged the notion of
transitional justice as a form of compromise among contracting parties whereas others have instead
considered it as a specific context of application of general normative principles independently
justified (hence the proper interpretation of “transitional”).4
The specific task for a normatively framed programme of justice in transition is the focus
of some of the most influential literature in the field as, for instance, in R. Teitel (2003), where
the author considers how twentieth-century institutional and legal developments of transitional
justice revolved around three major historical events/phases: I) the post-Second World phase of the
Nuremberg Trials prosecuting Nazis’ generals, II) the post-Cold War phase which has modified the
bipolar equilibrium and opened democratization processes, and finally, III) the steady-state phase
of transitional justice
shrinking. Is the end of globalization also the end of liberal cosmopolitan
values? Will the new millennium see an unreserved struggle between nationalist
autocracies and cosmopolitan states? Can we reconcile cosmopolitanism with selective
citizenship?
Cosmopolitanism and globalization are not — in principle — coextensive terms.
This has never been so since the first modern theorizations of liberal cosmopolitanism.
Kantian cosmopolitanism, for instance, never required but simply permitted
a globalized world. Kant’s notion of “the right to visit” ultimately understood as
non-refoulement is the quintessential, non-derogable, protection that cosmopolitanism
requires, but one which excludes the possibility that commercial visits are also
mandatory rights. Kant’s cosmopolitanism can afford itself to survive in a minimalist
way even if it incorporates a constructivist — maximalist — dynamic. In times
of hardships, as they are today, cosmopolitanism should be seen in terms of militant
cosmopolitanism.
In the following sections I will address this intellectual turn and consider how the
notion of jus cogens has progressively replaced concept of cosmopolitan law as nonderogable
law.
It is not by chance, therefore, that Marko asks the following fundamental questions: “Why should we protect minorities at all?”,2 “And, if we should, is it possible to effectively protect them?”.3 These are only apparently rhetorical questions. In fact they formulate deep intellectual demands questioning why liberal approaches have developed concepts of toleration of minorities as well as compensatory measures for past injustices.4
fascism to the democracy out of which the political recognition of autonomy for
minority groups within the nation state represents a specific section.1 Luckily, South
Tyrol has not experienced genocide at the hands of dominant surrounding states,
yet, within the local German-speaking population there is still the vivid perception
of the humiliation perpetrated by the fascists through their program of territorial
Italianization based on ‘the options’ [in German: Die Optionen]’. This set of measures
issued between 1939 and 1943 obliged both the German-speaking South Tyroleans
and the Ladin-speaking language group to either move to the III Reich or to become
assimilated Italians.
In the following epistolary, Allen Wood and Claudio Corradetti offer two different standpoints on what can be still defined as textual interpretation. Whereas for Wood there must be kept a clear-cut separation between what a text shows and what an interpreter argues starting from the text, for Claudio Corradetti such distinction remains internal to textual exegesis in so far as interpreter’s conclusions follow a logical pattern of justification starting from textual hints.
All in all, the exchange revolves mainly around two points: 1) a substantive divergence on what was the final understanding and rationale of Kant’s international relations and 2) the meta-questions concerning: what is textual interpretation? What are its limits and possibilities? The letters below reproduced in full the exchange that occurred between 8-15 February 2020 in occasion of Corradetti’s presentation at the Political Theory Symposium (Political Science co-sponsor with German Studies and International Studies), organized by William Scheuerman at Indiana University at Bloomigton. Allen Wood replies to Bill Scheuerman on Claudio Corradetti’s “Part 3 – Theory and Practice. The World (State) Republic as a Regulative Idea of Reason”, in Kant, Global Politics and Cosmopolitan Law. The World (State) Republic as a Regulative Idea of Reason, Routledge, London-New York, 2020.