Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (44:4) pp. 697-705, Dec 2013
Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determi... more Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determine whether such entities have a good of their own, and so are candidates for being directly morally considerable. We argue that the good of non-sentient organisms is grounded in an etiological account of teleology, on which non-sentient organisms can come to be teleologically organized on the basis of their natural selection etiology. After defending this account of teleology, we argue that there are no grounds for excluding synthetic organisms from having a good also grounded in their teleological organization. However, this comes at a cost; traditional artifacts will also be seen as having a good of their own. We defend this as the best solution to the puzzle about what to say about the good of synthetic organisms.
Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far ... more Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them1. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma2, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used3, 4. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible positive outcomes—that is, agreements with the requisite emissions reduction commitments5, 6. Other work on large-scale social dilemmas suggests that it should be possible to resolve the climate problem7, 8, 9. It therefore seems that equilibrium selection10 may be a barrier to successful negotiations. Here we use an N-player bargaining game in an agent-based model with learning dynamics to examine the past failures of and future prospects for a robust international climate agreement. The model suggests reasons why the desirable solutions identified in previous game-theoretic models have not yet been accomplished in practice and what mechanisms might be used to achieve these solutions.
In order to determine whether current (or future) machines have a welfare that we as agents ought... more In order to determine whether current (or future) machines have a welfare that we as agents ought to take into account in our moral deliberations, we must determine which capacities give rise to interests and whether current machines have those capacities. After developing an account of moral patiency, I argue that current machines should be treated as mere machines. That is, current machines should be treated as if they lack those capacities that would give rise to psychological interests. Therefore, they are moral patients only if they have non-psychological interests. I then provide an account of what I call teleo interests that constitute the most plausible type of non-psychological interest that a being might have. I then argue that even if current machines have teleo interests, they are such that agents need not concern themselves with these interests. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, current machines are not moral patients.
Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences (44:4) Part B, pp. 697-706, 2013
Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determi... more Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determine whether such entities have a good of their own, and so are candidates for being directly morally considerable. We argue that the good of non-sentient organisms is grounded in an etiological account of teleology, on which non-sentient organisms can come to be teleologically organized on the basis of their natural selection etiology. After defending this account of teleology, we argue that there are no grounds for excluding synthetic organisms from having a good also grounded in their teleological organization. However, this comes at a cost; traditional artifacts will also be seen as having a good of their own. We defend this as the best solution to the puzzle about what to say about the good of synthetic organisms.
One reason that developments in synthetic biology are philosophically interesting is that they fo... more One reason that developments in synthetic biology are philosophically interesting is that they force us to reconsider a central dogma of environmental ethics, namely that there is some fundamental difference between artifacts and organisms such that the latter have goods or interests of their own that are due moral consideration while the former do not. The creation of entities that are at the same time artifacts and organisms forces us to clarify and reflect on existing accounts of the metaphysical and moral distinctions many environmental ethicists have wanted to make between entities of these kinds. In “Biological Interests, Normative Functions, and Synthetic Biology”, Sune Holm (2012) explores the challenge that synthetic or fully artifactual organisms raise for one of the most prominent accounts that supports the central dogma just described.On the distinction between synthetic and artifactual organisms, see (Holm 2012, pp. 15–20). While various environmental ethicists have attemp ...
Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, Beauchamp, T. and Frey, R. Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 826-854, 2011
This article discusses moral problems about the use of modern biotechnology in agriculture that e... more This article discusses moral problems about the use of modern biotechnology in agriculture that emerged in the early 1990s over recombinant bovine growth hormone, a chemical produced using genetically engineered microorganisms and then injected into dairy cows to increase milk yield. Then, there came genetically engineered soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton, and recently genetically engineered animals and cloned animals intended as food or breeding stock in agriculture. The discussion provides a moral framework for evaluating these new applications of modern biotechnology as they affect the food supply. It notes that all of the livestock are sentient beings with determinable welfare levels, which assures them of some degree of moral status. It points out that the moral importance of animals takes on a massive significance in light of the number of animals in the livestock sector. The livestock sector also is one of the most significant contributors to global environmental problems.
American Hournal of Bioethics: Neuroscience (1:2) pp. 41-48, 2010
Robust technological enhancement of core cognitive capacities is now a realistic possibility. Fro... more Robust technological enhancement of core cognitive capacities is now a realistic possibility. From the perspective of neutralism, the view that justifications for public policy should be neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good, only members of a subset of the ethical concerns serve as legitimate justifications for public policy regarding robust technological enhancement. This paper provides a framework for the legitimate use of ethical concerns in justifying public policy decisions regarding these enhancement technologies by evaluating the ethical concerns that arise in the context of testing such technologies on nonhuman animals. Traditional issues in bioethics, as well as novel concerns such as the possibility of moral status enhancement, are evaluated from the perspective of neutralism.
Our environmental wrongdoings result in a moral debt that requires restitution. One component of ... more Our environmental wrongdoings result in a moral debt that requires restitution. One component of restitution is reparative and another is remediative. The remediative component requires that we remediate our characters in ways that alter or eliminate the character traits that tend to lead, in their expression, to environmental wrongdoing. Restitutive restoration is a way of engaging in ecological restoration that helps to meet the remediative requirement that accompanies environmental wrongdoing. This account of restoration provides a new motivation and justification for engaging in restorative practices in addition to the standard pragmatist justification and motivations.
Advances in our scientific understanding and technological power in recent decades have dramatica... more Advances in our scientific understanding and technological power in recent decades have dramatically amplified our capacity to intentionally manipulate complex ecological and biological systems. An implication of this is that biological and ecological problems are increasingly understood and approached from an engineering perspective. In environmental contexts, this is exemplified in the pursuits of geoengineering, designer ecosystems, and conservation cloning. In human health contexts, it is exemplified in the development of synthetic biology, bionanotechnology, and human enhancement technologies. Designer Biology: The Ethics of Intensively Engineering Biological and Ecological Systems consists of thirteen chapters (twelve of them original to the collection) that address the ethical issues raised by technological intervention and design across a broad range of biological and ecological systems. Among the technologies addressed are geoengineering, human enhancement, sex selection, genetic modification, and synthetic biology. The aim of the collection is to advance and enrich our understanding of the ethical issues raised by these technologies, as well as to identify general lessons about the ethics of engineering complex biological and ecological systems that can be applied as new technologies and practices emerge. The insights that emerge will be especially valuable to students and scholars of environmental ethics, bioethics, or technology ethics.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (44:4) pp. 697-705, Dec 2013
Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determi... more Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determine whether such entities have a good of their own, and so are candidates for being directly morally considerable. We argue that the good of non-sentient organisms is grounded in an etiological account of teleology, on which non-sentient organisms can come to be teleologically organized on the basis of their natural selection etiology. After defending this account of teleology, we argue that there are no grounds for excluding synthetic organisms from having a good also grounded in their teleological organization. However, this comes at a cost; traditional artifacts will also be seen as having a good of their own. We defend this as the best solution to the puzzle about what to say about the good of synthetic organisms.
Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far ... more Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them1. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma2, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used3, 4. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible positive outcomes—that is, agreements with the requisite emissions reduction commitments5, 6. Other work on large-scale social dilemmas suggests that it should be possible to resolve the climate problem7, 8, 9. It therefore seems that equilibrium selection10 may be a barrier to successful negotiations. Here we use an N-player bargaining game in an agent-based model with learning dynamics to examine the past failures of and future prospects for a robust international climate agreement. The model suggests reasons why the desirable solutions identified in previous game-theoretic models have not yet been accomplished in practice and what mechanisms might be used to achieve these solutions.
In order to determine whether current (or future) machines have a welfare that we as agents ought... more In order to determine whether current (or future) machines have a welfare that we as agents ought to take into account in our moral deliberations, we must determine which capacities give rise to interests and whether current machines have those capacities. After developing an account of moral patiency, I argue that current machines should be treated as mere machines. That is, current machines should be treated as if they lack those capacities that would give rise to psychological interests. Therefore, they are moral patients only if they have non-psychological interests. I then provide an account of what I call teleo interests that constitute the most plausible type of non-psychological interest that a being might have. I then argue that even if current machines have teleo interests, they are such that agents need not concern themselves with these interests. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, current machines are not moral patients.
Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences (44:4) Part B, pp. 697-706, 2013
Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determi... more Synthetic organisms are at the same time organisms and artifacts. In this paper we aim to determine whether such entities have a good of their own, and so are candidates for being directly morally considerable. We argue that the good of non-sentient organisms is grounded in an etiological account of teleology, on which non-sentient organisms can come to be teleologically organized on the basis of their natural selection etiology. After defending this account of teleology, we argue that there are no grounds for excluding synthetic organisms from having a good also grounded in their teleological organization. However, this comes at a cost; traditional artifacts will also be seen as having a good of their own. We defend this as the best solution to the puzzle about what to say about the good of synthetic organisms.
One reason that developments in synthetic biology are philosophically interesting is that they fo... more One reason that developments in synthetic biology are philosophically interesting is that they force us to reconsider a central dogma of environmental ethics, namely that there is some fundamental difference between artifacts and organisms such that the latter have goods or interests of their own that are due moral consideration while the former do not. The creation of entities that are at the same time artifacts and organisms forces us to clarify and reflect on existing accounts of the metaphysical and moral distinctions many environmental ethicists have wanted to make between entities of these kinds. In “Biological Interests, Normative Functions, and Synthetic Biology”, Sune Holm (2012) explores the challenge that synthetic or fully artifactual organisms raise for one of the most prominent accounts that supports the central dogma just described.On the distinction between synthetic and artifactual organisms, see (Holm 2012, pp. 15–20). While various environmental ethicists have attemp ...
Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, Beauchamp, T. and Frey, R. Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 826-854, 2011
This article discusses moral problems about the use of modern biotechnology in agriculture that e... more This article discusses moral problems about the use of modern biotechnology in agriculture that emerged in the early 1990s over recombinant bovine growth hormone, a chemical produced using genetically engineered microorganisms and then injected into dairy cows to increase milk yield. Then, there came genetically engineered soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton, and recently genetically engineered animals and cloned animals intended as food or breeding stock in agriculture. The discussion provides a moral framework for evaluating these new applications of modern biotechnology as they affect the food supply. It notes that all of the livestock are sentient beings with determinable welfare levels, which assures them of some degree of moral status. It points out that the moral importance of animals takes on a massive significance in light of the number of animals in the livestock sector. The livestock sector also is one of the most significant contributors to global environmental problems.
American Hournal of Bioethics: Neuroscience (1:2) pp. 41-48, 2010
Robust technological enhancement of core cognitive capacities is now a realistic possibility. Fro... more Robust technological enhancement of core cognitive capacities is now a realistic possibility. From the perspective of neutralism, the view that justifications for public policy should be neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good, only members of a subset of the ethical concerns serve as legitimate justifications for public policy regarding robust technological enhancement. This paper provides a framework for the legitimate use of ethical concerns in justifying public policy decisions regarding these enhancement technologies by evaluating the ethical concerns that arise in the context of testing such technologies on nonhuman animals. Traditional issues in bioethics, as well as novel concerns such as the possibility of moral status enhancement, are evaluated from the perspective of neutralism.
Our environmental wrongdoings result in a moral debt that requires restitution. One component of ... more Our environmental wrongdoings result in a moral debt that requires restitution. One component of restitution is reparative and another is remediative. The remediative component requires that we remediate our characters in ways that alter or eliminate the character traits that tend to lead, in their expression, to environmental wrongdoing. Restitutive restoration is a way of engaging in ecological restoration that helps to meet the remediative requirement that accompanies environmental wrongdoing. This account of restoration provides a new motivation and justification for engaging in restorative practices in addition to the standard pragmatist justification and motivations.
Advances in our scientific understanding and technological power in recent decades have dramatica... more Advances in our scientific understanding and technological power in recent decades have dramatically amplified our capacity to intentionally manipulate complex ecological and biological systems. An implication of this is that biological and ecological problems are increasingly understood and approached from an engineering perspective. In environmental contexts, this is exemplified in the pursuits of geoengineering, designer ecosystems, and conservation cloning. In human health contexts, it is exemplified in the development of synthetic biology, bionanotechnology, and human enhancement technologies. Designer Biology: The Ethics of Intensively Engineering Biological and Ecological Systems consists of thirteen chapters (twelve of them original to the collection) that address the ethical issues raised by technological intervention and design across a broad range of biological and ecological systems. Among the technologies addressed are geoengineering, human enhancement, sex selection, genetic modification, and synthetic biology. The aim of the collection is to advance and enrich our understanding of the ethical issues raised by these technologies, as well as to identify general lessons about the ethics of engineering complex biological and ecological systems that can be applied as new technologies and practices emerge. The insights that emerge will be especially valuable to students and scholars of environmental ethics, bioethics, or technology ethics.
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