Experimenters often ask subjects to rate displays in terms of high-level visual properties, such ... more Experimenters often ask subjects to rate displays in terms of high-level visual properties, such as animacy. When do such studies measure subjects' visual impressions, and when do they merely reflect their judgments that certain features should reflect animacy? Here we introduce the 'Blindfold Test' for helping to evaluate the evidence for whether an effect reflects perception or judgment. If the same effect can be obtained not only with visual displays, but also by simply describing those displays, then subjects' responses may reflect higher-level reasoning rather than visual processing-and so other evidence is needed in order to support a 'perceptual' interpretation. We applied the Blindfold Test to three past studies in which observers made subjective reports about what they were seeing. In the first two examples, subjects rated stimuli in terms of high-level properties: animacy, and physical forces. In both cases, the key findings replicated even when the visual stimuli were replaced with (mere) descriptions, and we conclude that these studies cannot by themselves license conclusions about perception. In contrast, a third example (involving Motion-Induced Blindness) passed the test: subjects produced very different responses when given descriptions of the displays, compared to the visual stimuli themselves-providing compelling evidence that the original responses did not merely reflect such higher-level reasoning. The Blindfold Test may thus help to constrain interpretations of the mental processes underlying certain experimental results-especially for studies of properties that can be apprehended by both seeing and thinking.
We report a new attentional cueing effect, which shows how attention models the physical force of... more We report a new attentional cueing effect, which shows how attention models the physical force of friction. Most objects we see are in frictive contact with a 'floor', such that clockwise rotation causes rightward movement and counterclockwise rotation leftward movement. Is this regularity encoded in spatial orienting responses? In Experiment 1, seeing a clockwise-rotating 'wheel' produced faster responses to subsequent targets appearing on the right vs. left (and vice versa for counterclockwise rotation). Thus, when viewing a lone rotating wheel, we orient attention toward where we predict it will move next, assuming frictive floor contact. But what happens if the rotating wheel is seen touching another visible surface? In Experiment 2, rotational cueing was stronger for wheels touching a visible floor, was abolished for wheels near but not touching another surface, and reversed for wheels touching a ceiling. We conclude that the visual system makes an assumption of frictive floor contact, and rapidly analyzes visual cues to frictive contact with other surfaces, in order to orient attention toward where objects are likely to move next.
Even simple geometric shapes are seen as animate and goal-directed when they move in certain ways... more Even simple geometric shapes are seen as animate and goal-directed when they move in certain ways. Previous research has revealed a great deal about the cues that elicit such percepts, but much less about the consequences for other aspects of perception and cognition. Here we explored whether simple shapes that are perceived as animate and goal-directed are prioritized in memory. We investigated this by asking whether subjects better remember the locations of displays that are seen as animate vs. inanimate, controlling for lower-level factors. We exploited the 'Wolfpack effect': moving darts (or discs with 'eyes') that stay oriented toward a particular target are seen to be actively pursuing that target, even when they actually move randomly. (In contrast, shapes that stay oriented perpendicular to a target are correctly perceived to be drifting randomly.) Subjects played a 'matching game' – clicking on pairs of panels to reveal animations with moving shapes. Across four experiments, the locations of Wolfpack animations (compared to control animations equated on lower-level visual factors) were better remembered, in terms of more efficient matching. Thus perceiving animacy influences subsequent visual memory, perhaps due to the adaptive significance of such stimuli.
Researchers in our field—like pretty much everyone else—seem to have a collective fascination wit... more Researchers in our field—like pretty much everyone else—seem to have a collective fascination with visual illusions. A recent Perception editorial, however, wonders whether this is a good idea (Braddick, 2018). In particular, while acknowledging plenty of useful research on (and inspired by) various individual illusions, Braddick asks whether it is really helpful to identify illusions more broadly as a category: “what have we gained by putting them in the same box ...?” (p. 1). Braddick’s suggestion is that doing so is a mistake motivated primarily by a superficial “innocent pleasure,” but that illusions as a category are actually “deeply unhelpful for science” (p. 1). In an explicit attempt to be provocative, Braddick even suggests that focusing on illusions as a natural kind (i.e. as a privileged grouping that reflects something important about the structure of the mind) is an “infantile disorder.” In this respect, Braddick’s editorial succeeds admirably: we are provoked! In particular, we are provoked to explain why we disagree: we think that “illusions” are a natural kind whose existence has profound implications for our (scientific!) understanding of seeing, thinking, and especially how seeing and thinking do and do not interact. This is a theme that has figured quite a lot in recent debates about how cognition may influence perception, but curiously it was not mentioned either in Braddick’s editorial or in subsequent defenses of the importance of illusions (e.g., Shapiro, 2018; Todorovic, 2018) ...
We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898–1... more We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898–1967). In the motif, a scene is depicted that contains a silhouette, which itself contains another depicted scene. The silhouette is bistable, appearing either as a figural region whose positive space is covered, or filled, with the interior scene texture, or as a ground region providing a window onto a more distant scene. We call this the ‘reversible figure–ground motif’. Because the stimulus does not change when our percept changes, the motif’s appearance at any particular moment cannot be explained by its local or global image statistics. Instead principles of perceptual organization, and in particular image segmentation and figure–ground assignment, appear crucial for determining whether the interior of the silhouette is processed as a material vs. a scene — which in turn reflects the fundamental role of visual segmentation in material and scene perception more generally.
We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898-1... more We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898-1967). In the motif, a scene is depicted that contains a silhouette, which itself contains another depicted scene. The silhouette is bistable, appearing either as a figural region whose positive space is covered, or filled, with the interior scene texture, or as a ground region providing a window onto a more distant scene. We call this the 'reversible figure-ground motif'. Because the stimulus does not change when our percept changes, the motif's appearance at any particular moment cannot be explained by its local or global image statistics. Instead principles of perceptual organization, and in particular image segmentation and figure-ground assignment, appear crucial for determining whether the interior of the silhouette is processed as a material vs. a scene-which in turn reflects the fundamental role of visual segmentation in material and scene perception more generally.
ABSTRACT A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in ... more ABSTRACT A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in artists' painting styles after the onset of degenerating neurological illnesses like Alzheimer's disease or Fronto-temporal dementia. However, these studies have typically been descriptive and qualitative in their analyses. Our study was motivated to show that quantitative methods can be applied to the neuropsychology of art production and to determine whether there are systematic changes in the art produced by two individuals with Alzheimer's disease (AD). Using the Assessment of Art Attributes which probes 6 formal characteristics (depth, color temperature, color saturation, balance, stroke, and simplicity) and 6 conceptual characteristics (depictive accuracy, abstractness, emotion, symbolism, realism, and animacy), we found that both AD patients produced paintings with more abstraction and use of symbolism and with less depictive accuracy and realism. Their paintings did not change in the use of depth, or balance or in the quality of their stroke. When these observations are combined with those made recently in 3 artists with focal brain damage, we find that conceptual more than formal perceptual attributes are susceptible to change after neurological illness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 2013
A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in artists’ ... more A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in artists’ painting styles after the onset of degenerating neurological illnesses like Alzheimer’s disease or Fronto-temporal dementia. However, these studies have typically been descriptive and qualitative in their analyses. Our study was motivated to show that quantitative methods can be applied to the neuropsychology of art production and to determine whether there are systematic changes in the art produced by two individuals with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Using the Assessment of Art Attributes which probes 6 formal characteristics (depth, color temperature, color saturation, balance, stroke, and simplicity) and 6 conceptual characteristics (depictive accuracy, abstractness, emotion, symbolism, realism, and animacy), we found that both AD patients produced paintings with more abstraction and use of symbolism and with less depictive accuracy and realism. Their paintings did not change in the use of depth, or balance or in the quality of their stroke. When these observations are combined with those made recently in 3 artists with focal brain damage, we find that conceptual more than formal perceptual attributes are susceptible to change after neurological illness.
Of the many effects that eye contact has, perhaps the most powerful is the stare-in-the-crowd eff... more Of the many effects that eye contact has, perhaps the most powerful is the stare-in-the-crowd effect, wherein faces are detected more readily when they look directly toward you. This is commonly attributed to others’ eyes being especially salient visual stimuli, but here we ask whether stares-in-the-crowd might arise instead from a deeper property that the eyes (but not only the eyes) signify: the direction of others’ attention and intentions. In fact, even simple geometric shapes can be seen as intentional, as when numerous randomly scattered cones are all consistently pointing at you. Accordingly, we show here that cones directed at the observer are detected faster (in fields of averted cones) than are cones averted away from the observer (in fields of directed cones). These results suggest that perceived intentionality itself captures attention—and that even in the absence of eyes, others’ directed attention stands out in a crowd.
Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. A... more Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. And this is especially true when those eyes are looking at you: direct gaze has profound influences, even at the level of basic cognitive processes such as working memory. For example, memory for the properties of simple geometric shapes is disrupted by the presence of other eyes gazing at you. But are such effects really specific to direct gaze per se? Seeing eyes is undoubtedly important, but presumably only because of what it tells us about the " mind behind the eyes " – i.e., about others' attention and intentions. This suggests that the same effects might arise even without eyes, as long as an agent's directed attention is conveyed by other means. Here we tested the impact on working memory of simple " mouth " shapes – which in no way resemble eyes, yet can still be readily seen as intentionally facing you (or not). Just as with gaze cues, the ability to detect changes in geometric shapes was impaired by direct (compared to averted) mouths – but not in very similar control stimuli that were not perceived as intentional. We conclude that this disruption of working memory reflects a general phenomenon of " mind contact, " rather than a specific effect of eye contact.
Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eye... more Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. And this is especially true when those eyes are looking at you: direct gaze has profound influences, even at the level of basic cognitive processes such as working memory. For example, memory for the properties of simple geometric shapes is disrupted by the presence of other eyes gazing at you. But are such effects really specific to direct gaze per se? Seeing eyes is undoubtedly important, but presumably only because of what it tells us about the "mind behind the eyes" - i.e., about others' attention and intentions. This suggests that the same effects might arise even without eyes, as long as an agent's directed attention is conveyed by other means. Here we tested the impact on working memory of simple "mouth" shapes - which in no way resemble eyes, yet can still be readily seen as intentionally facing you (or not). Just as with gaze cues, the ability to d...
2011 Seventh International Conference on Natural Computation, 2011
Area MT+ is a patch of middle temporal cortex that plays a critical role in our ability to percei... more Area MT+ is a patch of middle temporal cortex that plays a critical role in our ability to perceive motion in the visual modality. Recent neuroimaging studies of congenitally blind adults suggest that this brain area can "learn" to represent auditory motion, but only when individuals are deprived of visual input from birth. Here I present a parallel distributed processing
Experimenters often ask subjects to rate displays in terms of high-level visual properties, such ... more Experimenters often ask subjects to rate displays in terms of high-level visual properties, such as animacy. When do such studies measure subjects' visual impressions, and when do they merely reflect their judgments that certain features should reflect animacy? Here we introduce the 'Blindfold Test' for helping to evaluate the evidence for whether an effect reflects perception or judgment. If the same effect can be obtained not only with visual displays, but also by simply describing those displays, then subjects' responses may reflect higher-level reasoning rather than visual processing-and so other evidence is needed in order to support a 'perceptual' interpretation. We applied the Blindfold Test to three past studies in which observers made subjective reports about what they were seeing. In the first two examples, subjects rated stimuli in terms of high-level properties: animacy, and physical forces. In both cases, the key findings replicated even when the visual stimuli were replaced with (mere) descriptions, and we conclude that these studies cannot by themselves license conclusions about perception. In contrast, a third example (involving Motion-Induced Blindness) passed the test: subjects produced very different responses when given descriptions of the displays, compared to the visual stimuli themselves-providing compelling evidence that the original responses did not merely reflect such higher-level reasoning. The Blindfold Test may thus help to constrain interpretations of the mental processes underlying certain experimental results-especially for studies of properties that can be apprehended by both seeing and thinking.
We report a new attentional cueing effect, which shows how attention models the physical force of... more We report a new attentional cueing effect, which shows how attention models the physical force of friction. Most objects we see are in frictive contact with a 'floor', such that clockwise rotation causes rightward movement and counterclockwise rotation leftward movement. Is this regularity encoded in spatial orienting responses? In Experiment 1, seeing a clockwise-rotating 'wheel' produced faster responses to subsequent targets appearing on the right vs. left (and vice versa for counterclockwise rotation). Thus, when viewing a lone rotating wheel, we orient attention toward where we predict it will move next, assuming frictive floor contact. But what happens if the rotating wheel is seen touching another visible surface? In Experiment 2, rotational cueing was stronger for wheels touching a visible floor, was abolished for wheels near but not touching another surface, and reversed for wheels touching a ceiling. We conclude that the visual system makes an assumption of frictive floor contact, and rapidly analyzes visual cues to frictive contact with other surfaces, in order to orient attention toward where objects are likely to move next.
Even simple geometric shapes are seen as animate and goal-directed when they move in certain ways... more Even simple geometric shapes are seen as animate and goal-directed when they move in certain ways. Previous research has revealed a great deal about the cues that elicit such percepts, but much less about the consequences for other aspects of perception and cognition. Here we explored whether simple shapes that are perceived as animate and goal-directed are prioritized in memory. We investigated this by asking whether subjects better remember the locations of displays that are seen as animate vs. inanimate, controlling for lower-level factors. We exploited the 'Wolfpack effect': moving darts (or discs with 'eyes') that stay oriented toward a particular target are seen to be actively pursuing that target, even when they actually move randomly. (In contrast, shapes that stay oriented perpendicular to a target are correctly perceived to be drifting randomly.) Subjects played a 'matching game' – clicking on pairs of panels to reveal animations with moving shapes. Across four experiments, the locations of Wolfpack animations (compared to control animations equated on lower-level visual factors) were better remembered, in terms of more efficient matching. Thus perceiving animacy influences subsequent visual memory, perhaps due to the adaptive significance of such stimuli.
Researchers in our field—like pretty much everyone else—seem to have a collective fascination wit... more Researchers in our field—like pretty much everyone else—seem to have a collective fascination with visual illusions. A recent Perception editorial, however, wonders whether this is a good idea (Braddick, 2018). In particular, while acknowledging plenty of useful research on (and inspired by) various individual illusions, Braddick asks whether it is really helpful to identify illusions more broadly as a category: “what have we gained by putting them in the same box ...?” (p. 1). Braddick’s suggestion is that doing so is a mistake motivated primarily by a superficial “innocent pleasure,” but that illusions as a category are actually “deeply unhelpful for science” (p. 1). In an explicit attempt to be provocative, Braddick even suggests that focusing on illusions as a natural kind (i.e. as a privileged grouping that reflects something important about the structure of the mind) is an “infantile disorder.” In this respect, Braddick’s editorial succeeds admirably: we are provoked! In particular, we are provoked to explain why we disagree: we think that “illusions” are a natural kind whose existence has profound implications for our (scientific!) understanding of seeing, thinking, and especially how seeing and thinking do and do not interact. This is a theme that has figured quite a lot in recent debates about how cognition may influence perception, but curiously it was not mentioned either in Braddick’s editorial or in subsequent defenses of the importance of illusions (e.g., Shapiro, 2018; Todorovic, 2018) ...
We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898–1... more We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898–1967). In the motif, a scene is depicted that contains a silhouette, which itself contains another depicted scene. The silhouette is bistable, appearing either as a figural region whose positive space is covered, or filled, with the interior scene texture, or as a ground region providing a window onto a more distant scene. We call this the ‘reversible figure–ground motif’. Because the stimulus does not change when our percept changes, the motif’s appearance at any particular moment cannot be explained by its local or global image statistics. Instead principles of perceptual organization, and in particular image segmentation and figure–ground assignment, appear crucial for determining whether the interior of the silhouette is processed as a material vs. a scene — which in turn reflects the fundamental role of visual segmentation in material and scene perception more generally.
We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898-1... more We draw attention to a frequent motif in the work of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte (1898-1967). In the motif, a scene is depicted that contains a silhouette, which itself contains another depicted scene. The silhouette is bistable, appearing either as a figural region whose positive space is covered, or filled, with the interior scene texture, or as a ground region providing a window onto a more distant scene. We call this the 'reversible figure-ground motif'. Because the stimulus does not change when our percept changes, the motif's appearance at any particular moment cannot be explained by its local or global image statistics. Instead principles of perceptual organization, and in particular image segmentation and figure-ground assignment, appear crucial for determining whether the interior of the silhouette is processed as a material vs. a scene-which in turn reflects the fundamental role of visual segmentation in material and scene perception more generally.
ABSTRACT A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in ... more ABSTRACT A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in artists' painting styles after the onset of degenerating neurological illnesses like Alzheimer's disease or Fronto-temporal dementia. However, these studies have typically been descriptive and qualitative in their analyses. Our study was motivated to show that quantitative methods can be applied to the neuropsychology of art production and to determine whether there are systematic changes in the art produced by two individuals with Alzheimer's disease (AD). Using the Assessment of Art Attributes which probes 6 formal characteristics (depth, color temperature, color saturation, balance, stroke, and simplicity) and 6 conceptual characteristics (depictive accuracy, abstractness, emotion, symbolism, realism, and animacy), we found that both AD patients produced paintings with more abstraction and use of symbolism and with less depictive accuracy and realism. Their paintings did not change in the use of depth, or balance or in the quality of their stroke. When these observations are combined with those made recently in 3 artists with focal brain damage, we find that conceptual more than formal perceptual attributes are susceptible to change after neurological illness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 2013
A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in artists’ ... more A substantial body of literature supports the idea that systematic changes can occur in artists’ painting styles after the onset of degenerating neurological illnesses like Alzheimer’s disease or Fronto-temporal dementia. However, these studies have typically been descriptive and qualitative in their analyses. Our study was motivated to show that quantitative methods can be applied to the neuropsychology of art production and to determine whether there are systematic changes in the art produced by two individuals with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Using the Assessment of Art Attributes which probes 6 formal characteristics (depth, color temperature, color saturation, balance, stroke, and simplicity) and 6 conceptual characteristics (depictive accuracy, abstractness, emotion, symbolism, realism, and animacy), we found that both AD patients produced paintings with more abstraction and use of symbolism and with less depictive accuracy and realism. Their paintings did not change in the use of depth, or balance or in the quality of their stroke. When these observations are combined with those made recently in 3 artists with focal brain damage, we find that conceptual more than formal perceptual attributes are susceptible to change after neurological illness.
Of the many effects that eye contact has, perhaps the most powerful is the stare-in-the-crowd eff... more Of the many effects that eye contact has, perhaps the most powerful is the stare-in-the-crowd effect, wherein faces are detected more readily when they look directly toward you. This is commonly attributed to others’ eyes being especially salient visual stimuli, but here we ask whether stares-in-the-crowd might arise instead from a deeper property that the eyes (but not only the eyes) signify: the direction of others’ attention and intentions. In fact, even simple geometric shapes can be seen as intentional, as when numerous randomly scattered cones are all consistently pointing at you. Accordingly, we show here that cones directed at the observer are detected faster (in fields of averted cones) than are cones averted away from the observer (in fields of directed cones). These results suggest that perceived intentionality itself captures attention—and that even in the absence of eyes, others’ directed attention stands out in a crowd.
Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. A... more Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. And this is especially true when those eyes are looking at you: direct gaze has profound influences, even at the level of basic cognitive processes such as working memory. For example, memory for the properties of simple geometric shapes is disrupted by the presence of other eyes gazing at you. But are such effects really specific to direct gaze per se? Seeing eyes is undoubtedly important, but presumably only because of what it tells us about the " mind behind the eyes " – i.e., about others' attention and intentions. This suggests that the same effects might arise even without eyes, as long as an agent's directed attention is conveyed by other means. Here we tested the impact on working memory of simple " mouth " shapes – which in no way resemble eyes, yet can still be readily seen as intentionally facing you (or not). Just as with gaze cues, the ability to detect changes in geometric shapes was impaired by direct (compared to averted) mouths – but not in very similar control stimuli that were not perceived as intentional. We conclude that this disruption of working memory reflects a general phenomenon of " mind contact, " rather than a specific effect of eye contact.
Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eye... more Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. And this is especially true when those eyes are looking at you: direct gaze has profound influences, even at the level of basic cognitive processes such as working memory. For example, memory for the properties of simple geometric shapes is disrupted by the presence of other eyes gazing at you. But are such effects really specific to direct gaze per se? Seeing eyes is undoubtedly important, but presumably only because of what it tells us about the "mind behind the eyes" - i.e., about others' attention and intentions. This suggests that the same effects might arise even without eyes, as long as an agent's directed attention is conveyed by other means. Here we tested the impact on working memory of simple "mouth" shapes - which in no way resemble eyes, yet can still be readily seen as intentionally facing you (or not). Just as with gaze cues, the ability to d...
2011 Seventh International Conference on Natural Computation, 2011
Area MT+ is a patch of middle temporal cortex that plays a critical role in our ability to percei... more Area MT+ is a patch of middle temporal cortex that plays a critical role in our ability to perceive motion in the visual modality. Recent neuroimaging studies of congenitally blind adults suggest that this brain area can "learn" to represent auditory motion, but only when individuals are deprived of visual input from birth. Here I present a parallel distributed processing
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