There are many reasons why democracy is difficult in societies deeply divided along ethnic lines.... more There are many reasons why democracy is difficult in societies deeply divided along ethnic lines. But of those reasons, one of the most troubling is outbidding—ethnic divisions tend to produce ethnic parties each of which seeks to portray itself as the true defender of the group while at the same time portraying its rivals as weak or as selling out. Claim and counter-claim result in an 'ethnic auction' that leads even moderate parties to adopt an increasingly hard-line stance, which in turn makes compromise across ethnic lines all the harder to secure. What generally goes unnoticed, however, is that outbidding can occur only if voters generally like their politics as hard-line or uncompromising as possible (e.g., because they think that other groups will be more fearful of them) or if they are so fearful of what other groups might do to them that ethnic parties can easily play upon their insecurities (e.g., because they are in a minority and feel that they might be overrun). Neither assumption must inevitably hold. But if either does hold, the prospects for democracy may be severely diminished.
Deeply divided societies would seem infertile ground for mass deliberation. “Enclave deliberatio... more Deeply divided societies would seem infertile ground for mass deliberation. “Enclave deliberation,” among people on the same side, may well occur. But people on opposing sides may not trust one another. They may not listen with an open mind. They may regard the other side’s arguments as insincere cover for sectional interests. They may have an all too vivid sense of what the other side wants but not see how it could reasonably want it. In Rawlsian terms, the opposing camps may have trouble viewing one another as reasonable people engaging in reasonable disagreements.
But perhaps we underestimate the deliberative capacities of ordinary citizens, even in deeply divided societies. This paper examines a Deliberative Poll (DP) in the Omagh area of Northern Ireland, a society only recently emerged from protracted violence, reflecting and reinforcing the deep divide between Catholics and Protestants. The topic—the future of the local schools—was one on which many of the issues were heavily impinged by the Catholic-Protestant divide. We examine the extent to which a representative sample, including both Catholics and Protestants, was able to deliberate constructively and how the experience changed their policy attitudes and their opinions of one another.
In this article, we examine the assumption that, insofar as actors deliberate well, political int... more In this article, we examine the assumption that, insofar as actors deliberate well, political integration will follow. We do so specifically with respect to the political integration of Muslims in the field of ethnic relations in Britain, using data retrieved from two quality British broadsheets. Our approach has two components. First, we consider the quality of the deliberative interventions actors make, comparing Muslim actors with other actors. Second, we use measures drawn from network analysis to assess the level of political integration as indicated by the ties that those deliberative interventions forge. Our findings show that the link between how Muslim actors deliberate and their political integration in the field is more complex that one might assume. Although Muslims do not deliberate as well as normative deliberative theory says they should, empirically they are politically integrated, having forged diverse relationships that avoid the danger of polarisation.
This paper examines the relationship between compromise and fairness and considers in particular ... more This paper examines the relationship between compromise and fairness and considers in particular why, if a fair outcome to a conflict is available, the conflict should still be subject to resolution through compromise. It sets out the defining features of compromise and explains how fair compromise differs from both principled and pragmatic compromise. The fairness relating to compromise can be of two types – procedural and end-state; it is the coherence of end-state fairness with compromise that proves the more puzzling case. We offer reasons why people should be allowed to resolve conflicting or competing claims through compromise, even if compromise comes at the expense of end-state fairness, but we resist the suggestion that the primary rationale for compromise is to be found in non-ideal circumstances.
The international community has many reasons to promote compromise between the parties to interna... more The international community has many reasons to promote compromise between the parties to internal conflicts. Yet to do so effectively, the international community ought to treat principled rather than strategic compromise as its default position. To make this case, we begin by defining ‘compromise’ and by distinguishing principled from strategic compromise. We then defend the idea of principled compromise against the realist who thinks that that idea is implausible. We conclude by offering a number of practical reasons why principled compromise ought to be preferred. Our argument does not deny that strategic compromise will sometimes be the only option. But, unlike principled compromise, strategic compromise does not provide the parties with any particular reason to look beyond their own particular concerns or to give any ground beyond what is absolutely necessary.
Although the idea of the public interest features prominently in many accounts of deliberative de... more Although the idea of the public interest features prominently in many accounts of deliberative democracy, the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest is rarely spelt out with any degree of precision. In this article, I identify and defend one particular way of framing this relationship. I begin by arguing that people can deliberate about the public interest only if the public interest is in principle identifiable independently of their deliberations. Of course, some pluralists claim that the public interest is an implausible idea, which casts doubt on the idea that there might be something for people to deliberate about. Yet while, following Brian Barry, we can get around this problem by defining the public interest as an interest in which everyone shares qua member of the public, what still needs to be explained is why people should be prepared to privilege this particular capacity. I argue that the account of political equality with which deliberative democracy is bound up offers a compelling explanation of this sort, even if it also gives rise to some difficult questions of feasibility. I conclude by considering the charge that any political scheme that framed the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest in this way would be undesirable.
One of the most basic charges levelled at the consociational model is that, although it may provi... more One of the most basic charges levelled at the consociational model is that, although it may provide for conflict management, it fails to provide for the longer-term goal of conflict resolution. This article seeks to respond to this charge by viewing the consociational model through a deliberative democratic lens. In particular, I argue that deliberative democracy provides normative standards that can inform the design of consociational institutions in ways that encourage political leaders to focus on the interests of everyone in society, rather than merely on the interests of their own ethnic group. In so far as consociational institutions, deliberatively conceived, can have this effect, there is in principle no reason why they might not also provide for conflict resolution.
Comparative scholars have disagreed for some time now as to whether democratic institutions in a ... more Comparative scholars have disagreed for some time now as to whether democratic institutions in a divided society are more likely to remain stable if those institutions are premised on a concern for inclusion or on a concern for moderation. But since the empirical evidence marshalled by such scholars is often open to interpretative dispute, neither side has been able to prove its case conclusively. In order to help move this stability debate forward, this article demonstrates how inclusion and moderation can be recast as co-requirements of an underlying principle of political equality. To this end, it offers a deliberative democratic account of political equality, expressed in terms of requirements of publicity and reciprocity, that enables us to see how inclusion and moderation might be reconciled. Moreover, it shows how this deliberative reconciliation may itself provide for a more effective form of institutional stability than can be achieved under either of the two main contending comparative approaches.
There are many reasons why democracy is difficult in societies deeply divided along ethnic lines.... more There are many reasons why democracy is difficult in societies deeply divided along ethnic lines. But of those reasons, one of the most troubling is outbidding—ethnic divisions tend to produce ethnic parties each of which seeks to portray itself as the true defender of the group while at the same time portraying its rivals as weak or as selling out. Claim and counter-claim result in an 'ethnic auction' that leads even moderate parties to adopt an increasingly hard-line stance, which in turn makes compromise across ethnic lines all the harder to secure. What generally goes unnoticed, however, is that outbidding can occur only if voters generally like their politics as hard-line or uncompromising as possible (e.g., because they think that other groups will be more fearful of them) or if they are so fearful of what other groups might do to them that ethnic parties can easily play upon their insecurities (e.g., because they are in a minority and feel that they might be overrun). Neither assumption must inevitably hold. But if either does hold, the prospects for democracy may be severely diminished.
Deeply divided societies would seem infertile ground for mass deliberation. “Enclave deliberatio... more Deeply divided societies would seem infertile ground for mass deliberation. “Enclave deliberation,” among people on the same side, may well occur. But people on opposing sides may not trust one another. They may not listen with an open mind. They may regard the other side’s arguments as insincere cover for sectional interests. They may have an all too vivid sense of what the other side wants but not see how it could reasonably want it. In Rawlsian terms, the opposing camps may have trouble viewing one another as reasonable people engaging in reasonable disagreements.
But perhaps we underestimate the deliberative capacities of ordinary citizens, even in deeply divided societies. This paper examines a Deliberative Poll (DP) in the Omagh area of Northern Ireland, a society only recently emerged from protracted violence, reflecting and reinforcing the deep divide between Catholics and Protestants. The topic—the future of the local schools—was one on which many of the issues were heavily impinged by the Catholic-Protestant divide. We examine the extent to which a representative sample, including both Catholics and Protestants, was able to deliberate constructively and how the experience changed their policy attitudes and their opinions of one another.
In this article, we examine the assumption that, insofar as actors deliberate well, political int... more In this article, we examine the assumption that, insofar as actors deliberate well, political integration will follow. We do so specifically with respect to the political integration of Muslims in the field of ethnic relations in Britain, using data retrieved from two quality British broadsheets. Our approach has two components. First, we consider the quality of the deliberative interventions actors make, comparing Muslim actors with other actors. Second, we use measures drawn from network analysis to assess the level of political integration as indicated by the ties that those deliberative interventions forge. Our findings show that the link between how Muslim actors deliberate and their political integration in the field is more complex that one might assume. Although Muslims do not deliberate as well as normative deliberative theory says they should, empirically they are politically integrated, having forged diverse relationships that avoid the danger of polarisation.
This paper examines the relationship between compromise and fairness and considers in particular ... more This paper examines the relationship between compromise and fairness and considers in particular why, if a fair outcome to a conflict is available, the conflict should still be subject to resolution through compromise. It sets out the defining features of compromise and explains how fair compromise differs from both principled and pragmatic compromise. The fairness relating to compromise can be of two types – procedural and end-state; it is the coherence of end-state fairness with compromise that proves the more puzzling case. We offer reasons why people should be allowed to resolve conflicting or competing claims through compromise, even if compromise comes at the expense of end-state fairness, but we resist the suggestion that the primary rationale for compromise is to be found in non-ideal circumstances.
The international community has many reasons to promote compromise between the parties to interna... more The international community has many reasons to promote compromise between the parties to internal conflicts. Yet to do so effectively, the international community ought to treat principled rather than strategic compromise as its default position. To make this case, we begin by defining ‘compromise’ and by distinguishing principled from strategic compromise. We then defend the idea of principled compromise against the realist who thinks that that idea is implausible. We conclude by offering a number of practical reasons why principled compromise ought to be preferred. Our argument does not deny that strategic compromise will sometimes be the only option. But, unlike principled compromise, strategic compromise does not provide the parties with any particular reason to look beyond their own particular concerns or to give any ground beyond what is absolutely necessary.
Although the idea of the public interest features prominently in many accounts of deliberative de... more Although the idea of the public interest features prominently in many accounts of deliberative democracy, the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest is rarely spelt out with any degree of precision. In this article, I identify and defend one particular way of framing this relationship. I begin by arguing that people can deliberate about the public interest only if the public interest is in principle identifiable independently of their deliberations. Of course, some pluralists claim that the public interest is an implausible idea, which casts doubt on the idea that there might be something for people to deliberate about. Yet while, following Brian Barry, we can get around this problem by defining the public interest as an interest in which everyone shares qua member of the public, what still needs to be explained is why people should be prepared to privilege this particular capacity. I argue that the account of political equality with which deliberative democracy is bound up offers a compelling explanation of this sort, even if it also gives rise to some difficult questions of feasibility. I conclude by considering the charge that any political scheme that framed the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest in this way would be undesirable.
One of the most basic charges levelled at the consociational model is that, although it may provi... more One of the most basic charges levelled at the consociational model is that, although it may provide for conflict management, it fails to provide for the longer-term goal of conflict resolution. This article seeks to respond to this charge by viewing the consociational model through a deliberative democratic lens. In particular, I argue that deliberative democracy provides normative standards that can inform the design of consociational institutions in ways that encourage political leaders to focus on the interests of everyone in society, rather than merely on the interests of their own ethnic group. In so far as consociational institutions, deliberatively conceived, can have this effect, there is in principle no reason why they might not also provide for conflict resolution.
Comparative scholars have disagreed for some time now as to whether democratic institutions in a ... more Comparative scholars have disagreed for some time now as to whether democratic institutions in a divided society are more likely to remain stable if those institutions are premised on a concern for inclusion or on a concern for moderation. But since the empirical evidence marshalled by such scholars is often open to interpretative dispute, neither side has been able to prove its case conclusively. In order to help move this stability debate forward, this article demonstrates how inclusion and moderation can be recast as co-requirements of an underlying principle of political equality. To this end, it offers a deliberative democratic account of political equality, expressed in terms of requirements of publicity and reciprocity, that enables us to see how inclusion and moderation might be reconciled. Moreover, it shows how this deliberative reconciliation may itself provide for a more effective form of institutional stability than can be achieved under either of the two main contending comparative approaches.
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Papers by Ian O'Flynn
But perhaps we underestimate the deliberative capacities of ordinary citizens, even in deeply divided societies. This paper examines a Deliberative Poll (DP) in the Omagh area of Northern Ireland, a society only recently emerged from protracted violence, reflecting and reinforcing the deep divide between Catholics and Protestants. The topic—the future of the local schools—was one on which many of the issues were heavily impinged by the Catholic-Protestant divide. We examine the extent to which a representative sample, including both Catholics and Protestants, was able to deliberate constructively and how the experience changed their policy attitudes and their opinions of one another.
But perhaps we underestimate the deliberative capacities of ordinary citizens, even in deeply divided societies. This paper examines a Deliberative Poll (DP) in the Omagh area of Northern Ireland, a society only recently emerged from protracted violence, reflecting and reinforcing the deep divide between Catholics and Protestants. The topic—the future of the local schools—was one on which many of the issues were heavily impinged by the Catholic-Protestant divide. We examine the extent to which a representative sample, including both Catholics and Protestants, was able to deliberate constructively and how the experience changed their policy attitudes and their opinions of one another.