Don Garrett is Silver Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Previously Kenan Distinguished Professor for Teaching Excellence at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, he has also taught at Harvard University and the University of Utah. His research interests include seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, and political philosophy. He is the author of Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1997), Hume (Routledge, 2015), and Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He is also the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (Cambridge University Press, 1996 Address: New York, New York, United States
Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against... more Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against the existence of substances other than God (that is, substances of fewer-than-all attributes); and (2) an explanation of why no such substances exist. In his important 2002 article “Spinoza’s Substance Monism,” Michael Della Rocca offers on Spinoza’s behalf an alternate argument and an alternate explanation, both of which he claims better serve Spinoza’s purposes and better capture Spinoza’s intentions than those provided in chapter 2. After proposing three terminological clarifications (concerning “necessary existence” and “a priori”) and two substantive amendments to the argument of the chapter, this postscript rebuts those claims.
Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by... more Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by at least three propositions of Ethics Part 1—namely, 1p16, 1p29, and 1p33—to the doctrine that every state of affairs holds with strict metaphysical necessity. In their densely argued and widely cited article “Necessitarianism Reconsidered” (1999), Edwin Curley and Gregory Walski raise objections to this interpretation and argue that Spinoza instead believes that there could have been (from all eternity) any one of many different possible complete systems of finite modes. This postscript develops and clarifies the interpretation defended in Chapter 4. It does so, first, by responding to the worries of Curley and Walski about the coherence of the view that the chapter attributes to Spinoza, and second, by rebutting their specific objections to the chapter’s interpretation of each of the three propositions of Ethics Part 1 at issue.
Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de se... more Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de sensoconceitos que tambem incluem os conceitos de AZUL, SAGACIDADE, BELO, VIRTUDE e CAUSA. Cada um deles e obtido atraves (i) da ativacao de uma sensibilidade primitiva, (ii) da consequente formacao de uma “ideia abstrata”, (iii) da adocao de um “padrao de juizo” juntamente com “regras para o julgar”; e da atribuicao de relacoes inferenciais. O desenvolvimento do conceito de PROBABILIDADE a partir do “sentimento de crenca” tambem possibilita a obtencao do conceito de VERDADE PROVAVEL, que, assim como os de BELO e VIRTUDE, funciona como um conceito normativo. A compreensao resultante da normatividade epistemica humeana produz implicacoes diretas para seu exame do ceticismo.
It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philo... more It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philosophy were to be rejected, the only alternative would be Spinozism.” As the papers in the present collection illustrate, conclusions of roughly this form were reached in one way or another by Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Perhaps, then, the most general reply that might be off ered on Spinoza’s behalf would be this: “Such astute philosophers must have been right in judging disjunctively that either their own philosophy or Spinozism was correct. Th eir own philosophies are all inconsistent with one another. From these premises, you may draw your own conclusion about the truth of Spinozism.” Th e fi rst premise of this short and swift argument may, of course, be disputed. Whether the argument is sound or not, however, there is both historical and philosophical value in understanding in greater detail how Spinoza would have responded to the interpretations and criticisms of the philosophers who came after him – and of none is this more so than the German Idealists, for whom his philosophy fi gured so centrally in so many ways and through so many modes of transmission well described in these pages. In what follows, therefore, I will endeavor to off er as faithfully as I can on his behalf some of that response, not (I am sorry to say) on every important topic raised in the rich array of contributions here, but on some of the particularly central and recurring ones: God, fi nite modes, the attributes of Th ought and Extension, and the human mind. In doing so, I will seek to distinguish accurate from inaccurate interpretations and substantive from merely apparent disagreements, and I will sometimes call attention to additional resources within Spinoza’s philosophy that may not have been fully appreciated by his successors. Based on this limited treatment of central parts of his philosophy, I will also venture along the way brief and opinionated assessments of the continuing value and signifi cance of that philosophy in the light of subsequent appropriations, objections, and revisions. Th is is nevertheless just
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2009
Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori ... more Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori or a posteriori, necessary or contingent, analytic or synthetic, con-ceptual or empirical, certain or probable, self-evident or inferential, general or particular, intellectual or imaginative. In ...
many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couc... more many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couched in terms of reason: whether probable reasoning or causal inference is founded on reason, scepticism with regard to reason, reason and the passions, whether moral distinctions are based on reason. To understand what Hume has to say about these issues, we must understand what his account of reason and reasoning is. (HR 1)
Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile... more Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile apparent contradictions in Hume's theory. Two examples occur early in Part I of Book I of the Treatise. Hume argues that all ideas are derivable from impressions (what Garrett calls "the Copy Principle"). Garrett defends Hume's rigorous attempt to found this principle empirically, taking Hume at his word when he describes it as "the first principle I establish in the science of human nature." (T 7)1 Notoriously, Hume almost immediately provides a counter-example: suppose a person had experienced all shades of blue except one, and further suppose they were presented with a table of all these shades, with a blank where the missing shade ought to be. Clearly, Hume says, such a person could supply "from his own imagination" the relevant idea, without having first experienced the corresponding impression. This presents an apparent counter-example to the Copy Principle. Another example occurs a little later. Hume claims that "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10) Distinct ideas are separable. Garrett calls this "the Separability Principle", and it is almost as important for Hume as the Copy Principle. For one thing, it shows that Hume's theory of ideas, though heavily influenced by Locke, is importantly different from the earlier theory: Locke thought there were some necessary connections between distinct ideas, connections that could not be reduced to identities or partial identities.2 More importantly, the separability of distinct ideas is the primary ground of Hume's conceivability criterion of demonstration, crucially employed in the arguments concerning the causation, necessary connection and induction. But Hume seems to present an apparent counter-example to the Separability Principle as well. When discussing distinctions of reason, Hume admits that we can distinguish between "the
In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of caus... more In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of cause and effect"), Hume sets out to "explain fully" the relation of cause and effect (Hume 1978; henceforth "THN"). Twelve sections and ninety-five pages later, at the climax of THN I.iii. 14 ("Of the ...
Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no id... more Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no idea can represent what is not the case and (ii) that every idea of imagination represents a truly vast amount of what is or has been the case. This essay examines the roles of confusion and causation in Spinoza’s theory of imaginative representation. In doing so, it uncovers a promising way in which he could use his distinctive conatus doctrine—that “each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (E3p6)—both to constrain the otherwise vast extent of the imaginative representation of what is and to explain how imaginative misrepresentation is possible.
Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary ter... more Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary terms to ‘true religion’; in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, his character Philo goes so far as to express ‘veneration for’ it. This paper addresses three questions. First, did Hume himself really approve of something that he called ‘true religion’? Second, what did he mean by calling it ‘true’? Third, what did he take it to be? By appeal to some of his key doctrines about causation and probability, and to some key features of the characters and content of the Dialogues, I argue, contrary to important recent interpretations by Immerwahr and Falkenstein, that Hume's ‘true religion’ is a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that he regarded as true in an epistemic sense.
Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against... more Chapter 2 (“Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Argument”) offers on Spinoza’s behalf (1) an argument against the existence of substances other than God (that is, substances of fewer-than-all attributes); and (2) an explanation of why no such substances exist. In his important 2002 article “Spinoza’s Substance Monism,” Michael Della Rocca offers on Spinoza’s behalf an alternate argument and an alternate explanation, both of which he claims better serve Spinoza’s purposes and better capture Spinoza’s intentions than those provided in chapter 2. After proposing three terminological clarifications (concerning “necessary existence” and “a priori”) and two substantive amendments to the argument of the chapter, this postscript rebuts those claims.
Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by... more Chapter 4 (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) argues, among other things, that Spinoza is committed by at least three propositions of Ethics Part 1—namely, 1p16, 1p29, and 1p33—to the doctrine that every state of affairs holds with strict metaphysical necessity. In their densely argued and widely cited article “Necessitarianism Reconsidered” (1999), Edwin Curley and Gregory Walski raise objections to this interpretation and argue that Spinoza instead believes that there could have been (from all eternity) any one of many different possible complete systems of finite modes. This postscript develops and clarifies the interpretation defended in Chapter 4. It does so, first, by responding to the worries of Curley and Walski about the coherence of the view that the chapter attributes to Spinoza, and second, by rebutting their specific objections to the chapter’s interpretation of each of the three propositions of Ethics Part 1 at issue.
Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de se... more Na psicologia cognitiva de David Hume, o conceito de PROBABILIDADE faz parte de uma familia de sensoconceitos que tambem incluem os conceitos de AZUL, SAGACIDADE, BELO, VIRTUDE e CAUSA. Cada um deles e obtido atraves (i) da ativacao de uma sensibilidade primitiva, (ii) da consequente formacao de uma “ideia abstrata”, (iii) da adocao de um “padrao de juizo” juntamente com “regras para o julgar”; e da atribuicao de relacoes inferenciais. O desenvolvimento do conceito de PROBABILIDADE a partir do “sentimento de crenca” tambem possibilita a obtencao do conceito de VERDADE PROVAVEL, que, assim como os de BELO e VIRTUDE, funciona como um conceito normativo. A compreensao resultante da normatividade epistemica humeana produz implicacoes diretas para seu exame do ceticismo.
It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philo... more It is remarkable how many important philosophers of the past have come to think: “If my own philosophy were to be rejected, the only alternative would be Spinozism.” As the papers in the present collection illustrate, conclusions of roughly this form were reached in one way or another by Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Perhaps, then, the most general reply that might be off ered on Spinoza’s behalf would be this: “Such astute philosophers must have been right in judging disjunctively that either their own philosophy or Spinozism was correct. Th eir own philosophies are all inconsistent with one another. From these premises, you may draw your own conclusion about the truth of Spinozism.” Th e fi rst premise of this short and swift argument may, of course, be disputed. Whether the argument is sound or not, however, there is both historical and philosophical value in understanding in greater detail how Spinoza would have responded to the interpretations and criticisms of the philosophers who came after him – and of none is this more so than the German Idealists, for whom his philosophy fi gured so centrally in so many ways and through so many modes of transmission well described in these pages. In what follows, therefore, I will endeavor to off er as faithfully as I can on his behalf some of that response, not (I am sorry to say) on every important topic raised in the rich array of contributions here, but on some of the particularly central and recurring ones: God, fi nite modes, the attributes of Th ought and Extension, and the human mind. In doing so, I will seek to distinguish accurate from inaccurate interpretations and substantive from merely apparent disagreements, and I will sometimes call attention to additional resources within Spinoza’s philosophy that may not have been fully appreciated by his successors. Based on this limited treatment of central parts of his philosophy, I will also venture along the way brief and opinionated assessments of the continuing value and signifi cance of that philosophy in the light of subsequent appropriations, objections, and revisions. Th is is nevertheless just
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2009
Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori ... more Many prominent distinctions involving kinds of knowledge or cognition are dichoto-mous: a priori or a posteriori, necessary or contingent, analytic or synthetic, con-ceptual or empirical, certain or probable, self-evident or inferential, general or particular, intellectual or imaginative. In ...
many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couc... more many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses and the positions that he advocates are couched in terms of reason: whether probable reasoning or causal inference is founded on reason, scepticism with regard to reason, reason and the passions, whether moral distinctions are based on reason. To understand what Hume has to say about these issues, we must understand what his account of reason and reasoning is. (HR 1)
Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile... more Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, is to reconcile apparent contradictions in Hume's theory. Two examples occur early in Part I of Book I of the Treatise. Hume argues that all ideas are derivable from impressions (what Garrett calls "the Copy Principle"). Garrett defends Hume's rigorous attempt to found this principle empirically, taking Hume at his word when he describes it as "the first principle I establish in the science of human nature." (T 7)1 Notoriously, Hume almost immediately provides a counter-example: suppose a person had experienced all shades of blue except one, and further suppose they were presented with a table of all these shades, with a blank where the missing shade ought to be. Clearly, Hume says, such a person could supply "from his own imagination" the relevant idea, without having first experienced the corresponding impression. This presents an apparent counter-example to the Copy Principle. Another example occurs a little later. Hume claims that "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10) Distinct ideas are separable. Garrett calls this "the Separability Principle", and it is almost as important for Hume as the Copy Principle. For one thing, it shows that Hume's theory of ideas, though heavily influenced by Locke, is importantly different from the earlier theory: Locke thought there were some necessary connections between distinct ideas, connections that could not be reduced to identities or partial identities.2 More importantly, the separability of distinct ideas is the primary ground of Hume's conceivability criterion of demonstration, crucially employed in the arguments concerning the causation, necessary connection and induction. But Hume seems to present an apparent counter-example to the Separability Principle as well. When discussing distinctions of reason, Hume admits that we can distinguish between "the
In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of caus... more In A Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.2 (entitled "Of probability; and of the idea of cause and effect"), Hume sets out to "explain fully" the relation of cause and effect (Hume 1978; henceforth "THN"). Twelve sections and ninety-five pages later, at the climax of THN I.iii. 14 ("Of the ...
Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no id... more Spinoza seems to commit himself to two implausible doctrines about representation: (i) that no idea can represent what is not the case and (ii) that every idea of imagination represents a truly vast amount of what is or has been the case. This essay examines the roles of confusion and causation in Spinoza’s theory of imaginative representation. In doing so, it uncovers a promising way in which he could use his distinctive conatus doctrine—that “each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” (E3p6)—both to constrain the otherwise vast extent of the imaginative representation of what is and to explain how imaginative misrepresentation is possible.
Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary ter... more Despite his well-known criticisms of popular religion, Hume refers in seemingly complimentary terms to ‘true religion’; in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, his character Philo goes so far as to express ‘veneration for’ it. This paper addresses three questions. First, did Hume himself really approve of something that he called ‘true religion’? Second, what did he mean by calling it ‘true’? Third, what did he take it to be? By appeal to some of his key doctrines about causation and probability, and to some key features of the characters and content of the Dialogues, I argue, contrary to important recent interpretations by Immerwahr and Falkenstein, that Hume's ‘true religion’ is a doctrine, enunciated by Philo, that he regarded as true in an epistemic sense.
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