The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal conce... more The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal concepts, a class of concepts that require judges to interpret values in their application of the law. The paper focuses on the legal concept of human dignity, a central concept in international human rights law and in the constitutional practice of many states. Nearly every article or book written on the concept of human dignity begins by noting its resonance and the power of its promise. The affective dimension of the concept is, however, soon set aside by most scholars and legal practitioners in order to work out the term’s content. Against this trend, the paper explores the affective dimensions of the legal concept of human dignity. Situated in the field of comparative human rights, the paper examines the various roles emotions play in judicial interpretations of the concept of human dignity in human rights and constitutional law. The paper begins by offering a working definition of emotion before setting out the challenge to legal theory and practice posed by evaluative legal concepts. It then sketches out the landscape of dignity jurisprudence and various key sites for the study of emotion. The paper then develops a typology of roles that emotions play in judicial interpretations of the legal concept of human dignity. The three roles that emotions play, orientation, tracker, and service, draw upon the unique features of emotions to enliven and direct judicial understandings of the concept. Emotions fulfill orientation roles when they imbue a concept with their own meaning, tracker roles when they react to the subject matter of the concept, and service roles when they guide the use of the concept. Each role contributes an additional layer of meaning to the concept by lending structure, and often a sense of importance and clarity, to judicial interpretations of human dignity.
Our panelists will speak to some complex cases where the Supreme Court ruled on questions of juri... more Our panelists will speak to some complex cases where the Supreme Court ruled on questions of jurisdiction, including the adjudicative jurisdiction of a Superior Court over property outside of the province in cases concerning Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and the scope of the Federal Criminal Law Power, by looking at an impugned law’s pith and substance, and the relationship between public health and criminal law purposes. Cases: Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v. Uashaunnuat (Innu of Uashat and of Mani‑Utenam), 2020 SCC 4; Reference re Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, 2020 SCC 17. 0:00 Session 2 Introduction 1:51 Indigenous Peoples’ rights and the Canadian Constitutional Structure: the Challenge of Transboundary Claims , Sophie Thériault 24:02 Touch of Evil: Disagreements at the Heart of the Criminal Law Power , Eric Adams 44:08 Panel Q&
There is much critical potential in bringing together the philosophy of emotion and the study of ... more There is much critical potential in bringing together the philosophy of emotion and the study of international law. Narratives about legitimate political and legal authority have tended to either assume that it is possible to extricate emotions from political judgement, or to rest upon uncomplicated (and wholly demystified) assumptions about the legibility of emotions over time and place. Philosophers interested in emotion have regularly grappled with questions concerning an emotion’s reach and range (insofar that the emotion in question bears an intersubjective component), and recognition (comprehensibility) of emotions beyond one’s own social and political communities (or even beyond one’s self). Emotions contain evaluative judgments, and, as such, they strike as subjectively involved and image-laden “engagements with the world” (to quote Robert Solomon’s memorable phrase). Where evaluative judgements are embedded within the structure of an emotion, we can expect it to be scripted...
Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples tha... more Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples that are meant to resonate with a particular emotional import and operate in judicial reasoning as though they do. Judicial applications of constitutional rights are regularly interpreted by reference to past violations (either through precedent, contextual framings, and/or legislative history), which in turn elicit a series of emotions which work to deepen and intensify judicial understandings of a right guarantee (freedom of association, freedom of expression, equality, security of the person, etc.). This paper examines the way in which invocations of past political histories, and rights abuses (however ill or well-defined), work to conjure up a set of service emotions (emotions which work to establish a particular frame of mind), which guide judicial applications of doctrine in cases concerning an alleged violation of a constitutional right. El razonamiento jurídico en la tradición de de...
The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal conce... more The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal concepts, a class of concepts that require judges to interpret values in their application of the law. The paper focuses on the legal concept of human dignity, a central concept in international human rights law and in the constitutional practice of many states. Nearly every article or book written on the concept of human dignity begins by noting its resonance and the power of its promise. The affective dimension of the concept is, however, soon set aside by most scholars and legal practitioners in order to work out the term’s content. Against this trend, the paper explores the affective dimensions of the legal concept of human dignity.Situated in the field of comparative human rights, the paper examines the various roles emotions play in judicial interpretations of the concept of human dignity in human rights and constitutional law. The paper begins by offering a working definition of emotion before setting out the challenge to legal theory and practice posed by evaluative legal concepts. It then sketches out the landscape of dignity jurisprudence and various key sites for the study of emotion. The paper then develops a typology of roles that emotions play in judicial interpretations of the legal concept of human dignity. The three roles that emotions play, orientation, tracker, and service, draw upon the unique features of emotions to enliven and direct judicial understandings of the concept. Emotions fulfill orientation roles when they imbue a concept with their own meaning, tracker roles when they react to the subject matter of the concept, and service roles when they guide the use of the concept. Each role contributes an additional layer of meaning to the concept by lending structure, and often a sense of importance and clarity, to judicial interpretations of human dignity.
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470974 T A Kojevean Lens A Re-exa... more Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470974 T A Kojevean Lens A Re-examination the ECJ's Ruling in the Kadi Case Abstract: In his Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, Alexandre Kojeve outlines the achievement of a just international order. ...
The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal conce... more The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal concepts, a class of concepts that require judges to interpret values in their application of the law. The paper focuses on the legal concept of human dignity, a central concept in international human rights law and in the constitutional practice of many states. Nearly every article or book written on the concept of human dignity begins by noting its resonance and the power of its promise. The affective dimension of the concept is, however, soon set aside by most scholars and legal practitioners in order to work out the term’s content. Against this trend, the paper explores the affective dimensions of the legal concept of human dignity. Situated in the field of comparative human rights, the paper examines the various roles emotions play in judicial interpretations of the concept of human dignity in human rights and constitutional law. The paper begins by offering a working definition of emotion before setting out the challenge to legal theory and practice posed by evaluative legal concepts. It then sketches out the landscape of dignity jurisprudence and various key sites for the study of emotion. The paper then develops a typology of roles that emotions play in judicial interpretations of the legal concept of human dignity. The three roles that emotions play, orientation, tracker, and service, draw upon the unique features of emotions to enliven and direct judicial understandings of the concept. Emotions fulfill orientation roles when they imbue a concept with their own meaning, tracker roles when they react to the subject matter of the concept, and service roles when they guide the use of the concept. Each role contributes an additional layer of meaning to the concept by lending structure, and often a sense of importance and clarity, to judicial interpretations of human dignity.
Our panelists will speak to some complex cases where the Supreme Court ruled on questions of juri... more Our panelists will speak to some complex cases where the Supreme Court ruled on questions of jurisdiction, including the adjudicative jurisdiction of a Superior Court over property outside of the province in cases concerning Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and the scope of the Federal Criminal Law Power, by looking at an impugned law’s pith and substance, and the relationship between public health and criminal law purposes. Cases: Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v. Uashaunnuat (Innu of Uashat and of Mani‑Utenam), 2020 SCC 4; Reference re Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, 2020 SCC 17. 0:00 Session 2 Introduction 1:51 Indigenous Peoples’ rights and the Canadian Constitutional Structure: the Challenge of Transboundary Claims , Sophie Thériault 24:02 Touch of Evil: Disagreements at the Heart of the Criminal Law Power , Eric Adams 44:08 Panel Q&
There is much critical potential in bringing together the philosophy of emotion and the study of ... more There is much critical potential in bringing together the philosophy of emotion and the study of international law. Narratives about legitimate political and legal authority have tended to either assume that it is possible to extricate emotions from political judgement, or to rest upon uncomplicated (and wholly demystified) assumptions about the legibility of emotions over time and place. Philosophers interested in emotion have regularly grappled with questions concerning an emotion’s reach and range (insofar that the emotion in question bears an intersubjective component), and recognition (comprehensibility) of emotions beyond one’s own social and political communities (or even beyond one’s self). Emotions contain evaluative judgments, and, as such, they strike as subjectively involved and image-laden “engagements with the world” (to quote Robert Solomon’s memorable phrase). Where evaluative judgements are embedded within the structure of an emotion, we can expect it to be scripted...
Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples tha... more Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples that are meant to resonate with a particular emotional import and operate in judicial reasoning as though they do. Judicial applications of constitutional rights are regularly interpreted by reference to past violations (either through precedent, contextual framings, and/or legislative history), which in turn elicit a series of emotions which work to deepen and intensify judicial understandings of a right guarantee (freedom of association, freedom of expression, equality, security of the person, etc.). This paper examines the way in which invocations of past political histories, and rights abuses (however ill or well-defined), work to conjure up a set of service emotions (emotions which work to establish a particular frame of mind), which guide judicial applications of doctrine in cases concerning an alleged violation of a constitutional right. El razonamiento jurídico en la tradición de de...
The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal conce... more The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal concepts, a class of concepts that require judges to interpret values in their application of the law. The paper focuses on the legal concept of human dignity, a central concept in international human rights law and in the constitutional practice of many states. Nearly every article or book written on the concept of human dignity begins by noting its resonance and the power of its promise. The affective dimension of the concept is, however, soon set aside by most scholars and legal practitioners in order to work out the term’s content. Against this trend, the paper explores the affective dimensions of the legal concept of human dignity.Situated in the field of comparative human rights, the paper examines the various roles emotions play in judicial interpretations of the concept of human dignity in human rights and constitutional law. The paper begins by offering a working definition of emotion before setting out the challenge to legal theory and practice posed by evaluative legal concepts. It then sketches out the landscape of dignity jurisprudence and various key sites for the study of emotion. The paper then develops a typology of roles that emotions play in judicial interpretations of the legal concept of human dignity. The three roles that emotions play, orientation, tracker, and service, draw upon the unique features of emotions to enliven and direct judicial understandings of the concept. Emotions fulfill orientation roles when they imbue a concept with their own meaning, tracker roles when they react to the subject matter of the concept, and service roles when they guide the use of the concept. Each role contributes an additional layer of meaning to the concept by lending structure, and often a sense of importance and clarity, to judicial interpretations of human dignity.
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470974 T A Kojevean Lens A Re-exa... more Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470974 T A Kojevean Lens A Re-examination the ECJ's Ruling in the Kadi Case Abstract: In his Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, Alexandre Kojeve outlines the achievement of a just international order. ...
Uploads