Paul D Robinson

Ohio State University, Philosophy, Graduate Student

London School of Economics and Political Science, Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Alumnus

University College London, Cognitive, Perceptual and Brain Sciences, Alumnus

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I hold MSc degrees in Philosophy of Science (LSE) and Cognitive and Decision Sciences (UCL). Currently, under the supervision of Prof. Richard Samuels, I'm pursuing a PhD in Philosophy with a Graduate Interdisciplinary Specialization in Cognitive and Brain Sciences.

My interests span cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social psychology. My research concerns the nature and function of memories, attitudes, beliefs, and inferential / reasoning processes. The overarching theme is how people "change their minds" and to what extent it is possible to "debias" human thought. I am working to apply this research to issues in (politico-religious) conflict resolution.

I am a member of the International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion. My study of the politics and the religions of what is widely termed the "Ancient Near East" has led me to participate in archaeological excavations at sites that were inhabited by Canaanites, Philistines, and Judeans (southern Israelites).

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Papers by Paul D Robinson

Is Jeremiah Also Among the Philosophers? Induction and Falsification in the Hebrew Prophets.

Talk given at the Herzl Institute, Jerusalem, 2014.

Implication and Inference: On the Relevance of Logic to Reasoning.

MSc Thesis. University College London. Department of Cognitive and Brain Sciences. Supervisor: Ni... more

Emergence and Entanglement: Formal Ontology and Physical Science.

MSc Thesis. London School of Economics. Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method. S... more

Drafts by Paul D Robinson

REASONING, RULES, AND REPRESENTATION

by Richard Samuels and Paul D Robinson

In recent years, philosophical theories of reasoning in general, and logical inference in particu... more In recent years, philosophical theories of reasoning in general, and logical inference in particular, have been heavily influenced by a regress argument, which purports to undermine a general conception of reasoning that has widespread acceptance amongst psychologists, and cognitive scientists –what we call the intentional, rule-following account. In this chapter, we highlight the virtues of the intentional rule-following account, provide a detailed reconstruction of the regress argument, and show that it is unsound. Specifically, we argue that a range of received accounts of psychological processes in cognitive science have the resources to address the regress.

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