Alison Hills

It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant's moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism. 2 But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant ...

Creativity is typically defined as a disposition to produce valuable ideas. We argue that this is a mistake and defend a new definition of creativity in terms of the imagination. It follows that creativity has instrumental value at most and then only in the right circumstances. We consider the role of tradition and judgment in worthwhile creativity and argue that there is frequently a tension between greater creativity and the production of value.

The status of moral testimony has recently been challenged, for both epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. This paper distinguishes two methods of teaching: transmission, “classic” learning from testimony, that results in second hand knowledge, and propagation which results in first hand knowledge and understanding. Moral propagation avoids most of the epistemic and non-epistemic problems of transmission. Moreover, moral propagation can develop and refine non-cognitive attitudes too. Therefore moral testimony should (and normally does) take the form of moral propagation, not transmission.

Though much of what we learn about the world comes from trusting testimony, the status of aesthetic testimony-testimony about aesthetic value-is equivocal. We do listen to art critics but our trust in them is typically only provisional, until we are in a position to make up our own mind. I argue that provisional trust (but not full trust) in testimony typically allows us to develop and use aesthetic understanding (understanding why a work of art is valuable, or similar); and aesthetic understanding is an essential component of aesthetic virtue. Aesthetic virtue is the orientation of a whole person towards aesthetic value and aesthetic reasons, through action, non-cognitive and cognitive attitudes. The ideal (aesthetically virtuous) way to make aesthetic judgements is through your own aesthetic understanding. Introduction.

A virtuous person has a distinctive grasp of what is important in the light of which she chooses what to do.  In what does this grasp consist? According to the intellectual tradition, moral virtue requires you always to be able to have an explicit, conscious, grasp of the reasons why your action is right. Recently, this view has been defended by Julia Annas. I do not think that her argument establishes her conclusion and I provide further defence of intellectualism, finishing with some conclusions about the importance of moral philosophy.

What is it to make a moral judgement? There are two standard views, cognitivist and non-cognitivist, plus hybrid options according to which moral judgements have cognitivist and non-cognitivist components.In this context, cognitivism is typically defined as the theory that moral judgments are beliefs. This paper is not a defence of cognitivism (or of non-cognitivism). Rather, the aim is to get clearer about what it means for a moral judgment to be a belief. I begin by setting out a tension between three claims: cognitivism; an account of belief, and an account of moral judgement. I think all three claims are plausible, but I will not be defending them here. Rather, my interest is in whether they can be reconciled. In order to do so, I distinguish between broad and narrow belief.  I give an example of a mental state that is a broad belief but not a narrow belief, a moral “ulief”. Finally, I set out new definitions of cognitivism and non-cognitivism and draw out some further implications of the argument.

According to pessimists about moral testimony, there are strong reasons not to form moral beliefs on the say-so of others. I defend pessimism by setting out a conception of what I call moral understanding. I argue that moral understanding is different from moral knowledge and that it is an essential part of good character and of morally worthy action. I argue that if we are aiming to acquire and to use our moral understanding, as we should, it is best neither to trust moral testimony nor to defer to moral experts but that taking moral advice can be worthwhile.

One of the familiar criticisms of utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. It requires us to promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects, our integrity, or the welfare of our friends and family. Recently Ashford has made a defence of utilitarianism in a number of important papers, arguing that utilitarianism provides compelling reasons for demanding duties to help the needy, and that other moral theories, notably contractualism, are committed to comparably stringent duties. In response, I argue that utilitarianism is even more demanding than is commonly realized: both act and rule utilitarianism are committed to extremely stringent duties to wild animals. In this regard, utilitarianism is more demanding (and more counterintuitive) than its major rival, contractualism.

In this paper I will show that we can distinguish the intended from the merely foreseen.  This problem is usually considered to be the most serious difficulty for the doctrine of double effect and has even led some who defend it to recast it in entirely different terms.  But to reject either version of DDE on these grounds is too hasty. I shall argue that the distinction between what is intended and what is merely foreseen as drawn by Michael Bratman (1999) is adequate to support DDE.

According to the doctrine of double effect (DDE), there is a morally significant difference between harm that is intended and harm that is merely foreseen and not intended. It is not difficult to explain why it is bad to intend harm as an end (you have a “bad attitude” toward that harm) but it is hard to explain why it is bad to intend harm as a means to some good end. If you intend harm as a means to some good end, you need not have a “bad attitude” toward it. I distinguish two ways in which you can treat something that is your chosen means to your ends. You can pursue your ends directly, and treat X as a mere means that you pursue for the sake of your end. Or you can pursue your ends indirectly, and treat X as a “plan-relative end” that you pursue for its own sake. I argue that much of the time we pursue our ends indirectly, and treat our means as plan-relative ends. There are significant analogies between intending harm as an end, and intending harm as a plan-relative end. So, under certain circumstances, it is morally worse to intend harm as a means or an end than to foresee the same amount of harm.