Edited by Anand Menon, Oxford University, Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, Hu... more Edited by Anand Menon, Oxford University, Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, Hussein Kassim, Birkbeck College, London and David Hine, Christ Church, OxfordThis new series presents books based on an ESRC-funded interdisciplinary seminar series on ...
... anything to the account of the development of post-war macroeconomics by Milton Friedman (197... more ... anything to the account of the development of post-war macroeconomics by Milton Friedman (1977)that author's Nobel Lecture. ... I am grateful to Thomas Baranga, William Coleman, Marc Janes, Gabrielle Krapels, and Dhruv Malhotra for assistance undertaking this research; to ...
It is argued that the European Central Bank's independence is not as secure as it seems ... more It is argued that the European Central Bank's independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position. It follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability. One consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as, often effective, attempts to protect its position. Another is that making a central bank (or any other institution) “completely independent'' may be much harder than it seems, and failed attempts, which come close, are not necessarily to be preferred, even by the advocates of independence, to less ambitious designs.
... Against this background, a small conference was held in Oxford on 21 September 1996, largely ... more ... Against this background, a small conference was held in Oxford on 21 September 1996, largely at the initiative of Dr. Jeremy Leaman of ... Dictionary of Economics by Lindsay and Wallich (1987, p.514), says, "The rational expectations school has added a new wrinkle to the case ...
The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be... more The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be methodologically flawed for the reason that the measure of independence does not permit a test of the hypothesis which suggests that these benefits exist. Particular doubt is cast on the merits of proposals to legislate to create independence. The argument is elucidated by comparison with the testing of a hypothesis about the benefits of centralized and decentralized unions. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumab... more The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumably attributable to the view that central banks, unimpeded by external forces, pursue the public interest. That presumption has not always been common in the economics literature, even in the discussion of central banking. The theory of bureaucracy suggests that such institutions pursue their own interests. It is here applied to the European central bank as it was in the past to other central banks. First, consideration is given to what is today implied by the view that central banks are primarily interested in maintaining their independence, maximising their discretion, and avoiding blame for poor outcomes. Second, the ECB's explanations of how it sees its role and status and its presentation of its strategy are considered. Certain limitations in the form of obscure explanation, confused analysis and selective referencing are identified. These appear to suggest that the ECB is concerned with the pursuit of its own agenda. Particular attention is drawn to the danger of paying too much attention to what it says about its own 'accountability'.
... That point was taken up by Gustavo Piga (2000), who, attributing the same view to Jean-Paul F... more ... That point was taken up by Gustavo Piga (2000), who, attributing the same view to Jean-Paul Fitoussi (1995), sug-gested that the aging of ... Others again, like Issing, Vitor Gaspar, Ignazio Angeloni, and Oreste Tristani (2001) seem to try to have it both ways.21 The relationship ...
... I Almost whenever it is said that early post-War macroeconomics made use of an 'L-shaped... more ... I Almost whenever it is said that early post-War macroeconomics made use of an 'L-shaped aggregate supply curve', the objective seems to be ... Turner (1960) offers one example of the view that the data was inadequate for the kind of studies being undertaken – he questioned ...
... But in the Nobel Lecture, as in one slightly earlier presentation Friedman (1975) he spec... more ... But in the Nobel Lecture, as in one slightly earlier presentation Friedman (1975) he specifically offered a critique of what he ... 1 I am grateful to Thomas Baranga, William Coleman, Marc Janes, Gabrielle Krapels, and Dhruv Malhotra for assistance undertaking this research; to ...
Edited by Anand Menon, Oxford University, Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, Hu... more Edited by Anand Menon, Oxford University, Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, Hussein Kassim, Birkbeck College, London and David Hine, Christ Church, OxfordThis new series presents books based on an ESRC-funded interdisciplinary seminar series on ...
... anything to the account of the development of post-war macroeconomics by Milton Friedman (197... more ... anything to the account of the development of post-war macroeconomics by Milton Friedman (1977)that author's Nobel Lecture. ... I am grateful to Thomas Baranga, William Coleman, Marc Janes, Gabrielle Krapels, and Dhruv Malhotra for assistance undertaking this research; to ...
It is argued that the European Central Bank's independence is not as secure as it seems ... more It is argued that the European Central Bank's independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position. It follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability. One consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as, often effective, attempts to protect its position. Another is that making a central bank (or any other institution) “completely independent'' may be much harder than it seems, and failed attempts, which come close, are not necessarily to be preferred, even by the advocates of independence, to less ambitious designs.
... Against this background, a small conference was held in Oxford on 21 September 1996, largely ... more ... Against this background, a small conference was held in Oxford on 21 September 1996, largely at the initiative of Dr. Jeremy Leaman of ... Dictionary of Economics by Lindsay and Wallich (1987, p.514), says, "The rational expectations school has added a new wrinkle to the case ...
The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be... more The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be methodologically flawed for the reason that the measure of independence does not permit a test of the hypothesis which suggests that these benefits exist. Particular doubt is cast on the merits of proposals to legislate to create independence. The argument is elucidated by comparison with the testing of a hypothesis about the benefits of centralized and decentralized unions. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumab... more The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumably attributable to the view that central banks, unimpeded by external forces, pursue the public interest. That presumption has not always been common in the economics literature, even in the discussion of central banking. The theory of bureaucracy suggests that such institutions pursue their own interests. It is here applied to the European central bank as it was in the past to other central banks. First, consideration is given to what is today implied by the view that central banks are primarily interested in maintaining their independence, maximising their discretion, and avoiding blame for poor outcomes. Second, the ECB's explanations of how it sees its role and status and its presentation of its strategy are considered. Certain limitations in the form of obscure explanation, confused analysis and selective referencing are identified. These appear to suggest that the ECB is concerned with the pursuit of its own agenda. Particular attention is drawn to the danger of paying too much attention to what it says about its own 'accountability'.
... That point was taken up by Gustavo Piga (2000), who, attributing the same view to Jean-Paul F... more ... That point was taken up by Gustavo Piga (2000), who, attributing the same view to Jean-Paul Fitoussi (1995), sug-gested that the aging of ... Others again, like Issing, Vitor Gaspar, Ignazio Angeloni, and Oreste Tristani (2001) seem to try to have it both ways.21 The relationship ...
... I Almost whenever it is said that early post-War macroeconomics made use of an 'L-shaped... more ... I Almost whenever it is said that early post-War macroeconomics made use of an 'L-shaped aggregate supply curve', the objective seems to be ... Turner (1960) offers one example of the view that the data was inadequate for the kind of studies being undertaken – he questioned ...
... But in the Nobel Lecture, as in one slightly earlier presentation Friedman (1975) he spec... more ... But in the Nobel Lecture, as in one slightly earlier presentation Friedman (1975) he specifically offered a critique of what he ... 1 I am grateful to Thomas Baranga, William Coleman, Marc Janes, Gabrielle Krapels, and Dhruv Malhotra for assistance undertaking this research; to ...
Using a range of sources, it is argued that, contrary to common belief, Milton Friedman had no sp... more Using a range of sources, it is argued that, contrary to common belief, Milton Friedman had no special influence on British policy in the 1970s and 1980s. The opposing impression appears to be derived in part from the work of Friedman’s admirers, but principally from the allegations of Margaret Thatcher’s opponents who believed they could taint her with his name.
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